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Thesis Abstract 
Great Britain and the United States faced common technological challenges to their 
navalpower, while often teetering on the brink ofhostililies with each other, throughout 
the Civil War era. This combination of rapid industrial-based changes in naval warfare 
and heightened diplomatic tension yielded contrasting solutions which reflected each 
nation's unique perspective-and predicament-on foreign affairs. WhiletheFederal 
Union wasfrom flrst to last concerned with subduing the rebellion of southern states it 
also took clear steps in 1861 and 1862 to both prepare for and deter any foreign 
interference in the conflict, starting with its navy. 
Britain's navy, meanwhile, faced a wide range ofpeace-time problems bothforeign and 
domestic. 'Economising the Empire'while also consolidating its security worldwide, 
maintaining batilefleet parity, if not superiority, over France, and determining the most 
effective armoured warships for these seemingly contradictory roles meant that the 
Admiralty was frequently drawn to the American struggle for providing examples in 
modem naval warfare, in addition to the strategic implications ofan ironclad US. Navy. 
These in turn provoked intense discussion in these years of both tactics and strategy (as 
they did in the United States) ofgreat importance. The 'tactical' debate over ironclad 
programs-over the limits and roles ofthe latest naval lechnology-led directly to larger 
issues ofnational policy. 
Moreover, the controversies which evolved on both sides of the Atlantic were not 
isolated, they originatedwith andcontinuedio affect one anotherAmerican andBrifish, 
in a precise relationship during a mutually-decisive phase of a common history. This 
thesis, therefore, is not a mere technical exposition of 'ships' but a study of the men 
behind their design, construction, anddeployment, andthe larger technological, political 




Ding, Clash, Dong, BANG, Boom, 
Rattle, Clash, BANG, Clink, BANG, 
Dong, BANG, Clatter, BANG 
BANG BANG! What on earth is this! 
This is, or soon will be, the Achilles, 
iron armour-plated ship. Twelve 
hundred men are working at her now; 
twelve hundred men working on 
stages over her sides, over her bows, 
over her stern, under her keel, 
between her decks, down in her hold, 
within her and without, crawling and 
creeping into the finest curves of her 
lines wherever it is possible for men 
to twist. Twelve hundred hammerers, 
measurers, caulkers, armourers, 
forgers, smiths, shipwrights; twelve 
hundred dingers, clashers, dongers, 
rattlers, clinkers, bangers bangers 
bangers! Yet all this stupendous 
uproar around the rising Achilles is as 
nothing to the reverberations with 
which the perfected Achilles shall 
resound upon the dreadful day when 
the full work is in hand for which this 
is but note of preparation the day 
when the scuppers that are now 
fitting like great, dry, thirsty conduit- 
pipes, shall run red. All these busy 
figures between decks, dimly seen 
bending at their work in smoke and 
fire, are as nothing to the figures that 
shall do work here of another kind in 
smoke and fire, that day. 
-Charles Dickens 
The Uncommercial Traveller 
Plain be the phrase, yet apt the verse, 
More ponderous than nimble; 
For since grimed War here laid aside 
His Orient pomp, 'twould ill befit 
Overmuch to ply 
The rhyme's barbaric cymbal. 
Hail to victory without the gaud 
Of glory; zeal that needs no fans 
Of banners; plain mechanic power 
Plied cogently in War now placed- 
Where War belongs- 
Among the trades and artisans. 
Yet this was battle, and intense- 
Beyond the strife of fleets heroic; 
Deadlier, closer, cahn 'mid storm; 
No passion; all went on by crank, 
Pivot, and screw, 
And calculations of caloric. 
Needless to dwell; the story's known. 
The ringing of those plates on plates 
Still ringeth round the world- 
The clangor of that blacksmiths' fray. 
The anvil-din 
Resounds this message from the Fates: 
War shall yet be, and to the end; 
But war-paint shows the streaks of weather; 
War yet shall be, but warriors 
Are now but operatives; War's made 
Less grand than Peace, 
And a singe runs through lace and feather. 
-Herman Melville 
A Utilitarian View of the Monitor's Fight 
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Although historian Stanley Sandler writes that "few exercises are more difficult than an 
evaluation of the comparative strength of the warships of different nations, "' this thesis 
will examine the correlative development and significance of British and Union ironclad 
programs during the American Civil War "Era" (roughly 1860-1866), concentrating on 
the pivotal, decision-making years of 1861 and 1862. The principal reason for this focus 
rests on three consecutive points: 
1. Great Britain was engaged in an ironclad naval arms race against Imperial France, 
but her most likely antagonist during this period was unquestionably the United 
States of America. 
2. Such a war between the two greatest maritime nations in the world would be 
primarily a naval oneý fought for "command of the sea", especially the coastal 
waters of the Northern states thernselves. 
3. Strategic "sea powee 13 is the tactical supremacy of warships; in this case, the 
supremacy of individual annour-plated warships to command the seas in question. 
The question then is why have there been no comparative studies of this precise naval 
relationship before? 
lain Hamilton has recently come closest, perhaps, with his superlative Anglo-French 
Naval Rivalry 1840-1870 (1993). This significantly addressed an important, relatively 
1 Stanley Sandler, 7he Einergence of the M rn Capital Ship (Newark. Universi of Delaw e Pr s, 
1979), 61. 
Ode ty at es 
2 See for example Memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne, on the Defence ofCanada-February 1862, signed 
John F. Burgoyne, Inspector-General of Fortifications, WO 33/11, and especially Report on the Defence of 
Canada and ofthe British Naval Stations in the North Atlantic, together with Observations on the Defence 
ofNew BrunswicA; &c., and Report on the Defence ofthe British Naval Stations in the North Atlantic, 25-1- 
1865, by Lieutenant-Colonel Jervois, Deputy-Director of Fortifications, WO 33/15. 
3 "Tactics and their partner technology, have meaning for strategy and high policy and often are driven by 
strategic considerations. With var ying success, states try to invest in military technologies that will provide 
weapons NNith characteristics most suitable for the protection or advancement of distinctive national 
interests, " Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage qfNavies in War (New 
York: The Free Press, 1992), 206-7. 
9 
unexplored subject-neglected in naval histories probably because no shots were actually 
fired in anger during this period; nor did the naval arms race end with (or indeed, help 
initiate) a great war like the subsequent Anglo-German one. Yet Hamilton was able to 
shed light on the character of both the British and French navies at a time when 
Industrial-era technologies threatened to destabilise the European "Balance of Power" at 
sea. 4 Nevertheless, as A. J. P. Taylor noted, "between 1861 and 1865 ... when British 
statesmen thought of war in these years it was with the United States, not with any 
continental Power. "5 As such, Kenneth Bourne's Britain and the Balance of Power in 
North America 1815-1908 (1967) briefly discussed the ongoing Anglo-American naval (if 
not maritime) rivalry, but only as a part of the larger diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. It therefore offered little insight on how the formulation of national policy 
crucially affects national warship design-and vice-versa-even though Bourne's 3-part 
work clearly hinges on the American Civil War years, specifically the Trent Affair 
(November-December 1861), which he regarded as "the most dangerous single incident 
of the Civil War and perhaps in the whole course of Anglo-American relations since 
iý6 1815. 
The following 3-part thesis also concentrates on the Trent Affair, but in direct contrast to 
the Battle of Hampton Roads (8-9 March 1862). Somehow in the period of these three 
months, the Anglo-American naval balance of power was completely upset; though 
Bourne classically derides the Union's force of ironclad-monitors as "unseaworthy'ý-- 
4 C. 1. Hamilton, Anglo-French Naval Rivalry 1840-1870 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
A. I P. Taylor, 7he Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), 
129. See also George L. Bernstein, "Special Relationship and Appeasement: Liberal Policy Towards 
America in the Age of Palmerston", The Historical Journal, 41,3, (1998), 725-750. 
6 Kenneth Bourne, Great Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815-1908 (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1967), 251. See also Norman. B. Ferris, 7he Trent Affair: A Diplomatic 
Crisis (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977) and Gordon R Warren, Fountain of Discontent. 
7he Trent Affair and Freedom of the Seas (Bostorr Northeastern University Press, 198 1). 
10 
taking contemporary assessments at face value only-he admits 'Ihere were still from the 
,, 7 British point of view periods of awkward disparity between the two fleets. 
A still more comprehensive, comparative naval history is James Phinney Baxter's 
Introduction of the Ironclad Warship, published in 1933, which plumbed British, French 
and American archival sources, but which also ends, not starts, with Hampton Roads. 
This was because Baxter's purpose, as stated in the Introduction to his Introduction, was 
to debunk American claims that the famous naval battle sounded "the death knell of the 
wooden walls... " and that the mastless, turreted U. S. S. Monitor was the forerunner of the 
modem battleship. Instead, "Hampton Roads demonstrated and emphasized the foresight 
of the French", who from 1858 had laid down an entire fleet of broadside-and-sail 
ironclads, while British Navy Captain Cowper Phipps Coles at least insisted on multiple 
turrets for his fully-rigged (though ill-fated) experiments. " 
Deliberately picking up where Baxter left off, Sandler's Emergence of the Modem 
Capital Ship (1979) dropped all pretence of a comparative naval history and sought to 
give full credit not to Dupuy de Ume (the brilliant French innovator), Coles, or the 
Monitor's inventor, John Ericsson, but to Edward J. Reed, the Chief Constructor of the 
Royal Navy. Though Reed's solution to the vexing paradox of how to reconcile the 
strategic strengths ideally represented by H. M. S. Warrior with the tactical advantages 
posed by the Monitor was the "central battery" ironclad, there is a clear break from his 
(concentrated) broadside-and-sail H. M. S. Hercules, for example, and his mastless, 
double-turreted H. M. S. Devastation (which Sandler and most naval historians, British and 
American, recognise as the first modem battleship. ) Even British naval authority Oscar 
7 Bourne, Britain, 23940,273-6,305-9. 
8 James. P. Baxter, 7he Introduction of the Ironclad Warship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), 
4; also 302-31. Paul H. Silverstone defines the original Monitor as at least the "first ironclad warship built 
without rigging or sails, " Civil War Navies 1855-1883 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 4. 
11 
Parkes fleetingly observed that "mention must be made of these ships [the monitors of the 
American Civil War] as they had a certain bearing upon subsequent British designs, to the 
extent that the Miantonomoh idea was behind the Cerherus and through her the 
Devastation, while the [Admiralty] Board must have had the Puritan in mind when 
specifying the design of the Glatton. "9 Yet Sandler proved unwilling to more fully 
explore this important connection. "Whether the monitors were a failure" he wrote, "is 
not so important here as the fact that the reports from America, by both British and 
American authorities [especially Rear Admiral Samuel F. Du Pont], almost uniformly 
wrote off the Ericsson monitor as practicaRy useless, particularly for sea service. Such 
reports could only strengthen the resolve of the controller and the chief constructor and 
most of the board against any precipitate oceanic turret-ship program. Coles himself 
termed the federal monitors wretched vessels. "10 
Indeed, it was difficult in the early 1860s to see exactly how a small coastal defence 
ironclad of a relatively "provincial" continental power like the United States could ever 
hope to compare with the large imperial ironclads of England and France-though the 
comparison was certainly made-and post-"Mahanian" naval historians and "Blue 
Water" advocates today seem to find it still more perplexing. Examples abound on both 
sides of the Atlantic. For many revisionist British naval historians, or Royal Navy 
apologists, there is a defensive tendency to ridicule obviously "inferior" "foreign" navies 
which may have had "a certain bearing" on Whitehall decision-making, let alone policy- 
making at Westminster. Andrew Lambert writes of the "block obsolescence of [France's] 
wooden-hulled [though fully-annoured] ironclads" which "left the Royal Navy pre- 
eminent. " Navies of "The Rest of the World" in the same volume are reduced to pithy 
9 Oscar Parkes, British Battleships. Warrior 1860 to Vanguard 19.50, A History ofDesign, Construction and 
Armament (London: Seeley Service & Co., 1970), 44-8. 
10 Sandler, Emergence, 189. 
12 
paragraphs on two and a half pages. " In Warrior to Dreadhought: Warship Development 
1860-1905 (1997), David K. Brown is even more succinct: "From 1860 to 1905 British 
warships, with few exceptions, were the best in the world. " Like Lambert, however, there 
is no supportive evidence cited; no foreign research actually conducted off the British 
Isles. The main agenda instead is to debunk the notion that the "nineteenth-century Navy, 
and to some extent the Admiralty as a whole, [was] reactionary ... the Admiralty was 
usually the leader and in the few cases when it was not the leader there were usually good 
reasons and it was not far behind. si12 
This however only replaces a threatened American chauvinism with a "Rule Britannia" 
one. Meanwhile, "though the subject remains ideologically charged, the passions aroused 
by British imperialism have so lessened that we are now better placed than ever before to 
see the course of the Empire steadily and see it whole. s113 Yet even the latest volume of 
the Oxford History of the British Empire primarily ventures "to explain how varying 
conditions in Britain interacted with those in many other parts of the world to create both 
a constantly changing territorial Empire and ever-shifting patterns of social and economic 
relations. " Missing here is a sense of how the "Pax Britannica" was dependent upon the 
ascendancy-or not-of the Royal Navy. "Fundamentally, the British Empire was 
concerned with power, " 14 notes Peter Burroughs in one essay of this volume; in another 
titled "Defence and Imperial Disunity" he identifies that "warships restrained the 
11 Andrew Lambert, Battleships in Transition: The Creation of the Steam Baldefleet 1815-1860 (London: 
Conway Maritime Press, 1984), 85; also 101,109-111. Hamilton effectively doubts this; Anglo-French, 
97-8. 
12 D. K Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought Warship Development 1860-1905 (London: Chatham Publishing, 
1997), 204. See also John F. Beeler, "A One Power Standard? Great Britain and the Balance of Naval 
Power, 1860-1880"1 The Journal ofStrategic Studies (Vol. 15, December 1992, No. 4), 557-560, and Birth 
of the Battleship., British Capital Ship Design 1870-1881 (London: Caxton Editions, 2003, reprint of 
Chatham Publishing 2001), where Beeler states "the manner in which the Board of Admiralty and its 
technological experts dealt with the financial, technological, strategic and tactical problems confronting 
them may fumish an instructive example for contemporary ["Americanl policy-makers, " 12. 
13 Andrew Porter (ed. ), The Oxford History of the British Empire- Volume Iff 7he Nineteenth Century 
(Oxford: University Press, 1999), vi, emphasis mine. 
14 Peter Burroughs, "Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire". in Porter, Oxford History, 170; 
323; 341. 
13 
expansionist designs of France and Russia, especially in the crucial Mediterranean 
corridor, gunboats occasionally backed British diplomatic or commercial ventures with a 
show of force, as in South America and China; naval squadrons suppressed piracy and 
African slave trading and guaranteed the openness of the seas. " If Great Britain was the 
"world policeman" of the 19th century, it was this predominating naval presence which 
gave it real power, if not authority, and supplied the Empire with its ultimate sense of 
defensive unity. Even current historiographic issues of British "informal" imperialism 
must take into account an equally informal naval hegemony which both reflected changes 
in social and economic relations (constituting essentially a maritime empire), but also 
technological if not political pressures. 
In many histories of the period, however, this reality is either assumed or ignored 
altogether, though "in the nineteenth century it began to appear possible, " Michael 
Howard points out, "for the nation which most effectively applied in its naval building 
programmes the developing techniques of marine engineering, metallurgy, and artillery 
construction to pulverize any opposing fleet without its victim being able to land a single 
shot on its assailant. "15 Burrough's excellent assessment of the central role played by the 
Royal Navy might thus also benefit with a more thorough understanding of how mid- 
Victorian naval policy was possibly also the victim of an "Imperial Defence" strategy, if it 
in fact existed in the early 1860s. Where British ironclads could reach but make no 
impression upon rival, local naval powers the apparatus of world supremacy was loSt. 16 
Nowhere was this dilemma manifested more acutely than during the American Civil War 
crisis in international relations. Winston Churchill, in his illustrious History of the 
15 Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 122-3. 
16 See for example, Andrew LambeM "Me Royal Navy, 1856-1914: Deterrence and The Strategy of World 
Power". in Keith Neilson and Elizabeth Jane Errington (eds. ), Navies and Global Defense: 7heories and 
StrateSy (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1995), and "Australia, the Trent Crisis of 1861, and the Strategy of 
Imperial Defence". in David Stevens and John Reeve (eds. ), Southern Trident. Stratqy, History and the 
Rise ofAustrahan Naval Power (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2001). 
14 
English-Speaking Peoples, regarded the nineteenth century as characterised not only by 
Victorian Britain but the other "Great Democracy": America. Nor did he entertain any 
serious conflict of interests between the two rising powers-someday to be the closest of 
wartime allies. Indeed, the formulation of the anti-monarchical, anti-European Monroe 
Doctrine in 1823 "depended on the fiiendly vigilance of the 'British man-of-war, ' but this 
fact was seldom openly acknowledged. For the best part of a century the Royal Navy 
remained the strongest guarantee of freedom in the Americas. Thus shielded by the 
British bulwark, the American continent was able to work out its own unhindered 
destiny. "17 During the Civil War, at least, this presence was regarded differently. British 
interests in keeping "Continental despots" out of Latin America, for example, initiated by 
earlier aggressive foreign secretaries like George Canning, could turn a sense of 
protection into mortal intrusion itself when those interests saw fit to change. As long as 
America's development as a united republic was "dependent" upon the naval supremacy 
of an imperial, non-republican democracy, she was also a hostage to fate. Consequently, 
the Union Navy's first concern in the rapid build-up of U. S. naval might was the 
exclusion of influence in American affairs posed by the Royal Navy; though this 
historical phenomenon stays relatively unappreciated and unexplored. 
Indeed, American naval historians have all too often measured the "succese' or "failure' 
of the Union's ironclad program from a determinist perspective. After all, how could a 
coastal defence warship be powerful if it was not yet part of an imperial navy? For 
Harold and Margaret Sprout, in their Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918, 
published in 1939, the "Continental" naval strategy of the early United States was a 
violation of good Mabanian "Maritime" sense: 
17 Winston Churchill, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples: Volume Four, Ihe Great Democracies 
(New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1958), 4: 29-30. 
15 
By unqualifiedly endorsing the shallow draft, unseaworthy 
monitor-type to the exclusion of sea-going ironclads, not merely as 
a temporary wartime expedient, but also as a permanent policy, the 
United States was perpetuating the strategy of passive coast and 
harbor defense, which had contributed so largely to the disasters of 
the War of 1812, and which was now failing to save the 
Confederate seaboard either from blockade or occupation by the 
Union forces. 18 
But if the real issue was then type of ironclad, insofar as this determined which far- 
reaching strategy was best for the survival of the nation, the Sprouts entirely omit to enter 
into an actual explanation of these ironclads' varying characteristics. Instead it is 
virtually assumed that recent tactical developments in naval warfare, such as annour 
plating and super-heavy mounted naval ordnance, made no difference in strategic 
principle than the earliest days of wooden fighting ships. Bernard Brodie's Seapower in 
the Machine Age, also published on the eve of America's entry into the Second World 
War, similarly argued "there is no use in rejoicing about an invention which enables the 
United States, for example, better to withstand the blows of an enemy if it also disables us 
from retaliating when he strikes at our vital interests abroad. " This was the very 
definition of "sea power", or "command of the sea": "retain seaborne communications for 
oneself and to deny them to the enemy", while also relying upon the "concentrated 
strength of a battle force. "19 
Implicit in these works is not how the monitors helped the Union achieve victory in the 
Civil War, but how they almost prevented it. A very recent study of Du Pont's ironclad 
repulse before Charleston (7 April 1863) by Robert M. Browning, Jr. ultimately takes the 
Union admiral's view of events: it was the tools at his disposal which were to blame for 
18 Harold and Margaret Sprout; The Mse ofAmerican Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1990 reprint of Princeton, 1939), 188-9. 
19 Bernard Brodie, Seapower in the Machine Age (New York GreenNvood Press, 1941; reprinted 1943 by 
Princeton University Press), 435,91-2. 
16 
his failure, not his leadership. 20 At the same time, William H. Roberts' treatment of the 
only seagoing broadside-ironclad constructed for the Union Navy before the end of the 
Civil War, U. S. S. New Ironsides, ultimately misses the point of why monitor-ironclads 
were favoured more than possible sisters of her. Unarguably the broadside was more 
effective in shore bombardment, where number of guns and a "suppressing fire" was 
more important than individual calibre. This, in combination with New Ironsides' 4V2- 
inch thick iron armour, and especially her light draft in comparison with the seagoing 
ironclads of European powers, made her the most respected ironclad to Confederates 
huddled in forts. But only the more heavily-armoured, rotating turret could handle the 
15-inch Dahlgren, and this was the weapon most feared by Confederate sailors in their 
own ironclads. 21 Was there more to the attraction of mounting such heavier, if fewer 
guns-in smaller, less expensive, more quickly constructed, and better protected vessels 
of even lighter draft-than subduing domestic opposition to the blockade? Roberts does 
not ask this question, nor does Browning, and relies in its place upon a conspiratorial 
theory that "politics, desire for commercial advantage, and 'monitor mania', rather than 
any innate technological superiority allowed the monitor type of ship to dominate the 
,, 22 Union ironclad program. Added to this is his obvious disappointment that "the vessels 
needed immediately took precedence: many shallow-draft armored ships that could 
operate in the shallow harbors and rivers of the Confederacy, instead of a few expensive 
ocean-going ships to meet the European ironclads on equal terms at sea, " though he later 
admits-but fails to explain-that the end result of the Union Civil War ironclad program 
20 Robert M. Browning, Jr., Success Is All That Was Expected. 7he South Atlantic Blockading Squadron 
During the Civil War (Washington, D. C.: Brassey's Inc., 2002). See also Donald L. Canney, Lincoln's 
Navy. The Ships, Men and Organization, 1861-65 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 195-6, who 
writes: -This illogic [of attacking Charleston] can only be explained by the 'monitor fever' rampant in the 
land... one of the earliest examples of the 'magic' of technology when applied to war. " 
21 William C. Emerson also points the significant disparity in manpower requirements, since a "crew of 
thirty-five manned each gun in the main battery; 25 for the gun itself, and 10 stationed at the tackle for the 
ports. These latter crew also relieved the side-tacklemen in serving the guns in continuous and rapid fire, " 
"U. S. S. New Ironsides: America! s First Broadside Ironclad", Warship (1993), 27. 
22 William H. Roberts, USS New Ironsides in the Civil War (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 
1999), xii. See also Spencer C. Tucker, A Short History of the Civil War at Sea (Wilmington: Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 2002), 61. 
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was that "within a strictly limited sphere (i. e., the coastal waters of the United States), the 
U. S. Navy was superior to any possible invader. , 23 
What these works share in common is their lack of a deliberate comparative approach 
which, especially concerning Union and British ironclad programs of the Civil War era, 
must address the roots of naval power itself, as well as decision-making in ships design 
and national policy. Mahan himself wrote that "the natural tendency of the extreme effort 
for protection undoubtedly is to obscure the fimdamental truth ... that the 
best protection is 
to injure the enemy, " but this did not necessarily answer the question of how the United 
States was potentially clad in iron-by both Union and British navies-during this crucial 
24 interval of technological, political and social upheaval . 
Hence, in neither case, the naval or diplomatic histories of the Civil War, has the vital 
connection between the two approaches been adequately explored. This gap in the 
literature may stand to reason simply because no naval conflict occurred between Great 
Britain and the United States, as between American 'North' and 'South'. Yet the entire 
question of how and why these two powers avoided a confrontation-which many 
considered inevitable at the time-is answered only to the point that such a war was 
considered unnecessary; not the equally important concern of whether it was winnable. 
"Although naval personnel constituted only 5 percent of the Union armed forces, " noted 
James McPherson in his Pulitzer prize-winning Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War 
Era (1988), "their contribution to the outcome of the war was much larger. , 25 Yet even 
in his 2004 Presidential Address of the American Historical Association, McPherson 
signally ignored the role of this "5 percent" in the British cabinet's fateful deliberations 
23 Roberts, New Ironsides, 122,124. 
24 Alfred Thayer Mahan, A&niral Farragut (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1893), 324. 
25 James M. McPherson, Baule Cry ofFreedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 
382. 
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over intervention in the fall of 1862.26 Howard Jones, in his Union in Peril: The Crisis 
over British Intervention in the Civil War (1992), for example, makes the same general 
omission though he does at least provide a clue: 
Northerners believed that the Monitor's activities revealed British 
concern about the Union's strength at the end of the 
war .... [Charles Francis 
Adams, the U. S. minister to Britain] 
noted that the Union Navy's new prowess exhibited at Hampton 
Roads had caused a sensation in England and would probably 
force a build-up in its own navy and fortifications. He also 
believed that the Union's military power had neutralized British 
interest in intervention. That same evening, puffed up by the 
day's good news, Adams attended a reception held by Lady 
Palmerston and engaged in a brief conversation with [Secretary 
for War Sir George Comewall] Lewis, who uncharacteristically 
lost self-control and lashed out at the North for seeking to 
subjugate the South. Reconstruction of the Union was 
impossible, Lewis exclaimed. Adams cut short the heated 
exchange by remarking that British desire to see the United States 
divided was the most compelling argument against allowing that 
event to take place. 27 
The fact remains-inexplicably dormant-that in 1862 U. S. Secretary of the Navy 
Gideon Welles could write "we are not, it is true, in a condition for war with Great 
Britain just at this time, but England is in scarcely a better condition for a war with US. q128 
Historical comparisons between American and European navies should therefore not stop 
for the years 1861-1865 when examining the Union Navy; they should intensify. Nor 
should histories of America's role as a naval power assume that this great struggle for 
national identity (what one British historian has defmed as "the greatest struggle of the 
nineteenth century , 29) was entirely domestic in scope, or that the technologically 
" "Presidential Address: No Peace Without Victory, 1861-1865", reprinted in The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 109, No. I (February 2004), 1-18. 
27 Howard Jones, Union in PeriL 7he Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 110-11. See also Howard Jones, "History and Mythology: The 
Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War", in Robert E. May (ed. ), 7he Union, the Confederacy, and 
the Atlantic Rim (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1995), 29-67. 
28 Journal entry dated 11 -8-1862, in Howard K Beale (ed. ), Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the Navy 
under Lincoln andJohnson, 3 vols. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1960), 1: 79. 
29 Brian Holden Reid, The American Civil War and the Wars of the Industrial Revolution (London: Cassell, 
1999), 16. 
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sophisticated weapon systems devised by the Union Navy-the most advanced ironclad 
steamers of their kind in the world-indicated a preoccupation solely in that direction. 
Did 'world naval power' begin or end at one's own shores is a question which needs 
reconsidering. 30 Even studies of Union Civil War ironclads themselves tend to be near- 
sighted. The Monitor did more than save the blockade from a devastating Confederate 
challenge, and therefore restore international belief that Federal power was ascendant. In 
the high stakes game of Civil War diplomacy, it offered President Abraham Lincoln's 
administration a unique and valuable playing card with which to counter the recent 
menace of a British counter-blockade of the North. 
Perhaps not ironically, one of the few naval histories which stressed this correlation was 
also the first. Reverend Charles B. Boynton, with the official approval of the U. S. Navy 
toward the close of the Civil War, began compiling a two volume History of the Navy 
during the Rebellion which laid particular stress on the influence of British sea power 
upon American history. Completed three years after hostilities ended, Boynton, Chaplain 
of the U. S. House of Representatives and Assistant Professor at the U. S. Naval Academy, 
saw fit to make the following remarkable observation: "While our Army has done a work 
beyond all praise, and has settled the question of our ability to defend our territory against 
any force which could be brought here, the Navy has saved us from foreign intervention 
that could not have been otherwise avoided, while at the same time its labors in putting 
down the rebellion have been far greater than has been generally supposed. " Clearly, the 
30 Victorian navy Admiral George Ballard ruefully noted in his comprehensive study of Britain's "Black 
Battlefleet of 1870"1 for example, that "the strategic conception [of coastal defence] which left the initiative 
in movement to the enemy ... retained at 
least sufficient official acceptance to absorb an annual and 
appreciable proportion of the national expenditure on new fleet construction, " George A. Ballard (edited by 
G. A. Osborn and N. Aý M. Rodger), The Black Battlefleet., A Study of the Capital Ship in Transition 
(London: Nautical Publishing Co., Lymington & the Society for Nautical Research, Greenwich, 1980), 218; 
yet Rear Admiral Raja Menon of the Indian Navy has observed that "the exertions of power abroad 
necessitates the domination of someone else's littoral, " Raja Menon, Maritime Stratqy and Continental 
Wars (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 184. 
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emphasis Boynton makes is upon theforeign not the domestic potency of the Union Navy 
during the Civil War. Where is that discernment now? 
Indeed, the entire purpose of the Union Navy, as Boynton saw it, was to guarantee 
national sovereignty against foreign enemies first, insofar as the Union army dealt 
primarily with the domestic rebellion of the Southern states. "With England and France, " 
Boynton observed, "the most interesting question connected with our affairs has been, 
whether we could create a truly formidable Navy": 
Our naval strength was the standard by which they measured their 
power to attack, and ours to defend. They did not believe it 
possible for us to produce a Navy in a few months which could 
both seal up our long line of sea-coast and defy their most 
formidable ships, and this mistaken judgment was the main 
influence in deciding their policy in regard to American affairs. 
A history of the Navy, then, is a history of that power by which 
Europe gauges our national importance, and by which our rank 
among nations is assigned. 31 
History of the Navy during the Rebellion thus regarded the American Civil War as a 
contest of 'American' versus 'European' political and social values, and, "more than all 
else, the Navy has been an original creation, a true outgrowth of distinctive American 
thought ... the embodying of truly American 
ideas; and whatever question there may be in 
regard to any other feature of our civilisation, no one will deny that there are American 
ships, American cannon, and an American Navy. " National identity in this sense, its 
ironclads, "should be studied by the people, " Boynton maintained, "because they show 
the originating and independent power of American mind, when operating on a large 
scale, and competing with the whole of Europe. " Invaluable for its long forgotten insight, 
Boynton's obsequious (and perhaps ingratiating) portrayal of the U. S. Navy nevertheless 
suffers from partial resources, severe patriotic bias and the still widespread Anglophobia 
31 Charles B. Boynton, The History of the Navy during the Rebellion, 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton, 
1867-68), 1: 6. 
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of the day. England, Boynton was sure, "desired, with an earnestness not exceeded by 
that of Jefferson Davis himself, the humbling of the North, and the separation of the 
Union. 9932 
As a result, many questions remain. Had Britain fully "desired the separation of the 
Union" would the course of her naval construction been altered? What effect did the 
ironclad naval race with France-before the outbreak of the war in America-have on 
British policy? If national protection and deterrence of foreign intervention in the Civil 
War, if not outright preparations for a worldwide maritime war against the British 
Empire, were guiding principles behind the rapidly mobilising United States Navy, what 
was the basis for British national and imperial doctrine? These questions were frequently 
asked by opposing members of Parliament, for they were deterministic of what naval 
power meant itself. The Admiralty spokesman, Lord Clarence Paget's reply was that in 
determining Britain's ironclad shipbuilding policy "one could not advert to the subject 
without more or less dealing with foreign nations, and especially with France. 03 In other 
words, power was a relative concept. Boynton's comparison of Union and British naval 
means (surprisingly limited given his main argument) would have benefited by also 
examining the evolution of Britain's ironclad program, instead of proceeding with a 
narrative of the American Civil War. Subsequently, it might have contributed much more 
satisfactorily to an appreciation of American, if not British, predominance even in the 
absence of actual campaigns and battles. As such, this thesis picks up where Boynton, 
not Baxter, left off. 
32 Boyntorý History, 1: 14-15; also 56-8,91-2. 
33 44-1864, Hansard, 431-2. 
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PART ONE 
Deterring the Union: British Naval Supremacy 
24 
1. An ironclad race with France 
It is important to remember that the British ironclad program only began as a response to 
the establishment of the French ironclad fleet of Napoleon 111. Until 1858, Great Britain 
held a precarious edge in screw-propelled, steam-powered wooden-hufled ship-of-the- 
line. 34 As the lead was looking to be decisively in favour of the Royal Navy once more, 
the French ironclad Gloire seemed to change the rules again. 35 Following the evident 
success of the Gloire design-and concept-the French added to the ironclad's sisters 
still under construction with an announcement of a program for an entire fleet of ocean- 
going iron-plated warships. The sheer scale of the program, so quickly engineered by the 
talented naval architect and head of the French Ministry of Marine, Dupuy de Lome, and 
decisively endorsed by the Emperor himself, suddenly made the British response of the 
Warfior-class- vessels superior in virtually every aspect of sea-keeping, powerfidly 
armed and strongly protected-seem inadequate. The Board of Admiralty, headed by 
Edward Adolphus Seymour, the 12'h Duke of Somerset, under Lord Palmerston's (Henry 
John Temple, 3rd Viscount) new'Liberal Coalition' government (1859), met in early 1861 
to discuss the urgency of a full-scale response. 36 
The immediate nature of the threat to British security was apparently that of invasion. 
Coupled with the massive fortification and modernisation of the strategic port of 
Cherbourg, it was obvious to the naval members of the Board that "immediate steps 
should be taken to meet so formidable a force-otherwise the spring of 1862 might see 
the French in possession of such a fleet of iron cased ships as could give them the 
34 ADM 1/5765,23-2-1861, Navy Ships Building, &c.: An Account, showing the Expenses incurred on Her 
Majesty's Ships Building, Converting, Repairing, Filling, &c., during the Financial Year 1859-60, lists 
L1,018,061 expended for "Ships and Vessels building" , most of these for sailing ships still converting to 
screw, either before or after launching. Ironclad ships are not listed. 
35 Hamilton, Anglo-French Naval Rivalry, see Chapter 3 "Anglo-French Diplomacy and the Transition from 
the Screw-Liner to the Ironclad, 1854 Onwards". 
36 ADM 1/576, minutes dated 13-1-1861. J. P. Baxter surmises 13 February as the more likely date of this 
minute, given the reference to a Foreign Office report dated after, Introduction, 171, ff. 
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command of the Channel. 07 This was not a politically-calculated alarmist sentiment, but 
a cool appraisal of fact. 38 To the professional Navy, in a war with France or not, such a 
likelihood was embarrassing and unthinkable. 39 
In January 1861 the Controller (formerly 'Surveyoe), Admiral Sir Baldwin W. Walker, 
presented designs to the Board for what was to be the new Valiant-class of broadside- 
ironclad. Taking into account the public as well as professional criticisms of the 
Warrior-class, and the two successor broadside-ironclads of considerably smaller 
dimensions, Defence and Resistance (280' length; speed 11.228 knots for Defence 40 ) the 
new ship was "proposed to place 30 of the guns on the Main Deck, which is to be 
protected by Armour Plating from end to end. "41 This would give the new Valiant and 
Hector substantially more protection than the unarmoured ends of the first four 
broadside-ironclads, Warrior and Black Prince, and Defence and Resistance, whose 
limited armour belts protected barely half of their long batteries. 42 Yet even while the 
battery itself was now to be fully protected, the waterline protection was still less than 
complete, being "within 30 ft of the Stem, and 35 ft of the Stem Post" five feet below the 
load waterline. 43 If the ships heeled or rolled during action and suffered a penetrative hit 
in this unprotected stretch of 65 feet, the consequences could instantly be disastrous. If 
they did not sink, they could be seriously crippled. 
37 ADM 1/5765,13-1-1861. 
38 Andrew Lamber4 "Polifics, Technology and Policy-Making, 1859-1865: Palmerston, Gladstone and the 
Management of the Ironclad Naval Race, " The Northern Mariner, Vol. 111, No. 3 (July 1998), 9-38. 
39 And unjustifiable; as Oscar Parkes notes, "[Palmerston] was one of Sir Howard Douglas's disciples, and 
in consequence work on the wooden line-of-battle ships was speeded up so that our old superiority in these 
could be regained, and a Two-Power standard in them assured by 1861. And this in the face of the 
knowledge that the French had not laid down a wooden ship-of-the-line since 1855! " British Battleships, 
14. 
40 Ballard, Black Battlefleet, 241,247. 
41 ADM 1/5774,10-1-1861. 
42 11ýs weakness was presumably compensated by numerous water-tight compartments which could be 
flooded in the case of shell penetration damage. While the Warrior, for example, was to gain only(? ) 26 
inches more draught, the corresponding loss in speed and manageability to such long ironclad ships with 
their ends flooded made this safeguard extremely unattractive. See Brown, Warrior, 14, for increase in 
draught. 
43 ADM 1/5774,10-1-1861. 
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This was not the only disadvantage. By increasing armour protection over the first four 
broadside-ironclads, Walker warned "it will scarcely be questioned that this amount of 
security against injury from Shot and Shell is not to be obtained without compromising 
important qualities of sea-going ships. " The added weight towards the ends of the ships 
would contribute to heavy pitching at sea and thus make them "unsuited for general 
service, " (as was yet to be tested for the Warrior. ) Furthermore, "from their 
comparatively larger amount of Armour Plating, they will approximate much more nearly 
to that of the 'Warrior' class than their relative tonnage would appear to indicate. "44 This 
was considered a move more towards coastal defence than otherwise, despite the 
immediate tactical improvements in design. The Gloire, however, already incorporated a 
fully protected battery and was as fast as the Valiant-class, which in turn was slower than 
Warrior's fourteen-knot maximum under steam by two knotS. 45 
If the Board expressed alarm at the French ironclad program, it is significant that these 
statements came after the designer of the Warrior, Chief Constructor Sir Isaac Watts, had 
provided the Admiralty with improved Warriors in the form of the Achilles; and only two 
weeks after the Valiant-class submission was approved. Some of the original problems 
with the first four ironclads were solved in the new design. An iron ship-and the first to 
be constructed in a Royal Dockyard (at the newly re-facilitated Chathamfý--the Achilles 
was armoured entirely along the waterline, with modifications which saw to the 
protection of the rudder and steering gear; dangerously exposed on the preceding 
ironclads. As with the first ships, little more than half her bulwarks and battery were 
covered by the armour plating at first; within a year all the unprotected guns were 
removed. But the Achilles' full armour protection (4Y2-inches of wrought iron plating on 
44 Ibid. 
45 Parkes, British Battleships, 30. 
46 Brown, Warrior, 15. 
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18-inches of teak, identical to Warrior's), combined with the need for speed and sea- 
worthiness, again produced an ironclad as long as the Warrior, with a gigantic spread of 
sail 30,133 square feet carried in four masts and a bowsprit (later reduced to three masts). 
Speed was comparable, yet the draught exceeded Warrior's at 27Y2-feet. This stupendous 
warship was a Victorian overkill, if the original concern of the Board was better actual 
protection for this most expensive naval investment, especially when the length of time 
involved in its construction, given the unforeseen problems occurring with the other 
ships, meant that Britain herself was vulnerable longer. When an ironclad of this 
reasoning was finally produced its armour was no longer superlative but inferior, and the 
problem of where to station these ships even in home Ports remained. Nor did the new 
broadside monster solve the problem of sheer handiness in combat, especially in close 
quarters such as harbours or inlets. If the issue of armour and armament was forefront in 
the mind of the Controller, as was sea-keeping, the capacity for coastal defence was 
growing by comparative leaps and bounds. But under Walker's direction at least, the 
emphasis was more upon sea-keeping than full protection and powerful armament. His 
resignation shortly afterwards did little to encourage the Board or the public that the 
French threat was properly met. 
On the 2 May 1861 the new Controller, Rear-Admiral Robert Spencer Robinson, 
recommended the testing of annour plates on the plan of Mr. Charles Lancaster, who 
boasted of his ability "to deliver any quantities of such Plates so manufactured, of any 
thickness up to ten inches. A7 The following day Robinson wrote to the Admiralty "it 
would be very advantageous to erect the Frames of such of these [line-of-battle] ships as 
are nearly completed, with a view of preparing them for 50 Gun Frigates to be covered 
with Armour plating... " Surplus wood supplies in the dockyards could thus be taken care 
of, and "If from any cause a pressing necessity should arise for a Force of this 
47 ADM 1/5774,2-5-186 1. 
28 
description, a great proportion of the work will be already done ... and time will 
have been 
gained for any further experiments on the combination of wood and Iron which it may be 
desirable to make . 
48 This next step, the introduction of the wooden-hulled conversions of 
the Royal Oak-class, was regarded as an improvement on the Valiant-class, with a fully 
protected battery (and along the waterline), but not so much in terms of range as the 
Warfior, for his submission added only that "she would be a sufficiently good Sea Boat 
to go to the Mediterranean if required.... "49 
However, with wooden hulls, the ships of this class could be seen as more free ranging in 
that there was no worry of excess fouling. Although the main theatre of naval operations 
for France was more likely to be the Mediterranean, this was also a factor in the French 
decision to proceed with Dupuy de Lome's first ironclads-which capitalised more on 
French strengths and relied less on comparative French weaknesses, such as iron ship 
manufacture. 50 What did it matter that wooden hulled ships would not last as long as 
iron-hulled ones, when advances in armour, ordnance, and engineering made it painfully 
obvious that the new warships would be obsolete within years, not decades? The 
Controller toughened his proposal by remarking "it is needless to call their Lordships' 
attention to the fact that every maritime power in Europe is advancing in this direction, 
and that unprotected wooden ships cannot contend with success against their iron coated 
rivals, and I confidently submit for their Lordships' consideration that we should not 
neglect this means of preparing for a conflict, which though we may not seek it, may yet 
against our will be forced upon us. "51 Thus, the decision to initiate the Royal Oak-class 
of broadside-ironclads was influenced more by the need to utilise existing wooden ships 
still under construction from the previous government's building program-increasingly 
49 Ibid., 8-5-1861. 
49 ibid. 
50 Hamilton, Anglo-French, 92-8. 
51 ADM 1/5774,8-5-1861. 
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regarded as a liability in a naval action against French ironclads. Conversions saved time 
and money. 52 It also made the most of government resources while the private firms 
struggled with iron-hulled ironclads already on order. 
Robinson increased the pressure for these conversions (which also satisfied the earlier 
need of the Board) as a means simply to increase numbers. His "Table of French iron- 
53 
plated Shipe', dated 21 May 1861 , identified sixteen French 
ironclads built, launched, 
or under construction, as well as a further eleven floating batteries (including the five 
constructed for the bombardment of Kinburn. in 1855). 54 Though the five Royal Oaks 
would be "in every way inferior for all the purposes for which we require a Ship of War, 
to Ships of the 'Achilles' class, built of Iron and with those modifications in Plating &c. 
which we are prepared to make", nevertheless it was "so important ... to have some Ships 
constructed to meet the Navies of other Powers at least on equal terms, that, rather than be 
without such Ships... not as the wisest, nor as the most economical, nor as the safest way 
of meeting the exigencies of the case, but because ... other considerations make this plan 
the only practicable one at the present moment... "55 
These comments were directed to the cautious policy of experimenting with the new 
technologies carefully before fully comn-dtting to one design. Somehow, a superiority in 
individual ship design was gained (with the Warrior-class, and the improved Achilles), 
but the collective ironclad force soon to be at Britain's disposal was markedly less than 
that of France. The issue was more complex than which sea-going ironclads would 
52 ADM 1/5840,25-3-1862, notes the original estimate price per ton for Warrior as E31.5, the actual cost at 
L41.67 per ton; while the Black Prince contract estimate at 07.25 per ton rose to L39.78. These figures 
were later adjusted to: Warrior final rate per ton L42.25; Black Prince L41.57. The Warrior cost L239, 
646.01 (ADM 1/5802, op. cit., "Iron-Cased Ships-Statement of Cost", 25-3-1862, No. 408. ) The cost for 
the improved Warrior-class, the Achilles, laid down on 1-8-1861, was estimated at the time at 054,410 
(ADM 1/5774, "Drawings for Iron-cased Ships". ) J. P. Baxter notes a find cost of L444,380, when she was 
finally completed for sea on 26-11-1864, Introduction, 167. 
53 ADM 1/5765,21-5-1861. 
54 Baxter, Introduction, 69-91. 
55 ADM 1/5765,22-5-1861. 
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counter the French ones best, or how many ironclads of what degree of greater or lesser 
armour protection or speed would be required. Intertwined with these deliberations was 
the growing certainty that strategic superiority represented more perfectly by the Achilles 
and the Wartior-class did not necessarily equate with the tactical advantages innate to 
smaller, more numerous ironclads, even wooden-hulled conversions such as that of the 
Royal Oak-class, or the grander imperative which made the best use of the nation's 
existing industrial and maritime resources. The right balance still had not been reached, 
and the Royal Navy seemed to be losing the race. 
The Admiralty again considered its options. Along with Robinson's expedient of the 
Royal Oak-class, the growing concerns of armour protection and armament still rested on 
the one principle linking the two. The best armour scheme was the Warrior's, which, at 
4Y2-inches was equal to the first-generation French ironclads. 56 In regards to annour, 
therefore, it was a question not so much of thickness, but coverage; protecting more of 
the ship's armament with nothing less than the proscribed arrangement, an increase in 
area not volume. Similarly, the 68-pounder muzzle-loading smoothbores and the breech- 
loading 110-pounder rifled Annstrong guns were seen in the spring of 1861 as the 
heaviest naval ordnance available. Greater an-nament still implied weight of broadside. 
To increase this aggregate sense of firepower, improved ironclads had to mount more 
guns-not fewer guns of an even heavier calibre. The logical consequence of this 
principle would be the Minotaur-class ironclads, "the longest and largest single-screw 
fighting ships ever built, and the heaviest in the Navy for the next ten years, uniquely 
,, 57 favoured in a rig which comprised the spectacular array of five masts... These ships 
represented the 'second generation' phase of the British ironclad program, and would 
56 ADM 1/5774; on 7-5-1861 Robinson reported to the Admiralty his crificisms of an ironclad fully belted 
with solid seven inch iron plating, but with no wood backing-plans of which were being prepared for the 
Russian government by the British iron shipbuilder J. Samuda. 
57 Parkes, British Battleships, 60. 
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quickly prove the most problematic in terms of construction, cost, practicality, and 
obsolescence. Referring back to the 13 January minute, the High Commissioners of the 
Board of Admiralty recited to the government on 23 May 1861 the progress of French 
ironclads: 
... Fifteen Iron cased sea going Frigates of the First Class including two, rated as ships of the line which are either in 
commission afloat or plating, in process of building or ordered to 
be commenced immediately. 
I in Commission 
I afloat-plating 
I afloat, engines finished 
I ready for launching 
2 nearly ready for launching 
8 laid down this year 
I named-not laid down 
15 totaI58 
Against this the Admiralty could only offer "two Frigates of the First Class afloat and 
plating. [in margins: Warrior, Black Prince, 46 guns each] ... Two of an inferior class 
afloat and plating. [Resistance, Defence, 22 guns each] ... Two of a superior class the 
tender of which was accepted in the end of January last [Hector, Valiant, 32 guns 
each]... And one of the First class the keel of which is not yet laid [Achilles, 50 guns], 
making a total of seven afloat building and ordered. " It was therefore a matter "of urging 
on Her Majesty's Government the necessity of adopting immediate measures for the 
construction of iron plated vessels of the first class with such improvements as experience 
has suggested, " and "to ask for authority to call for tenders for new iron cased ships from 
the private trade as well as to employ additional hands in building and converting wooden 
ships to carry armour, being convinced that none but the most vigorous and energetic 
58 ADM 1/5765,23-5-1861. 
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measures will prevent the command of the Channel at an early date falling into the hands 
of the French Emperor. , 
59 
However, it was the First Lord's candid and direct analysis of the 'best plan' on the same 
day, which correctly observed: "One great difficulty in deciding upon the best mode of 
effecting this increase [in numbers of ironclads] has arisen from the uncertainty in which 
we still remain as to the construction which should be adopted. "60 Three choices now 
presented themselves. The first was to cut down existing screw ships-of-the-line or 
ftigates and cover their sides with 4Y2-inch annour plates. It was the fastest and cheapest 
plan. Nevertheless "these vessels would ... not be sea-going ships, they would be equal to 
the floating batteries building in France, but inferior to the ftigates now laid down, " and 
Somerset immediately concluded that "unless therefore there should be the apprehension 
of an immediate necessity for defensive preparations, this course appears to be 
unadvisable. " The next possibility was that of the Royal Oak-class; proceeding with 
existing frames in Royal Dockyards which would allow for greater control during 
completion (including lengthening) and a more integrative finished product. Less 
expensive than new iron ships, they would "probably be equal to the French plated ships, " 
but their wooden hulls would not last, and, ever mindful of public criticism, the First Lord 
noted "they will be inferior to the Warrior type, and will be justly considered as 
indicating a retrograde movement rather than an advance in ship-building. " 
The third alternative was "to apply to the Treasury and propose a supplementary vote to 
Parliament with the intention of constructing five or six iron-ships to be plated according 
to the system which the Controller and the practical officers of his department now 




Minotaur-class was the introduction of a new armour scheme which called for thicker 
plates, now 51/2-inches, backed by only I 0-inches of teak to account for the greater weight 
in iron. As serious as the fact that the new combination was untested was the implication 
that all previous armour-protection arrangements were inadequate: 
The objections to this course are chiefly financial and political. 
While the navy estimates amount to twelve millions it would be 
necessary to review carefully every source of expenditure before 
applying for an increased outlay under the head of iron-ships. It 
would reasonably be said that until the Warrior had been tried at 
sea, such a demand was preposterous, and that if we condemn the 
construction of the Warrior before this vessel has even been tried, 
Parliament may fairly refuse to entrust the board with means of 
making new experiments at such a cost. 
The political objection would be equally strong as such an 
application to Parliament would be ascribed to some new distrust, 
at a moment when a good understanding with France may most 
usefully tend to the removal of difficulties in our relations with the 
United States. 61 
Somerset's political message was overlooked. The Board's minute re-empbasised the 
danger of French naval power, not the manipulation of it. Thus, despite the initiation of 
two smaller improvements of the first four partially protected broadside-ironclads, a more 
protected version of the Warrior that was to lose none of its essential sea-going qualities, 
particularly its speed, and four immediate wooden-bulled conversions (to be named Royal 
Oak, Prince Consort, Ocean, and Caledonia), the Admiralty eventually decided upon the 
construction of three (rather than six) more large iron-hulled broadside-ironclads as a 
response to the perceived threat from France. 
The British ironclad program was a mixed choice. Four of the ironclads were slower than 
the rest, and two of these, the Defence and Resistance, were already considered 'inferior' 
before completion. By March 1862 the Controller would report The sum that the Firm 
61 ibid. 
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The magnIficently restored HALS. 
Wai*rior, now at Portsmouth. She 
was the world's most revolutionary 
warship by 186 1 -, only against her 
can the Monitor's own radical 
innovations be appreciated. 
(Right) Note the exposed rudder 
head. (Author's collectim) 






[Westwood and Baillie] may be considered as having paid exactly out of Pocket for 
building the Resistance amounts to f. 157,972.11.02, " and that the Admiralty "will have 
paid ... a stun of ten thousand pounds beyond what they were strictly entitled to by the 
terms of the Contract. " 62 Of the fourteen ironclads built, building or approved to be 
contracted for by the summer of 1861, ten were iron-hulled, but these were broken down 
into five different classes, two of them smaller and slower than the rest, each with their 
own armament and armour configuration-making a comparative representation of their 
fighting abilities tedious. As a result, confiision plagued the intended purposes of these 
ships, whether as coastal defence vessels, ships to operate in an open sea line-of-battle, or 
simply to 'command the Channel'. It may well be argued that this variety of ironclads 
built within the same period ofnaval ordnance and arinour advances was in fact an asset 
to the Royal Navy, whose duties stretched from the global to the immediate vicinity of the 
British Isles. However, there is no indication that this would be anything other than an 
exercise ofjustification in hindsight, since there is very little discussion as to exactly how 
vessels other than ironclads built expressly for coast defence were to actually defend the 
country. As the French ironclads were intended to dominate any wooden warship they 
may encounter at home or abroad, it can only be assumed that the British ironclads were 
projected to overwhelm those of the French wherever they may be encountered. If the 
Defence was a failure at sea, its ability to fight in more sheltered waters was no less and 
probably more than that of the Warrior. If the primary concern was for the defence of the 
Channel-or Mediterranean trade routes to India-then trans-oceanic ironclads were a 
violation of the principle of consolidation of force. The heart of the problem was that the 
proper ironclad simply was not found in either the first or second generation responses to 
first, the French threat, to armour-plated challenges emerging from the rest of Europe, and 
then to the danger of entanglement in the American Civil War. There is no other reason 
to explain the Defence and Resistance without referring to cost-effectiveness and the 
62 )MM 1/5802,6-5-1862. 
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limited, not extended, operationability of the Warrior and Black Prince; while the Valiant 
and Hector continued this criticism by adding more armour protection in place of speed. 
To regain speed and range and yet add more protection, the Achilles took the Royal Navy 
back into a state where some of its ironclads were better than any existing French design 
in all these respects. Even so, this did not solve the initial problem of superior numbers, 
and by gambling more, not less, in the taxing production of a few 'super' broadside- 
ironclads the Admiralty committed itself to the hope that well before these vessels were 
even launched, potential enemies would not develop guns powerful enough to pierce their 
long thin sides or armour thick enough to make the fire of so many guns as meaningless 
as the broadsides poured into the C. S. S. Virginia. As the Achilles was not launched until 
December 1863-or the first of the Minotaur-class, the Minotaur, though launched in the 
same month, was not commissioned until April 1867-this calculation proved to be 
unrealistic within months. It was the need for a practical solution to the immediate, if not 
geo-strategically proximate, threat posed by Napoleon III's decision which motivated 
Spencer Robinson to suggest the 'retrograde' Royal Oak conversions, all of which were 
launched before the Achilles. At a stroke the continued production of vulnerable first- 
class wooden men-of-war was replaced with such vessels clad in iron, without exceeding 
the naval estimates. Indeed, it was the new First Naval Lord Sir Frederick Grey's 
opinion, in a letter written to the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Station, Vice- 
Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, shortly after her completion that "the Royal Oak is the best 
of the whole... 963 This was fortunate, since the race with France left the British Empire 
partially protected. 
63 12-6-1863, Sir Frederick Grey to Milne, MP. 
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11. Industry and conversion problems 
Work on the next generation of British ironclads proceeded with all available resources at 
hand. Great Britain's economy was strong, but the social system was crying out for 
reform which naturally interfered with large naval estimates and appropriations. 64 While 
much of the populace supported the notion of unquestioned naval mastery over France or 
any other power-indeed, the lore of the older generation demanded it-the price 
involved was such that 'wooden ships and hearts of oak' could not suffice in the 
Industrial Age. Taxation was for every income more real, generally, than patriotism and 
world prestige. It was an inconvenient time, when the Empire was "happily at Peace with 
all Sovereigns, Powers, and States, "65 for an expensive, technologically-bold naval arms 
race with Britain's nearest and most dynamic continental neighbour. For every ironclad 
the French emperor was prepared to lay down, the Admiralty felt compelled to answer. 66 
Furthermore, if the threat took the form of ocean-going ironclads, the form of the British 
67 response was virtually pre-decided as well . Already the 
Royal dockyards were filled to 
capacity working on the completion of the unarmoured steam ships insisted upon in the 
previous administration (to meet the earlier deficit acquired in steam ships-of-the line 
against France, and to surpass it again unquestionably) in addition to the new ironclads. 
64 See Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy., Ideology, Interest, and Sea Power during the Par 
Britannica (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986); also Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: 
Economic Change andMilitaty Conflictfrom 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 193-203. 
65,4, DM 1/5765, Proclamation by the Queen [on American Civil War neutrality], 13-5-1861. 
66 Palmerston himself observed famously, on the question of a pre-arranged naval arms limitation treaty 
with France-and the British addendum for twice the number of French ironclads-discussed in Parliament 
in July 1861: "the Emperor would laugh at us and say 'By all means! I must have 20 or 24 Iron-cased 
ships-you are quite welcome to have 40 or 48, and I hope you will find the money to build them; but do 
not expect that I am to sit with nry hands crossed till you have done so! ' ", Parkes, British Battleships, 49. 
67 Hamilton, Anglo-French, "rbe extent of the failure of British naval-war planning suggests that more was 
involved than any simple Admiralty failure to cope with the implications of technological change. Some 
basic failure was involved, a failure whose main symptom was an excessive degree of copying ... The fact that the French navy acted in a particular way was all too often a sufficient incitement for the Royal Navy 
unthinkingly to follow, " 140. 
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There can be no denying that the pace and scale of industry was tremendous. While Lord 
Lyons (Richard Bickerton Pemell), Britain's minister to the United States, informed Vice- 
Admiral Milne of the hostile reaction in Washington to the Queen's Proclamation of 
Neutrality to the rising war between the Northern and Southern states, and warning him 
the Federal government was unlikely to "abstain from provoking language or even 
aggressive conduct, " the Admiralty Controller was noting ten-hour days starting at 6am 
68 for workmen, Monday through Saturday in the Deptford yard. Two days later on 14 
June 1861, Robinson objected to the request to assign steam gunboats for the training of 
Royal Navy volunteers and the crews of Coast Guard ships, as "no serious interruption of 
all the proposed works in the Dock Yards and factories will be occasioned. "69 
The need for consolidating resources was understandable even given the size and 
demands of the pre-existing Royal Navy. Perhaps in response to Lyons' letter to Milne, 
forwarded by the Foreign Office, the Admiralty directed the Controller the following day 
(12 June) to comment on their historic memorandum abolishing the historic Sailing 
Ordinary as it merged into the new 'Steam Reserve'. Robinson prescribed "in the First 
Division of Steam Ordinary at each Port a Line of Battle Ship, a Frigate, a Corvette, a 
Sloop, a small vessel, and a Paddle Wheel Steamer, " a considerable force, with three 
other Divisions behind it, in addition to the vessels actually in commission. 70 In March 
1862 he counted thirty-nine Corvettes afloat alone, with the Royal Navy categorised into 
Line-of-Battle Ships, Frigates, Corvettes, Sloops, and Gun Vessels and Gun Boats of the 
I't and 2nd Class, while "the Paddlewheel Steam Ships should be divided into Frigates, 
Sloops, Despatch Vessels, and Small VesselS. "71 Ironclad warships are not mentioned, 
but they were in fact at the top of the list in power and priority. The Parliamentary 
68ADM 1-5767,6-11-1861, enclosed 25-5-1861, Lyons to Milne; ADM 1/5774,12-6-1861. 
69 ADM 1/5774,14-6-1861. 
70 ADM 1/5766,8-7-1861. 
71 ADM 1/5802,3-12-1862. 
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Expense of Ships in 1861-18622 recorded a labour and materials total of L932,323 for 
"Ships and Vessels built or building by contract, or purchased", next to the 11,003,047 
paid for all "Steam ships and vessels fitting out, refitting, repairs and maintenance in 
commission and reserve". Of the 25 ships of private construction subsequently registered 
only 18 are armed and of these 9 are ironclads: 
Name of Ship Guns Tonnage Where When Total Remarks 
+ built or laid Expenditure 
Contractor building down on each Ship 
to 31-3-1862 
Agincourt 50 6,621 Birkenhead 30-10- 12,352 
J. Laird, Sons & 1861 
Co. 
Blac Prince 40 6,109 Glasgow 12-10- 322Y239 Launched 
Napier & Sons 1859 27-2-1861 
Defence 16 3,720 Jarrow, 14-12- 209,075 Launched 
Palmer, Brothers Newcastle 1859 24-4-1861 
& Co. 
Hector 32 4,063 Glasgow 8-3- 157,285 
Napier & Sons 1861 
Minotaur 50 6,621 Blackwall 12-9- 18,847 
Thames Iron Ship 1861 
Building Co. 
Northumberland 50 6,621 Millwall 10-10- 8,905 
C. J. Mare & Co. 1861 
Resistance 16 3,710 Poplar 21-12- 213,047 Launched 
Westwood, 1859 11-4-1861 
Baillie, Campbell 
& Co. 
Valiant 32 4,063 Poplar 1-2- 119,911 
Westwood, 1861- 
Baillie, Campbell and then 
& Co. +Thames 24-2- 
Iron Ship Building 1862 
Warrior 40 6,109 Blackwall 25-5- 328,453 Launched 
Thames Iron Ship 1859 29-12- 
Building Co. 1860 
TOTAL 1,627,198 
Listed separately from "Ships and Vessels building in Her Majesty's Dockyards" are 
those "Ships, commenced as wooden ships, converted into iron cased vessels while 
building", the five emergency expedients of the Royal Oak-class: 
72 ADM 115862, AnnualAccountofExpenseofShips, 1861-2 
... ordered to be printed 14 April 1863. 
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Name of Ship Guns Tonnage Where built When laid Total 
+ or building down Expenditure on 
Contractor each Ship to 
31-3-1862 
Caledonia 34 4,125 Woolwich 1-10-1860; 70,248 
conversion 
6-6-1861 
Ocean 34 4,045 Devonport 23-8-1860; 3-6- 74,999 
1861 
Prince Consort 34 4,045 Pembroke 13-8-1860,6-6- 103,969 
(late Mumph) 1861 
RoyalAyýed 34 4,045 Portsmouth 1-12-1859; 22- 94,113 
6-1861 
Royal Oak 34 4,056 Chatham 1-5-1860; 3-6- 112,166 
1861 
TOTAL 455,495 
Perhaps more indicative of the level of dependency upon private contractors which the 
Royal Navy found itself during the beginning of its ironclad program is the fact that of the 
68 ships listed under construction in Royal Navy yards, only the Achilles is annour- 
plated. 
Nameof Guns Tonnage Where built When Total Remarks 
Ship or building laid Expenditure 
down on each Ship 
to 31-3-1862 
Achilles 30 6,079 Chathain 1-8-1861 62,921 Building in I I I I I I 
a dock. 
The remaining 12,761,198 expended on ships constructing in Her Majesty's Dockyards 
included 10 of 89 guns or more (such as H. M. S. Howe, 121 guns, laid down in Pembroke, 
10 March 1856, and launched 7 March 1860), 9 of 51 guns, 3 of 36 guns, 4 of 22 guns 
and 2 of 21 guns. This was still 11,371,084 more than expenditures made to private 
contractors for ironclads, but this was for 67 warships as opposed to 9, whose costs were 
increasing in most cases well beyond their contracts. 
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The contract tenders for the three broadside-ftigates of what was to be the Minotaur-class, 
originally the Alexander, Dictator, and Invincible (awarded to Thames Iron Shipbuilding 
Co., C. J. Mare & Co., and J. Laird, Sons & Co., respectively), specified a; E5,000 penalty 
if the ships were not completed for the Navy in time. None of the estimates for the 
construction of the six new iron-hulled ironclads submitted to the Controller on the last 
day of August 1861 exceeded 24 months, and in the case of Thames Iron, the price per 
ton of L48.10.0 would rise to 150 if the armour plates themselves were made elsewhere, 
in addition to three extra months. The Board did not necessarily accept the cheapest 
estimate, for in addition to quality of construction and completion time there was the 
factor of the actual likelihood of firms already committed to government, commercial and 
foreign orders meeting their obligations successfully. The experience of the previous 
ironclad ships increasingly cast doubt on this prospect. Although Robinson ranked the 
south London Mare & Co. fifth in the list of "character and experience of the Parties and 
therefore their fitness to be employed in building Ships of this Class, irrespective of 
price" and Glasgow's Napier & Sons third, the Admiralty replied it did not "consider it 
advisable to give another contract at present to Messr. Napier until the Hector is ffirther 
advanced. ? iD This was despite the enclosed letter from Napier which explained "although 
the completion of the Black Prince has occupied considerably more time than was 
anticipated-in consequence of the details of that Vessel being of an unusual nature and 
new to us & and also to your Inspectors-who often could not give us the information we 
required, when wanted to continue the progress of the work uninterruptedly, and thereby, 
besides the delay, leading us into much extra expense-yet, from the experience 
Inspectors and ourselves have now acquired, we feel confident that, with the proposed 
,, 74 new Vessel, we should be able to make rapid progress... 
73 ADM 1/5774,31-8-186 1. 
74Ibid. Enclosed letter dated 30-8-1861. 
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The lack of confidence also worked the other way. Aside from noting the presence of 
government inspectors in their shipyards, Napier (and Wigram & Sons of Blackwall) 
acknowledged Robinson's Item 4 proviso of his 5 August bid for tenders which stipulated 
"the Admiralty are to be at liberty to alter the arrangement of the Plating within three 
months from the date of the Contract without additional charge. , 75 It was, after all, the 
business of these major firms to know of the navy's growing predilection for modifying 
the construction of its new iron ships up until the last possible moment based on any 
ordnance advances or arinour plate test findings. On 5 September the Admiralty re- 
considered the names of the ships themselves in browsing through the Navy Signal 
Books. Dictator became Northumberland, recalled as the ship which received Napoleon I 
in 1815; Invincible turned to Captain and then to the more politically explicit Agincourt, 
and Alexander turned to Audacious which, being criticised as "always used in a bad 
sense, " then became the Elephant-a name that suggested itself, perhaps, not so much 
great size and power as clumsiness-and was later turned to Minotaur. 76 
As Thames Iron accepted the challenge for its second great ironclad construction, it 
petitioned the Admiralty for the financial losses incurred "two years and a half to the 
production of so noble a specimen of iron shipbuilding, " H. M. S. Warrior. 77 At first, 
Robinson took a lenient approach. Even though the company could be legally asked to 
reimburse the government 18,000 for its own work in completing the first ironclad, the 
costs per ton for the Resistance and Defence were even more. He advised the Admiralty 
that "the liberal conduct they will have adopted with regard to this Company, will I think 
prove in the end of great advantage, as it will encourage private Firms to tax their 
resources to the utmost to answer any extraordinary demands which the Government may 
find if necessary to make upon them. " Thames' letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 
75 Ibid. Enclosed bid for tenders dated 5-8-1861. 
76 ADM 1/5774,5-9-1861. 
77 ADM 1/5774,11-11-1861. 
43 
William Romaine, bears consideration for its description of the real problems facing 
Britain's shipbuilding industry. The question was not just changes in design, multiple 
orders and rapid production rates; the firm required all extra costs plus "the moderate 
addition of twelve and a half per cent profit". 78 
Meanwhile, the Resistance herself, launched in April, meanwhile, was still on the 
Victoria Docks waiting for Admiralty possession. Due to the state of the tides, she would 
not be available now until 3 December. She was far from complete and ready for service. 
Her propeller "still in a barge on the docks"; "There are no Anchors or Cables on board", 
and "the Steering Gear is not completed, but temporary Steering Gear might be fitted by 
Wednesday next ... There are no coals at present on board the Shi P.,, 
79 ThoUgh; E50,000 
was set aside in the estimates for any extras with the first four ironclads, Robinson was 
careful to mention that "their Lordships would be perfectly justified in authorizing [sic] 
the payment of 15,000 ... on account of extras on the Resistance, though not on account of 
the terms of the contract... " 
During the war scare with the United States over the Trent Affair, from the end of 
November until the new year, the Controller's attitude towards private contractors soured 
a great deal. The same company which launched the Resistance nearly a year before, 
Westwood, Baillie, Campbell & Co., was also responsible for the new ironclad Valiant 
and informed the Admiralty "we have a claim of L12,000 for Extras, etc., which we are 
satisfied could not be reduced to L8,000 if disputed. ..,, 
80 Robinson objected to these 
claims three weeks earlier, observing that "in dealing with the Warriors case their 
Lordships were induced to consider it as favourably as possible for the Firm employed in 
78 Ibid. Enclosed letter dated 5-11-1861. 
79, A, DM 1/5744,18-11-1861. 
80ADM 1/5802,28-3-1862; enclosed letter from James Campbell of Westwood Baillie to Paget, Admiralty 
Secretary, dated 26-3-1862. 
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building that Ship, for reasons which were obvious, and which must be so fresh in Their 
memories that they need not be repeated. "81 Though the Resistance was as new a ship in 
design and structure to its builders as the Warrior was to Thames Iron Shipbuilding, "the 
Firm had ample means ofjudging of the nature of the work required of them, and of their 
resources for executing it. " By taking on the Valiant at 142 per ton after twelve months 
of construction on the former ironclad, at f. 44 per ton, the contractors signalled their 
confidence in enjoying a profit from extra work, and Robinson coolly remarked "it 
certainly is not the province of the Admiralty to take care that no loss should fall on the 
Parties who, as Men of Business, had every means of knowing how best to conduct their 
own affairs. " Now the Resistance was delivered far later than hoped, the Valiant's 
progress was in jeopardy and the final bill calculated by the Controller's Department was 
L157,972.11.02-a figure which put the Admiralty "ten thousand pounds beyond what 
they were strictly entitled to by the terms of the Contract. " Robinson accused them of 
more than carelessness in accepting the burden; in his opinion the builders were simply 
'wasteftil' and 'negligent' with the job itself The issue of added cost was, if anything, a 
justifiable complaint by the Admiralty, whose own proposal, Robinson noted, "appears to 
me to be as liberal ... as possible, unless manifest 
injustice were done to other 
Contractors. , 82 
Problems continued to emerge from every comer, however, which must have eroded 
Robinson's original optimism even when private contractors did feel obliged to "'tax their 
resources to the utmost". On the 5 May 1862 Robert Napier & Sons wrote to Romaine 
"the precedence of the Warrior was of no practical assistance to us, but was in many 
respects, and more particularly in the details of finishing the Black Prince after her 
launch, seriously detrimental from having to receive very often our instructions at second 
81 ADM 1/5802,0-3-1862. 
82 ibid. 
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hand from the Warrio? s Inspector. " This was despite the fact that work was performed 
day and night, "employing on the Black Pfince in the Building Yard alone fully 1600 
men. ..,, 
83 In addition to overruns of L8,463, Napier claimed an absence of actual profit in 
building Warrior's sister-ship, echoing directly the appeal made by Thames Iron the 
previous November. But Robinson disputed the figures as erroneous and the evident 
client jealousy as suspicious. In fact, "neither of the contractors received the whole 
command named for their respective Ships, each of them failed to deliver the Ship 
complete, and from the sum of 1255,164 which the Warrior cost, 13,578 was deducted on 
account of works done in the Dock Yard; and from the sum of f. 251,071 which the Black 
Prince cost, 110,818 was deducted for work done in the Dock Yard to complete the 
Ship. )584 
Nor was the problem restricted to the dockyards. The relatively sudden large scale 
manufacture of iron armour plates appears to have caught everyone unprepared. Between 
the delays occasioned by the ships themselves and the Admiralty's hesitancy in 
committing fully to designs from inception to actual achievement, the qualities of the all- 
important armour protection were sources of impediment. Hence, on the same day 
Napier was writing to Romaine, Robinson was obliged to report to the Board that "the 
supply of Armour Plates is in an unsatisfactory state": 
Nine Firms at the beginning of this year were after survey of their 
Premises considered to be capable of supplying Armour Plates of 
[solid] 41/2" thickness... 
Tenders have been accepted for the supply of Armour Plates, 
dependent on their due resistance to the effects of shot, from five 
Manufacturers for 6 Ships: 
Achilles W. Sanderson 
Royal Oak The Thames Company 
Royal A tfred Mess. Brown & Co. 
83 ADM 1/5802,8-5-1862, enclosed letter dated 5-5-1862. 94 Ibid. Robinson's reply to the Admiralty is dated 8-5-1862. 
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Ocean The Butterley Company 
Prince Consort W. Sanderson 
Caledonia Lancefield Forge 
Company 
Of the nine manufacturers above named four only up to this time 
have succeeded in making Plates which successfully resist the 
trials: 
The Thames Company 
Mess. Brown & Co. 
W. Sanderson 
Mess. Hill & Smith 
[not accepted for contract] 
The other firms though some of them are undoubtedly capable of 
manufacturing these Plates have failed to do so hitherto, the quality 
of the Plates having proved inferior, and unsuitable for the 
purpose. 
In November last a Tender was accepted for Armour Plating for 
the Caledonia from the Lancefield Forge Co. The Plates to be 
delivered in six months from the date of the order. 
No Plate that this firm has manufactured has stood the test, and 
five months have elapsed. 
In the month of January last a Tender was accepted from the 
Butterley Co. for Armour Plating for the Ocean. The Plates to be 
delivered in six months. No plate has yet been completed and 
85 consequently none have been tested. 
Robinson then recommended that the 5Y2-inch plate contract for Royal Sovereign be 
given to Brown & Co. As he confidently expressed, "I may add that there is no doubt of 
Mess. Browrfs capability to fulfil any Contract they may enter into, or of the excellency 
of the work they turn out, and that the prices named in their letter are reasonable. " This 
too would prove to be a completely ingenuous prediction. 
On 12 March 1862 Robinson reminded the Admiralty "the Warrior having 4V2-inches of 
iron Plating over 18-inches of Teak and the Minotaur and her class having 51/2-inches of 
Iron Plating over 9-inches of Teak, " the new armour scheme for the Minotaur-class 
broadside ironclads was still uncertain until the Iron Plate Committee, which seemed "to 
be rather doubtful whether SV2-inch iron plates of good quality can be manufactured, 
85 ADM 1/5802,5-5-1862. 
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though the Contractors for building these ships do not doubt that they can easily be 
procured, " actually conducted its tests. 86 By 15 May nothing was accomplished and 
again the Controller submitted an urgent request for a target to be fired upon at the testing 
grounds at Shoeburyness. 87 The results when they came were more than disappointing. 
Firing at the target with the new 12-ton gun (with cast-iron spherical, 150-lb. shot, and a 
50-lb. charge) at a combat range of 200 yards, "the general damage was much greater 
than in the Warrior Target, although the latter was subjected to much more severe fire. , 88 
After only four heavy shots the target itself was battered beyond service. The first shot 
alone bad "hit the centre plate ... and made a hole through the plate 12.5" x 12.2", and 
about 13" deep, " while the second hit had struck the bottom plate and gone clean 
through, making a hole "13" x 12.5"... " The test had proven the inadequacy of the new 
scheme, the crucial differences in iron plate manufacture (as some plates from submitted 
by different firms reacted better or worse than others), the inadequacy of the fastenings of 
the through bolts of even the first generation ironclads (less than 2 inches in diameter)- 
and the power of the heavier gun, as the much vaunted, traditional 68-pounder 
smoothbore fired immediately afterwards at the same range created serious dents but no 
penetration. The Committee's findings were that: 
The advantage of the Warrior wood-backing is fourfold. 
1. It stops small fragments of iron from entering the ship. 
2. If large pieces of the plate are broken off, it holds them in their 
places, and makes them still useful, to a certain extent. 
3. It deadens the jar, and so preserves the fastenings and the 
structure generally. 
4. It distributes the effect of the blow over a larger area of the 
skin and frame of the ship. 
We do not attach importance to wood as a support to the plate. In 
this respect we conceive it is inferior to more rigid material. 89 
86,4, DM 1/5802,12-3-1862. 
87 ADM 1/5802,15-5-1862. 
88 ADM 115 809,22-7-1862. 
89 ]bid. 
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With regard to the specific deficiencies of the iron-forging of certain private firms, even 
for those ironclads of the same class, the Iron Plate Committee remarked in September 
1862 that in testing the new "120-pounder Whitworth gun ... fired from a 600 yards range, 
at a target representing the side of the Warrior, " the plates were of a "very inferior 
character of the 4Y2-inch plates of which this Warrior target was composed. They were 
from Parkhead forge, near Glasgow, and are said to be of the number of those made for 
the Black Prince. "90 
By now the situation seemed to be getting worse rather than better, with British iron 
shipbuilding in the hands of private industry. The Controller noted five finns in 
particular, Napier, Thames, Laird, Samuda, and Mare, which were unacceptably 
delinquent with their orders: 
Ship Contractor Contract Price 
Minotaur Thames Iron Ship Building Co. 1321,117 
Northumberland C. J. Mare & Co. 
Agincourt J. Laird, Sons & Co. 1329,393 
Hector Napier & Sons 1172,677 
Valiant Westwood, Baillie, Campbell & Co. 1207,212 
Orestes (troopship) J. Laird, Sons & Co. 173,109 
Tamar (troopship) J. Samuda & Co. 168,188 
The situation with the Northumberland was worst. "The Contractors have been 
repeatedly written to and urged to expedite this Ship, but without effect. She should be 
launched in February 1863, but there is no prospect now of her being launched earlier 
90 ADM 1/5809,10-10-1862, enclosed reports, dated 16- and 25-9-1862. 
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than April 1864. " The counsel of the Admiralty Solicitor, moreover, could not easily see 
the contract withdrawn and handed to another builder for no other reason than 'slow 
progress', as this was not a specific clause in the contract. 91 A letter to Thames Iron 
regarding the "backward state" of the Minotaur met with a list of numbered complaints 
which included the alterations to the ship's design and construction ordered subsequently 
by the Admiralty. These involved the changing of a raised screw while under sail, as with 
the first generation ships, to a fixed one requiring the re-working of the complicated stem 
posts, and changes in the ar-mour itself in proportion to its wood backing. Robinson 
addressed these points one at a time, "in order to prevent the Board of Admiralty from 
being placed at a disadvantage at any future time, if the Company should become remiss 
and fail to complete the Contract within the stipulated time. , 92 
Even so, he must have felt that Thames Iron was not alone as, "the case of the Valiant has 
been already reported on, and the progress of that Ship has been far less satisfactory that 
that of the Minotaur. 03 Part of the problem was organisational, for even within the 
Admiralty misunderstanding, indecision and delay were likely if changes were not 
constantly made to meet the new demands. A revealing report on bureaucratic stiffness 
was made on 19 November 1862, entitled "Ships in Commission-Alterations & 
Additions, Mode of Processing". This described "the present roundabout practice ... as 
follows: 
The Captain writes a letter containing the suggestion to his 
Cornmander-in-Chief who forwards it to the Secretary of the 
Admiralty, who sends it to the Lord in whose department the 
matter is supposed to be, who orders the Controller to report, who 
sends it back to the Dock Yard Officers for the necessary 
91 ADM 1/5802,26-9-1862; also ADM 1/5802,2-7-1862, where the Solicitor's enclosed letter dated 3-7- 
1862 identifies the loophole in the contract. "the Admiralty have no power reserved to them by such 
Contract to enter and finish the Vessel until the period limited by the Contract for completin it has expired. 
There is no penalty for the non-progress of the WorL" 
92 ADM 1/5802,26-11-1862. 
93 ibid. 
( LO oLF; mav)! L L 
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explanations and reports, who send it back to the Controller, who 
sends the report with any observations he may think requisite to 
the Secretary of the Admiralty, who places it in the hands of the 
Lord to whose department it relates, who gives the requisite 
authority, which is communicated to the Controller. 94 
In December 1862 Rear-Admiral Robinson mounted a summary analysis of the needs of 
the Royal Navy. 95 The issue at stake, though superficially one of government decreases 
in dockyard wages, was nothing less than the ability of private industry to adequately 
provide for the needs of the nation. "The number of Men, Seamen, and Marines voted for 
the service of the Navy, " the Controller began, "tells directly on the number of men 
required in the Dock Yards. " As it was, for every man afloat there could be expected a 
rise in dockyard wages of LIO over the next three years and the proportion was a reliable 
indicator as the number of Men, Seamen and Marines voted for each year rose or 
declined. This represented a ratio of 40 per cent devoted to new ships, wood and iron, 
and the burden upon the Navy was only increasing as the number and tonnage of steam 
ships grew each year-which meant rising costs for maintenance and fitting as a whole. 
Furthermore, "it may ... be taken as a rule that one 
fourth of the whole Force afloat 
requires to be renewed every year, that is, that if 300 Ships are in Commission in any 
given year, 75 will be paid off and require repair and refit. " The number of ships in 
commission by the end of 1862 was such that nearly all of those ships paid off and 
requiring repair and refit, "must be carried over to the ensuing year, " whereas in the 
previous year already half of those paid off were necessarily carried over. 96 However, the 
number of new ships under construction was decreasing, which possibly meant breaking 
even in the estimates. In fact, Robinson calculated, "it is just 
94 ADM 1/5802,19-11-1862. 
95 ADM 1/5802,3-12-1862. 
96 Even Sir Frederick Grey of the Admiralty was obliged to respond to Vice-Admiral Milne's request for 
the replacement of ships on his precarious American Station that "we cannot divert our dock-yard men from 
more important work to do what is after all not an absolute necessity, " 4-10-1862, MP. 
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Year Number of Ships Tons 
1859 15 37,364 
1860 23 40,519 
1861 15 21,482 
1862 9 16,616 
possible to keep pace with the wants of the service with slight reductions in the Force of 
the Dock Yards... As far as can be foreseen there will be a saving on Vote 8 of between 
thirty and forty thousand pounds. 9,97 
But the issue before Parliament of a "total abandonment of Ships building in our Dock 
Yards would be a dangerous measure to adopt in the present transition state of our 
Military Navy, " and here the Controller ran through the main considerations, 
requirements, and objectives for Britain's ironclad program as he saw them. First, the 
issue between wood and iron ships was suggested as one between the "present large force 
afloat", and its maintenance, and the ability of Royal Navy yards to adopt to the utter 
necessity in naval warfare for annour cladding ships. 
Robinson's unequivocal belief that "the ordinary wooden Ship is sure to be immediately 
destroyed by the ordinary artillery of all nations, and the larger the Ship the more certain 
the destruction, " probably refers to the only such engagement known by 1863; the 
destruction of the frigates Cumberland and Congress by the ironclad-ram Virginia. Not 
just France, but "every maritime power, according to its means, has considered it 
indispensable to clothe its Military navy in Iron Armour, " yet because the greatest of 
these (and the nearest to England) had "perfected and prepared a large nwnber of [sea- 
going] Ships, " Robinson recapitulated the basic decision of the Admiralty that such 
ironclads "can only be met on equal terms by a similar description of Force .... a certain 
number of Ships which can contend on equal terms with our neighbours. " Hence the 
97 "M 1/5802,3-12-1862. 
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determination to employ numerous commercial iron shipbuilders-a recourse of little 
alternative when the Royal Navy itself was obliged to maintain in its own facilities such a 
'large force afloat' for the protection of British interests worldwide. 
Nevertheless this solution had only led to problems; "the work is slow, very expensive, 
requires an immense amount of inspection as to Workmanship and materials and in no 
case has such a ship been perfected without large expenditure of time and money in the 
Dock Yards. " Even if iron shipbuilding was found to be unquestionably better than 
wooden conversions, Robinson was severe in his judgment that "our past experience 
teaches us that no reliance whatever can be placed on private Shipbuilders keeping any 
engagements they may enter into with the Admiralty. " 
Since the Controller maintained "that our present large force afloat, and the reliefs that it 
requires, are insuperable objections to any considerable reductions in the expenditure of 
Wages in our Dock Yards, " the natural conclusion would be to favour wooden 
conversions into ironclads in the government facilities. It was the second plan adopted 
by the Admiralty in May 1861, along with the privately built iron-hulled ironclads, and it 
was bound to mitigate any "new discovery of the power of Artillery, " which "disturbs all 
foregone conclusions, " (and therefore suggested time-consuming iron-hulled ventures 
were short-lived in any case. ) This would both modernise the navy and free it from any 
commercial exploitation or failures. It would also give the Controller, the Navy, and the 
Government much more direct and encompassing control over the means of ironclad 
construction. After all, Robinson made sure to point out to the Admiralty, "whatever 
may be said as to Iron Ships Armour Plated it is to be remembered that we have not yet 
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afloat one Ship of that description plated from end to end, while several powers have 
actually sent to Sea wooden Ships so protected. ii% 
This marked a personal preference by the Controller for more fully-protected ironclads, 
more quickly produced, at less cost, and perhaps handier as well, if limited to some 
degree in range-although range was defined inevitably as the ability to be at least as 
good as the French examples. 99 It was a discussion of these very principles which suited 
the Royal Navy best in the mind of its Controller that contributed to the debates with 
Captain Coles. Likewise, it was the preference of Rear-Admiral Robinson for ships of 
the Royal Oak-class that sealed up the possibility for any large introduction of turret ships 
based on Coles' designs; for by the time the Admiralty was willing to seriously 
reconsider the inventor's claims-in the wake of the public furor which accompanied the 
news of the American ironclads-the nation's dockyards were already filled with wooden 
conversions and standard repair and fitting of wooden steam vessels on the one hand, and 
massive iron-hulled constructions on the other, which were consuming the full attention 
of those contractors they did not break altogether. 
" Ibid. 
99 in mentioning the capabilities of the "Prince Consort-class [Royal Oak-class]" at sea Robinson stated 
,, afler seeing the French and Italian Iron-clads, which perform all the service required of them in the 
Mediterranean, and elsewhere, I have no hesitation in saying that these ships are fully equal to them, and 
need not shrink from any comparison with any wooden Iron-clads afloat, " ADM 1/5892,19-11-1864. 
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Ill. Enter Captain Coles 
ne two trends in the British ironclad program, the move by Coles for turret ships as 
opposed to broadside-ironclads, and the desire of Robinson to shed the wooden bulk of 
the navy in favour of sea-going ironclads themselves more heavily annoured (and then 
armed), began their convergence back at the beginning of 1861.100 If the initial decisions 
of the Board of Admiralty were designed to answer the French challenge, ship to ship, 
then the list of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's new ironclad navy included a preponderance 
of floating batteries for coastal and harbour defence. 
101 The program which included the 
Valiant and Hector, the five Royal-Oak wooden conversions; the improved Warrior-ship 
Achilles; and then the even larger Minotaur-class iron broadside ships left no room for 
coast defence, as discussed above. As with the Warrior, the first instinct in filling in this 
strategic layer was to design a ship intrinsically superior to its French counterpart in 
every way. This included its powers to carry the war to the other side of the English 
Channel in an assault on heavily fortified naval bases such as Cherbourg. The original 
armoured floating batteries, if not the concept of "block ships", were constructed for this 
purpose to begin with during the Crimean War. 102 Their success at the bombardment of 
the forts at Kinbum protecting Sevastopol in September 1855 had proven the 
opportunities for penetrating closer to shore under heavy fire to deliver at close range the 
firepower more vulnerable, deeper draught wooden screw-liners dared not to. In that 
sense-and this is significant-the first coastal ironclads acted as almost classical siege 
engines. It was this stignia of steam "batteries" which clung to the perception of these 
types of ironclads in mid-nineteenth century naval warfare, and contributed to the 
100 ADM 1/5765,23-5-1861 "Iron Cased Ships". 
'0' Baxter, Introduction, 102-3,112,113-114. 
102 Hamilton, Anglo-French, 74-8: "the Crimean War at sea, primarily a coastal war, was distinctly peculiar 
in comparison with the kind of wars the British and French navies were accustomed to, where for the most 
part the great events had been engagements on the high seas. This peculiar war, and the new naval 
instruments it gave rise to, for some years closely shaped men's conceptions of future naval wars, even 
where the supposed opponents were Britain and France themselves, " 78. 
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prejudice of them against more traditional types of man-of-war, namely, the graceful 
sailing broadside vessels. Coastal ironclads were "infernal machines"; sea-going ones 
were "armoured shipe. 
Present at the Kinburn bombardments was Commander Cowper Coles, who three months 
before had devised a raft to cany a 32-pounder and its crew into shallow water and attack 
the guns at Taganrog in the Sea of Azov. The plan worked, but the inherent deficiencies 
of the French broadside-batteries at Kinbum, namely the large and vulnerable gun ports 
needed to permit the training of the guns on either axis, compelled him to seek an 
improvement. With the endorsement of his uncle, the Black Sea theatre second-in- 
command Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, Coles' idea for a steam-powered raft of extremely 
light draught (5-feet on average) mounting a single 68-pounder cannon in a 
hemispherical-though non-revolving turret-was sent to the Admiralty for 
consideration in November 1855.103 It was this occasion which the inventor would refer 
to on first receiving news of the U. S. S. Monitor, six and half years later. But one crucial 
difference was that the ship itself was expected to manoeuvre to bring its single gun to 
bear. Furthermore, because of its qualities as a close-shore vessel, both the Surveyor, 
Admiral Walker, and his Chief Constructor, Sir Isaac Watts, rejected the craft on 22 
January 1856 for its obvious poor seaworthiness, and for the lack of full annour 
protection in Coles' design. 104 
After several years Coles returned with a new submission, evidently taking into account 
many of the previous objections. He had now reversed his opinion that turning the ship 
itself was acceptable, when the armour-protected guns themselves could be mounted on a 
"' For one of the best accounts of Coles in this period see David B. McGee, "Floating Bodies, Naval 
Science: Science, Design and the Captain Controversy, 1860-1870". University of Toronto, unpublished 
Ph. D. thesis, 1994. 
104 Baxter, Introduction, 181- 195. 
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revolving turntable. With the Admiralty's order to build the Warfior, on II May 1859, in 
response to the French Gloire, Coles applied to mount several such "shotproof 
hemispherical screens" on similar vessels. 105 The improvement over a partially-protected 
fixed battery to him was obvious. But Walker first made the important observation- 
which was to harry Coles to the very end of his life-that: 
... as these guns with their screens are to be ranged at the mid-ship fore and aft line of the deck they could only occupy the intervals of 
space between the masts and finmel and other necessary middle 
line fittings of the vessel, while the spread of the shrouds for the 
support of the masts would very considerably restrict the degree of 
training of several of the guns, either therefore the guns must be 
small or the ship must have great length... 106 
It was a fundamental incompatibility between turrets and sea-going ironclads reliant upon 
sails as their secondary, even primary, means of propulsion. It is remarkable that Coles 
seems to have forgotten the tactical origins of annoured ships to begin with and focused 
his attention instead to their armament. Revolving turrets on light-draught ironclads had 
other merits than engaging fortifications on land, and the inventor was fairly obsessed 
with the conviction that revolving turrets held many advantages over the traditional, 
somewhat unimaginative broadside. But what he failed to grasp were the practical 
limitations to turret ships on the high seas-which at the same time were their greatest 
strength. If only broadside ships could be successfully relied upon to employ full sail for 
long-distance cruising or fleet actions on the open ocean somewhere, and turrets were 
superior to broadsides, then the strategic limitations to turret ships also involved the 
strategic limitation of broadside ironclads themselves. If the latter were to engage 
fortifications from any distance they would be prey to the former, whose zone of 
operation ships like the Warrior had overlapped. If the latter were denied the power to 
attack fortifications-or to conduct close blockades over ports defended by the latter, of 
105 Ibid., 187. 
106 Ibid., 188. 
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what use were they? They were superior to any wooden vessels on the high seas by 
being impervious to at least explosive shell-fire. This made them extremely potent as 
commerce raiders or protectors. Moreover, a squadron of such ships would be superior to 
a single ironclad of comparable strength. It was therefore the original threat from France, 
that greatest of continental powers who had often employed a guerre de course naval 
strategy against (Britain's) commerce, which drew attention away from the unique 
primacy of coastal defence implicit in Coles' turrets, while at the same time convincing 
the Admiralty that an ocean-going ironclad fleet was the only way to check French 
aggression in a naval war with her. It was an expensive hypothesis which even Coles 
bought into. 
The Admiralty, however, could recognise the potential value in turrets themselves, 
particularly for coast defence purposes. Shortly after Coles' submission in 1859 work 
began on commission to the private shipbuilder J. Scott Russell for the construction of an 
experimental turret on Coles' plans. This was ironic given Russell's claim to fame for the 
Warrior. In the meantime Coles prepared new specifications for a turret ship, which he 
finally patented on 15 June 1860. These included several revolving turrets mounted along 
the middle-line, and undoubtedly pointed the way towards the steel battleships of the 
future. The ship-platforin itself was fully armour-protected, the sides inclining at 40 
degrees from the water's edge to a point above the inclined truricated cone of the turrets 
themselves, which were thus partially sunk below the edge of the "upper deck". in 
essence, the ironclad, had it been constructed, may very well have resembled one of the 
later Confederate casemate-ironclads but with the superior feature of a turret armament. 
Only in the U. S. S. Dunderberg was this general scheme put into action, but before the 
massive casemate (which was also fitted for broadside ports) was completed the turrets 
above were left out. Coles also introduced the measure of "a flying bulwark ... capable of 
being turned down either inwards or outwards in order to allow the gun to be fired over 
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all from beneath the shield, " which would be a significant feature with future low 
freeboard turret ships rigged for sail, as "this flying bulwark would mask the battery until 
ý, 107 fire is opened, and shelter the crew in bad weather from wind and sea... His plan, 
however, does not specify whether the ship was intended for coastal or open ocean 
operations. Judging from the design it would seem more suitable for the former purpose. 
There are no details of sail configurations; the patent is for the turret and the armoured 
shell. Yet, as Baxter points out, Coles alluded to fifteen such vessels, each armed with 9 
turrets carrying 18 guns, at the Royal United Services Institution on 29 June 1860: 
An enormously strong ship is thus obtained-not weakened, as are 
ordinary ships, by numerous portholes, but having a continuous 
side, with the weights placed amidships instead of at the 
sides .... three of these shield ships would be equal to ten 3- deckers.... In future our fleets must fight in armour; and 
supremacy afloat must depend henceforth on superior ability to 
produce the new ships required. 108 
Here the reference to ironclad construction is telling for the efficiency of the ships in 
armour and size would make them generally less expensive than the controversial 
Warfior. Also significant is a reference not to tackling fortifications, or, at this point, not 
even enemy ironclads, but to wooden ships-of-the-line. To replace broadside ironclads or 
"3-deckers" with turret ships was never intended by Coles to forfeit command of the sea. 
Nevertheless, the sea-going oversights in the design did not escape the Admiralty 
constructors any more than before, even while the publicity of the concept began to 
expand. It was in fact a peculiar feature of the public debate which eventually surrounded 
Captain Coles and his turret-ship inventions that the issue was looked at from completely 
different ends. To the public at large, the superiorities of a turret ship over a fixed row of 
107 ADM 1/5802,6-5-1862; enclosed Specification of C per Phipps Coles-Iron-Cased ps of Wr Ow Shi a 
(London: George E. Eyre and William Spottiswoode, Great Sea] Patent Office, 1860); also Baxter, 
Introduction, 189. 
log ibid., 189. 
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guns were easy to understand. So was the concept of an ironclad itself, even though in all 
previous experience, the emphasis was just as much upon superior numbers of ships-of- 
the-line or seamanship than the particular form of the armament, or the physical 
protection of the vessel itself. The situation had now changed. In the Age of Sail (and 
then also steam), the best means of defence was in superior firepower alone. Wooden 
walls could deflect some shot, but that was not necessarily their purpose, and the key to 
preventing damage to one's own vessel was simply to inflict more on the opponent's first, 
and most-usually by manoeuvre (raking), range, or heavier weight of broadside at the 
closest effective range, and as fast as possible. Coles' inventions challenged this in 
several fundamental respects. The key to a superior offence was now in the superior 
defensive qualities of the armoured cupola. Coles does not mention weight of broadside 
or firepower because, as Spencer Robinson was to reassert, "two guns in a ship that 
cannot be sunk and where the battery is protected will prove more than a match for 
twenty, in an ordinary wooden Ship. "109 In an annoured ship range counted for little 
except for the actual likelihood of hitting the target, as with broadside fire, while the need 
for finding the proper tack or lee in combat was mitigated-even without the use of 
stearn-driven screws-by the manoeuvring of the ar m-ament itself, by forward or aft fire 
regardless of the position of the ship and in the tracking of an enemy. It was a better form 
of man-of-war altogether, and to a growing audience outside the Admiralty it was 
difficult to see why the professionals were hesitant to accept the obvious. 
On the opposite end of this debate, however, were the practical limitations in applying the 
principles of an armoured cupola to every purpose a man-of-war in the Royal Navy may 
have. In early 1861 the new Controller, Spencer Robinson, reported the opinions of the 
"professional officers of his department", Isaac Watts, and his assistants Joseph Large and 
Richard Abethall, that even "vessels of the size of the Gun Boats are much too small to 
109 ADM 1/5802,1-4-1862. 
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carry Captain Coles' revolving platform and iron shield or any adaptation of it (as 
recommended by Captain [Sherard] Osborne) without losing the advantage of light 
draught of water, and a great deal of stability. " Furthermore, "the propositions to armour 
plate the sides for the protection of the boilers; to place the Boilers within a dome of 
wrought iron, or to make the outer side of the wing boilers of increased thickness to resist 
shot; to employ wrought iron plates instead of wood more generally in the construction of 
Gun Boats; and to fit transverse watertight compartments in them, appear to us impossible 
to be carried out in such small vessels. " Osboume's original submission, dated 17 
November 1860, also made the often overlooked observation that "... from. the day rifled 
cannon came into use, ship armour and the introduction of vessels offering less larger 
area than our present line of battle ships, has become an absolute necessity for success in 
naval warfare. "' 10 
Nor was there any indication that a broadside-ironclad would be inferior to a turret- 
ironclad. While the turret ship could aim its armament more freely, the broadside ship 
had twice the guns and could engage simultaneous enemies in a sea battle. A similar 
exposition of the broadside argument began when Henry Hubbard, a Gunner on H. M. S. 
Gannet at Constantinople, wrote to his commander on 15 March 1861 of changes in 
armament "that will change this Ship into a good Fighting Sloop, capable of not only 
holding our own against, but proving very destructive to, an enemy of even superior 
numbers. " Hubbard argued for a smaller number of guns (though the new rifled, heavier 
ordnance of Sir William Armstrong) positioned on pivots which could deliver more 
overwhelming fire at a much longer range over a greater arc. The smaller number of guns 
would also entail a relatively smaller vessel, which was an advantage in combat. Captain 
Richard S. Hewlett, of the gunnery training ship H. M. S. Excellent at Portsmouth, 
110 ADM 1/5774,25-2-1861; enclosed letter from Captain Sherard Osboume to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated 17-11-1860. 
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disagreed. The problem to him was the slower speed of the Gannet, which would not 
allow her to choose the range. "Now it is in close Action that every Engagement will be 
brought to an issue, and although a Vessel with powerful long range Guns may no doubt 
annoy another from a distance of 1500 or 2000 yards, experience has shown us that a very 
large quantity of Ammunition may, under these circumstances, be fired away at a small 
object (constantly on the move) with little or no effect. ""' 
This time the Board sided with the lower rank. On 18 July Robinson acknowledged "the 
established armament of the present sloops of 17 and II guns being in many respects, and 
especially with reference to the more powerful nature of modem artillery, very 
inefficient, " that reducing the number of 17-gunned sloops to 6 guns with mobile guns 
would be superior. "The weight of shot thrown at a broadside by the proposed Armament 
will exceed that now delivered; the range will be far greater, and the angle of training of 
the guns on the broadside will be 100' as compared with 69' on the old plan. , 112 On 2 
September Grey confirmed the change in armament for the new steam sloops under 
construction. 
113 
Though the double armament added to the weight, length, draugbt, and cost of the 
broadside-ironclad, the actual weight, proportion and cost of any turret ships were yet to 
be discussed; and as long as the Warfior carried the heaviest guns available, in a larger 
quantity than the Gloire, behind armour thick enough to withstand most fire, she was 
herself "Mistress of the Seasý'. But still the ideas of Captain Coles, even before the news 
"'ADM 1/5774,18-7-1861; enclosed letter dated 15-3-1861, Gunner Henry Hubbard to Commander 
Lambert. 
112 Ibid. It is interesting to note the phrasing "weight of shot thrown at a broadside". This may have been 
referring to the growing likelihood that foreign station vessels might encounter armoured ships, where "the 
continuous fire from a greater number of smaller Guns ... spread more over the Vessel" would be futile. 113 ADM 1/5774,2-9-1861. In the summer of 1864, Gannet returned home for repairs and refit at 
Devonport; the Controller then ordered that "she should be armed during her next commission with a heavy 
gun in midships, and a lighter rifled pivot gun at bow and stem, in place of the eleven 32-pounders with 
which she was armed during her last commission, and of which ten were 25 ml. guns only, " ADM 1/5891, 
24-8-1864. 
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of the Monitor and the Virginia escalated the public debate into a national one (in March 
1862), whispered the latent contemporary appeal of "Progress" that experiments, if they 
were made, seemed bound to justify. 
Such an opportunity did not come until mid-September 1861, by which time, in addition 
to the first four broadside-ironclads-two large and two small-the British Admiralty had 
committed itself (in responding to the naval intelligence reports from Paris) to eleven 
modified ironclads of the more customary design. Coles' prototype turret, whose armour 
arrangement matched the Warrioiý's, was transferred to the Crimean War ironclad-battery 
H. M. S. Trusty for testing under severe fire. The trial was a complete success; the turret 
taking 33 hits from 68-pounder smoothbores and II O-pounder Armstrong rifled guns and 
yet proving capable of firing at moving targets without complication while the vessel 
itself turned. The loading of the guns themselves was also proven more efficient than the 
cramped broadside quarters. Interest in the highly publicised experiment went straight to 
the top. The Prime Minister (Palmerston) wrote with evident approval to his Foreign 
Secretary, Lord John Russell (I" Earl), on 24 September 1861 that "Somerset thinks that 
comparatively small iron cased ships armed in this way with all their guns, perhaps 16 on 
deck, and without any portholes and therefore low in the water, will prove formidable 
ships of war. "' 14 
The following day the Admiralty directed Robinson to report on Coles' proposals for a 
new ironclad warship. Despite noting that "the protection afforded by the Cupola to the 
guns' crews is complete, and far more effective against vertical as well as horizontal fire 
than that obtained by iron plating applied to the general form of ships sides; and the 
offensive power of guns in these shields is also considerably greater than that possessed 
by guns mounted in the ordinary way and fired through Port holes, " the Controller seems 
114 Baxter, InftWuction, 191-2. 
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to have come away from the interview with the captain-inventor somewhat confused. 
115 
First of all, it is likely that the design for "a Flush-deck vessel to carry two cupolas with 
four Armstrong guns" was in fact a modification of Coles' original June 1860 patent 
turret-vessel. Robinson's note of better protection from "vertical as well as horizontal 
fire" must refer to the angled turret ("shield") design; sloped at right-angle fire from 
another ship, and at right-angle fire plunging from directly above. He also remarks that 
"up to this time [Coles] has not clearly determined whether an inclined or vertical side is 
to be part of his plan. " He is probably not referring again to the form of the turrets 
themselves but the angled casemate of the ship itself This is corroborated in the 
enclosed "Remarks on the proposed Designs for a vessel to carry two of Capt. Coles' 
shields, " from the Chief Constructor, dated the day before the Controller's report. Here 
the Constructor notes two plans, where "the iron on the inclined side is ... too thin to offer 
effectual resistance to shot, being only equivalent to 41/2-inches vertical plates without 
,, 116 backin 
. 
As specified in Coles' 1860 patent, "the outer side is to be of iron and 
should be constructed as lightly as is consistent with the required strength. "' 17 Though 
the plans seemed sensible on paper, the Controller continued: 
But I cannot understand from anything that has been described to 
me by Captain Coles that the ship which is to carry these Cupolas 
stands less in need of Armour Plating than any other ship so that if 
their Lordships have decided, and decided wisely in my opinion, 
that every part of a ship must be protected in that manner, it will be 
necessary that Captain Cole! s ship should be plated all round as 
heavily as any other ship, and carry in addition the weight of the 
cupolas. To do this, and to obtain a tolerable degree of speed, 
larger dimensions per gun will be required than have yet been 
given in any ship, and consequently the expense per gun will be 
infinitely greater. 118 
115 ADM 1/5774,23-10-1861. 
116 Ibid. Previous British tests on annour plates indicated both that inclined armour afforded little more 
protection for. the added weight involved with the increased area required by the angle, and that wood 




If the ship in question was similar to Coles' 1860 patent, according to the opinion of the 
Constructor, and also Robinson, the whole concept of the angled sides was inadequate 
and required thicker support. As with the 1860 design the armoured vertical side which 
began at the waterline from the casemate had "the important defect that in consequence 
of not having sufficient displacement to allow of the Armour on the transverse bulkheads 
being carried more than 2ft 6ins below the waterline, the Engines, Boilers, and 
Magazines are greatly exposed to a raking fire. " According to the Constructor, if 
"sufficient security" was the issue, "a much larger ship would be required. " Whether or 
not there was an element of professional bias involved-for Coles' ship was in every way 
a public challenge to his own-this must have caused the Controller doubt, which was 
only increased when he promised the Board of Admiralty improved designs correcting 
the various flaws "as soon as I can get exactly from Captain Coles what is considered 
requisite for the proper adaptation of his shield to a sea-going sl-ýip. " 
Although events were finally underway which would lead to the order for both the Prince 
Albert and the Royal Sovereign-Britain's first turret ironclads-Coles himself must 
have come away from the October meeting somewhat disappointed. His inclined armour 
plan was clearly disapproved of and his lack of specific technical familiarity was exposed 
on several points. The most discomfiting of these, again, was the issue of sea-keeping. 
Robinson would most likely have preferred to abandon the inclined casemate. But as the 
vessel would still require extra armour protection below the waterline, and the ship would 
need to be enlarged to cany the added weight, and the more powerful engines and longer, 
finer-lined hull to adjust for the increase in weight and loss in speed, why not add more 
turrets? Robinson addressed the main issue directly when he remarked "that probably the 
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most disadvantageous mode possible of applying Captain Coles' shields to a ship is 
limiting the number of shields to two. ' 19 
119 Ibid. 
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IV. The spectre of modern coastal defence and assault 
During this time when Coles' scheme of armament was gaining acceptance, though the 
conundrum of how to actually exploit its qualities was surfacing, events abroad reminded 
British naval thinkers of the traditional character of sea power. As warships of the Royal 
Navy were about to operate with a French squadron off the coast Mexico, ostensibly to 
collect on defaulted loans, the Foreign Office inquired of the Admiralty of "the probable 
success of a combined military and naval attack on Vera Cruz. " 120 The two main 
concerns were the assault on the improved fortifications protecting the harbour and the 
"facilities or difficulties of a blockade of Vera Cruz and Tampico. " The Admiralty 
replied that since the forts were "built of a sort of coral rock which receives a shot 
without suffering much damage", and armed with 68-pounder smoothbores of English or 
Belgian make, that "a force of two line of battle ships and three frigates or corvettes with 
four gun vessels armed with 100 pdr. Armstrong guns, would be the least that could be 
sent with the prospect of having to encounter a serious resistance on the part of the 
Mexicans. Looking to the probable composition of a Mexican garrison and the probable 
defective organisation of the defence my Lords believe that a well arranged attack by the 
above detailed force would have a good probability of succeSS.,, 121 This was a sea-to-land 
ratio of almost 2-to-I in guns, with the heaviest guns available necessary to demolish the 
Mexican ramparts. Most likely, a covering barrage would be laid down from a protective 
though ineffective distance by the ships-of-the-line and frigates, while the shallow 
gunboats moved in to deliver a precise, devastating fire. But this was against a bankrupt 
non-'Power' without a navy, or the resources to fully develop one. 
120 ADM 1/5768,4-9-1861. See also Thomas Schoonover, "Napoleon is Coming! Maximilian is Coming? 
The international History of the Civil War in the Caribbean Basin, " in May, 7he Union, 101-13Q 
121 ADM 1/5768,4-9-1861. 
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A much more serious and complicated operation threatened in the following months 
during the Trent Crisis. Engaged in a continental-scale civil war, the United States 
nevertheless presented the Royal Navy with the gravest challenge it could imagine, 
despite Blackwood's confident assertion that "we shall assail their harbours, bum their 
fleets, destroy their commerce, and keep their whole seaboard in a state of constant 
alarm. "122 Unlike an assault upon French harbours or the maintenance of an effective 
blockade of the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of that nation, the logistical dimension 
alone of a war against the vast American eastern seaboard-on the far side of the Atlantic 
Ocean-was even more complicated in an age of steam-powered warships than in the 
wars of 1812 or the Revolution. Fuel was now a factor, supplied from the greatest of 
distances, along open-ocean routes subject to attack. 123 Effective convoy protection 
meant less ships available for blockade duty or the line-of-battle, let alone coastal defence 
for Britain against American privateers-while the ravages of the fast, heavfly-armed 
Confederate cruisers (built and building in Great Britain) were about to demonstrate that 
steam power offered an even greater flexibility to commerce raiding. Coal could be taken 
from captured ships, purchased with confiscated goods, or seized from the many 
unprotected depots of the British Empire around the world. Naval resources would be 
stretched far greater against Civil War America than in a war against the more prepared 
but much more proximate French or even undeveloped though extremely distant China- 
or Mexico. A 14 December 1861 circular from Colonial Secretary Henry Pelham, the 5 th 
Duke of Newcastle, "to the Governors of West India Colonies" thus warned that it would 
be 'impossible to increase the Land Forces now in the West Indies ... 
for repelling any 
attack of a predatory kind from which no disposition of H. M. 's Naval Forces can give 
them absolute security. " Local forces that could be scraped together by colonial 
122 Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, February 1862,228. 
123 During theTrent Crisis, the Royal Navy was quite aNvare that %vithout coal there could be no operations 
against the United States, with reinforcing steam colliers delivering at least 10,000 tons to various 




administrators would probably have to fend for themselves. 124 The old defences of 
Bermuda itself-Milne's chosen central base of operations-the British admiral found by 
the beginning of January 1862 to be "unstable and unsatisfactory ... still mounting 24 pdrs. 
instead of those of the heaviest calibre. " Although it "may be said to be no business of 
mine, " Milne wrote to his superiors in London, "the Navy is looked to for the defence of 
the Island[j indeed in its present state it would be impossible to leave it without Ships of 
War. , 125 On the other hand, Russell specified to Somerset a "first anxiety" of safely 
reinforcing Canada "without being intercepted" and then securing British trade with large 
numbers of protective cruisers well before "we may consider aggressive operationS.,, 126 
Somerset for his part was concerned that "some disaster" in Canada was "not impossible 
in the event of war"; openly consulting the best authorities for its defence first, he wrote 
to Lewis, would at least pre-empt a likely public inquiry afterwards, "as we shall have 
abundant advice after the event, telling us what we ought to have done. , 127 The bitter 
Crimean experience was still fresh in everyone's mind. 
Yet the biggest problem facing British politicians and naval thinkers at the end of 1861 
was not the defence of Canada, the maritime colonies, or the protection of trade, but 
laying down an offensive against the American coastline itself. If a maritime war with a 
continental power could be lost by England on the open sea lanes, it could only be won 
against the shores of the enemy. 128 Earlier that year a confidential printed report was 
circulated on what would be required for such a campaign. This was the List of the Chief 
Ports on the Federal Coast of the United States, showing the Shipping, Population, 
DocAyards and Defences asfar as known; also howfar accessible or vulnerable to an 
Attack, asfar as can he gatheredfrom the Charts. With an approximate Estimate of the 
124 ADM 128/56,14-12-1861. 
125 2-1-1862, Milne to Somerset, SP. 
126 28-12-1861, Russell to Somerset, SP. 
127 5-12-1861, Somerset to Lewis, SP. 
12s Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance ofPower in North America 181.5-1908 (Berk-eley: University 
of California Press, 1967), 20647. 
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Number of Vessels required to blockade the several Ports and Rivers-a valuable expose 
of the British conception of blockade and assault existing in 186 1.129 It begins with the 
geographical setting. "The length of the seaboard of the United States, not including bays 
and rivers, from the eastern frontier in the Bay of Fundy to Cape Hatteras, soudi of the 
Chesapeake, is about 1,300 miles. " By breaking this imposing stretch down the report 
optimistically denotes "seven principal ports and five secondary places, which it might be 
considered right to blockade. " But in addition to the size of the task involved, there was 
the factor of time. Every day the resources of the North were being mobilised, and the 
defences of each place improved. Regarding Portland, Maine, for example, the entrance 
to the principal channel leading to within three-quarters of a mile to the city itself is listed 
as protected by two forts on either end of the approach, 1,000 yards apart, with a third fort 
building deeper in the centre, forming a triple cross-fire. It was a typical harbour defence 
leftover from the previous national coastal fortification program (which confronted so 
many Union planners throughout the Civil War), augmented by modem ordnance. 
130 
if the channel was obstructed for the passage of deep-draught ironclads, however, or 
sown with torpedoes (mines), the attack could be quickly stalled under fire. 131 Perhaps it 
was for this reason that Milne "would rather have avoided or ... 
felt my way at Portland, 
than at once adopting any active operations against that Town and State" in addition to 
129 List of the Chief Ports on the Federal Coast of the United States, showing the Shipping, PopulatioT4 
Dockyards and Defences asfar as known; also howfar accessible or vulnerable to an Attack asfar as can 
be gatheredfrom the Charts. With an approximate Estimate of the Number of Vessels required to blockade 
the several Ports and Rivers (London: HMSO, 1861); copy found in MP. Boume identifies the author of 
the report as Captain John Washington, FLN., the Admiralty Hydrographer from 1855-62, Bourne, Britain, 
240. 
130 MP, List, I. See also Samuel J. Watson, "Knowledge, Interest and the Limits of Military 
Professionalism: The Discourse on American Coastal Defence, 1815-60", War in History, Vol. 5, No. 3 
(1998). 
131 'Me List also warns "the blockading ships ... must 
be on their guard against torpedos [sic], explosion 
vessels apparently laden with flour, but really with gunpowder, and other atrocious contrivances. The 
Ramilies, while lying here in June 1813, was nearly destroyed by one of these explosion vessels, fitted out 
by some merchants of New York; fortunately the vessel was not brought alongside, but one officer and 10 
men fell victims to it, " 5. 
72 
unrealistic British hopes that Maine would contemplate secession if Union leaders 
foolishly allowed the Civil War to escalate into a world war. 
132 
Natural obstruction by ice was also a factor, and the greatest concern in the report is, of 
course, draft of water. Milne, for example, was alarmed to observe U. S. warships taking 
soundings at Bermuda and stressed the need for British ships to do the same in American 
ports while peace still remained. 133 In the case of Boston, The List of Chief Ports noted 
"the harbour is spacious and safe when once inside, but the entrances are intricate, with a 
depth of only 18 feet in some parts at low water, or 27 feet at high water. " Furthermore, 
"all the forts looked new and in good order when seen last autumn. Fort Warren on 
George island is a double tier of casemates, probably with the American or small 
embrasure, faced with 8-inch wrought iron. " Given this, the report was forced to conclude 
that "it is probable that Boston could not be attacked with any hope of success, " although 
a blockade of the entrances to the city from the sea was possible with "at least ... one line- 
of-battle ship, two fiigates, two sloops, and two gunboats. 15134 Indeed, it seems more 
likely that Milne preferred counter-blockade and a disruption of Union "communications" 
rather than "to make war felt" by carrying it out "against the Enemy with Energy, and 
every place made to feel what War really iS.,, 
135 This type of operational strategy was 
simply less risky than direct assault since it allowed the British to fight on "chosen 
ground" of their own: the open sea. Here, factors such as draft of water and natural or 
man-made obstructions could be safely and conveniently ignored; even 
"manoeuvrability" to a far greater extent. 
132 24-1-1862, Milne to Somerset, SP. 
133 ADM 1/5787,31-12-1861. 
134 MP, List, 2-3. 
135 See Bourne, Britain, 23744. Bourne concludes that "it was almost entirely upon the moral and military 
effectiveness of the blockade [of the Northern States] that all Great Britain's chances of success seemed to 
depend, " 244. 
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The primary case in point in any proposed offensive operations against the United States 
was New York City, "the commercial capital of the United States, [with] a population of 
600,000 [and] near one million tons of shipping. " Likewise, however, the city's defences 
are listed in the survey as "10 or more forts and batteries, " some of which carry "every 
modem improvement; the guns, too, no doubt are of heavy calibre. " When questioning 
the "practicability or policy of an attack on the city of New York, "' the report continues, 
"there are so many circumstances to be considered that it might appear preswnptuous, at 
present to offer any remark. " But in a breathtaking scenario, the attack is indeed played 
out in the List-and "which is by no means recommended" in reality. Even if the 
gauntlet could be successfully run, "All that could be done then, would be to hold out the 
threat of bombarding the city unless the ships of war were surrendered and the Navy Yard 
destroyed": 
This measure n-dght have the effect of putting an end to the war, 
and if so it might be worth the risk. But the risk would be too great 
if the intention transpired and time were allowed the enemy to 
make preparations. The only hope of success would be to obtain 
good local pilots beforehand, to appear off Sandy Hook by day- 
break, at half-flood tide, and to make a bold dash for 16 miles from 
sea to the quays of New york. 136 
There are weaknesses in the conception of the report itself Laced with references to the 
deployments of the War of 1812, it often notes an effective blockade of a major port 
maintained by a single wooden man-of-war. Nor does it seem to take steam-powered 
blockade-runners into consideration, operating regardless of the wind. On Admiral 
Milne's copy of the List, the Commander-in-Chief of any probable naval war against the 
Union remarked that the proposed total number of warships outlined in the report ("6 
Line-of-Battle, II Frigates, 23 Sloops, and 20 Gunboats") was "entirely inadequate". 
Reflecting after the immediate danger posed by the Trent Affair had passed, Milne wrote 
136 MP, List, 7-8. 
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to Somerset that even the renowned steam-frigates of the Orlando-class-the British 
response to the pre-Civil War threat posed by the American navy's slow but powerfidly- 
armed Merrimack-class steam-firigates-would "prove unsatisfactory to the service as Sea 
Boats, and will work themselves to pieces, nor can the rudder exert its power over them, 
the Leverage is too great and they fall off into the trough of the Sea. " For littoral warfare, 
if not also blockade, the greater need was for paddle-steamers, the "most efficient and 
useful vessels for every service". 137 
The presence of steam-and-sail ships-of-the-line in American waters Milne meanwhile 
regarded as a positive drawback. T'his was dramatically underscored on 29 December 
1861, when the 27-foot draft steam ship-of-the-line H. M. S. Conqueror mortally ran 
aground at Rum Cay, Jamaica. 138 By early March, Milne's opinions against them had 
crystallised. In a highly significant letter to Sir Frederick Grey he reflected: 
If it had been war the great want would have been Frigates and 
Corvettes. By my letter to the Duke you would see the large 
service I had in view, and the Line of Battle ships would never 
have stood the gales and sea off the American coast. Every one of 
them would have been disabled, in fact I don't see of what service 
I could have employed them. As to attacking Forts it must never 
be done by anchoring ships but by ships passing and repassing in 
rotation so as not to allow a steady object to the Enemy. Ships 
with larger draft of water are unfit for this mode of attack you need 
not build any more. Their days are numbered except [against] 
France ... if she ever gets up a Navy. 
139 
With frequent references to modem, heavy, shell-firing guns in networks of fortifications, 
the List relies in no small degree upon iron-plated frigates to make coastal assaults, let 
alone blockades, truly successful. The presence of "iron", as such, protected traditional 
137 24-1-1862, Milne to Somerset SP. See also Milne's forwarded reports on various defects of vessels 
under his command in ADM 128/7,21-3-1862. In contrast, Robinson, the Controller, did not see the need 
for building any more paddle steamers 'for war purposes", nor even continue building unarmoured screw 
vessels, " ADM 115 802,5-4-1862. 
138 See ADM 1/5787,29-12-1861; also 17-1-1862, Milne to Grey, MP. 
139 10-3-1862, Milne to Grey, MP; also 15-5-1862, Milne to Somerset SP. 
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"wood" against modem ordnance. Whether this concern was well-founded is another 
matter, since at least American Civil War combat experience went both ways; some 
vessels were quickly devastated by close-range shell-fire, while others absorbed 
surprising amounts of punishment. What is certain, however, is that the added tactical 
risk of facing American ordnance necessitated the strategic presence of British ironclads. 
Even Palmerston was quick to point out to Somerset the desirability of sending either the 
old Crimean War ironclad batteries or the new armoured frigates (most of which were 
still under construction) since "the Americans put large Shell throwing Guns into all their 
Ships of War and our Ironsides would check mate such assailants. " "It seems to me, " the 
Prime Minister added at the height of the Trent Crisis, "that the only Danger we can have 
to apprehend from the American Navy would arise from their having armed their vessels 
with very heavy guns throwing large Shells, and being therefore Gun for Gun probably 
stronger than ours of similar classes. " Two days later, Grey confirmed this opinion. 140 
Yet missing especially in late-1861 British plans for assaulting or even blockading the 
Northern States was a consideration of the possibility of ironclad vessels emerging from 
the harbours or inlets to challenge enemy ships, wood or iron, although The List of the 
Chief Ports does mention a large broadside-ironclad (U. S. S. New Ironsides) building at 
"the private shipyard of Messrs. Cramp & Son ... for the use of the United States 
Government", and to be "ready for sea by the middle of July 1862. qi141 On 3 December 
1861 the Foreign Office also transmitted to the Admiralty a copy of the New York Herald 
(dated II November) which noted the second of the three ironclad prototypes approved 
by the Union Navy's Ironclad Board of 1861, the Galena, an important token of "the 
many improvements and the ideas that will be gained by experience" which would allow 
140 6-12-1861 Palmerston to Somerset; and 28-12-1861, Palmerston to Somerset, SP. See the collection of 
reports on "New Scheme of Armament for I-I. M. Ships, in consequence of Introduction of Armstrong Gun" 
in ADM 1/5792. 
141 MP, List, 9. 
76 
the Union Navy "to cope with any of the boasted navies of Europe. "142 But how would 
the Royal Navy in turn cope with Federal ironclads? 
Another important reference which the List makes when discussing the armament of 
Fortress Monroe, but does not weigh accordingly, is of "a 15-inch gun, named Rodman's 
gun, cast at Pittsburg, on the Ohio, (300 miles west of Philadelphia) which throws a solid 
shot of 420 lbs. weight, and the bursting charge of its shell is 16 lbs. of powder. Weight 
of gun nearly 22 tons. 17143 For the next four years this massive-calibre weapon, the main 
armament for most of the U. S. monitors constructed during the Civil War, would earn a 
reputation for smashing 4- to 6-inch laminated (though inclined), rolled armour plating. 
It was the nightmare of wooden warships failing prey to shell-firing guns writ large for 
early British ironclads. 
Summary: 
It was difficult to establish first, what Britain's overall strategic objectives were 
concerning the role of the Royal Navy by the 1860s, and second, how those objectives 
were to be met by various-and opposing-types of armour-plated warships. The 
traditional response to French challenges was to out-build them, shipfor ship, perhaps 
also achieving a qualitative as well as quantitative edge. Yet the advent of ironclad- 
frigates complicated this formula. It was not seen as possible to reconcile full armour 
protection with the greatest tactical speed and strategic range in one design. There 
142 ADM 1/5768,3-12-1861. Lyons also forwarded to Lord Russell at the Foreign Office the 5 December 
Daily Globe's full reprint of the U. S. Secretary of the Navy's Annual Report to Congress of 2 December 
1861, listing 3 ironclads under construction; ADM 1/5768,26-12-186 1. 
143 MP, List, 10. 
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would have to he some compromise. The Royal Oaks thus represented an 
acknowledgment that regional supremacy, hased on morefully-protected ironclads ofat 
least equal numbers to French varieties, was more important than high seas or imperial 
supremacy. Meanwhile, a Colonial Office memo ohserved that "the Colonies, especially 
the lesser Colonies which most call for assistance, are not separate nations; they are 
memhers of one immensely powerful and wealthy nation, from which they helieve that 
they are entitled to some share of general protection. The question is what that share 
should he. , 144 
Even when the Board ofA dmirally decided to push ahead with super iron-hulled Warriors 
in the form of the Achilles and then the Minotaur-class ironclads it became doubffiul 
whether British private industry andshipbuildingwouldbe able to meet the new demands 
of the Royal Navy. Somerset complained that a Committee on Dockyard Economy 
unfairly concluded "that the Dockyards will not bear comparison with the private 
establishments of the day. "145 If anything, the needfor more comprehensive strategic 
protection, as well as tactical protection in the shape andform of ironclads themselves, 
required equally greater consolidation of modern shipbuilding in the dockyards, under 
tighter government control, than otherwise. This would be an expensive undertaking, and 
did not sit well with Liberal drives for retrenchment; hence the appeal of Coles in 
providing the "most economical ship " which would also be the "most invulnerable and 
the most durable "-though his system of turret-ship conversions of steam ships-of-the- 
line could really only offer "National ". as opposed to Imperial, defence. 146 
144 28-1-1860, Colonial Office memo, written by T. Frederick Elliot, dissenting from a recent Report on 
military expenditure on the Colonies; WO 33-09,3. 
145 February 1860 printed memo, Somerset to Board, ADM 1/5741,12. 
146 Cowper Phipps Coles, Shot-Proof Gun-Shields, as Adapted to Iron-Cased Shipsfor National Defence, 
pamphlet reprinted from the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. 4,1860, from his lecture 
dated 29-6-1860 (Westminster: J. B. Nichols and Sons, 1860), 12. 
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What caught the British Empire in the proverbial flank-obsessed as it was with the 
recent French challenges to its naval supremacy-was the prospect ofhostilities against 
the Northern States at the beginning of the American Civil War. By then it was already 
questionable whether steam power entailed a greater economy of resourcesfor modem 
naval operations or had injact made them much more difficult and expensive. Added to 
this was the relative efficiency ofýlue-water, battlefleet warshipsfor close blockade work 
against the treacherous American coastline. Coastal or harbour assault itselfAdmiral 
Milne discounted as too risky, depending as it did upon Union defences not being ready 
intime. Though the naval and military build-up during the Trent Crisis would succeed in 
convincing Washington that the Union was indeed not prepared by the end of 1861 for a 
hostile dose ofBritish seapower, it also stressed to British authoritiesjust how perilously 
transitional thatforce had become. 
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V. Two ironclad adversaries: the Confederacy and Great Britain 
The creation of the ironclad navy of the United States was directed against two 
adversaries; one actual, and one potential; the Confederate States, and Great Britain. 
Before the Civil War erupted in America, with the bombardment of Fort Sumter on 15 
April 1861, few U. S. naval authorities gave the matter serious thought. In the beginning 
of 1860, Scientific American bemoaned the fact that "at present we have not a single first 
class war steamer-one that can compete with the most recently built French and British 
ones, and we regret that the Secretary of the Navy has not paid attention to these-we 
mean the iron-cased war wolves. "147 Indeed, Secretary Isaac Toucey's Annual Report in 
question (I December 1860) stated that "to arm a ship of war without a modem patented 
invention would give great advantage to the enemy, " but nowhere mentioned the 
phenomenon of armour-plating men-of-war occurring across the Atlantic. Instead, he 
cceamestly" recommended "the policy of a gradual, substantial, and permanent increase of 
the Navy, accompanied by the universal introduction into it of the motive power of 
steam. " There were important contemporary issues involved. Since the U. S. Constitution 
prohibited states from developing navies of their own-creating yet another potential 
source of complaint for advocates of "States' Rights'! ---it was even more imperative for 
Congress "to provided and maintain a naval force adequate to our [national] 
protection. 9148 
Probably no other American naval officer was better qualified to offer an opinion 
regarding ironclads than Commander John A. Dahlgren. Already famous for the 
widespread adoption of his shell-firing 'bottle-sliaped' heavy smoothbore cannon in the 
U. S. Navy, Dahlgren had also established himself as an authority on contemporary naval 
147 12-1-1860, Scientific American, 25. 
148 36 Ih Congress, 2 nd Session, Senate Executive Document No. 1, Vol. 3 (Washington: GPO, 1860), 
Messagefrom the President of the United States; Report ofthe Secretary ofthe Navy, 1-12-1860,3-5. 
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strategy and tactics with his treatise on Shells and Shell-Guns, published in 1857. This 
included a detailed analysis of the Crimean War, which Dahlgren suggested pointed to the 
superiority of the steam-powered vessel over forts, especially when running gauntlets of 
fire. It also demonstrated, at Kinbum, the value of impregnable floating batteries, at least 
46as auxiliaries in attacking shore works". 149 On 10 December 1860, Dahlgren, as 
Commander in charge of the Ordnance Department at the Washington Navy Yard, wrote 
to Captain George A. Magruder, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, 
that "the earnest attention now given by naval authorities to the armature of ships-of-war, 
and the enormous expenditure which England and France are incurring in building ships 
of this description, induce me to recall the attention of the bureau to the suggestions made 
by me on this subject several years ago. " Dah1gren recognised from successful tests of 
his 9-inch shells against wooden targets in 1852 that "the sides of a vessel may be 
protected by iron frames or plates as to make it nearly certain that shells will break by 
impinging them. " But permission was not given at the time to conduct armour plate tests 
of his own. 150 
By 2 February 1861, Dahlgren was writing to Senator James Grimes of Iowa, Chairman 
of the U. S. Senate Naval Committee, it was "advisable that the construction of some 
armored Gun Boats should be proceeded with. " But this should not be "to the exclusion 
of at least the one heavy fiigate" which Dahlgren specified as a ship "of 5ooo to 6000 
Tons", and which "may cost 1% to 2 millions which is the estimated expense of the 
English Plated-frigate Wartior, just launched-$500,000 will do to begin with. " Haste 
was needed, "for with all effort it would not be possible to get a ship ready for service in 
less than two years. " This was unusual, since the previous month he informed the House 
Chairman of Naval Affairs that "Gun Sloops [were] a class of vessel more needed in the 
149 j. k DaWgrer4 Shells and Mell-Guns (Philadelphia: King & Baird, 1857), 412-5. 
150 10-12-1860, Dahlgren to Magruder, DP; also 4-5-1861, Scientific American, 274. 
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Navy than any otheeý--if an ironclad were to be considered-suggesting the recent 
Iroquois-class as a model to be plated. 151 What was a long-range, ocean-going ironclad 
needed for? The ordnance expert did not specify, but noted instead an inquiry "from one 
of our most eminent private Ship Builders" (Donald McKay, of Boston) on armament 
schemes for various classes of ironclads. "Unless Government acts promptly, " Dahlgren 
cautioned, "it will be anticipated by private enterprise. " Presumably, this would be a fate 
worse than falling behind England or France. Nevertheless, in response to Donald 
McKay's inquiry, Dahlgren had to "regret to perceive that this Congress is not likely to 
make any appropriation for constructing an Iron plated ship. "152 
With a civil war looming, it was difficult to determine what kind of naval force would be 
needed to protect, if not preserve, the Union. The U. S. Navy's instincts were blue-water; 
the disposition of its existing warships, protecting far-flung American commercial 
interests, was proof of that. The initial public and professional reaction to European 
ironclad programs was to meet them on similar terms, differences in broadside armament 
notwithstanding. John Lenthall, Chief of the Bureau of Ship Construction and Repair, 
therefore rejected many early proposals coming into the Navy Department, typically 
because "the necessarily large size, the cost and the time required for building an iron 
cased steam vessel is such that it is not recommended to adopt any plan at present. t9153 
Yet opinion across the Atlantic was not so clearly united. "We cannot, with our wide- 
spread dominions, or colonies and commerce dotted all over the surface of the globe, 
expect to be superior at every assailable point, " argued Blackwood's in March 1861, "and 
we should utterly fail if, in the event of war with a great maritime power, we attempted to 
151 11-2-1861, Dahlgren to Grimes; 19-1-1861, Dah1gren to Morse, DP. See also Donald L. Canney, The 
Old Steam Navy, Volume 7Wo: Yhe Ironclads, 1842-188.5 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 7. 
152 11-2-1861, Dahlgren to Grimes; 20-2-1861, Dahlgren to McKay, DP. 
153 Quoted from Baxter, Introduction, 242. 
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be everywhere in force at the same time-a strategy which seems to be indicated by the 
powerful efforts made to produce that marine impossibility, great fighting-power and 
great speed. " Instead, Britain should have "a number of iron-clad vessels for the defence 
of our coast and narrow seas. Let them be capable of going as far as Brest or Cherbourg 
on the one hand, and Antwerp, Rotterdam, or Copenhagen on the other. "154 
For Gideon Welles, the new Secretary of the Navy coming to office during a civil war, 
"the necessity of an augmentation of our navy in order to meet the crisis ... was 
immediately felt, and a class of vessels different in some respects from any that were in 
service, to act as sentinels on the coast, was required. , 155 These 23 purpose-built, 
wooden-hulled, screw-driven steamships were later nicknamed the "90-Day Gunboats", 
for their speed of construction. They could operate in shallow draft, and mounted a heavy 
I Much Dahlgren smoothbore pivot. Already, the appropriations voted to the end of the 
fiscal year (3 0 June 1862) had jumped during the secession crisis-before Congress could 
approve-from $13,168,675 to $30,609,520, including the purchase or charter of 21 
steam and 3 sailing merchant vessels. But although "much attention has been given 
within the last few years to the subject of floating batteries, or iron-clad steamers" (surely 
the ultimate sentinels on the coast), Welles doubted whether "the period is perhaps not 
one best adapted to heavy expenditures by way of experiment and the time and attention 
of some of those who are most competent to investigate and form correct conclusions on 
this subject are otherwise employed. " Still, he recommended the appointment of a special 
board to report on "a measure so importanf'. 1 -6 
154 March 1861, Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 311,316. 
155 74-1861, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 90. 
156 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 96. Captain Gustavus Vasa Fox, also the newly-appointed 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, testified before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War on March 
19,1862 that "this matter of iron-clad vessels was brought up by the department a year ago, and Congress 
was asked for an appropriation of $50,000 in July to test the different kinds of plating, which was refused. 
We went to the President and he held a meeting at General [Winfield' Scott's office, and we were 
authorized to go ahead, without waiting for Congress, and make these iron plates. But when we came to 
call for proposals, which we did without authority from Congress, we ran against this difficulty-that there 
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Within weeks at least two important contenders for contracts for ironclads, Donald 
McKay and Cornelius Bushnell, were writing to Commodore Joseph Smith, the Head of 
the Bureau of Yards and Docks regarding any decisions on a Union progrwn for their 
construction. 157 Finally, on 3 August 1861, by an Act of Congress, Welles was directed 
"to appoint a board of three sldlftd naval officers to investigate the plans and 
specifications that may be submitted for the construction or completing of iron-clad 
steamships or floating batteries to be built, " appropriating $1,500,000 for the purpose. At 
the time this was equivalent to 000,000, the rough price of a single Warrior. 
Whether the Union would invest in such an "iron-clad steamship" or "floating batteries", 
however, was unclear. As J. P. Baxter noted, even getting Welles' proposal for an 
ironclad Board through Congress was not an easy affair, despite the grandiose vision (and 
therefore naval requirements) of the well-publicized "Anaconda Plan"158 and the 
emerging reports that the rebels at Norfolk had salvaged the wreck of the Merrimack-to 
convert her into a powerful ironclad of their own. A House amendment to Senator 
Grimes's 19 July bill for an Ironclad Board nearly made completion of the abortive 
Stevens Battery a condition for the special $1.5 million appropriation since the Senate 
opposed this. Referring back to the Navy's strategic requirements, Grimes argued "it was 
supposed to be possible that a conflict with some foreign Power might grow out of our 
present complications... " Moreover, "in that event it might be important to provide 
armored batteries, floating steam batteries, for the defense of the various harbors along 
was a limit to the making of these vessels. There is no preparation for making the plates in this country, 
except by forging them, which is altogether too slow and tedious for the necessity. There is but one rolling 
mill in the country that can make the plates by rolling, and that is the one that made the plates for the 
Monitor, " Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 3 vols., 37h Congress, Yd Session, 
1863, "Monitor and Merrimack"I 3: 416. 
157 See 24-7-1861, McKay to Smith, and 25-7-1861, Smith to Bushnell, RG 45, Entry 464, Box 49. 
15' Formulated by General Winfield Scott at the beginning of the Civil War, the Union's derisively 
nicknamed -AnacondaP would (too) slowly strangle the Confederate States into submission with a 
continental scale blockade, while Union land and naval forces further cut off the South, East from West, by 
gaining control of the Mississippi River. 
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our sea-coast. " These statements more clearly reflected the national resentment with 
England's neutrality-the threat of recognition of the Confederacy and an ensuring 
Anglo-American maritime war-Lincoln's perception of the global political and social 
significance of the Civil War; and Wel-les' "immediately felt" need for a brown-water 
naval force. "The sole purpose of this bill, " Grimes acknowledged, "is to enable the 
Secretary of the Navy to construct some floating steam batteries that can take position on 
either side of a harbor, or in the center of a harbor, to resist the ingress of vessels of 
war. 29159 
The story of how civilian engineer-inventor John Ericsson entered into the scene at this 
point has been well told many times before. During the Ciimean War, Ericsson submitted 
plans for an "Iron-Clad Stearn Battery, with Revolving Cupola" to Napoleon III. This 
was essentially a monitor. In his proposal to the French Emperor, dated 26 September 
1854, Ericsson declared that "the present system of long range is abortive" in naval 
combat tactics and technology. Smaller, rifled projectiles lacked sufficient weight and 
therefore hitting power; while "accurate aim at long range becomes absolutely impossible 
in practice. " What was needed therefore was a "complete system of naval attack" with a 
"self-moving vessel capable of passing within range of guns and forts, and of moving at 
pleasure in defiance of the fire of broadsides. " Yet despite its amazing inherent defensive 
powers (low freeboard and "semi-globular turret of plate iron 6 inches thick"), and the 
concentrated, all-powerful armament scheme-what torpedoes would be for submarines 
in the following century-Ericsson's dream-ironclad lacked auxiliary sail power, extra 
coal bunkers, or some equally revolutionary form of super-efficient steam engine. 
159 Quoted from Baxter, Introduction, 246, ff. 1. 
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Though it would "place an entire fleet of sailing vessels, during calms and light winds, at 
the mercy of a single craft", this was implicitly a coastal system of naval attack. 
160 
Ericsson was originally called upon by Bushnell to inspect the latter's own plans for an 
ironclad which he intended to submit to the Ironclad Board of 1861 (which consisted of 
Commodore Smith, Commodore Hiram Paulding and Commander Charles H. Davis). 
This vessel, later to become the U. S. S. Galena, was largely approved by Ericsson, who 
then revealed to Bushnell in the form of plans and a cardboard model complete with a 
revolving turret his own conception of a "perfect ironclad". Bushnell, immediately 
intrigued, pressed Ericsson to submit the design to the Board, and then gained the 
stubborn and doubtful inventor's permission to bring it to Washington for him. On 29 
August 1861 Ericsson drafted a letter to Lincoln seeking "no private advantage or 
emolument of any kind" for his ironclad proposals, since a thousand of his caloric engines 
already provided him with enough personal means. "Attachment to the Union alone, " he 
declared, "impels me to offer my services-my life if need be-in the great cause which 
Providence has called you to defend. " His battery could within 10 weeks "take up 
position under the rebel guns at Norfolk and ... within a 
few hours the stolen ships would 
be sunk and the harbor purged of traitors. " Ericsson concluded by drawing the 
President's attention to the "now well established fact that steel clad vessels cannot be 
arrested in their course by land batteries". New York was therefore "quite at the mercy of 
such intruders, and may at any moment be laid in ruinr-unless the Union possessed 
ironclads impervious to Britain's "Armstrong Guns" and were armed in turn with armour- 
crushing ordnance. 
161 Meanwhile, on 3 September, Merrick & Sons of Philadelphia 
proposed to Welles "an iron plated steamer" taking nine months to build at a cost of 
160 ., Of What avail would be the 'steam guard-ships' if attacked on the new system? Alas! for the 'wooden 
walls' that formerly 'ruled the waves. ' The long-range Lancaster gun would scarcely hit the revolving 
turret once in six hours, and then, six chances to one, its shot and shell would be deflected by the varying 
angles of the face of the impregnable globe, " quoted by Ericsson from his original proposal in John 
Ericsson, Contributions to the Centennial Fxhibition (New York. The Nation Press, 1876), 410-16. 
16129-8-1861, Ericsson to Lincoln, EPPA. 
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$780,000. This would be eventually accepted as the U. S. S. New Ironsides, the Union 
Navy's only serving seagoing broadside-ironclad. 
Yet Welles also saw merit in Ericsson's model, which Bushnell displayed for the 
Secretary at his home in Hartford, Connecticut directly after his meeting with Ericsson. 
Encouraged by this response, Bushnell then hurriedly solicited the backing of New York 
iron industrialists John F. Winslow and John A. Griswold, who also had influential 
connections with former State Governor William H. Seward, now the influential 
Secretary of State. By 7 September Bushnell was writing from Willard's Hotel in 
Washington to Cornelius Delarnater of the Novelty Iron Works of New York (who had 
originally referred Bushnell to Ericsson for professional scrutiny of the Galena's 
stability) with good news. Ericsson's plan "was formally laid before the President last 
Evening-on an introductory letter from Mr. Seward. " Lincoln, he reported, was "much 
pleased"----even so far as to make an appointment to accompany Bushnell and the 
"Ericsson Battery" before the Ironclad Board. 162 
Perhaps the presence of so much civilian authority went too far to pressure the naval 
professionals in charge, however. Ericsson's name also evoked bad memories of the 
U. S. S. Princeton's "Peacemaker" gun disaster of 28 February 1844. The Princeton was 
the world's first screw-propelled frigate, designed and engineered by Ericsson, but the 
"Peacemaker" was that of his Navy advocate, Captain Robert F. Stockton. When the gun 
exploded in a celebrated trial, killing the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy and 
others, as well as wounding several more (including Stockton himself), Ericsson soon 
found his own professional reputation tarnished. Worse still, his subsequent labour bill to 
the Navy of $15,000 for work on the Princeton was flatly rejected by Stockton, as was 
Ericsson's connection with the vessel as being on anything but a "volunteee' basis. In 
162 7-9-1861, Bushnell to Delarnater, EPPA. 
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Stockton's version of events, Ericsson had come uninvited to America from England, and 
then built the Princeton for free. f1is bill was never paid. 163 At any rate, all of the board 
members were naturally conservative to such a radical departure from conventional ship 
design, Commander Davis contemptuously advising Bushnell to "take the little thing 
home and worship it, as it would not be idolatry, because it was in the image of nothing in 
the heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the waters under the earffi. "164 
Dismayed but not dispirited, Bushnell returned home to New Haven, informing Ericsson 
on II September that Welles would "be pleased to see your plans and have the same 
adopted at once if you can secure the approval of the Board" which Ericsson would- 
keeping to Davis's own religious allegory-need to "converC '. 165 Accordingly, Ericsson 
proceeded to Washington where he heard with indignation the naval officers' doubts of 
his proposed vessel's stability. In a par-deluxe display of instructional presentation and 
salesmanship, Ericsson proceeded to convince the Board of his extraordinary grasp of the 
laws of physics, and his equally stunning ability to translate them into sound mechanical 
principles. Science was Ericsson's religion, and none of the Board members were able to 
deny that modem warfare was headed in this direction. "Gentlemen, after what I have 
said, " Ericsson concluded, "I deem it your duty to the country to give me an order to 
build the vessel before I leave the roorn. i9166 
When the Ironclad Board of 1861 at last reported its findings to Gideon Welles, on 16 
September, the Secretary of the Navy must have found their opening remarks 
discouraging. The "three skilful naval officers" doubted their own ability to address such 
a novel topic, "having no experience and but scanty knowledge in this branch of naval 
163 William Conant Church, 7he Life ofJohn Ericsson, 2 vols. (NeNv York- Charles Scribner's Sons, 1890), 
1: 92-6; 10 1-9; 117-5 1. 
164 Church, Life ofEricsson, 1: 250. 
165 11-9-1861, Bushnell to Ericsson, EPPA. 
166 Church, Life ofEricsson, 1: 253. 
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architecture. "167 Indeed, iron annour properties, experimental ordnance, and steam power 
seemed to be areas reserved more for engineers and inventors, not professional sailors. 
Though an application "was made to the department for a naval constructor ... with whom 
we might consult ... it appears that they are all so employed on 
important service that none 
could be assigned to this duty. " One thing, however, was certain, almost to the point of 
understatement: "Opinions differ amongst naval and scientific men as to the policy of 
adopting the iron armature for ships-of-war. " Specifically, was it better to invest in 
"ships" or "batteri&'? The Board's response to this central question was momentous: 
The enormous load of iron, as so much additional weight to the 
vessel; the great breadth of beam necessary to give her stability; 
the short supply of coal she will be able to stow in bunkers; the 
greater power required to propel her; and the largely increased 
cost of construction, are objections to this class of vessel as 
cruisers which we believe it is difficult successfully to overcome. 
For river and harbor service we consider iron-clad vessels of light 
draught, or floating batteries thus shielded, as very important; and 
we feel at this moment the necessity of them on some of our 
rivers and inlets to enforce obedience to the laws. 
Already, the Union Navy was turning away from a blue-water conception of naval power 
to a brown-water one. 168 But there were limits here as well. The Board felt that "no ship 
or floating battery, however heavily she may be plated, can cope successfully with a 
properly constructed fortification of masonry. "169 This too would prove to be an 
important observation. "Armored ships or batteries may be employed advantageously to 
pass fortifications on land for ulterior objects of attack, to run a blockade, or to reduce 
temporary batteries on the shores of rivers and the approaches to our harbors. " 
167 Curiously, Dah1gren. declined to serve on the Board ""ith Commodores Joseph Smith and Hiram 
Paulding; Baxter, Introduction, 247. 
168 As Donald Canney observes, however, the Navy's 7 August 1861 advertisement for ironclad 
submissions specified "not less than ten or over sixteen feet draught of water, " The Ironclads, 8-9. Naval 
constructor Samuel Pook noted there was "an advantage in the use of small vessel for lightness of draught 
to carry a heavier armament in proportion to their dimensions, and the increased cost of construction, " 12- 
11-1861, Pook to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, Box 49. 
169 16-9-1861, Ironclad Board to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. 
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As for ironclad ordnance, the Board acknowledged the great range of rifled guns, but "as 
yet we know of nothing superior to the large and heavy spherical shot in its destructive 
effects on vessels, whether plated or not. " Though rifled guns enjoyed greater range, "the 
conical shot does not produce the crushing effect of spherical shot. " This obviously 
echoed Dah1gren's conclusions. Armour plate itself should be "of tough iron, and rolled 
in large, long pieces" and probably backed by "some elastic substance (soft wood, 
perhaps is the best)" which "might relive the frame of the ship somewhat form the terrible 
shock of a heavy projectile, though the plate should not be fractured. " Since there were 
no facilities in America for rolling (rather than hammering) plates in the standard 4! /2-inch 
thicknesses of Europe, the Board also considered the possibility of contracting for 
ironclads in England. Yet "a difficulty might arise with the British government, in case 
we should undertake to construct ships-of-war in that country, which might complicate 
their delivery; and, moreover, we are of opinion that every people or nation who can 
maintain a navy should be capable of constructing it themselves. " 170 Either the Union 
would find the means-and the time-to invest in machinery and infrastructure to 
produce such armour on an equal scale, or another scheme would have to be found 
making the best of the nation's existing resources. 
In the meantime, the Ironclad Board concluded, "our immediate demands seem to require, 
first, so far as practicable, vessels invulnerable to shot, of light draught of water, to 
penetrate our shoal harbors, rivers, and bayous ... The amount now appropriated is not 
sufficient to build both classes of vessels to any great extent. "171 As a result, three 
contracts were awarded: to Bushnell, for the Galena; to Merrick & Sons, for the New 
Ironsides; and for Ericsson's Monitor, which seemed even at this stage in the Union 
Navy's ironclad program to meet the needs for the Union's coastal and river operations, 
170 16-9-1861, Ironclad Board to Welles, WP. 
171 ibid. 
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for at least the domestic purposes of the Civil War. That such a turreted, coastal defence 
ironclad could make headway at all with the U. S. Navy in 1861 reflects more perhaps on 
the contingency of the Civil War itself, rather than a rejection of its Blue-Water instincts. 
There was no guarantee, indeed, that Congress would be willing to invest in a wide- 
ranging ironclad force to "compete" with England or France after the war. Given past 
tendencies, in fact, this must have seemed highly unlikely. But in 1861, especially after 
the I't Battle of Bull Run, there was no guarantee that the war could even be won by the 
Union either. By the end of the year, it would be doubtful whether the war could be 
contained. 
What is often overlooked in this story, however, is the implicit role of Ericsson's ironclad 
battery, the famous Monitor, in relation to British-not Confederate-naval power. 
Already the overriding need was for light-draught, steam-powered men-of-war during the 
Civil War. The European ironclad examples could not be taken seriously until at least 
coastal hegemony was assured. But in addition to enforcing the blockade from within 
was the need to protect it from outside, intervening naval forces. Europe, especially 
Britain, had a vested interest in the Union blockade of the South. This was, in fact, the 
Confederacy's greatest hope and best chance for national independence, just at it was for 
the original Thirteen Colonies struggling against Britain during the Revolutionary War. 
On 21 May 1861 Seward wrote unofficially to Adams in London, that "British 
recognition would be British intervention, to create within our territory a hostile state by 
overthrowing this Republic itself. " The result would be a world war "between the 
European and the American branches of the British race. "172 Two months later he 
informed him that Union leadership understood and accepted the precautionary measures 
undertaken by Britain to protect its interests in North America; namely, the dispatch of 
172 George E. Baker (ed. ), The Works of William Seward, 5 vols. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Comparry, 
1884), 5: 244-5. 
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three regiments to Canada and additional warships to the British West Indies and North 
American Station. Indeed, "On our part the possibility of foreign intervention, sooner or 
later, in this domestic disturbance is never absent from the thoughts of this government. " 
it was precisely because of this fear that Seward was adamant of the danger of British 
recognition of the Confederacy. An Anglo-American war, necessarily a maritime one, 
would involve, "scenes of devastation and desolation which will leave no roots remaining 
out of which trade between the United States and Great Britain, as it has hitherto 
flourished, can ever again spring Up.,, 173 
Hence, when Cornelius Bushnell, Ericsson's earliest backer, first exhibited the Monitor 
plans to Secretary Welles in early September 1861, he announced that an anxious 
President Lincoln "need not further worry about foreign interference; I [have] discovered 
the means of perfect protection. "174 
173 Ibid., 280-6. 
174 James Tertius DeKay, Monitor., The Story of the Legendary Civil War Ironclad and the Man nose 
Invention Changed the Course of History (Pimlico: Random House, 1999), 73. DeKay deduces 20 
September as the date of his initial presentation of Ericsson's monitor-model at Welles, house, but this is 
well after the report of the Ironclad Board itself. 5 September is therefore more likely; see Church, Life of 
Ericsson, 1: 249; Canney, The Ironclads, 25. John Murray Forbes also noted to Fox his "original idea with 
%%hich I have bored you so much & which I broached to the President in April 61 that the sea belongs to us, 
& ought to be made our chief dependence for putting down the Rebels & keeping the foreign bull dogs 
peaceable, " 19-11- 1862, Forbes to Fox, FP. 
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VI. Building the Monitor 
Ericsson was officially notified of the Monito? s acceptance by the Ironclad Board on 21 
September 1861. The contract itself was not agreed upon, however, until 4 October. Still 
not completely satisfied with its decision, the Ironclad Board members demanded 
Ericsson's battery prove itself in combat before its fWI price was reimbursed to the 
contractors. Though his partners Bushnell, Winslow and Griswold thought this irregular 
and offensive, Ericsson himself found it "perfectly reasonable and proper. " "If the 
structure cannot stand this test, " he wrote to Smith, "then it is indeed worthless. " 175 
Bushnell wanted the promised date of completion modified to include " such time as she 
can be fairly tested under the enemy's fire. " This was not asking for much, he argued. In 
terms of "National defense", "the whole vessel with her equipment will cost no more than 
to maintain one regiment in the field 12 months, and each are experiments to be used to 
save the Government and Union, should ours prove what we warrant it, will it not be of 
infinitely more service than 100 regiments? "176 Winslow in turn was optimistic about 
completing the vessel in the promised "100 days", though in the winter shipbuilding 
season these would be necessarily "short ones-and few enough to do all that is to be 
done... "177 
But this was only the beginning of Ericsson's problems. On 25 September Commodore 
Smith was already expressing worry that "the concussion in the Turret will be so great 
that men cannot remain in it and work the guns after a few fires with shot. " Ericsson 
replied his "long drilling in the army" made him "perfectly familiar with the effect 
produced by firing heavy ordnance in close chambers. " If the turret were in a semi- 
globular form, the gunners "would be stunned as if struck by lightning. " But the 
175 2-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
176 4-10-1861, Bushnell to Sraith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
177 9-10-1861, Winslow to Ericsson, EPPA. 
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Monito? s cylindrical turret was perforated on top, 9-feet high and "so thick it will not 
vibrate". The vessel's forced air draft and positive air pressure from steam-powered 
blowers would also alleviate this concern. Indeed, "it will be comparatively a luxury for 
gunners to stand on the open grating of my turret, to standing on the gun deck of a ffigate 
during action: more air, less smoke and greatly diminished vibration overhead. 478 Nor 
was Ericsson prepared to submit finished designs for the battery in question. The genius- 
inventor was, in essence, making it up as he went along; building by day, planning by 
night, adapting to varying circumstances often beyond his control. 
The armour scheme for the Monitor; 's turret was-and perhaps remains-a controversial 
case in point. Widely publicized British tests had determined that thin layers of iron plate 
did not offer the same resistance to shot and shell as a single, homogenous plate of equal 
overall thickness. Furthermore, plates backed by an "elastic" substance, which helped to 
absorb shock waves generated by the impact of projectiles, were less prone to penetration 
or fracturing. Well-versed in the latest published theories, combined with his own 
understanding of physics, chemistry and engineering, Ericsson originally proscribed a 
single rolled 4-inch plate, backed by four layers of 1-inch plates to act as a cushion. 
These were all carefully overlapped to "break-joint", since the junctures of annour-plates 
were definite weak points. 179 On 4 October Ericsson wrote to Smith of his "expectation 
of obtaining rolled plate 4 inches thick to form the outer half of the turret, the inner half 
being composed of lighter plate riveted together... " But within a week he wanted to 
amend the contract, granting him "the authority to select either of the two modes 
specified of plating turret and the vessel's sides" since "Mr. Abbott of Baltimore states he 
will require full two months preparation to roll 4 inch thick plates, " and "other 
178 25-9-1861, Smith to Ericsson, EPPA; 27-9-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
179 In that sense at least, overlapping, IaminateV-type annour was less vulnerable than rows of solid slab. 
plates butted against each other, or interlocked by "longue and groove" fittings, as with the British Warrior 
and Defence-classes, and the Union's New Ironsides. 
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establishments have not given a positive reply. " Expediency of the precious contract, as 
well as the urgency of the Civil War, led him to adopt 8 layers of 1-inch plates, since 
these he could have "at once, 5 feet square, at the rate of 140 tons per week. " 
180 yet 
Ericsson was, for the moment, satisfied with this concession. "We are not going to fight 
the steel ý clad vessels of Europe at present, and for home use the four inch plating 
sustained by 40 feet of deck, and the end of 10 inch deck beams of oak, will be more than 
sufficient. ""' 
Another concern was the system of armament. Not only did Ericsson prefer the smashing 
power of heavy smoothbores at close ranges, like Dahlgren and other American ordnance 
experts, but "the carriage as well as the slides" would be redesigned to work in the turret. 
This was not a concern for Ericsson. "You will not doubt my ability to handle the [Xl- 
inch] gun, " he assured Commodore Smith, "if you call to mind the facility with which the 
12 inch guns of the Princeton were worked with my carriages and friction gear. "182 In 
fact, the weapons determined the size of the turret, and consequently the entire structure 
of the ship. 183 This underlying principle, fundamental in the evolution of the modem 
warship, marked a crucial difference from British practice. Following the Civil War, the 
British Ordnance Select Committee observed the U. S. Navy's "policy of considering the 
armament of a ship more particularly before designing her, with a view to obviate the 
difficulty and inconvenience frequently experienced in placing suitable guns on board a 
given ship, for the want of sufficient room, is a question for the consideration of the 
Admiralty-but it appears to the Committee to be well worthy of their attention. " 
180 4-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith; 8-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
is' 18-10-186 1, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
182 8-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
193 Though "the entire vessel is but a piece of mechanism, built for specific objects, " Stimers 
enthusiastically wrote to DaWgren, the armament would in some degree still have to be modified for the 
weapons platform, rather than vice-versa. Ericsson and Chief Engineer Stimers; preferred the barrels of the 
II -inch Dahlgrens eventually assigned to the 
Monitor to be shortened by 18 inches. Since the ironclad was 
intended for short-range actions added range would be a secondary concern to easier loading and greater 
rate of fire. 16-11-1861, Stimers to DaWgren, DP. 
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Admiral Robinson, the Controller, could only "entirely concur in the remarks made both 
by the Ordnance Select Committee and Captain [Astley Cooper] Key on the necessity of 
considering the Armament of a Ship before designing her, and on the importance of 
considering a Ship as mainly designed to carry Guns... " But heavy guns for the Royal 
Navy were the responsibility of the War Office, who in turn relied largely upon private 
inventors; the leading British guns were still on the testing grounds and few in number. 
The Admiralty was increasingly fi-ustrated; Robinson had "often pointed out the 
difficulties of designing a Ship without minute information as to the Armament proposed 
to be carried" and noted with his usual touch of complaint "that at this very moment there 
are more Ships fitted to carry large Ms than there are guns ready to put into them. , 184 
Thus on 8 October 186 1, when Ericsson requested specs for the II -inch Dahlgren, Smith 
was quick to inforin Captain A. A. Harwood, the new Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, 
that in addition to these two of the guns themselves would need to be "supplied at New 
York for the use of said Vessel. " On the 13th Ericsson wrote Smith he could not "proceed 
with the work on the battery turret until the receipt of drawing of the Dahlgren gun" but 
by then it was already en route. Smith, in the meantime, was sure to remind Secretary 
Welles that the Dahlgrens "should be prepared soon, as in case they are not ready when 
demanded by the Contractor, advantage may be taken of that clause in the contract which 
provides that the test shall be made by the Department within ninety days after the time 
stipulated for her completion. "' The Navy's own Bureaus had to cooperate fully and 
quickly amongst themselves. Increasing tension between the private contractor and the 
Government/haval professionals meant increased efforts to insure such an arrangement 
was not "impaired in any manner on our part. " This was probably more a relationship of 
mutual "respect" than mutual trust. "If the guns are not furnished and the vessel should 
184 ADM 1/5941,29-3-1865; the enclosed report of the Ordnance Select Comrnýittee is dated 27-2-1865. 
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prove a failure, " Smith warned, "the contract may be vitiated and the Government 
suffer. "185 
The building of the original Monitor was highly indicative of how this relationship 
evolved in the Union Navy's ironclad program. Smith may have wanted to trust Ericsson 
during the early stages of the Monitors construction, but frequently did not. He did, 
however, make sincere efforts to understand, and was relentless in this pursuit with the 
irritable inventor. I understand computations have been made by expert Naval 
Architects of the displacement of your vessel, " Smith wrote to Ericsson on II October, 
"and ... she will not 
float with the load you propose to put upon her and if she would she 
could not stand upright for want of stability, nor attain a speed of 4 knots. " The Navy 
Chief also disapproved of the abrupt overhang where the Monito? s upper raft hull was 
fastened to the lower hull and actually advised Ericsson to consult published British 
reports on Coles' shield design. Yet he was "extremely anxious about the success of this 
battery" for good reason: "the Govt. want some Dozen of them if they prove 
successful. , 186 Feeling challenged, tempted, though nonetheless annoyed, Ericsson 
replied "to these absurd statements made in relation to the battery" with full calculations 
of displacement and buoyancy which Smith could examine for himself A 
diagram/lecture on stability Ericsson promised to send the following day, adding "there is 
no living man who has tripped me in calculation or proved my figures wrong in a single 
instance in matters relating to theoretical computation. " 187 At some point the established 
authorities would simply have to trust him. 
185 8-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49; 11-10-1861, Smith to Harwood, RG 74, 
Entry 16, Box 4, Letterbook, 10; 13-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, 12-10-1861; Smith to Ericsson, RG 45, 
Entry 464, AD, Box 49; 19-10-1861, Smith to Welles, RG 71, Entry 1, Vol. 74, (Letterbook, 126-7. ) 
186 11-10-1861, Smith to Ericsson, EPPA- 
187 14-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, 16-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
Encsson was also worried the plans for the Monitor were leaked, but Smith assured him the "naval 
architects" in question were, in fact those of the Bureau of Construction & Repair (namely John Lenthall), 
16-10-1861, Smith to Ericsson, EPPA. 
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Yet "Monitor conver&', or "Ericsson's disciples". would have to be made one at a time, 
at least at first. The repeated, somewhat derogatory usage of these terms only emphasises 
the fact that an entire reordering of thought was occurring; a scientific rather than 
religious affair. This was a naval paradigm in the making. 
Neither was there, given the circumstances, any margin for failure. Smith tried to explain 
to Ericsson how he had "taken for granted" the latter's confident and energetic arguments, 
thereby assuming "a great responsibility in recommending in haste, to meet the demands 
of the service, your plan. "188 Not just the Navy and the Government's reputation was at 
stake, but his own. Scepticism prevailed. The "knowing ones" at the Ordnance Bureau, 
for example, doubted he would receive the highly-coveted 11 -inch Dahlgrens, saying they 
"will never be used on her. " Though slightly more at ease thanks to Ericsson's essays on 
displacement and stability, Smith then doubted the Monito? s ventilation system. Surely, 
carbonic acid gas would afflict the crew, especially the firemen. The only obvious 
solution to him was "that a temporary house must be constructed on deck, to be knocked 
away by shot if it so happens, for the officers. 089 For his part Ericsson responded that 
"the magnitude of the work I have to do exceeds anything I have ever before undertaken 
because there is not sufficient time left for planning, everything must be put in hand at 
once, a condition truly difficult. " Yet he begged Smith "to rest tranquil as to the result; 
success cannot fail to crown the undertaking. " This was precisely because the vessel in 
question was more of a "machine", the product of an engineer as well as a traditional 
shipbuilder. "Nothing is attempted not already well tried, " Ericsson wrote, "or of so 
strictly a mechanical a nature as to be susceptible of previous determination. "190 At the 
188 14-10-1861, Smith to Ericsson, EPPA. 
189 16-10-1861, Smith to Ericsson, EPP& Smith later explained to Chief Engineer Alban C. Stimers 
(recently assigned to superintend for the Navy the Monitor's construction) he had "pressed the Department 
so urgently to have the XI inch Dahlgren guns ready that one has been taken off the Pensacola, and another, 
the only one at the Navy Yard... The foundries have been so engaged that new guns could not be made in 
time, " 15-11-186 1, Smith to Stimers, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 5 1. 
190 17-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
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height of the Industrial Age, Ericsson was banking on the idea that the Monitor could be 
designed as a matter of universal calculation rather than personal experience. An 
engineer, like a shipbuilder, could design an ironclad. But the more potential problems 
were potentially solved by mechanical means (in this instance, the "sub-aquatic" 
Monitor's necessarily artificial system of ventilation' 9 1), the more important became the 
role of the engineer, and the more a steam-powered, iron-annoured warship became a 
device rather than a tool. Significantly, after the Battle of Hampton Roads the National 
Intelligencer wrote that Ericsson had "placed the people and the Government under 
incalculable obligations to his scientific attainnients", the Monitor. 192 
There was another dimension involved. When Ericsson fmally received the Department's 
own calculations of his battery's displacement, on 17 October, it did not take him long to 
report them "erroneous from beginning to end. " Lenthall had calculated for fresh, not salt 
water, and either way the difference, according to Ericsson, was only 2-inches extra 
immersion-a positive advantage in combat. In fact it proved relatively easy for the 
ironclad-inventor to dismantle an "observer's" calculations of the weight of his ship. 
"There are several dimensions that have been changed in laying out the work, " he noted, 
and "the substances particularly are varied. " As an example, the "I-inch" armour plates 
were really " 15/16ths-inch thick". Though the difference in weight (and therefore cost) 
would be readily adjusted on the Government's bill, Ericsson assured Smith, it was 
clearly impossible to double-check vital factors like displacement since these could only 
be based on details missing in the original contract specifications or free from constant, 
practically daily, modifications. 193 The Government was thus perpetually one step behind 
the contractor in the design evolution of such a vessel, who could also move to counter- 
191 See 18-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
192 12-3-1862, National Intelligencer. 
193 "Necessarily the specification, " Ericsson explained to Smith, "considering the novel character of the 
work-, could not be accurate in matters of detail, as it is not until the actual working plan is made out that 
precision is attained, " 23-10-1861, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
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question professional authority. What did the Navy know about ironclads, let alone iron- 
hulled steamships? "A builder of iron vessels alone can correctly estimate what his vessel 
will weigh. In the present instance, " Ericsson bluntly asserted, "the writer is the builder 
and knows all about the matter. " Furthermore since the Navy had "thrown the entire 
responsibility, as to practical success, on the contractor, you will I respectfully submit 
permit him to exercise freely his own judgment in carrying out the mechanical part of the 
work. "194 
Both sides, however, recognised the value of cooperation. Neither the contractors nor the 
Navy could afford to alienate one another. "Captain Ericsson is at work day and night to 
drive the work along, " Bushnell assured Smith on 21 October, "and is confident that it is 
impossible to improve in any particular upon his plan; but I am much pleased to have you 
keep him supplied with suggestions, for I know of two instances in which he has, in my 
judgment, greatly improved the vessel by adopting your suggestions: one by lining the 
inside of the turret with felt, and the other by making the bottom of [the] lower vessel 
wider. " Though Smith wrote to Ericsson "the more I reflect upon your battery, the more 
fearful am I of her efficiency, " he was nevertheless willing to assign Chief Engineer 
Alban C. Stimers to assist Ericsson as requested, and on 26 October he made the 
remarkable gesture of humbly apologising to the civilian he had hired. "You are the last 
man I desire to contest engineering questions with. I am fully aware of your scientific 
knowledge, skill & experience" The old Admiral was, however, understandably anxious 
about the Union Navy's experimental warships, upon whose success so much depended: 
I make suggestions, offer objections which are only intended for 
your consideration but is nowise to control your action. The 
responsibility rests with you and I would not change it if I could. 
194 18-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
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Excuse my interference thus far if I have annoyed you, &I will be 
silent in fliture. 195 
195 21-10-1861, Bushnell to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49; 21-10-1861, Smith to Ericsson, RG 45, 
Entry 464, AD, Box 5 1; 26-10-186 1, Smith to Ericsson, EPPA. 
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VII. Effect of the Trent Affair 
It was in the midst of this complex and frenzied state of affairs in New York that news of 
the capture of James Mason and John Slidell from the British mail packet steamer Trent 
reached Washington. The following day, 16 November, Ericsson forwarded to Smith an 
account of his battery in the latest Scientific American, which he found "admirably clear". 
"in view of its bearing on the harbor defenses of the country, " he noted, "I respectfidly 
suggest to the promoters of the enterprise to present a copy to the Secretary of State. "' 
Smith was not pleased, regretting "to see a description of the vessel in print before she 
shall have been tested. " Also wary of publicity "damaging alike to the enterprise and the 
navy, " however, is what prompted Ericsson to supply the press with an accurate 
description. "We are closely watched by hundreds, and the work has now progressed so 
far that many imagined they saw enough to judge of the result, " he explained. This was 
an effort on the part of the inventor to merely preserve his own reputation. The all- 
important sense of Northern morale, in relation to national security, was at stake. 196 Not 
without ominous irony, the same article leads with a description of the Warrior. "She has 
proved herself to be the fastest large war vessel afloat, " as reported in the British press, 
"as she is no doubt the most powerful. " Including the "new iron-clad gunboat" building 
at the Continental Works, Greenpoint, the U. S. "had no less than five iron-clad ocean war 
vessels in progress of construction, besides several iron-plated liver steamboats on the 
Mississippi": 
We are therefore making considerable progress toward securing 
an iron-clad navy, although, with but one exception, perhaps, 
none of these vessels will be first-class; still they may prove very 
196 16-11-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49; 18-11-1861, Smith to Ericsson, RG 45, 
Entry 464, AD, Box 51; 20-11-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 49. 
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efficient, and answer all the purposes demanded by the exigencies 
of the times. 197 
By the end of 1861 these naval requirements of the Union were distinctly double-edged. 
Reflecting after the immediate crisis over the Trent had passed, Blackwood's spelled out 
very clearly what dangers perpetually threatened the United States during the Civil War- 
from the other side of the blockade; from possible offensive actions conducted by Royal 
Navy. 198 On 19 October 1861 Harper's Weekly noted sarcastically that "John Bull is a 
practical man" who "should scornfully trample and toss all other nations, provided always 
that they are weak or that calamity has befallen them... " In its issue two weeks later 
(whose cover also featured an artist's conception of "the Rebel Steamer 'Merrimac', 
Razeed, and Iron-Clad"), Seward was depicted as ready to extract the teeth of the British 
Lion over the legal issue of arresting British subjects during the national crisis; his 
forbidding surgical instrument clutching a published letter to the Governor of New York 
calling for improved coastal defences. 199 Yet the crisis over the Trent came before the 
ccoperation7, as such, even started. Punch recognised the Union's predicament with 
typically explicit relish. Its 7 December issue alone featured two cartoons; of a 
gentlemanly "Mr. Bull" threatening Abraham Lincoln in a buffoonish admiral's attire of 
"no shuffling-an ample apology-or I put the matter into the hands of my lawyers 
Messrs. Whitworth and Armstrong, " and an oversized Jack Bull-sailor warning a 
diminutive Uncle Sam (dressed as a buccaneer and obviously too big for his boots) to "do 
what's right, my son, or I'll blow you out of the water. 1200 
197 16-11-1861, Scientific American, 313. The "five" ironclads noted, but still unnamed, were theMonitor, 
Galena, New Ironsides, the perpetually incomplete "Stevens Battery", and the recently contracted E. A. 
Stevens, or converted Coast Guard steamer Naugatuck. See Canney, The Ironclads, 73-4, on the 
Naugatuck. 
198 February 1862, Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 228. 
199 19-10-1861, Harper's Weekly, 659; and 2-11-1861,690-1. By 21 December, Harpers was perhaps 
unconsciously pairing-in the same issue-the graphic spectre of European intervention in the form of the 
Allied fleet appearing over the horizon to punish Me)dco (and thereby brushing aside the pretensions of the 
Monroe Doctrine), and Ericsson's "Battery". 
200 7-12-1861, Punch, 234. 
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It was surprising, therefore, for the New York Herald to announce on the 23 November 
1861, and before news of the British public reaction to the Trent's seizure reached 
America, that "we anticipate no conflict with Great Britain, nor do we believe that any 
serious trouble will grow out of Messrs. Slidell and Mason's arrest. Yý201 Active 
Midshipman Oliver Ambrose Batcheller, serving aboard the U. S. S. Vincennes off the 
mouth of the Mississippi River, wrote to his mother he too could "not believe" there 
would be war; rumours of a British ultimatum were "nonsense". "Trust Johnny Bull for 
any thing but so bold a move as that! It is not his nature. " Even if it was, he confidently 
assured his mother "that our Government will refuse to comply with the demand and that 
every possible means be employed to prepare for the war and when it comes fight until 
there are just men enough left to hang Mason and Slidell... 11202 Some members of the 
public felt otherwise. "I do not feel at all sure that we shall not get into a serious 
complication with England, " a friend of Secretary Welles wrote. "England is terribly 
touchy about her flag, & does not feel any too good natured to us to begin with. " An 
Anglo-American war "would be death to us just now. , 203 Instead, when the Lincoln 
Administration decided a month later to return them back on their way to England, the 
Herald coolly pledged "... as Rome remembered Carthage form the invasion of Hannibal, 
and as France remembers St. Helena, so will the people of the United States remember 
and treasure up for the future this little affair of the Trent. , 204 Midshipman Batcheller 
was even more bitter, noting that "A foreign war just at this time is much to be dreaded, " 
but nevertheless calling for a "war to the last breath but never dishonor. "205 
20123-11-1862, New York Herald. 
202 1-1-1862, Oliver Batcheller to his mother, BL. 
203 25-11-1861, John Hooker to Welles, WP. George Barnard to Welles wrote that "the tone of feeling 
among capitalists & merchants" in Boston was to refuse any unconditional demand for surrendering the 
captives. Instead the Administration should offer to submit the matter to -an impartial & neutrally chosen 
umpire". If the British government rejected this national, world, and even a large portion of British public 
opinion would therefore be united against it. "Me interests involved are too large & important to allow 
either nation to go into a war unless it can be shown to be an inevitable necessity, " 16-12-1861, Barnard to 
Welles, WP. The same proposal and sentiment, from Buffalo, New York-, can be found in 16-12-1861, 
Millard Fillmore to Lincoln, LP 
204 21-12-186 1, New York Herald. 
205 17-1-1862, Batcheller to his mother, BL. 
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Be that as it may, the Union remained acutely vulnerable to British seapower in the 
meantime. This fact made embarrassingly obvious was the price for "depriving the rebels 
of much strength which they would certainly have acquired in case of a war with England 
and France... , 206 Here Scientific American anticipated a vast, mutually-destructive 
commerce war carried out mostly by private "swarms of rovere'. Of the 15 millions tons 
of total world shipping, five belonged to Britain and five to the U. S. An Anglo-American 
holocaust would leave both nations degraded from their proud preeminance and 
France... 7207 A direct comparison between navies at the beginning of 1862 was 
overwhehningly in favour of Great Britain. This left the Royal Navy largely free to act 
against Northern port-cities, either by blockade or direct assault. The United States Navy 
could not possibly attempt a similar offensive against the British Isles; could it even 
mount an effective defence? Though it mentioned Congress passing a new bill for 20 
more ironclad gunboats, Scientific American suggestively recounted losses inflicted 
against English convoys during the War for Independence, and the famed exploits of 
American naval commanders in the War of 1812, instead. The defence of New York 
harbour was therefore left to the forts guarding its entrance. "But the introduction of iron- 
plated ships exposes us to attacks for which these forts were not provided, " explained 
Scientific American. Only with the immediate mass-production of U. S. Army Captain 
Thomas J. Rodman's 15-inch guns could the prized-city hope to "bid defiance to the iron- 
clad navies of the world. " Nothing else was mentioned, or in sight. 20' The cold months 
between November 1861 and March 1862 were thus the darkest of the Union Navy, and 
possibly the Union itself, throughout the American Civil War. 
206 29-12-186 1, New York Herald. 
207 28-12-1861, Scientific American, 407. Some US. naval officers were sceptical of this. In the event of 
an Anglo-American maritime war, "I see we could do nothing, " Captain Percival Drayton wrote to 
Dahlgrem "Steam places [Britain's] navy in a position of superiority that she never has occupied, and has 
killed Privateering dead dead [sic], first because the privateers could not get coal, and next they could never 
get a prize in when taken. With our imperfect blockade the Sumpter [sic] has not succeeded in doing so, " 
10-1-1862, Drayton to Dablgren, DP 
208 28-12-1861, Scientific American, 407; also 11-1-1862,18-1-1862 and 25-1-1862. 
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Against this backdrop work on the Monitor continued at a fever pitch. "I wish we had 
your vessel now, " Smith wrote to Ericsson, three days after the U. S. S. San Jacinto 
removed Mason and Slidell from the Trent. "The Govt. must create a fleet of plated Gun 
Boats. They will cost much less & will be more effective than the Army. " Lincoln knew 
that with McClellan still sitting with his newly reformed Army of the Potomac, the 
conspicuous absence of Northern military victories, or even offensive operations against 
the South, fin-ther tempted European powers to intervene in what they would regard as a 
hopeless and unnecessary struggle damaging to all. This only transferred pressure for 
success to the Union Navy. On 17 November an expedition under Commodore Samuel F. 
Du Pont succeeded in overwhelming the fortifications defending Port Royal. Now the 
controversial blockade of the southern Atlantic ports would be strengthened with a 
valuable Union base halfway between Savannah and Charleston. The presence of an 
entire flotilla light-draught ironclad batteries might therefore lead to even more ambitious 
projects against the Confederacy, while at the same time acting in the capacity of harbour 
and coast defence. Smith tantalized Ericsson. "Already I think the Department 
contemplates augmenting this description of force, " he indicated, though the decision 
would not be in his hands. Furthermore, "all the mistakes we may make I suppose may 
turn to the advantage of others. "209 Smith had doubts about the Galena as well. To 
Bushnell he expressed his "fear that in your eagerness to build an armored vessel, you did 
not reflect sufficiently on the many obstacles to be encountered, and which we now have 
to overcome as best we can. "210 
Nevertheless, in combination with the initially-well-received news of Mason and Slidell's 
capture, Welles could write to his son that "this last week has been a pretty eventful one 
209 11-11-1861, Sn-ýth to Ericsson, EPLOC. 
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for the Navy Department, or rather the news of great events have been highly 
interesting. , 21 1 Twelve years later, the former Secretary wrote that the capture of Port 
Royal was in fact "eclipsed by the startling news that the two rebel leaders, who had 
recently abandoned their seats in the Senate, and been selected by the Confederate 
organization to represent it abroad, and enlist foreign governments in its behalf, had been 
intercepted and were prisoners. " While this was initially accepted as a victory for the 
Union cause, since the Confederate mission to secure national recognition and material 
assistance was dramatically blocked before it began, Lincoln, Welles recalled, quickly 
realised the prisoners "would be elephants on our hands, that we could not easily dispose 
of. " Patriotic citizens might wrathfully demand their formal execution for treason. What 
message would this send to the people of the South? Lincoln's grand hopes for national 
reunification might be shattered. 212 A more immediate and palpable danger, however, 
came from an enraged British government and public. This served to sharply re-focus the 
North's attention back to its own weaknesses, nevermind its need for ironclad gunboats to 
spearhead finiher naval attacks against the Confederate States. As Captain John Rodgers 
wrote to his wife Anne, from the Union flagship at Port Royal, "we are unready and 
overmatched with the South, England, France and Canada-all at once. " It seemed the 
U. S. would have to fight or acknowledge the Confederacy. "The blockade I apprehend 
must be stopped whether we fight or apologize-certainly if we fght.,, 213 It was a cruel 
reminder of the international strategic disposition of the United States at the end of 1861. 
As Welles later recounted, "our country was then crippled, and Palmerston and Russell 
211 17-11-1861, Welles to son (possibly Tom), WP. 
212 Gideon Welles, "The Capture and Release of Mason and Slidell"I The Galary, Vol. 7 (May, 1873). 
"What a howl there will be among the rebel press of the South, on account of the settlement of the Trent 
affhir, " noted the Terre-Haute Daily Express of 31-12-1861. "A war between England and the United 
States would have been a grand diversion in their favor, but now that hope being blasted, they are left to the 
last lingering, feeble one, that the South may be able to become a province of England, " (from LP). 
213 21-12-1861, John to Anne Rodgers, RFP. 
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well knew it. The Administration felt that we were in no condition to embark in a foreign 
war, whatever might be the justification of our cause. , 214 
The exact purpose of the twenty new ironclad gunboats was, however, still a matter of 
debate in Congress. Could private contractors be relied upon to produce them in time, 
and without extravagant price? How would the inability of either the Navy Yards or 
commercial firms to produce the necessary quantity of iron armour plates complicate 
these concerns? What ironclad designs were best for the Union? Arch-Democrat 
Clement L. Vallandigharn of Ohio stressed the ironclads "should be constructed as soon 
as possible" since "they will be needed in case of the occurrence with a foreign Power of 
the war which seems impending over us... " The House Chairman of Naval Affairs, 
Charles B. Sedgwick, disagreed-or at least misunderstood the implication. The vessels 
in question were "not required for any such purpose" and in fact "it did not enter into the 
design of the Department in recommending them. They are required at home, for use 
, 7215 here... Two days previous he described them as "intended to be of such draught and 
built in such a way that they will be able to enter any harbor in the United States where 
there is over twelve feet of water upon the bar ... to be so protected as to be able, without 
injury, to run past any forts or defenses of any such harbors... "" Undoubtedly these 
were the "Bureatf' turret ships designed by Lenthall and Isherwood, discussed by J. P. 
Baxter. 217 Any interference in the contracting of these Departmental designs, Sedgwick, 
argued, "utterly embarrassed [the Department's] plan of overthrowing this rebellion and 
seizing the cities in the southern States by means of these armed vessels. " But the 
Department's design had inherent drawbacks. Although Navy Yards and existing private 
contractors might be relied upon to produce engines, boilers and hulls, the armour plates 
214 WelleS, "Capture", 648. 
215 19-12-1861, CG, 147. 
216 17-12-1861, CG, 123. 
217 Baxter, Introduction, 250-2; 2634; 275-6. 
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themselves were to be in solid 41/2-inch thicknesses, "very large, of the best quality 
hammered iron, and so bent as to fit the model of a vessel. " Since such plates could not 
be currently be manufactured in America extensively or quickly, they would have to be 
procured in England or France. 218 All this was fraught with added expense, delay, and 
political complications-especially at the height of the serious crisis over the Trent. 
Charles W. Whitney was also trying to persuade Commodore Smith that the company he 
represented, H. Abbott & Son of Baltimore, was indeed capable of rolling 4V2-inch plates. 
Hammered, or "forged", plates were proven by recent English experiments "to be brittle, 
unreliable, and incapable of resisting heavy shot... " With "our American charcoal iron" 
Abbott could insure superiority over any plates contracted for abroad. Three of their 
mills were already "in full operation day and night" with a fourth mill, even larger, under 
construction for the past six months. Within a month this last "could commence rolling 
the 41/2 inch plates at once. " The I-inch plates for Ericsson's battery were already being 
supplied by them. Yet Smith noted that "Mr. Ericsson ... endeavored to get Plates (4 
inch 
thickness) from Mr. Abbott of Baltimore, for his battery, but in vain. " He believed "the 
Navy Department is now about to build some iron-clad vessels, to be plated of 4V2inch 
iron"; perhaps now Abbott's offers could be taken more seriously than in early October, 
but Smith had "no control and no knowledge" of the Construction Bureau's plan for 
ironcladS. 219 Insistence by the Department upon hammered plates might save time and 
avoid complication than formally encouraging private fms to invest in new rolling 
2111 19-12-1861, CG, 148. Bending thicker armour plates was itself problematic. Heating them for the 
purpose was a more labour intensive, time-consun-dng and expensive process, while 'cold-bending' them 
with special heavy presses, according to tests conducted by the Iron Plate Committee, tended to damage the 
weld of the plates themselves and weaken their resisting powers. On 21 January 1862 Samuel Pook wrote 
to Commodore Smith that the armouring of the Galena was "now going on more rapidly than it has at any 
time before ... principally 
because the bars are now all bent and twisted by a wooden ]ever, instead of being 
heated and bent, as was first deemed necessary, " RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 5 1. The Monitor's I -inch 
laminated iron plates could also be cold-bent and their more concentrated welds were perhaps individually 
less subject to strain. 
219 10-12-1861, Whitneyto Smith; 11-12-1861, Smith to Whitney, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 51. 
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machines, planers, cranes, etc. 220 The New Ironsides was already committed to 
hammered armour plates of 4Y2-inch thickness. Twenty tuffet-ironclads, however, would 
require more of such forged iron than time permitted, let alone a large-scale industrial 
upgrade for rolling even thicker annour than Ericsson's battery. 
The Trent Affair also had the effect of redoubling Washington's efforts to improve the 
North's coastal fortifications. 221 On 14 October 1861 Seward had addressed the 
Governors "of all the Sates on the seaboard and lakes". Even though the likelihood of 
European intervention was "less serious than it has been at any previous period during the 
course of the insurrection, " Southern agents were working hard to capitalise on "the 
embarrassments of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce in foreign countries" as a 
result of the blockade. A controversy might suddenly add "the evils of a foreign 
war ... upon those of civil commotion which we are endeavoring to cure. " By neglecting 
the defence of its ports and harbours, the Union would "voluntarily incur danger in 
tempestuous seasons when it fails to show that it has sheltered itself on every side from 
which the stonn might possibly come. " Preoccupied with the immediate needs of the 
Army and Navy, the Federal Government needed the States to assess their own defences 
and submit the matter to Congress when it next convened. 
The Governor of Maine responded that his state was particularly subject to attack, as it 
was in the War of 1812. Portland's strategic importance was immense. "Its geographical 
position commands Canada on the north, and the lower provinces on the east, if properly 
fortified, as lines of railway, completed or in process of construction, radiate from it to 
Quebec and Montreal, and to St. John and Halifax. " If occupied by Great Britain, 
220 At any rate, Smith found recent shavings from the 4V2-inch (hammered) plates "made from scraps" 
being made for the New Ironsides, indicated "great toughness and tenacity", 5-12-1861, Smith to Whitney` 
RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 5 1. 
221 See for example 9-12-1861, Joseph G. Totten (US. Army Brevet Brigadier General and Colonel of 
Eýtneers) to Simon Cameron (Secretary of War), in Executive Document No. 6, House of Representatives, 
nd 37 Congress, 2 Session, Eistimatesfor Fortifications, 1-5. 
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American commerce on the Great Lakes and the ocean would be driven away; if properly 
fortified, it could serve as a main base of operations by the U. S. Navy. Lincoln and the 
War Department agreed. Officers would be sent to make official estimates, but Maine 
would have to pay the bill "in the first instance, advanced to the general government in 
the nature of a loan for the general defence of the country at large" which there was 
"every reason to believe" Congress would approve. This would be paid back "within a 
reasonable period", later specified on December 17, in the form of U. S. bonds "twenty 
years after date, bearing six per cent. interest, payable semi-annually'7.222 Since it was by 
no means clear whether the Union would actual-ly survive the Civil War, the 
government's warning of possible hostilities with foreign powers, and the willingness of 
Northern states to risk the expense of greater defences, was both realistic and brave. 
Preserving the sovereignty of the United States required an enormous act of faith. 
2n 19-12-1861, Executive Document No. 14, House of Representatives, 37 Ih Congress, Vd Session, 
Fortification of the Sea-Coast and Lakes-Messagefrom thePresident ofthe UnitedStates, 1-8. 
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VIII. Congress debates the "20 ironclad gunboats" 
On 8 January 1862 the U. S. Senate debated whether or not to amend House Bill No. 153, 
which authorised Gideon Welles to construct "twenty iron-clad stearn gunboa&'. The 
proposal would replace the words "Secretary of the Navy" with "the President" and 
would make the Chief Executive directly responsible for the contracting-and therefore 
also the designs, success or failure-of the Union's new ironclads. Welles was at the 
time under suspicion for some of the New York-based contracting of the early converted 
merchant ships purchased for the service on the blockade. 223 Much of this stemmed from 
disaffected contractors wielding powerful newspaper connections in revenge; rumour and 
innuendo. But worse than the implication that the Secretary was incompetent or corrupt 
(perhaps even "treasonous") was the attempt to spotlight Lincoln if he retained Welles in 
his cabinet. 224 The failure of a single ironclad in the midst of the Civil War might 
conceivably sink the entire Administration not just one of its departments, or one of their 
bureaus. 
On the same day, ironically enough, John Griswold wrote to Ericsson that their business 
partner John F. Winslow had returned from Washington, after a "thorough & very 
satisfactory interview with Secretaries Welles & Seward; also with the Pres. & Asst. 
Fox. " The issue, of course, was which pattern the new fleet of annoured gunboats would 
take. John Lenthall and Benjamin Isherwood, the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Construction 
and Steam Repair, respectively, enjoyed the obvious 'inside track' with their scheme for 
Coles-type turret ironclads. But inasmuch as the Navy professionals asserted their own 
design would best match the complex strategic needs of the country, the New York 
contractors already had a rival prototype nearing completion. Ericsson's Monitor had 
223 See Baxter, Introduction, 279-80. 
224 8-1-1862, CG, 219-21. 
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finally managed to gain the respect of Commodore Smith, another Bureau Chief, and was 
fast becoming a technological icon for young, ambitious engineers like Alban Stimers. 
225 
"We can have things our own way, " Griswold related to Ericsson, but only "if the Battery 
proves Equal to our expectation". The Government, while in a desperate burry to obtain 
ironclads, was nonetheless willing to wait; "nothing, to any extent, will be contracted for 
till she has been tested. 99226 
Time worked in more ways than one. Alarming reports were reaching the North of the 
steady progress of the rebel conversion of the Merrimack at Norfolk. Such an ironclad in 
the hands of former U. S. naval officer Franklin Buchanan (recent commandant of the 
Washington Navy Yard and first superintendent of the U. S. Naval Academy in 1845) 
would surely be used for more than just the protection of Norfolk or the James River 
leading to the Confederate capitol of Richmond. The entire control of Hampton Roads, 
the anchor of the Union blockade itself, would be challenged. Wooden steamships would 
face an annoured one. Fortress Monroe might even be compelled to surrender-a loss 
more devastating than Fort Sumter nearly a year earlier, since the backdoor to 
Washington would be exposed to Confederate naval power. The offensive aims of the 
Union Army were also converging on this vital strategic crossroads, North and South. 
Although 'his' Grand Army of the Potomac was now properly trained and equipped since 
the disaster of Bull Run, General George B. McClellan was not eager to risk its 
destruction in another frontal assault against the reinforced Confederate Army blocking 
the same route to Richmond. Instead he contemplated a massive flanking thrust towards 
Richmond via the York and James Peninsula, utilising-and thus dependent upon- 
Union naval power. It became increasingly likely, therefore, that a showdown would 
take place between the Merrimack and the only Union ironclad possibly ready in time, 
225 Frank M. Bennett, The Steam Navy of the United States (Westport: Greenwood Press, reprint of 1896), 
280-1,337-8. 
226 8-1-1862, Griswold to Ericsson, EPPA. 
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the Monitor. This would be the latter vessel's contractual "test of fire". 
227 Hence 
Ericsson and his associates held another distinct advantage. As Griswold pointed out, 
"they were amazed at Washington to learn that within the hundred days the Battery 
would be completed... " Under these circumstances, "they [Lenthall and Isherwood] dare 
not override us, & the 'arrangement' so nicely made is knocked into the future, if not 
killed. ý1228 
According to Baxter, the status of the Bureau's ironclad proposal was by then already 
uncertain. This was because one man in particular, Gustavus Fox, the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, was by now uncertain about the effectiveness of the Bureau's design against 
Ericsson's. It was his insistence for the Bureau to press ahead with, and the design was 
as much his own as it was Lenthall and Isherwood's. 229 But when Ericsson and his 
associates learned of this ambitious move on the part of the Navy, they moved quickly to 
question the expediency of Fox's design, if not also implicitly the purpose for which 
these ironclads were intended. On 23 December Ericsson wrote to Welles offering to 
build six more ironclads, noting that Coles' turrets were ill-designed, unable to withstand 
the shock of impact from heavy shot because of their reliance on short segments of wood- 
backing, and cogs for rotation near the vulnerable inside base of the turret. 230 
At any rate, these technical objections coincided with Welles' own aversion to procuring 
ironclads or armour plates abroad-in fact, to rely upon foreign powers at all during the 
Civil War, and especially in the malodorous climate before, during, and especially as a 
"' "I think the wrought iron shot of the Ericsson Battery will smash in her [the Merrimack's] 21/4 inch 
plates, " Smith wrote Ericsson, "provided she can get near enough to hers, whilst the IX inch Shot and shells 
of the Merrimac will not upset your Turret. Let us have the test as soon as possible, for that ship [the 
Merrimack] will be a troublesome customer to our vessels in Hampton Roads, " 29-1-1862, Smith to 
Ericsson, EPPA. 
228 8-1-1862, Griswold to Ericsson, EPPA- 
2" For a more complete look at Fox's career as Assistant Secretary see William J. Sullivan, "Gustavus Vasa 
Fox and Naval Administration"s Catholic University of America, unpublished Phl). thesis, 1977. 
230 See Baxter, Introduction, appendices, 350-60. 
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result of, the Trent crisis. On 31 January prominent engineer Daniel B. Martin reported 
to Lenthall from Liverpool. After visiting all the major armour plate manufactures and 
iron shipbuilders of the United Kingdom, and "invited bids for the Armour and Towers 
[of the Bureau's proposed turret-ship] to be sent to me at this place by the 20th inst. ", he 
had still not received "one direct offer". Violating British neutrality was a concern. 
Northern financial credit was also as suspect as that of the South. "None of the parties 
would be willing to make a Contract until advices was received about the payments. " 
Finally, "all of the parties capable of doing this kind of work are full of orders, there is I 
understand orders for Armor plates from the French, Spanish, Russian, Austrian, and 
Italian Governments, beside what is being done for this Government which appears to be 
doing considerable in that line. " At any rate, the actual bending of plates, Martin noted, 
"has been done by the Ship Builders", not the manufacturers. 231 The seed of doubt was 
thus effectively planted. A hasty commitment to one entire class of ironclads might 
prove disastrous-and Congress was already indicating just how high that repercussion 
might reach. 
These factors only combined to add more pressure for the original battery to "penetrate 
Southern barriers", "withstand shore batteries fire", and check the Merrimack. On 14 
January Smith crisply notified Ericsson that 'the time for the completion of the shot-proof 
battery according to the stipulations of your contract, expired on the 12 th instant. " Ten 
days previously Ericsson grumbled that although $200,000 of private funds had already 
been expended in construction of the vessel, "only $37,500 have as yet been paid by the 
navy agent, and that amount was not obtained until five weeks after the presentation of 
your order. " Because of this, his "contemplated organization and operation by what is 
called night gangs, has been to some extent frustrated. " Stimers also retorted, on 21 
January, that the two 11 -inch Dahlgens now needed for the 'Ericsson Battery' were 
23131-1-1862, Daniel B. Martin to Sn-Ui, RG 19, Entry 6 1, Box 1. 
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nowhere to be seen. "I believe, however, " he wrote to Smith, "that there are now two of 
these guns afloat in the gunboats at the navy yard, and it therefore resolves itself into a 
choice between whether the Ericsson Battery or two wooden gunboats should be 
delayed. " One can imagine the Commodore's anger upon receiving this news. It was 
exactly the sort of bureaucratic obfuscation he had feared since October might humiliate 
the Department in its dealings with private contractors, while depriving the Government 
of its right to enforce deadlines. Few professionals within the Department seemed to 
take the experimental ironclad seriously. "I took pains to have two XI-inch guns ready 
for the Erricsson [sic], " Smith complained to Secretary Welles, "but it seems they have 
been taken for other vesselS., 232 At least the Monitor's newly appointed commanding 
officer, Lieutenant John L. Worden, "after a hasty examination of her, " was "induced to 
believe that she may prove a SUCCCSS. 97233 By the 24h Stimers estimated a revised 
launching date for the Monitor in five days, "if the tide does not serve badly on that day. " 
Along with the missing Dahlgrens, the last armour plates ordered for this completely 
'pre-fabricated' iron warstýp were behind delivery. 234 As Stimers poignantly observed, 
"the more nearly completed each part becomes, the more practicable it looks. 7235 
Ericsson's long-held, radical vision was becoming a clear-cut reality. But would it 
successfully conform to the multiple (and often contradictory) requirements of the Union 
Navy? 
232 14-1-1862, Smith to Ericsson, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 51; 4-10-1861, Ericsson to Smith, RG 45, 
Entry 464, AD, Box 49; 21-1-1862, Stimers to Smith, with Smith's endorsement included, RG 45, Entry 
464, AD, Box 51. 
233 13-1-1862, Worden to Smith, ORN, Series 1, Vol. 6,516-17. 
234 See William N. Still, Jr., Monitor Builders: A Historical Study of the Principal Firms and Individuals 
Involved in the Construction of USS Monitor (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Interior, 1988), 
eSP ecially 24-6. 
23 24-1-1862, Stimers to Smith, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 51. The Monitor was launched on the 
morning of 30 January, 1862. 
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Thus, the following day Hale was obliged to ask the Navy Department what exactly its 
plans for an ironclad flotilla were; purpose and form. 236 Welles' reply of 7 February 
1862, was, at thisjuncture, absolutely crucial. T'he Department could "probably build ten 
or twelve iron-clad gunboats in the next six months, " he wrote, "and probably double or 
three times that number within a year. " As for any specific model, Welles relayed that 
his Department did not "propose to confine itself exclusively to any particular plan yet 
offered", but would indeed "avail itself of the experience which will be gained in the 
construction of those now going forward, one of which will soon be tested in actual 
conflict. " This was clearly the Monitor. Ericsson's proposal, to dispel any doubts, was 
mentioned by name; and the "ten or twelve gun-boats" are in fact his own. The Bureau 
turret ship scheme had already lost its inside advantage. This was due more to its own 
inherent design drawbacks, rather than the "political" influence of Ericsson and his 
financial backers, as others have suggested. 237 Facts spoke louder than words at the time; 
if the Bureau turret ships could have been produced as cheaply, easily and quickly as 
Ericsson's monitor-ironclads they might have stood a better chance with primary 
decision-makers involved, namely Fox and Welles, and probably to some extent, 
Abraham Lincoln himself. The actual tactical superiority of the monitor design over the 
Fox-Lenthall scheme was another matter. Issues of laminated armour vs. solid plate (and i 
rolled iron over hammered), Coles "cupolas" or Ericsson "towers", tw6turrets with one 
gun or one turret with two, and low freeboard vs. freeboard even lower were all largely 
conjectural. Arguably, they remain so today. But laminated 1-inch Plating, bent into 
turrets, could be had; rolled 41/2-inch plates could not. A working model of an Ericsson 
turret vessel at least now existed for testing and improvement; Coles' prototype was still 
236 Reprinted, with WeIles' reply in 8-2-1862, CG, 697. 
" See for example, William H. Roberts, " 'The Name of Ericsson': Political Engineering in the Union 
ironclad Program, 1861-1863", Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, No. 4 (1999), reflecting the bitter 
contemporary suspicions of Captain Thomas Turner of the U. S. S. New Ironsides; see 7-5-1863, Turner to 
john Andrew (Governor Massachusetts), Hamilton Fish Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 
Washington, D. C. 
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years away from completion. Ericsson's arguments for maximum concentration of 
weight, armour protection and firepower were better realized in the single turret of even 
thicker armour protection and ever greater guns than multiple turrets weakly protecting 
weaker armaments by comparison. Higher freeboard, at the same time, meant more area 
to be plated-or less area protected at all. Given the fact that the Bureau turret ships 
were not intended for cruising purposes, any arguments for partial protection lost their 
meaning, while a monitor's freeboard capitalised on even greater economy of national 
resources needed for its construction and consolidation of defensive force. 
There are at least two important features of Welles' response to the Hale; the Navy's 
response to the Senate; the Administration's response to Congress. First, the Monitor had 
all but established itself as the prototype coastal defence ironclad of the Civil War at least 
a month before the Battle of Hampton Roads, not as a result of its famous duel with the 
C. S. S. Virginia. Recurring arguments that "Monitor Mania" as a result of the events of 
8-9 March 1862 somehow "blinded" Assistant Secretary Fox and the Navy Department 
as a whole neglect this fact. To be sure, the enormous and unprecedented national 
excitement and enthusiasm for Ericsson's strikingly futuristic warships did wonders for 
the Navy's public relations, and gave the White House an ever-welcome boost of support. 
if the Navy had half-committed itself to monitors before Hampton Roads-4for that 
matter, was there really another 'half'? )--it was certainly bound to them afterwards. But 
any efforts made by the "powerful Ericsson Lobby" or "clique" were far from 
conspiratorial in nature. They were wide open to professional scrutiny. 238 Indeed, it was 
238 Still notes that "Charles 11 Cramp, who owned extensive shipbuilding facilities in Philadelphia, wrote in 
his memoirs of a New York 'ring' presumably involving Admiral Gregory and other naval officers 
responsible for warship construction in the country, as well as influential civilians. He accused the 'ring' of 
preventing 'the construction of a type of iron clad vessel except monitors, ' and of concentrating warship 
construction, especially armored vessels, in New York City. " Yet most pre-war iron shipbuilding, Still 
continues, was concentrated in New York City. Ericsson's backers, especially John GriswoK did have 
political influence; "Nevertheless, there is no evidence that a New York ring existed. Of the 27 monitors 
contracted before 1863,20 were built outside New York City, and naval officers in Washington, 
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Ericsson's near-invincibility on technical issues which all but guaranteed him advantage 
over many rival designs for ironclads submitted to the Navy throughout the American 
Civil War. As Hale later commented to Congress, "these boats are considered by the 
Department, and by practical men who have the best means of judging, as the very best, 
and in fact the only means of coast defense that is now known to the military science. 9239 
Secondly, to Hale's inquiry of the purpose of the (monitor) ironclad gunboats proposed 
by the Navy, Welles stated they were "to reduce all the fortified sea ports of the enemy 
and open their harbors to the Union Army. " Examined closely, this was a significant 
caveat not mentioned by Ericsson. Even the 1856 proposal to Napoleon III was intended 
to attack ships, not forts. His private letter to Lincoln of August 1861 maintained this 
distinction, adding only that his floating batteries would help protect Northern ports from 
attack by European ironclads. Even in naming the Monitor, Ericsson specified: 
The impregnable and aggressive character of this structure will 
admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion that the batteries 
on the banks of their rivers will no longer present barriers to the 
entrance of the Union forces. 
The iron-clad intruder will thus prove a severe monitor to those 
leaders. 
But there are other leaders who will also be startled and 
admonished by the booming of the guns from the impregnable 
iron turret: "Downing Street" will hardly view with indifference 
this last "Yankee notion, " this monitor. To the Lords of the 
Admiralty the new craft will be a monitor, suggesting doubts as to 
the propriety of completing those four steel ships at three and a 
half million apiece. 
On these and many similar grounds, I propose to name the new 
battery Monitor. 240 
particularly ... 
Fox, were most responsible for concentrating on the monitor type, " Still, Monitor Builders, 
29. 
239 8-2-1862, CG, 697. 
240 20-1-1862, Ericsson to Fox, quoted from Ericsson, Contributions, 465-6 emphasis mine. Ilis letter still 
ruffles British feathers today; the 1976 Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea declaring that "Downing 
Street, in fact; viewed the Monitor with complete indifference, having two years earlier launched the 
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Yet when Hale recommended Ericsson's "boats" to Congress, he too added that "stone 
forts can be battered down by these batterieS.,, 241 
In fact, Welles' reply bears the hallmark influence of Fox, whose own thinking retained 
the original concept that the gunboats were to run Confederate gauntlets and engage 
Confederate forts, not Grimes's assertion they were to solve the nation's coastal defence 
problems in the face of foreign-particularly British-naval intervention. 242 This 
contradiction between coastal assault and coastal defence, between attacking the 
Confederacy and defending against the British Empire would manifest itself more clearly 
as soon as the Passaic-class monitors saw action, a year later. Furthermore, their obvious 
failure to reduce forts-at least without direct support from the Army-would outweigh 
their intrinsically less-obvious success in deterring foreign intervention. It would be 
much easier for political opponents of the Lincoln Administration to point to blatant 
battlefield defeats, or at least "repulses", than subtle diplomatic victories. The ironclads 
might topple the Executive after all. 
At any rate, the Union's naval resources were perpetually split between the need to 
maintain its command of the sea, or at least the protection of its commerce worldwide, 
and strike at the Confederacy. On the eve of the Battle of Hampton Roads, Fox 
apologized to Flag-Officer Louis M. Goldsborough, commanding the North Atlantic 
Blockading Squadron, for the short supply of the new double-ender gunboats. I 
presume you are aware that we are about to undertake the biggest job of the war, " he 
wrote, referring to the forthcoming operation against New Orleans, "and that we are 
straining every nerve to concentrate a force to accomplish it successfully; this is why we 
Warrior, which could have blo%vn fifty Monitors out of the water, " Peter Kemp (ed. ), The Oxford 
Companion to Ships and the Sea (New York Oxford University Press, 1976), 555. 
241 8-2-1862, CG, 697. 
242 See for example, 4-2-1862, CG, 620-1. 
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have no boats. " Meanwhile, the Confederate commerce raiders Nashville and Sumter 
were having their own way against Northern. shipping, "when we ought to have a dozen 
boats after them. " Nevertheless, the Navy was "immensely popular and will remain so if 
we continue successful, " Fox concluded. 243 In addition to victories off the North 
Carolina coast, Forts Henry and Donelson had fallen in the West, thanks to the combined 
operations of Union land forces under General Ulysses S. Grant and Commodore Foote's 
partially annoured steam-gunboats. 
Yet victories at home served two types of political purposes. In debating the Naval 
Appropriations Bill, on 12 February, including the supplementary appropriation of $15 
million for an improved class of double-ender gunboats, Navy supporters could easily 
point to their own usefulness in suppressing the rebellion. Sedgwick recapitulated "Mr. 
Speaker, Congress has appropriated money for the Navy with great liberality. It has 
hitherto ordered to be built twenty-three gunboats, twelve side-wheel vessels, and three 
ironclad vessels. " But "the Navy has got something to show for the money expended on 
it. It has got Hatteras, and Port Royal, and Roanoke Island, and it will have taken every 
fortified place on the rebel coast within the next four months if liberal appropriations are 
continued to be made for it. " Yet, "on the other side of the Atlantic to-day, nothing can 
be pointed to as having been achieved by the Army that looks to the suppression of the 
rebellion, " remarked one congressman. "The governing classes of England, with 
Palmerston at their head, " were "willing if not anxious to go to war... " Subsequently, 
"the one power which we can create to resist them, is just the power to the creation of 
which these $15,000,000 are to be set apart; and I am, therefore, large as the sum is, in 
favor of puffing it at the disposal of the Secretary of the Navy for this purpose. 244 
243 1-3-1862, Fox to Goldsborougk ORN, Series 1, Vol. 6,624. 
244 ibid. 
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A disaster at New Orleans, on the other hand, Fox wrote to Commander David D. Porter, 
would be "fatal to everything and overwhelms the Navy and everybody connected with it 
in everlasting disgrace. " Taunting foreign as well as domestic eyes were watching too. 
"The French and Russian both said to me today 'recollect that you are to have New 
Orleans on the 10th of March', but we will give you till the 20'h. "245 All this said nothing 
for any Confederate naval initiative, however. On 21 February Captain John Marston of 
the steam frigate Roanoke-lying at Hampton Roads with her engine disabled and a crew 
short of 180 men-related to Welles the disturbing local intelligence that "the Merrimack 
will positively attack Newport News within five days... "246 
Summary: 
The Trent Affair suddenly upset the Union's offensive strategic initiative against the 
Confederacy, forcing a defensive one instead against Great Britain. This led to a 
subsequent confusion as to what type ofironclads should be built, and what their ultimate 
purpose would be, offensive or defensive. Such a tactical-level dichotomy reflected the 
larger strategic debate over how the Union would successfully crush the Rebellion. It 
could not obviously win the war on the defensive, and in the absence ofaggressive action 
on the part of the A nny of the Potomac tinder General McClellan, relatively quick strikes 
by the Navy, feasibly taking out one Southern port city after another, seemed a logical 
alternative. Nevertheless, the war could not be won either if it involvedforeign powers 
operating against one Northern port city after another. In this sense it was always held 
to be more important to secure the Union against possible interference first and last, 
before any efforts to subdue the domestic enemy couldbe reasonably expectedto succeed 
Great Britain was the bigger potential threat to the survival ofthe United States, even if- 
and especially if-it was already at war with the Confederate States. 
245 24-2-1862, Fox to Porter, PFP. 
246 21-2-1862, Marston to Welles, RG 45, Entry 15. 
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This was not a universal opinion, however. In thefinal Senate debate of 12 February 
1862, over House Bill No. 165-for coastalfortifications-Senator Hale objected it had 
"nothing to do with the present war. It is prospective. It looks to other things than the 
prosecution ofthis war or the defense ofthe country in it; and it appropriates S7,000,000, 
when we need every dollar we can beg and borrow, and 1 had almost said steal, but the 
stealing is the other way. "A string offortifications along the northern frontier, he 
added, would provoke a similar British response and a spiralling arms race. 
Nevertheless, the billpassed the Senate with a vote qf28 to 10 . 
247 It was better to be safe 
than sorry, and by 1862 the US. Navy, the Lincoln Administration and the Northern 
public alikefound themselves thoroughly humiliated by the very real and likely threat of 
British intervention-Brilish seapower-and were determined this type of political 
influence could never again be wielded against the Union. 
The shift towards a Brown-Water navalforce even before the issue arose of ironclad 
"boats " or "batteries " also reflected the overriding strategic requirements of the United 
States in comparison with those of the British Empire at the same time. Dah1gren had 
meanwhile expressed a willingness to forego a measure of strategic range, if not 
seakeeping, infavour ofa tactically superior, mastless ironclad entirely reliant upon her 
supply ofcoal to determine the extent ofter operations. Theforeign threat only added to 
this concern for regional, if not coastal, supremacy--even as the Admiralty committed 
itself to a program of deep-draft, iron-hulled ironclads mounting the largest array of 
mast, sails and rigging ever seen. Did the British commitment to imperial defence imply 
an inability to operate against an enemy's coastline? On 8 February 1861 Vice-Admiral 
Sir Richard Dundas wrote to the Secretary of the Defence Commission, for the attention 
of the Duke of Cambridge and Lord (Sidney) Herbert, the Secretaryfor War, that "to 
prevent the passage of iron-cased ships" ("as exemplified in the French ship 'La 
Gloire ") into Portsmouth harbour floating batteries could be readily devised by 
converting ships-of-the-line. Though it would "not be desirable that they shouldfittedfor 
permanent service at sea ... they should be so adapted as to render it inexpedient that they 
should be detached to a distance... " The Defence Committee (again) disagreed. Such 
vessels would not be as effective asfixedforts, it defensively declared, and "the proposal 
to devote so large a portion of our naval resources to a special purpose ... sojarfrom 
increasing our security, will tend to weaken our strength by dividing our means of 
resistance. " Indeed, it was not clear how ironclads might be usedfor coastal defence or 
247 12-2-1862, CG, 762. 
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assault. "It certainly appears to us a strange argument that, because by the introduction 
of iron-cased vessels, bombardment has become comparatively easy, and consequently, 
that iron-cased ships are requiredfor protection, therefore, the defending vessels are to 
he deprived of the support offorts, and are to he put on an equality with an equal 
number, or on an inferiority with a greater number of a similarly equipped squadron of 
the enemy. , 248 
By this reasoning it was perhaps fallacious for the Union Navy to concentrate on 
annoured batteries as well, whetherfor coastal assault or defence-with the important 
distinction, not mentioned by the British Committee, that it was not so much about 'equal 
numbers' of ironclads but their individual character, based on their strategic function. 
All things not being equal in ironclad design, between coastal and global operational 
parameters, it remained to be seen whether or not a mastless ironclad "battery" would 
by its nature be superior to "iron-cased ships", if not also forts. For the US. Navy, it 
also remained to be seen whether its hasty reliance upon coastal defence, and therefore a 
superior ironclad battery, could befully entrusted to the abilities ofprivate contractors 
such as John Ericsson. Deprived of much of Iheirpractical seafaring experience in this 
unique situation, professional Union sailors were naturally dubious of "weapons 
pla6lbrms ". much less "machines", as warships. 
248 Letter Addressed by the Royal Commissioners on National Defences to the Secretary of Statefor War, 
Relative to the Proposed Substitution of Iron-Cased Vessels for the Forts at Spithead (London: George 
Edward Eyre and William Spottiswoode, 1861), 3-11; see WO 33-10. 
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PART TWO 
The Fulcrum of Hampton Roads 
129 
1. Hampton Roads and its consequences 
When the Confederate ironclad Virginia finally did attack, on Saturday, 8 March 1862, 
the Union Navy was, surprisingly, fairly surprised. Not only were the frigates and sloops 
at Hampton Roads caught helpless, disabled or aground, but repeated broadsides of 9- 
inch solid shot against the ironclad's 38' sloping armoured casemate proved futile in 
preventing the 4-knot moving vessel to ram the Cumberland and then leisurely set the 
Congress on fire. The vital crossroads between Fortress Monroe, Norfolk, and the mouth 
of the James River in fact consisted of mostly disabled Union vessels, all wooden, many 
of which were sail only. The oaken heart of Union seapower was literally pierced with 
iron. Two powerfully armed Federal warships were destroyed in a matter of minutes, 
with over 250 casualties. 249 Even worse, the enemy was virtually untouched, and 
prepared to finish off the rest of the Union's seapower; bombard Fortress Monroe- 
perhaps into surrender-along with surrounding Union positions. In fact the Virginia 
might dominate the strategic nexus of the war. 
Welles famously recounted in his diary how Lincoln"s Cabinet panicked at the news. 
Secretary for War Stanton feared the Virginia would steam up the Potomac and shell 
Washington. Even though the Secretary of die Navy assured him the Merrimack's old 
hull drew too much water, and therefore could not possibly ascend the Potomac to 
Washington, Stanton was doubtful. When Welles informed him the Monitor was en 
route to Hampton Roads and should already be there, doubt turned to scom when Welles 
informed him the Union's ironclad champion only had two gunS. 250 
'9 As James McPherson points out, this was "more than the navy suffered on any other day of the war" and 
"a feat no other enemy would accomplish until 1941, " Battle Cry of Freedom, 176. Donald Canney adds 
that "the circumstances were extraordinary: the survivors attest to the helplessness of both wooden vessels 
and their hapless crews in the face of an impersonal and impenetrable iron behemotIL The traurna of 8 
march 1862 would haunt the Union navy for the remainder of the war, " Lincoln's Nai5ý 218. 
250 Beale, Diary, 1: 61-7. 
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This was the result of a single converted ironclad, on its first day of operation . 
25, For the 
Union Navy in early March, 1862, it was a disaster of the highest magnitude. 
Furthermore, it was well known that other rebel "rams" were under construction 
throughout the South; at New Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, and on the 
Mississippi. The rapid mobilization of the North's maritime and industrial resources had 
produced a credible blockade covering roughly 3,500 miles of enemy coastline. Wooden 
gunboats had already launched successful strikes against the South's exposed, seaboard 
flanks. At Richmond, Confederate Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin had dispatched 
his best soldier, General Robert E. Lee, to oversee the coastal defences of the Carolinas 
and Georgia. 252 Lee knew that Union seapower could pressure Richmond to divert 
precious manpower-resources away from its defence or operations in the West. Suddenly 
the situation appeared reversed. The rebels' technological "wonder-weapons" might yet 
outweigh the strength of the Federal fleet. 253 
into this already historic maelstrom of naval warfare steamed the U. S. S. Monitor later 
that night . 
254 News of her arrival, it was telegrammed to Major-General John E. Wool, 
commanding some 10,000 Union troops at the scene, "infused new life into the men. ý255 
The next morning, the two iron-plated steam warships duelled for the immediate fate of 
the stricken Union steam frigate Minnesota, and the control of flarnpton Roads. Among 
the thousands of Northern and Southern spectators, crowded along opposite shores, who 
251 See 74-1862, Mallory to Davis, ORIV, ser. 1, vol. 7,43. 
252 See Lee's subsequent 9-11-1861 report to Benjamin, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 12,299-300. 
253 Fox had written to Lincoln on 4 March, however, that the Monitor's trials were complete and she was on 
her way to Hampton Roads, 4-3-1862, Fox to Lincoln, LP Confederate President Davis was urged to use 
the virginia offensively, up the Potomac if she were lightened enough; 28-2-1862, Douglas F. Forrest to 
Davis, ORIV, ser. 1, vol. 7,737-9. 
254 On March 4, WeUes had ordered Captain John Marston, the senior naval officer at Hampton Roads, not 
to allow the Monitor '10 go under fire of the enemies' batteries, except for some pressing emergency". The 
ironclad and her crew were untried, so "her commander should exercise his men at the guns, and in all 
respects prepare for serious work. " Perhaps she would have been ordered to attack the Krginia at Norfolk. 
The following day, however, Wefles telegrammed Marston to send the Monitor to Washington when she 
arrived; 4-3-1862, Welles to Marston, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 6,678-9,681-2. 
255 8-3-1862, telegram, W. D. Whipple, Assistant Adjutant-General to Major-General Wool, 0MV, ser. I., 
vol. 7,5. 
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witnessed this dramatic encounter was Gustavus Fox. He had come down from 
Washington to see for himself the contentious Monitor, scheduled to arrive from New 
York. There is little doubt that the experience fully "converted" the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy to Ericsson's claims as well. In a telegram to Welles Fox briefly relayed the 
events: 
HEADQUARTERS, Fortress Monroe --- 6 45 p. m. 
(Received March 9,1862. ) 
The Monitor arrived at 10 p. m. last night and went immediately to 
the protection of the Minnesota, lying, aground just below 
Newport News. 
7 a. m. to-day the Merrimack, accompanied by two wooden 
steamers and several tugs, stood out toward the Minnesota and 
opened fire. 
The Monitor met them at once and opened her fire, when all the 
enemy's vessels retired, excepting the Merrimack. These two 
ironclad vessels fought part of the time touching each other, from 
8 a. m. to noon, when the Merrimack retired. Whether she is 
injured or not it is impossible to say. Lieutenant I L. Worden, 
who commanded the Monitor, handled her with great skill, 
assisted by Chief Engineer Stimers. Lieutenant Worden was 
injured by the cement from the pilot house being driven into his 
eyes, but I trust not seriously. The Minnesota kept up a continuous 
fire and is herself somewhat injured. 
She was moved considerably to-day, and will probably be off to- 
night. The Monitor is uninjured and ready at any moment to repel 
another attack. 
G. V. FOX, 
Assistant Secretary 
G. WELLES, 
Secretary avy 2,56 
Fifteen minutes later, Fox telegrammed John Ericsson, in New York, that his "noble boat" 
had "performed with perfect success". In the unprecedented, critical relationship between 
256 ORIV, ser. I., vol. 7,6. 
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man and machine in naval warfare, the officers and crew of 58 men (including Stimers) 
had handled their own wonder-weapon "with great skff I. 257 
The Monitor was indeed shot-proof-but so was the Virginia. The rebel ironclad 
remained a serious threat. "I was the nearest person to her outside of the Monitor, " Fox 
wrote to Welles, "and I am of the opinion she is not seriously injured. " Any of the I I- 
inch gunboats still available Fox wanted sent to Hampton Roads. 
258 It was now painfully 
obvious that only the biggest Union guns on hand might succeed in overcoming such 
armour protection. 259 In addition to the superiority of "iron over wood", the "revolution" 
in naval warfare manifested at the Battle of Hampton Roads was that concentrated 
broadsides of lighter cannon were useless in comparison with single, overwhelming 
blaStS. 260 In two consecutive days of firing against the Virginia, the Minnesota alone 
expended 78 10-inch and 169 9-inch solid shot, without reSUlt. 
261 The first action 
between ironclad ships was thus a famouslyfrustrating one, with neither antagonist able 
to wield a decisive advantage over the other. 
262 As such, the stage was immediately set 
for new ordnance, ship design, and tactics in the age of steam. 
257 opiv, ser. I., vol. 7,7. 
258 9-3-1862, telegram, Fox to Welles, ORN, ser. I., vol. 7,7. 
259 For the C. S. S. Virginia, this consisted of two layers of rolled iron armour plate, each 2-inches thick-, 
angled at 3r and supported by oak and pine. In response to Lincoln's inquiry as to whether the Virginia 
could ascend the Potomac and attack Washington, Dah1gren replied that only a vessel drawing less than 22 
feet might reach the city, and that he was mounting his sole II -inch gun at Giesboro Point to protect the 
arsenal, at a range of 50-yards from any passing vessel. "Shot of 170 pounds at 50 or 100 yards will be apt 
to do something, " 9-3-1862, telegram, DaWgren to Lincoln, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 7,76-8. 
260 71he "performance, power, and capabilities of the Monitor, - Welles wrote to Worden, "must effect a 
radical change in naval warfare. " What this might involve the Secretary did not specify, only noting that 
Worden's vessel with only 2 guns had repelled "a powerfid armored steamer of at least eight guns" and that 
this action had "excited general admiration and received the applause of the whole country, " 15-3-1862, 
Welles to Worden, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 7,38. 
261 10-3-1862, Charles W. Homer, Gunner, to Captain G. J. Van Brunt, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 7; also 10-3-1862, 
Brunt to Welles, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 7,11-12. The Monitor later reported faing "forty-one solid cast-iron shot 
in her engagement with the Merrimack, equally divided between guns 27 and 28, " 16-3-1862, Lieutenant 
William jeffers to Goldsborough, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 7,28. 
262 major-General Benjamin Huger, Commander of the Confederate Department of Norfolk, 
recogaized the long-term problem, however: "As the enemy can build such boats faster than we, they 
could, when so prepared, overcome arry place accessible by water. How these powerful machines are to 
be stopped is a problem I can not solve. At present, in the Virginia, we have the advantage; but we can 
not tell how long this may last, " 10-3-1862, Huger to General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector 
General, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 7,54-5. 
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On 10 March the Minnesota was finally got off ground and resumed position back at the 
entrance of the Roads, off Fortress Monroe. 'Me Monitor followed her up. That day Fox 
and General Wool inspected the battle-scarred ironclad and conferred with her officers. 
Wool had already been telegraphed by General George B. McClellan to prepare to 
evacuate the Union position at Newport News, if the Navy lost control of the Roads, and 
fall back on Fortress Monroe, taking care of the valuable 12-inch "Union GuO-the only 
one of its kind in existence. 263 Undoubtedly, Fox was shown the Anny's massive, 
experimental rifled gun and its companion 15-inch calibre smoothbore as they were both 
prepared to assist in the defence of the fort . 
264 Two of his telegrams made on the 
following day confirm that the Assistant Secretary had made the important connection 
between the corporeal events of recent days and the Union ironclad program's course for 
the future. 711ýe first, to Lieutenant Henry Wise, Assistant Inspector of Ordnance at the 
Navy Department, requested Dahlgren to assist Brigadicr-Gencrat J. W. Ripley (the 
Army's Chief of Ordnance) in the casting of "some projectiles for the Union gun here. v7265 
The second one, to Dahlgren, clearly reflected Stimers' flustration in not being allowed to 
fire the special wrought-iron shot specially cast for the Monitor's II -inch guns but 
ultimately not allowed for Dah1gren's fear that the guns would be over-strained. "It is the 
only thing that will settle the Merrimack, " Fox persisted. Additionally, "We must have 
more of these boats with 15-inch guns, and you must go ahead with your furnaces at once 
to make them to stand solid shot. "266 
Dahlgren replied that the risk of an I I-inch gun burst within the Monitor's turret-as a 
result of firing wrought-iron shot-outweighed their use. "I am only awaiting the action 
263 9-3-1862, telegram, McClellan to Wool; 10-3-1862, telegramý Wool to McClellan, Official Records of 
the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, 30 vols., (hereafter "0. R. N. '), ser. 1, vol. 7, 
75-6,84. 
264 11-3-1862, telegram, Fox to Welles, O. R. N., ser. I., vol. 7,91-2. 
265 11-3-1862, telegram, Fox to Wise, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 7,92. 
2" See the original 11-3-1862 telegram, from Fox to DaHgren, found in the DP 
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of the Senate and then for as large guns as you want with solid shot. 7267 The day before 
the Virginia's attack, Dahlgren wielded his authority in ordnance matters in response to 
Fox's "proposition to build a vessel like the 'Lancaster' so as to carry 20 guns of M in. on 
the Gun deck, in lieu of 22 of IX in., and to retain the two XI in. on the Spar deck. " The 
increase, he calculated, would add from 170 to 280 tons' weight to the vessel and nearly 
80 extra men to the crew. Twelve 11 -inch guns could only therefore be contemplated, six 
to a broadside. But whether these should be on a regular broadside-carriage on an 
enclosed gun-deck or an open-deck pivot was another matter, especially since such large 
guns would have to be stowed at sea "in two line fore and aft on each side of the middle 
line of the decle', parallel to the ship's side. "You may safely rely on one thing, "' he 
concluded to Fox: "that the power of a ship of War may always be in proportion to her 
capaci And that the lar est ship can always be made the most powerful in offense as 
well as in defense. , 
268 
Ile events at Hampton Roads had Dahlgren rather eating his words later. Ericsson's 
published remarks on the ironclad duel, that the Monitor's II -inch guns should have been 
aimed more at the Virginia's waterline, Dahlgren argued only proved his point; that the 
lack of wrought-iron shot would not have made any positive difference in the battle's 
outcome. "Ilat the use of but one M in. gun at a time should have effected so much 
against a vessel 4 times the size with perhaps 6 or 8 times the Ordnance power, presenting 
an entire oblique surface to the Monitor's aim is so good a result that it seems to me the 
267 11 -3-1862, DaWgren to Fox, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 7,92-3. Both the 15-inch smoothbore gun. and a rifled 12- 
inch were being tested at Fortress Monroe. "Since the recent naval engagement it is thought that nothing 
can stop the Merrimack here except the Monitor and the big guns (the 15-inch and 12-inch). General Wool 
is desirous of having both of these guns mounted on the beach and plenty of ammunition for them as soon 
as possible, "; 11-3-1862, T. G. Baylor, First Lieutenant of Ordnance, to Ripley, ORN, ser. I., vol. 7,93-4. 
Nicknamed "Floyd" the 15-inch prototype was ordered by Stanton to be renamed the "Lincoln Gun"; 11-3- 
1862, telegram, Stanton to Wool, ORN, ser. I., vol. 7,94. 
2,68 7-3-1862, DahIgren to Fox, DP. 
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excess of hypercriticism even to suggest that more might have been done. ..,, 
269 Here was 
both veiled criticism of Ericsson, the now wildly-popular civilian inventor, and yet an 
acknowledgment by Dahlgren that Ericsson's principles-embodied in the Monitor-had 
somehow overturned his own . 
270 The smaller, lighter-draft turret vessel had succeeded in 
driving away the large, deep-draft, broadside-armed opponent. Various proposals 
submitted by Dahlgren before the battle emphasized either converting shallow draft 
gunboats into armoured central battery ironclads or lightly protecting the new double- 
ender gunboats with their open-deck pivots. 271 Now Ericsson and Fox were rushing 
forward with plans of even more heavily armoured turret-mounted guns, of even heavier 
calibre-designed to inflict singular mortal blows against ostensibly "more powerftil" 
ironclads. 
In this regard Ericsson's proposal to Welles of 23 December 1861 to build six improved 
monitors held an important advantage over rival designs-particularly the Bureau's- 
since arming them with 15-inch guns was a specifically mentioned feature. "The Monitor 
was not half completed before I saw clearly what might be done, " Ericsson wrote to Fox. 
He had been perfecting them since early that December at least, anticipating many of the 
suggested improvements Stimers offered following the Monitor's trial by fire. Foremost 
among these was the placing of the pilot house on top of the turret, rather than the 
269 17-3-1862, DaWgren to Harwood, RG 74, Entry 201, Item 5, Box 2. DaWgren quickly added that "of 
course I would not be understood as wishing to depreciate the high merit of the projector and builder of the 
Monitor which so astonishingly endured the brunt of the Merrimack's fire. " 12-3-1862, telegram, Ericsson 
to Fox, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 7, on ain-dng at the Virginia's waterline. 
2" "Now comes the reign of iron-and cased ships are to take the place of wooden ships and Stone Forts- 
Battering Rams to stand in lieu of Ordnance, " from Dahigren's curious history-essay, dated "March 8, 
1862" but nevertheless finished afterwards. Dah1gren somewhat unfairly comments "Upon the untried 
endurances of the Monitor, and her timely arrival did depend the tide of events-Two circumstances which 
in the particular case amounted to Accidents. " In another sense, both the Monitor's defensive capabilities 
and her immediate deployment to Hampton Roads were by design. 
271 See 7-10-1861, Dah1gren to Welles, RG 74, Entry 201, Item 5, Box 2, for Dah1gren's proposal to convert 
the screw-gunboat U. S. S. Pawnee with iron plating "not less than 2 inches thick-, nor more than 3 inches, " 
This would "extend along the sides of the section where the body of thevessel begins to fall off into the 
fine lines of the ends, the extremes of the side plating to be connected across the interior by a transverse 
partition of plating. " See Canney, Lincoln's Navy, 66-7, for a description of the Pawnee, originally armed 
with four ii-inch pivots but eventually changed to twelve 9-inch broadside guns. See 16-10-1861, 
DaWgren to Harwood, RG 74, Entry 201, Item 5, Box 2, for his suggestion to partially armour double-ender 
gunboats. 
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isolated, vulnerable box-like structure on the Monitor's forward deck. This would be 
cylindrical too, composed of eight inches of laminated I -inch plates, and fixed in position 
when the turret revolved. But "on account of the most unexpected march which Mr. 
Isherwood stole upon me in relation to my cylindrical, impregnable, steam revolving 
turret, " Ericsson explained, "I have kept my own counsel. "272 
In the meantime, the North reacted to news of the two-day naval battle at Hampton Roads 
with mixed feelings of shock, amazement and joy. After relating his own account of the 
Monitoý's performance, Stimers congratulated Ericsson upon his "great success": 
Thousands have this day blessed you. I have heard whole crews 
cheer you. Every man feels that you have saved this place to the 
nation by fin-nishing us with the means to whip an ironclad frigate 
that was, until our arrival, having it all her own way with our most 
powerful vesselS. 273 
To Commodore Smith, a man nearly as responsible for the Monitor's completion as her 
builder, Stimers had to express his condolences. The Bureau Chief s son, Joseph, was 
among the killed in action. I knew him well; indeed, we were shipmates in that same 
Merrimack when she sailed under an honorable flag-by people who did not steal her. " 
At sea the Monitor needed higher ventilation pipes, but otherwise he considered "the form 
and strength of the vessel equal to any weather I ever saw at sea. " Waves rolled smoothly 
uninterrupted "right across her deck; it looks to the sailor as if his ship was altogether 
under water, and it is only the man who has studied the philosophical laws which govern 
floatation and stability who feels exactly comfortable in her during a gale of wind. " The 
272 14-3-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. "From the new suggestion in Congress on the subject of gunboats, - 
Sargent wrote to Ericsson, "it would seem to me that they have been trying to steal your thunder-and I 
only hope that they will not spoil it in the Stealing. " Only low-freeboard ironclads could insure their 
machinery from penetrative hits. 7-3-1862, Sargent to Ericsson, EPLOC 12-3-1862, telegram, Ericsson to 
Fox, ORN, ser. 1, vol. 7. 
273 9-3-1862, Stimers to Ericsson, ORAr, ser. 1, vol. 7,26-7. 
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CWef Engineer also considered laminated amour plating better than "solid forged 
plates". 
274 
The Battle of Hampton Roads also gave John Lenthall of the Bureau of Ship Construction 
& Repair new hopes for his own scheme of turreted ironclads. One of the chief 
objections the previous winter was their requirement for (foreign-built) solid, slab armour 
plates. Now, "injustice to the Bureaif', Lenthall wrote to Welles, the Department would 
reconsider "a vessel built on the principles of the plan then prepared". The Novelty Iron 
Works, who built the Monitor's laminated iron turret, was offering to build a Bureau 
turret ship in "51/2months for the sum of Five hundred and thirty thousand dollars, 
suggesting a modification in the plating which recent experience will justify ... 
vv275 But 
this would either overturn the sudden popular success of the Monitor's inventor, and his 
own proposal for six improved sister-ships of the same basic design-or introduce a rival 
turret-ship system of higher freeboard and Coles-cupolas. 
At any rate, Lenthall's proposals were again too reactionary, too slow to effectively 
compare with Ericsson's. Nothing was mentioned of increasing the firepower of the 
former's turret ship, from one I I-inch gun per turret (similar to Coles' ideas of only one 
11 O-pdr Armstrong per turret on the Royal Sovereign conversion and the purpose-built 
Prince Albert) to two; or more importantly, especially after the indecision of the 
Monitor's guns against the Virginia's armour protection, of substituting 15-inch guns for 
the II -inch. Nor was the other drawback of the Bureau's turrct vessel prototype, it's 
relatively higher freeboard and therefore greater area of hull to be protected-and 
274 17-3-1862, S timers to Smith, ORM., ser. 1, vol. 7,27. 
275 13-3-1862, Lenthall to WeUes, RG 19, Entry 50. 
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therefore also greater expense, difficulty, and delay of construction-addressed by the 
Union Navy's chief of ship construction. 276 
On the same day Lenthall wrote to Welles, Ericsson wrote to Fox of his delight that the 
proactive Assistant Secretary, fully converted from the Bureau's vision to Ericsson's, 
seriously considered 20-inch calibre guns for the "swift, impregnable tuffet carrier" 
which Ericsson was already busy designing. The concept of alternative "visions" here is 
crucial: whereas the Bureau (and its advocates) had its eye more on deploying turret ships 
for coastal assault-attacking Charleston for example-Ericsson, Fox and their 
supporters were focusing ever more on the problem of strategic coastal defence- 
deterring foreign intervention. This included the construction of even larger monitors 
with ocean-going pretensions. "With all my heart" Ericsson wrote Fox, "if you can make 
the guns I [will] most willingly supply the gear for supporting, working and housing the 
same. Enforce your plan of employing such heavy ordnance and in twelve months we 
can say to England and France, leave the Gulfl. We do not want your Kings and 
monarchical institutions on this continent. 
" See the problems Lenthall faced, for example, when trying to procure the 4V2-inch thick plates for the 
Roanoke-conversion; 24-6-1862, Lenthall to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. Thomas Rowland of the 
Continental Iron Works at Green Point directly complained that the cost of fitting Ericsson's lighter plates 
bore "no comparison ... with that of applying 4Y2 in. plates to the side of a hull, when said plates are obliged 
to have compound curves... " In his view "few Engineers in this country have a proper conception of the 
difficulties to be surmounted, and the expenses which must necessarily be increased, in cladding the sides 
of any of our Steam Frigates... " See also 1-1-1862, Scienlific American, 277. 
277 13-34 862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
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11. Super-monitors, super-guns 
On the morning of 15 March 1862 Fox met with Ericsson in New York. Their 
conference all but hammered out the future shape of the Union's ironclad navy for the 
rest of the Civil War and beyond. Ericsson wrote soon after the Assistant Secretary's 
departure he was "much gratified ... to find how fully you appreciate the advantage of 
drawing the supply of air, in the intended swift turret carrier, through pilot house and 
turret. " With a projected 5,000 horsepower engine there would be more than enough 
artificial ventilation available through a separate, armoured vent-pipe above deck "when 
chasing an enemy with full power" at sea. This promised to resolve any doubts 
concerning the habitability of new monitors. The second main concern, low freeboard, 
was closely connected to the first, and therefore the solution of the former meant the 
acceptance of the latter. Ericsson was jubilant: "Your support in relation to the flush 
deck only 18 inches out of water is most encouraging and will be a tower of strength in 
the battle with prejudice, which must be waged, before the good cause is Wumphant. "278 
Much of the credit for the acceptance of the monitor system of ironclads belongs to Fox, 
whose ideas often proved to be as far-sighted and free from convention as Ericsson's. 
Such a kindred spirit was nothing new for the Swedish engineer-inventor, however, who 
must have recalled his initial fiiendship with Stockton some 20 years before. Whereas 
then Ericsson was new to the country and vulnerable, his personal status since Hampton 
Roads seemed as secure as, ironically, the country's was not. But this did not prevent 
Fox from honestly confronting him with proposed modifications to his plans. "When I 
spoke to you last Summer of a vessel of extraordinary speed and one 20 inch gun, 
invulnerable, so far as the tower was concerned, as a fit match for the Warrior, " Fox 
wrote on his return to Washington, I did not think you would take the Monitor as a 
2711 15-3-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
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type. " Events since then had compelled him "to consent fully in the plans which you 
showed me in New York Saturday. " His "suggestions of detail" he therefore trusted 
Ericsson would take "in the kind spirit which prompted them. " These included the 
specific incorporation of a ram; a 12-foot height for the ventilation pipe of the seagoing 
monitor, forward of the stack; an iron cage around the propellers to prevent fouling; "a 
nice iron gallery ... abaft the smoke pipe 
for promenade", 8-feet high; and a staggering 25- 
inch thick turret. Always prone to optimism, however grim, Fox regarded the Navy's 
losses at Hampton Roads as useful in "awakening" the public mind (and opening the 
purse-string of Congress). "Most fortunately we have met with a disaster-this is the 
,, 279 Almighty's teachings always-success never gives a lesson. 
Far from feeling insulted, Ericsson regarded Fox's suggestions as "genius". He was in a 
good mood to be sure, and it never hurt to flatter equally enthusiastic patrons. Fox being 
"a perfect master of the subject", Ericsson pledged "we shall now have a navy that will 
place the United States at the head of Naval powers. " Fox was rightly suspicious this 
might prove easier said than done, even if with the full bacldng of Congress. But 
Ericsson assured him, perhaps rightly too, that "the building of a dozen Monitors is a 
17ý 
mere trifle with the enormous engineering capibilities of the United States at this 
moment. Y, 
280 
There were, however, major qualifiers to this statement. If "a dozen Monitore' meant 
simple reproductions of the original, including its guns, budding them might have indeed 
been fairly painless. If more were needed, and of a more complicated design and 
demanding armament, there would be complications. The fixed price of materials and 
availability of skilled labour were also requisite. Yet in the early spring of 1862 there 
279 18-3-1862, Fox to Ericsson, FP. 
280 19-3-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
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was still every reason to expect an early end of the war; Federal forces were poised in 
both the eastern and western theatres to deliver simultaneous crushing blows to the 
Rebellion. Fox replied he wanted "25 inches for the fast boats that will cross to the 
enemy's comtry " because he foresaw "that the most enormous calibre of ordnance must 
immediately come into use, and we must prepare for them, not for anything in existence 
at this time. siN 1 Fox knew it would take at least a year before such fearsome naval 
weapons were ready for use. Maybe by then it would be England's turn to yield to the 
spread of Lincoln's American democracy? 
Almost immediately the qualifiers set in. On 22 March Fox wrote Ericsson he preferred 
two turrets in his "three hundred & filly feet vessel". Two days later he added twin- 
screws. In this he "would risk a voyage around the world, and a battle with the whole 
iron fleet of England. 97282 Oddly enough, four years later Fox would take a twin-screwed, 
double-turreted monitor, the U. S. S. Miantonomoh, across the Atlantic to face British 
ironclads-though in peace; the London Times recounting Fox's challenge that "if the 
experiment could be made without exciting ill-feeling on either side, he would allow the 
whole ironclad fleet of England to open fire on the Miantonomoh, and continue it for two 
days, provided that the Miantonomoh might afterwards be allowed to have ten hours' 
firing at our ships in return. P1283 Though Ericsson wrote he found his patron's "boldness 
in the matter ... a source of gratification, 
" he also had to stress the importance of keeping 
Dahlgren's new 15-inch gun to Ericsson's exacting proportions to fit his 20-foot diameter 
turret. He was in the meantime settling for I I-inch thick laminated turrets for the six 
improved monitors underway, capable of an additional outer plate of solid four-inch 
thickness, as soon as Northern mills could readily produce them. 284 But on the same day 
291 20-3-1862, Fox to Ericsson, EPLOC. 
292 22-3-1862, Fox to Ericsson, EPLOC; 24-3-1862, Fox to Ericsson, FP. 
283 16-7-1866, London Times. 
284 22-3-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
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that Dahlgren complained to Fox of delays in finishing the specifications for the 15-inch 
gun--due to constant wartime demands and a shortage of staff-Ericsson wrote him his 
call for twin turrets and screws "have depressed me in spirit more than any occurrence... " 
While before he "had supposed we were on the same track", Fox's new ideas he 
exclaimed "convince me that our ideas are as opposite as the poles. " The topic was "too 
vast" to go into at present; in the meantime he enclosed a plan for a 26-foot diameter 
turret housing a massive 20-inch calibre gun of proscribed length. He was, finally, "very 
curious to see Captain Dahlgren's guns and fear greatly he will require more width than 
the turrets will admit of . 9285 1 
it was impossible to reconcile so much in a single person. Even if Fox agreed completely 
and always with Ericsson's vision, that alone was in growing danger of distraction from 
other interested parties who likewise shared common ends but opposing means. As 
reported by Scientific American, on 18 March the New York City Chamber of 
Commerce, along with Mayor Peter Cooper "and delegations from the Philadelphia and 
Boston Boards of Trade" solicited Ericsson's advice. Forts were considered ineffective 
next to "several light iron-clad vessels to carry 15-inch guneý-"to resist such a vessel as 
a io,,;?. 286 the W4 rr Meanwhile, various state governments of the North were busy preparing 
information for Congress on the series of nationally strategic canals under proposal. 
-you will much oblige many parties here, amongst our prominent merchants in particular 
if you will favor me, " Richard P. Morgan of Chicago wrote Ericsson, "with a statement 
as to the least draft of water admissible for vessels like the Monitor designed to cope with 
285 25-3-1862, Dahlgren to Fox; and Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
286 29-3-1862, Scientific American (vol. 6, no. 13), "Harbor Defences" 203. See also Ericsson's quote on 
page 194. Ericsson wrote to Fox it was his "duty yesterday to kill, ii possible, the scheme of building a 
Monitor for the harbor. I offended several of our great men here, but I feel I have served the country by 
preventing an imperfect thing from being got up at the moment when the strong arm of the government 
directed by skill like your own, is carrying the new system into practice, " referring to even more ambitious 
free-ranging versions; 19-3-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
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such craft as might be brought into the Lakes by the British Government through their 
Canals in Canada. , 287 
Lenthall and Isherwood were also dismayed with the larger strategic direction the Navy's 
undeniable and growing reliance upon Ericsson represented. Monitors, according to the 
professionals, could not possibly "constitute a navy or perform its proper ftmctions. " 
Seagoing ironclads of the largest possible dimensions, built in expanded Government 
dockyards equipped for iron shipbuilding and large-scale, heavy armour-plate 
manufacture, would be better suited to America's long-term interests. "Wealth, victory 
and empire are to those who command the Ocean, the toll gate as well as the highway of 
Nations; and if ever assailed by a powerftd maritime for, we shall find to our prosperity, 
if ready, how much better it is to fight at the threshold than upon the hearthstone. 1288 Yet 
the question remained for Welles and the Administration whether or not the United States 
during the Civil War could rightly afford such a strategy. 
Before the fateful month of March 1862 was Out this was thus far from settled or free of 
complications. Fox may in fact have been trying to reconcile the best of the old Bureau 
design features (twin screws and turrets) with Ericsson's own (low freeboard; a steam- 
rotated turret mounting the heaviest possible guns). At any rate, Welles tried to sum up 
the immediate lessons of Hampton Roads-and capitalise on them-in his 25 March 
appeal to the House and Senate Naval Committees. Drawing upon the recent arguments 
from both the bureau chiefs and his own Assistant, he asserted that "T'lie navy, as it exists 
at present, cannot successfully contend against a power employing iron-clad vessels, and 
consequently cannot meet the requirements of the country. " It was therefore time to 
287 17-3-1862, Morgan to Ericsson, EPPA. See also 15-3-1862, S. H. Sweet, Deputy State Engineer and 
Surveyor, to Commodore Joseph Smith, on possible ironclads for canal transport, and Smith's subsequent 
telegram inquiry to B. 11. Bartol, care of Merrick & Sons, Philadelphia, for building "the wood work of a 
gunboat two-hundred by forty-eight by twelve feet, in sixty days. Plates can be had in four weeks. Engines 
in sixty days, " 15-3-1862, Smith to Bartol, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 51. 
2811 17-3-1862, Lenthall and Isherwood to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. 
143 
initiate the "construction of armored vessels on a scale commensurate with the great 
interests at stake. " Another public advertisement, dated 20 February, had been placed 
calling for submissions of plans "which are now being received, developing the ingenuity 
and skill of our countrymen, " and the Secretary had "faith they Will produce models for a 
class of vessels for home defence and for sea-service... " This statement already 
suggested a predisposition to Ericsson's own efforts rather than the Bureau's; it also 
served to politically confirm the Navy was indeed fully supportive "of the people 
themselves". Additionally, Welles called for $500,000 for improved gun making 
facilities at the Washington Navy Yard (and assistance for Dahlgren); and a new 
(monitor) program of light-draft ironclads for river service, a 15-inch gun class for 
harbour defence and coastal operations, and a 20-inch gun class for ocean-going 
purposes. Curiously, he also noted the need for "mechanical" obstructions for full 
harbour defence against a concentrated, superior naval force, not just forts and a few 
harbour defence floating batteries. Finally, it was necessary for a $100,000 appropriation 
for iron target tests, Dahlgren's old request; a round $30 million for all of the above. 289 
Significantly, this was the price-tag for getting the nation ready for a major naval war 
with one or more European powers, not simply winning the war against the Confederacy. 
The day after Welles had written to Congress he appointed Smith, Lenthall, Isherwood, 
and civilian naval architect Edward Hart to form a new Ironclad Board to review the 
advertised ironclad proposals; Dahlgren finally sent his plans for a naval 15-inch gun to 
Fox; and Ericsson addressed the Assistant Secretary's preferences for twin screws and 
turrets . 
290 "1 cannot give up the idea, which I have cherished for some time, " Ericsson 
wrote, "of building a war vessel under your auspices, as I cannot entertain a doubt that 
289 25-3-1862, Welles to Hale and Sedgwick-, RG 45, Entry 5; and 37'h Congress, Senate, Mis. Doc. No. 70, 
"Letter of the Secretary of the Navy", 1-3. Congress only authorised $25,000 for iron target tests; 34- 
1862, CG, 1514. 
290 26-3-1862, Welles to Smith, Lenthall, Isherwood and Hart (possibly "Hartt'), RG 45, Entry 13; 26-3- 
1862, DaNgren to Fox, RG 74, Entry 201, Item 5, Box 2. Smith's report to Welles, dated 9-4-1862, also 
mentioned engineer Daniel B. Martin as a board member; RG 45, Letters Rec'd. 
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you will after carefully looking into the subject, abandon the double propeller system as 
well as your last proposition of employing two turrets. " Fully confident of his own 
expertise, the builder of the Monitor reminded Fox it was a mistake to always defer to 
British customs, which were often founded on erroneous principles. Indeed, everyone 
was new in the ironclad game. "The English are now on the wrong track", he asserted. 
"Put the weight of Coles' 6 turrets and 12 guns into one turret with two guns and you will 
defeat him in two rounds. " Nor was Ericsson afraid of critiquing Fox's "argument in 
favor of two propellers", which he believed was "not strong enough. " The principle of 
maximum concentration could also be applied in this regard, since a single shaft would 
be stronger than two smaller ones in the same hull, and could be more fully protected. 
"In relation to the superiority of a single turret I would have published a statement long 
ago, " he added, "but for the fact that our enemies would be taught how to beat us. As 
long as England builds many-turreted vessels we can defy her, for our single vessel such 
as I have sent you a model of, with your two 20 inch guns and 2 feet thick turrets, can 
destroy the whole English navy in open water. " It was a simple matter of calculation. 291 
By I April 1862 Ericsson was beginning to realize the extraordinary pressure he was 
under; to furbish the six Passaic-class ironclads to insure "impregnability" for the Union, 
and to finish off plans for a veritable super-monitor that could finish off British naval 
supremacy. The task of designing the latter, however, which Ericsson proposed to name 
the "Dictator", required specs for a 20-inch gun which Dalilgren was loathe to provide. 292 
Even after finally submitting amended plans (with their trunnions) for a 15-inch gun to fit 
within Ericsson's 26-foot diameter turrets, Dah1gren could not resist protecting himself 
by formally notifying Harwood, "that this can only be considered as an experiment on a 
large scale, unsupported by any of the data usually considered important to the 
29126-3-1862, Ericsson to Fox, also 28-3-1862, Fox to Ericsson, and 29-3-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
292 14-1862, Ericsson to Fox, EPPA, 
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introduction of new ordnance, and, for a piece of this size, indispensable. " In Dahlgren's 
opinion the safety of the gun was now dependent upon its proper forging, and therefore 
the responsibility of the original 15-inch Rodman's manufacturer----ý'the same kind of 
iron-the same grades of that iron, the same process of casting ... the same tensile 
strength, density and other characteristics'ý-not his own modified version of it. 
293 
Ericsson, at the same time, was worried about the contractors-and the Navy-in 
providing the adequate number of 15-inch guns even for the Passaics. "I fear these win 
not be done in time", he wrote to Fox, "and if so our impregnable fleet will not amount to 
much. g1294 Even young Oliver Batcheller realized the significance and potential of the 
new Yankee invention; "I trust now, " he wrote to his father on April 3, "that all our 
harbors will be protected by iron clad 'Monitors' after which we can look for some form 
of 'iron machines' which will place us on an equal footing with France & England in 
foreign waters. 7ý295 Ericsson's close confidant, Boston attorney John 0. Sargent, went 
still ftirther. The success of the Monitor ensured "you will enjoy something a little earlier 
than the posthumous reputation which you were always sure of" Ile London Times was 
in state of panic, and "if North and South would leave off fighting each other [and] get 
into a war with France and England, " Sargent wrote, "you would have a better field for 
your operations and I should feel a little easier in mind and body. " Saving the Union was 
one thing, but if Ericsson "could add to it the title of the Conqueror of England and 
France" his "ambition would probably be fUn. v, 296 
The Bureau of Ordnance meanwhile responded to Smith's concerns about the ironclads' 
various armaments by recommending a Board to examine the ironclads in question, both 
293 74-1862, DaWgren to Harwood, RG 74, Entry 201, Item 5, Box 2. Harwood duly informed Welles that 
any further demands for guns of even greater calibre, etc., would have to be met in turn by "greater space in 
the turrets or other modifications in the plans of iron clad vessels".. 84-1862, Harwood to WeUes, RG 45, 
Letters Rec'd. 
294 14-1862, Ericsson to Fox, EPPA. There was also apparent confusion as to whether their armament 
would consist of 15- or 12-inch calibre guns; see 54-1862, Smith to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. 
2" 34-1862, Batcheller to his father, BL. 
296 8-4-1862, Sargent to Ericsson, EPLOC 
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those already under construction and still under consideration. Harwood candidly 
informed WeHes he found "the sudden introduction of so many different calibres 
objectionable, " and could not "perceive ... any good reason exists for adopting XII inch 
cast iron guns for the iron-clad vessels. , 297 Indeed, as Fox wrote to Ericsson the same 
day, Dahlgren was already busy with the "big gune', "we must stand to that. , 298 Far 
from ignoring the habitability of the new monitors the Assistant Secretary was deeply 
concerned. "It was blowing a gate during my whole visit and the little Monitor was 
rather uncomfortable being pretty well under water. Her deck leaks some and as the iron 
cannot be removed, this point should be looked to in others. " Simple additions such as 
light deck platforms and "a tarpaulin tent to enable Jack to take his segar [sic] would 
render him more comfortable and contented. " "As I wrote you before, " Fox stressed, 
"these low craft must be made perfectly comfortable for an hands in all weathers if we 
wish to succeed in them as regular cruisers, a point I desire to obtain. " Perhaps a testing 
a mock-up turret against a 15-inch gun would shed light on other issues as well. Ericsson 
replied that "What we are now building will be tight. Jack will also be made comfortable 
this time. Yet let me say that when actually face to face with the eneLny awaiting action 
gny moment, the hatches must be closed excepting on turret. " A target-test Ericsson also 
agreed might be useful. "Of course if we do not like to look at the scars we produce, we 
can put on new plates to hide our bruises. " More significantly for Ericsson, at least, news 
was coming back of England's reaction to the battle of Hampton Roads and the Monitor. 
"They imagine their Wartiors impregnable. Why, our new Monitors with their 450 
pound balls, will sink the boasted Ironsides in two rounds, nor will their applying also 15- 
29115-4-1862, Harwood to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. The idea Of a 12- as opposed to 15-inch gun may 
have sternmed firom Ericsson himself, given his original "Oregoe gun for the U. S. S. Princeton; a banded, 
muzzle-loaded 12-inch calibre gun of wrought irOrL Oddly enough, on 28 April DaWgren submitted 
tracings of a XIH-inch gun to Fox, "the dimensions of which will suit the same Turrets as those intended to 
receive the XV in. guns, " DP. "Captain Ericsson does not expect to mount either gun indifferently I 
suppose, " he added four days later, "but to put one class in one Turret and another kind in another turret. " 
if all the turret portholes were bored to fit 13-inch guns, DaWgren felt "it may not be difficult to enlar2e it 
for the 15 in., " 304-1862, DaWgren to Fox, FP. 










-inch guns help the matter. We can stand that piU, but they will perish under its 
operation. "2'9 
Finally, in regards to wood versus iron hulls for the new ironclads, Ericsson disagreed 
with Fox's assertion that "Wood under water does not rot. " The Assistant Secretary had 
cconly to carry out the plan" which Ericsson "urged on the Department some 16 years ago, 
to build sheds under which to place your Iron Gun boats, on dry land, with a convenient 
inclined machinery for putting your fighting craft in and out of water at Pleasure. " 
Stimers was "much struck" by the idea when Ericsson repeated it the previous day. "A 
dozen gun boats under houses" might be thus be kept in "good working order for 50 years 
at less annual expense than a single gun boaf' otherwise. "In times of trouble a fleet may 
on this system be launched at a days notice. " Previously this scheme was regarded as 
"quite 'visionary"'; if only Fox would "give the subject a deliberate consideratioW' he 
would "find the idea not so stupid as it was once pronounced. " Likewise, the notion of 
fitting the new monitors with permanent deck vents, perhaps even a superstructure-to 
facilitate better living conditions, especially for long-distance cruising-Ericsson 
strongly opposed. Even an elevating hatch would be better. "Let us take care not to 
fritter away the grand principle of a perfectly flush deck within 18 to 20 inches of the 
water's edge and absolute success will attend our labors. " Again Ericsson specifically 
promised what this "absolute success" would mean, for by "Adhering to this idea we are 
masters of the sea within a year. v9300 
There could be no doubt who the real adversary was in this pursuit of naval power. Two 
days later, Ericsson took the bold step of addressing William Seward, the U. S. Secretary 
of State, with one of the most revealing declarations of Union ironclad policy during the 
299 15-4-1862, Fox to Ericsson, FP; 16-4-1962, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
300 15-4-1862, Fox to Ericsson, FP; 21-4-1862, Ericsson to Fox., FP. 
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American Civil War. "The state of the naval defences of the country being so intimately 
connected with its inter-national relations, " he wrote: 
I deem it my duty to report to you that under orders from the 
Secretary of the Navy, keels for 6 vessels of the Monitor class of 
increased size and speed have already been laid ... The amount of 
mechanical force now concentrated on the work is quite 
unprecedented. 
The speech of the Duke of Somerset in the House of Lords on the 
4'h instant and the news from England to-day in relation to the 
expedients now adopted by the Admiralty to avert the dangers to 
England suggested by the recent developments in naval warfare, 
tend to prove that this country now occupies the vantage ground. 
The six vessels above alluded to will be absolutely impregnable 
against even the last "14-ton gun" of Armstrong, in consequence 
of their sides being only 18 inches above water, a circumstance 
which converts their decks into bulwarks supporting the armor 
plate with resistless force. Our turrets, too, are absolutely 
impregnable as we now make the same 11% thick-all iron. Our 
guns of 15-inch calibre will throw 450-pound shot. To this 
enormous projectile the Warrior, Black Prince and the razeed line- 
of-battle ships, will present only a five-inch iron plating. This thin 
armor may be said to afford no resistance to our 450-pound Shot. 
Under its terrific impact, the sides will be actually crushed in. 
England is now committing the serious blunder of attending to the 
protection of her guns alone by the so-called cupolas. She 
overlooks the safety of the vessel intended to carry her guns. 
'Me British Admiralty, it would appear, can only see in the 
Monitor a revolving turret (erroneously supposed to be of English 
origin), forgetting that without the peculiarly constructed hull of 
the Monitor, her cupola Ships will stand no chance in a conflict 
with this country. 301 
Nothing gave more impetus to Ericsson and the Union's preference for monitor-type 
ironclads than England's own reaction to the Battle of Hampton Roads, and the 
controversy between Coles and the Government over turret-ship ironclads for the Royal 
Navy. "To save time, and repetition" Ericsson enclosed a copy of his letter to Seward to 
Fox. Perhaps the inventor was circumventing the Navy's authority, if not pre-empting its 
freedom of choice in terms of ironclad policy? It did not seem to matter. After all, 
30123-4-1862, Ericsson to Seward, EPPA. See also Churck Life OfEricsson, 2: 5-6. 
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Ericsson was delighted to point out to the Assistant Secretary how "The English 
government are all adrift on the question of naval defence. " Armstrong's latest gun test 
"only confirms what all the world knows, that England is now without a fleet. 2302 
Nothing sealed the case for coast defence monitor-ironclads more than the recent Trent 
Affair, Anglo-American tensions, and the threat of foreign intervention in the Civil War. 
As official committee reports came back to Congress in April 1862 the largely accepted 
wisdom was that "Good armor and upright dealing united are well calculated to make 
nations friendS. 003 While the Northern States were becoming, "by the pressure of 
domestic rebellion, more able to take care of our interests at sea, with the aid of gunboats 
and steamers and a marine of armed cruisers and privateers, ever ready, " England had 
"lowered her tone and altered her policy to conform to the changed relations which her 
navy bears to the rest of the world. 22304 
302 28-4-1962, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
303 23-4-1862,37h Congress, Vo Session, House of Representatives, Report No. 86, Permanent 
Fortifications and Sea-Coast Defences, 21. See also 8-4-1862,37h Congress, 2d Session, Senate, 
Executive Document No. 41, Letter of the Secretary of War, Communicating the Report of Edwin F 
johnson, upon the Defences ofMaine; and 30-4-1862, Joseph 0. Totten to Lincoln, "Defence of the Upper 
Lakes-Memorandurn for the President", LP Totten boldly admitted, especially in the wake of the fall of 
New Orleans, that "It is not possible to prevent the passage of vessels into Lake Michigan by means of 
fortifications, however placed... As we see that fortifications cannot be so placed as to prevent this, resort 
must be had to floating means. " 
304 10-4-1862, CG, 1622. 
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In. Ericsson, the Navy, and control of the Union ironclad program 
In response to Welles" request for assistance in nearly every aspect associated with Union 
turret-ironclads, coastal or (Western) river-and at the lowest possible price-Ericsson 
wrote "There cannot be the slightest objection to your ordering copies to be made and 
distributed of the plans and specifications which I have presented to the Department. No 
change whatever has been contemplated on my part for those plans and specifications. s005 
If ever there was a chance for the Swedish-American inventor-engineer to "make a 
killing", this was it. Yet Ericsson seems to have been much more interested with fame 
than fortune. It was more important to him personally that he was proved-rather than 
paid-right in the face of years of official rejection and what he regarded as professional 
prejudice. The unforeseen circumstances of the American Civil War had completely 
changed the nature of this relationship, placing the "Individuar' over "Systenf'. and the 
Navy rather at the mercy of a civilian inventor, let alone an engineer. Thus, 
magnanimity, if not patriotism, to the American Union was probably worth more to John 
Ericsson at this moment in his life than mere royalties. 306 When Stimers responded to 
Fox's concerns of the 23rd he had to agree "about the importance of time in getting out 
new vessels". No one else could promise-and deliver-ironclads meeting so many of 
the Union's urgent requirements than Captain Ericsson. Furthermore, Stimers was not 
305 224-1862, Welles to Ericsson, and 244-1862, Ericsson to Welles, EPPA. James B. Eads agreed with 
Ericsson that '3500 is a small enough fee for each boat under all the circumstances for your valuable 
inventioný and [11 will cheerfully respond to any drafts you may make for the amount... I will only state that 
in starting the construction of six boats I am not so abundantly supplied with money as I hope to be after 
receiving something from the GovL on account of them, " 13-6-1862, James B. Eads to Ericsson, EPPA. 
See also 20-6-1862, Eads to Ericsson, EPLOC, where Eads remarks "I think with you that America is about 
to make all the world wonder. I am thankful for being bom in this era. " See also, 23-7-1862, Eads to 
Ericsson, and 28-7-1862, Ericsson to Eads, EPLOC 
306 Ericsson's biographer, William Conant Church, also noted the inventor-engineer's personal belief that 
science woLdd eradicate warfare by making it too terrible to practice. See, for example, Ericsson's 19-5- 
1862 endorsement of the Raphael's repeating rifle to Secretary of War Stanton, which in his assessment 
formed "one of the many strides which mechanical science is now making to render war too destructive 
long to continue the disgrace of civilization. The true friend of human progress will support such 
inventionsl" EPLOC See also 28-6-1862, W. L. Barnes to Erastus Coming, WP "[Eriesson7si sympathies 
are hearty & warm with reference to our success as a government", Barnes wrote, "& failure in this respect 
would be regarded by him as a calamity that concerned the civilization of the world. " 
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above admitting he found Ericsson's "new plans so superior to any thing I had expected, 
that it appears to me it will be better for the Government to depend mainly on him for 
some time to come, at least until the subject is fully and satisfactorily developed. " The 
two navy professionals, one an engineer, the other a leading voice in the Department, 
recognized how to handle the nineteenth century's quintessential irascible genius. 307 Me 
prospect of humbling England was also an irresistible part of the bargain, and that too 
probably drove Ericsson to dictate ironclad policy "for free" during this crucial interval 
more than demand his fair share of the actual price of an ironclad navy of predominantly 
his design. Besides, Ericsson was still pressing Fox and Welles for a squadron of huge 
ocean-going monitors, and Fox clearly shared the same preference which Ericsson wrote 
44came just in time to give proper direction to my labors": 
Armstrong's last boast also stimulates to exertions in the same 
directiom The national contest for supremacy is now inaugurated. 
Sir William may do his best, but we will make floating targets 
which he cannot demolish, and guns that will sink any thing that 
his country has yet out to sea. 308 
Generosity with his designs and patents now could mean greater opportunities for 
Ericsson in the near future. Over 120 engines were already in demand, "counting 
upwards of 10,000 written dimensions" which he was preparing to charge 5 percent. But 
"if you deem this too higlf', Ericsson informed Welles, "I beg that you will fix a lower 
rate. " He would not charge for the use of the specifications he supplied. All he asked 
was compensation for the "actual cost of preparing the plane'. "In the mean time any 
contractor who presents ... me a contract duly ratified by the Department will at once be 
supplied with plans and full instructions. , 309 The fact that Commodore Smith was 
pushing the Secretary for an armament upgrade of 9-inch to II -inch DaIdgrens for the 
307 24-4-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP. 
308 28-4-1862, Ericsson to Fox, EPLOC. 
3" 24-4-1862, Ericsson to Wefles, EPPA. 
153 
broadsides of the New Ironsides-and was himself dependent on Ericsson for the carriage 
and slide designs to make it possible, might have added to Ericsson's extraordinary 
influence at this time. 310 These were solid practical factors affecting Union naval policy 
rather than 'public hysteria' or 'monitor fever' following the Battle of Hampton Roads. 
Welles himself gently pushed for more. Could not Ericsson have the new monitor 
specifications photographed for faster distribution to contractors nationwide? Was it 
possible to increase the monitors' speed? Ericsson replied that utilizing photography 
was, surprisingly, not practical. "Tbe plans I furnish are of that accurate and detailed 
character that they may at once be put into the engineer's hand. Engineers well know 
that obtaining such plans is in the present case equal to putting the work six months 
ahead. " The speed of the Federal ironclads was a relative affkir-and this of course 
meant their superiority to "the average rate of European war vessele'. Because of the 
Union's overriding need to operate along its own coast, with ironclads therefore of 
comparatively light tonnage, Ericsson assured the Secretary of the Navy "we are building 
exactly what we most need. " 'Me new monitors' finer lines combined with a more 
moderate length would "admit of very rapid evolutions" while the "large class (the 
Warfior class) and the steam rams" could not "affect anything against our small turret 
vessels". In close combat it was better to turn quickly, to "present our stems to 
assailants", while the monitors were well designed to act as rams as well. A vessel that 
tried to ram a monitor would do more damage to itself. Ericsson was adamant, both in 
the suitability of his ironclads-and their purpose. "You will find on careful examination 
that there are no vessels yet produced in Europe that could sustain an encounter with the 
fleet of turret vessels now building under your orders. j, 311 
310 See 244-1862, Smith to Welles, RG 71, Entry 1, Vol. 74. Ilie vessel was officially designated "New 
Ironsides" 10 May 1862, Welles to Smith., RG 7 1, Entry 5, Box 423. 
31 1284-1862, Ericsson to Welles, EPPA. 
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How to deal with this potential threat, however, was still "a difficult and delicate task", 
Smith privately relayed to Welles on 10 May; "to decide between the plans submitted, 
varying as they do in model and general character. " Furthermore, "much delay" was 
experienced due to "the constant and indispensable office duties of the Bureau Members 
of the [Ironclad] Board. " As Chairman, Smith expressed his own "opinion that vessels or 
Floating Batteries for harbor and coast defence, should first claim attention to protect our 
Ports from foreign or rebel aggression... " Most of the money appropriated by Congress 
for more ironclads should thus be allocated for this particular class; the rest invested in 
two large ocean-going types, one wooden-hulled, the other iron for experimental 
purposes. On the other hand, Smith was not convinced that turret ships should fully 
dominate the Union's ironclad program. "For obvious reasons, " he maintained, "case- 
mated batteries affording more guns for broadside action than turrets, should also be 
tested. " Monitors were "no doubt efficient for harbor defence, " but in his estimation they 
were "not the safest or of the most approved plans for Ocean or coast-service. "' The 
original Monitor's passage to Hampton Roads he offered as proof It was therefore 
disturbing to him that the other Board members had disregarded their full responsibility 
"of expressing an opinion upon each case presented for consideration", and had in fact 
recommended "the adoption of but one of the plans presented, and that is nearly identical 
in form and appointments with the plan prepared and advertised for by the Bureau of 
Construction &c, except that the material of the vessel is to be of iron. " The Commodore 
also promised that his comments in the forthcoming report on the various proposals 
would be brief, finding it irresistible to add that they "should not, perhaps, be entitled to 
the weight due those expressed by other members of the Board who are presumed to be 
experts in the matters treated of %, 
312 
312 10-5-1862, Srnith to Welles, WP; also RG 45, Letters Rec'd and RG 71, Entry 1. 
155 
As such, the Ironclad Board's report three days later was again prepared to call out 
Ericsson's low freeboard, single turret, single screw, laminated turret ship ideal against 
that of the Bureau of Ship Construction & Repair, "the thick plated iron-clad wooden 
vessel of the usual form, with two revolving towers, and two propellers, of which the 
complete printed specifications of hull, plating, towers and machinery, accompanied by 
photographic working drawings-prepared by order of the Department-have been for 
long time widely circulated. " There was more than a hint of resentment present. All of 
the submissions made seemed mere modifications, the Board stated, of these two types 
which "seem thus far to cover the entire field on Us subject and ... whatever may 
originally have been a matter of opinion as to relative merits an actual experiment with 
the Monitor has given a result satisfactory to the Department. " No one had solved the 
problem of combining the best qualities of an ironclad with a cruiser. Wooden 
steamships would "still be found useful, especially in times of general peace for the 
protection of commerce in distant seas, and for war purposes against half civilized or 
barbarian nations, and others not having the means of obtaining armored vessels. " it 
might therefore "be sound economy" to follow the British example and apply iron plating 
to some of the larger steam frigates, which alone could "carry iron plates of the thickness 
required to resist the artillery now in use. " The Department's experimental refitting of 
the Roanoke would "determine the question of the practicability and economy of the 
conversion of vessels of this class. ,, 313 If the Roanoke proved a success, the Navy might 
invest more of its resources into wooden-hulled, seagoing conversions, but seasoned 
white oak and yellow pine were in short supply, both for the government and private 
industry. To avoid the wastes associated with building warships with green tilnber, only 
iron-hulled ventures ought to be considered in future, while "Only the most pressing 
necessity can ju stify constructions from such materials, and in the event of less time 
being required. " Laminated armour plate schemes were also to be considered "a make 
313 bid. 
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shift justified by the impossibility of obtaining solid plates in the time allowed. " What 
the Board was looking for was an iron-hulled, twin-screwed, double-turreted ironclad, 
with "rudder, screws, and anchor ... protected by overhanging portions of the 
hull, the 
deck of which need not exceed two feet above the water level": a monitor. Of all the 
proposals recently submitted, that of G. W. Quintard's Morgan Iron Works of New York 
City met these preferred qualities the most. 314 This would become the U. S. Navy's first 
twin-turret monitor-ironclad, the Onondaga. 315 
Perhaps most importantly, the Ironclad Board was determined not to forfeit all control 
over Union ironclad policy and construction to private inventors and firms. The 
Department would begin designing a new class of double-turreted monitor-type ironclads 
for harbour defence which would "best suit its purposes". 316 Relying upon departmental 
plans-and control over "distribution of resourcee' among other factors-would insure 
greater uniformity in designs to various contractors, avoid confusion, and keep down 
costs. 317 Furthermore, the Board was adverse to any designs for ocean-going ironclads. 
"The cost of such vessels is so enormous, and the interests to be confided to their 
protection are so great that the most mature consideration should precede the adoption of 
any design or system of construction. " Though this in itself implied a experimental 
process which could take years, similar perhaps to great cfforts underway in Europe, the 
64most judicious course" for the Union ironclad program would be "for the Department to 
have plans and specifications prepared by a Board of Naval Officers, with which might 
314 ibid. 
"' See also Donald L. Canney, The 1ronvWs, 62-4. Canney states the Onundaga's designer "eliminated 
the Ericsson monitor overhang and the excessive armor shelf, or hip, of those vessel". though the ship 
model photograph and ship's plans to which be refers Oearlysbow an overhanging upper shelf over the 
stern, protecting the rudder and screws. 
3L6 13-5-1862, Ironclad Board to Welles, RG 45, Letters Recd. These would become the four double- 
turreted monitors of the Monadnock-class, and then the even larger double-turreted class of four Kalamazoo 
ocean-monitors-all of --Ahich incorporated wooden hulls, however. 
317 Scientific American found this premise objectionable. "A very general opinion prevas in the 
community that it costs the government more to build steamers in the national navy yards than to obtain 
them from private builders. And it is believed by many persons ... that any Idnd of iron work for war 
vessels, may be fiffnished by several manufacturers of angle iron, shafting and rolled plates, at less cost than 
such work can ever be made at any national navy yard, " 28-6-1962, Scienly1c American, 404. 
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be associated, if the Department deems necessary, other persons of reputation and 
experience in the building of iron vessels, and upon such plans and specifications 
advantageous offers to construct will be proposed by contractors in competition on equal 
terms. 018 Ericsson's role would thus become that of an "associate"; possibly, but 
unlikely. 
Stimers himself thought Fox's choice of Ericsson's "great ocean steamer" over "Harbor 
defence vessels to go twelve knots an houe' a mistake-until he saw Ericsson's finished, 
though preliminary specifications. "Ilat vessel will astonish the world fiffly as much as 
the Monitor did", he wrote to Fox. Again, Ericsson's sublime ambitions combined with 
his very obvious ability to carry them out "converted" another sceptical "disbeliever", 
even one as closely affiliated as Stimers, who continued, "Now if we can build this vessel 
and send her to sea without having any description of her published and let her make her 
first appearance in an English port, it would absolutely frighten them, with no boasting 
account having preceded her, to have a Yankee ship come right into their port, which the 
merest inspection would show was impregnable to Sir William Armstrong's experimental 
achievements; would do more to keep Mr. Bull on his good behaviour toward us than any 
one thing it is possible to do. 019 Ericsson, Fox and Stimers constituted a triumvirate, 
with the usurpation of British naval supremacy its stated goal. 
But would Gideon Welles join in too? Ericsson's cursory designs were for a par deluxe- 
monitor with a single, 30-foot outside diameter turret, which he promised to build for the 
Secretary "within nine months from the date of receiving your orders to proceed, 
for ... 
$1,150,000. " It would be the fastest war vessel afloat. Side an-nour would consist 
of six layers of I-inch iron plate, backed by 41/2-inch thick iron stringers and 3'9" of 
318 13-5-1862, Ironclad Board to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. 
319 18-5-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP. 
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wood. The turret itself would consist of 10-inch deep rolled-iron bars sandwiched 
between layers of 1-inch plates, making a total thickness of 24-inches. Thus, "The balls 
from the powerful new Armstrong gun will prove harmless against this impenetrable 
mass of wrought iron. " The description of guns, however, was ambiguous. They would 
not be 20-inch Dahlgrens but "constructed of wrought iron" and "warranted to stand twice 
the charge and carry three times the weight of ball compared with the boasted English 
gun. "320 Even as a rain "she will be far more formidable than anything that Europe has 
yet produced. " Ericsson calculated that moving at 17 knots his monitor would inflict a 
staggering 32 million pounds of force "acting through a space of one fbot`ý-and pointed, 
significantly, across the Atlantic. 32 1 Despite the fantastical qualities of Ericsson's 
proposed super-monitor one thing was certain: this was high-pressure salesmanship at 
work. 
Yet Fox could only guarantee Ericsson that his plan would be "immediately considered". 
"It seems a powerful vessel, " he wrote, "worthy of your brains. " The Assistant Secretary 
wanted four, perhaps for a round million dollars per ship. Did Ericsson believe they 
could be built simultaneously, "two at New York, one at Boston, and - one at 
Philadelphia"? At any rate, Fox would now officially cancel the order for the overlarge, 
cast iron 20-inch gun. 322 Remarkably, on the same day, 21 May, Commodore Smith 
expressed to Welles his whole-hearted disapproval of a rival proposal for an ocean-going 
turret ship, mounting 20-inch guns, from "Messrs. Pervil and Howes". The turrets were 
too large, "and the 20 inch guns too big for working at sea, even if they can be made, 
which, under the present system of casting, I consider impracticable. " Laminated armour 
320 19-5-1862, Ericsson to Welles, EPPA. Ericsson explained his thoughts to Fox the same day in more 
detail: "a 16 inch ball (weight 550 lbs. ) will produce the greates effect PQssibl ... As a small ball can be 
propelled at a greater speed than a large one, the practical question is simply: what size ball will produce a 
hole or rent so large that it cannot be stopped during action? Whatever that size be, there let us stop, and 
then go for the greatest possible initial velocity, - 19-5-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
321 19-5-1862, Ericsson to Welles, EPPA. 
322 21-5-1862, Fox to Ericsson, EPLOC See also 21-5-1862, Welles to Harwood, RG 74, Entry 16, Box 4. 
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he also objected to, and the "gun deck will be too near the water, it should be at least six 
feet above the line of flotation. " This assessment did not bode weff for Ericsson's own 
version, which Welles on the same day instructed Smith, John Lenthall, and Benjamin 
Isherwood to evaluate. 323 Worse still, Ericsson responded to Fox's inquiries that the cost 
of his super-monitor was simply beyond negotiation given practical engineering 
requirements. technical terms. Concurrently building four would not decrease their price 
(or completion time) but possibly the opposite, given the competition over limited labour 
and resources. 324 Perhaps not surprisingly, Fox informed prominent Boston shipbuilder 
Robert B. Forbes soon after the Department had "given out about a dozen harbor defense 
craft" and needed "a class of vessels to go out and meet the enemy, not to receive him in 
our harbors. " To date, Fox was still fishing around, and open to suggestions. "We have 
not a single proposition for a cruising vessel and most of the sea steamers proposed must 
probably hover on the coast. v025 
As could also be expected, Smith's first impression of Ericsson's new monitor-ironclad 
was not favourable. To the Bureau Chief it was nothing more than a proportionately 
larger version of the original, and obviously therefore "well adapted for harbor defence, 
but not calculated for Ocean service. " As such, many of the objections he made of the 
original were revived, especially the upper bull overhang. For harbours would it not be 
better to construct for the same price "three batteries", "each bearing guns and iron 
armature equal to this, though with less speed"? Yet, the Commodore noted to Welles, 
"We have already under contract ten vessel of the class of the Monitor of increased size 
and dimensions, besides nine others with the Monitor Turret for river service. " Relying 
323 21-5-1962, Smith to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd; 21-5-1962, Welles to Smith, LentMl and Isherwood, 
RG 45, Entry 13. 
32A 22-5-1862, Ericsson to Fox, EPLOC 
325 30-5-1862, Fox to Robert B. Forbes, FP. Forbes was the "Principal Inspector" for gunboats building in 
Massachusetts and Maine". assisted by Samuel Pook, see 10-7-1862, "List of Principal and Assistant 
Inspectors appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to Superintend the Construction of Gun Boats under 
Contract", addressed to Gregory, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
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upon new ordnance without a lengthy and meticulous series of tests Smith also objected 
to. 326 The entire principle, in fact, of a sea-going monitor was incongruous to the same 
U. S. naval professional who supervised the already historic Monitoes construction. 327 
At this point it seems Ericsson's confidence in the full acceptance of his ideas wavered. 
"I learn, not without regret, " he wrote to Fox, "that my plans of the large turret ship are 
being 'thoroughly examined and will be reported upon' ". These were "but a sketch 
intended as a basis for a contract. " Whatever the "Engineer in Chief', his Bureau Chief 
rival, Benjamin Isherwood might report, Ericsson assumed he could "consider it as an 
instruction conveying the wishes of the Department rather than a criticism on my plan 
and proposition. " If the Department wanted more details he could easily supply them. 328 
First, were they intrigued by the ship's potential? Did they trust Ericsson, as they finally 
did in the autumn of 1861 with the original Monitor? Did they trust him any more, or 
less, since the Battle of Hampton Roads? 
Already he was willing to give in on the idea of twin-turrets, "for two of the proposed 
four vessels", as much as "the ship can sustain. " Smaller guns and improved armour- 
plate manufacture might indeed facilitate such an option. For less than $100,000 
Ericsson was willing to provide the former, of IS- or 16-inch calibre, and promising they 
would "mark an era in the history of artillery and naval warfare. " Isherwood's 
preliminary memo on the super-monitor's speed, however (which Fox had forwarded), 
Ericsson could not "refrain from recording [his] dissent". 329 Stimers' own calculations 
tended to favour Ericsson's. All other mechanical and structural factors for the proposed 
326 23-5-1862, Smith to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. 
327 Smith went so far as to "perceive no advantages which the Turret affords over a case-mate'. To hiný the 
advantage of rotating the guns was more than offset by the disadvantage that "the guns could not be fired on 
both sides at the same time, which is often important, " 3-6-1862, Smith to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. 
By the end of 1864, he had not changed his mind, writing Dahlgren I fear the Ericsson big ships will prove 
a failure but I hope not. I am right on the record in regard to them, " 1-12-1864, Smith to Dahlgren, DP 329 6-6-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP- 
329 ibid. 
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vessel being fixed, the grate surface of the boilers was, in the Chief Engineer's 
experience, where "the shoe always pinches when we are trying to make our ship go fast 
and I find in this instance that he [Ericsson] has been (as engineers usually are) more 
liberal with his engine power than he has in the extent of his fire. " Furthermore, while 
"one admires the talents of Isherwood more than I do, " Stimers ventured his opinion to 
Fox, "but if you will examine his professional writings during the past twelve years, you 
will perceive that for some reason he is greatly prejudiced against Ericsson. Commodore 
Smith will tell you the speed he predicted for the Monitor. 030 
The Assistant Secretary, for his part, could only relay to Ericsson "If you and Isherwood 
differ with regard to the grate surface, other engineers had better look over the figures. 
All I ask is to be convinced that 16 knots can be obtained the first day. " There was no 
need for his prize-inventor to take alarm. "Whatever responsibility attaches to the 
recommendation of the plan I assume. " Double-checking Ericsson's figures, however 
rough they were, was "of course very necessary before making the large contract that I 
desire. . 031 Concessions worked both ways, for Ericsson could not refuse to consider the 
thicker huff plate, more solid-plated turret armour and different boilers which Fox (and 
Stimers) desired if he wanted the 'large contract' too. 332 Whether or not this sort of 
compromise was best was another matter, giving ground to get approval, Ericsson might 
critically disfigure his original specifications with outside suggestions and modifications 
better than his own in some cases, worse in others. In any case, Stimers tried to reinsure 
his mentor "You will not be interfered with in your arrangements. The Secretary and Mr. 
Fox have the greatest confidence in you skill and uprightness... " But Ericsson had to 
keep in mind the extraordinary demands he was placing on them, for Stimers considered 
330 6-6-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP. 
331 9-6-1862, Fox to Ericsson, FP. 
332 See 6-6-1862, Fox to Ericsson, FP. 
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"they take as much responsibility as could be expected from them when they decide in 
favor of your plans in direct opposition to the views of the Bureau officers. 
033 
This opposition arrived the following day in the form of Lenthall and Isherwood's report 
to Welles on Ericsson's ocean-going monitor proposal-which had virtually become a 
referendum on who should direct the Union's ironclad program. According to their 
calculations, Ericsson's ship would draw 19 feet 5 inches, with 2 feet 7 inches above the 
waterline amidships and her extremities only "just awash. " Perhaps more damaging, the 
Bureau chiefs estimated the ship's material value at $883,000, "which by adding five (5) 
per centurn for omissions" became $927,000-over $220,000 less than Ericsson"s asking 
price. Comparing the dimensions of the proposed ironclad with other (commercial) 
vessels, and her engines and boilers, "under the most favorable conditions and for short 
periods a maximum speed of 133/4knots per hour may be attained. " Burning 158 tons of 
coal every 25 hours, such a monitor could only carry fuel "sufficient for 6V3 days 
consumption", thus hardly making her an oceanic steamer. The upper hull overhang 
inhibited greater speed and distance (though how they were able to make such a 
determination, especially if "based on the performance of coppered vessels of the usual 
form" is not mentioned. ) Consequently, her draft prohibited her use for efficient harbour, 
if not coast, defence, yet the vessel had no masts and sails, relying upon engines that 
could offer little speed and strategic range . 
334 Ericsson's super-monitor was all but 
worthless. This also said little for her actual seaworthiness, which Lenthall and 
Isherwood regarded "under all conditions of weather is extremely problematical: the 
small height of her deck above the water and the form and position of her projecting hips 
333 9_6. IS62, Stimers to Ericsson, Church, Life ofEricsson, 2: 9-9. 
334 indeed, when the U. S. S. Dictator finally arrived at the Norfolk Navy Yard, in December of 1864, her 
commander, Commodore John Rodgers, wrote his wife: "We are all ready to move, but detained by the 
tide. There is not water enough for this vessel to go to Hampton Roads except at half fide. " likewise, there 
was "barely width in the Channel here to allow the vessel to swing by means of lines at both ends so as to 
pivot her in the iniddle of the channel, " 6-12-1864, John to Anne Rodgers, RFP. 
163 
are opposed to the requirements of an efficient sea going vessel, if the past experience of 
most Seamen can be applied to vessels of this kind. 22335 
Perhaps that was the point. Ericsson's naval and maritime technology was so radical that 
few, if anyone, could property assess its likelihood of success. Truly, the Swedish- 
American inventor-engineer was taking the Union Navy off into uncharted waters. 
Hence, Ericsson's assertions that low-freeboard did not necessarily imply a lack of 
seaworthiness could be counterbalanced by Lenthall and Isherwood's equally-convincing 
arguments that semi-submersion acted as a drag upon the projected speed of monitors at 
sea. Furthermore, it seemed logical that "rafts" were more vulnerable to ramming than 
higher-freeboard warships; and who could say whether turret guns could be operated in 
open seas? Ericsson's recent conceded preference for thicker plates for the side hull 
armour only coincided "with the views we have given on this subject on several 
occasions" (and could thus be turned against him. )336 What did this imply for Ericsson's 
credibility? 
in a draft of a letter to Fox, dated II June 1862, Ericsson stated his intention to "meet 
your wishes" to "greatly reduce the proportion of the armor timbers at the bow, in other 
regards, the length of the ram". Apparently this alteration "came just in time-to a day 
almost. " The "manner in which the said overhang is now being secured is such that the 
entire weight of the ship would not have power enough to endanger the security of the 
junction. " In other words, the super-monitor would not feature an overhang at the 
bow. 337 Fox also wanted Ericsson to "try and make the bottom of the big ships [13-16ths 
of an inch thick] and the frames in proportion, and the grate and heating surface as 
expressed in my note. " These modifications too would radically affect the ironclad's 
335 10-6-1862, LentUl and Isherwood to Welles, RG 19, Entry 50. 
336 ibid. 
337 See also Church, Life ofEricsson, 2: 10-11. 
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weight, but Fox still encouraged Ericsson to write "an official letter to the Secretary of 
the Navy, proposing to build four vessels of the speed of 16 knots and according to other 
points herein talked of Two of one turret each, and two of two turrets each ... The 
018 Secretary will answer your proposition at once. It was not exactly what Ericsson 
wanted, but Fox would continue to allow him to argue his case to Welles, in direct 
opposition to the Bureau chiefs. Assuming Ericsson was willing to bend to his (and to 
some extent, the Bureau chiefs') wishes, the Assistant Secretary would also continue to 
personally advocate Ericsson's plans. This way Ericsson would get his contracts, and the 
Department would get more of the type of ironclad it preferred. 
Five days later Fox wrote to Ericsson, "The [Secretary] has to day decided to let you 
build two vessels of the big class-one of I turret and I of two turrets. " He was sorry 
that an entire squadron had not been approved, the original dream, 'but if no new plans 
are presented within a few months, " he promised, "it may be considered by him desirable 
to build two more. , 339 Clearly, the Union Navy was not about to go as far with him as 
Ericsson wanted. There was still-and likely there would always bc-enough opposition 
to prevent a technological overhaul so radical in nature, with such a sweeping 
professional reliance upon one man. Even the extraordinary and tumultuous 
circumstances of the American Civil War-especially the overriding threat of war with 
the British Empire-could notjustify giving Ericsson such carte blanche control. 
338 13-6-10862, Fox to Ericsson, EPLOC. 
339 18-6-1862, Fox to Ericsson, EPPA. The official letter of approval from Welles is dated 23-6-1862, and 
bears the influence of Lenthall and Isherwood4 Who crucially specify 'The beams of the vessel with two 
turrets to be of wrought iron, " WP. 
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Summary: 
The grandiose magnitude of this objective all but eclipsed that ofsubduing the South- 
though not that of overpowering any future ironclads crudely fashioned by the South. 
Indeed, wiping out the threat of the converted Virginia and her rough-and-ready sisters 
would by a logical side effect of the investment in monitors which could handle the more 
formidable ironclads building in Europe (rather than vice-versa). At any rate, the spring 
of 1862 saw the Union in an excellent position, it seemed, to end the war within months. 
New 6rleans was captured, Vicksburg was next (thereby completing Union control ofthe 
Mississippi River and cutting the South in two), and the Army of the Potomac was closing 
in on the Confederate capital of Richmond. The events at Hampton Roads meanwhile 
served to give Britain pause, as well as insure the survival of the Union blockade. A 
single Confederate ironclad had suddenly upset the balance ofpower; a single Union one 
restored it. Another obvious lesson was the needfor singularly heavy guns to smash iron 
more than wood 
It was this growing obsessionfor maximum concentration offorce-to undo the outcome 
of the Trent, 4ffair-which againfavouredJohn Ericsson's schemes over that of the Navy 
Bureaus. Lenthall and Isherwood could only respond that the United States had to 
confront British naval supremacy on similar terms. Instead of consolidating the 
technological powers of individual warships, the power of the Federal government itsetr 
over national technologies-in iron shipbuilding, armour manufacture, engine- 
production and gun-making-should be consolidated to produce a wide-ranging, first- 
class ironclad navy second to none. This said littlefor the actual design of the ironclads, 
themselves, basing their innate superiority more, as was the Royal Navy, upon 
incremental increases of armour thickness, firepower and overall numbers of such 
warships, a supremacy of mass production in the modem IndustrialAge between rival 
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national resources, one continental-based, the other maritime. It also ignored the 
circumstances of the United States at the time, desperately fighting as it was for a 
continent under one government. 
Aside from the pervasive threat of a war with Great Britain, which Ericsson and Fox 
exploited to the fullest, the enormous popularity of the Monitor after her duel with the 
Virginia paradoxically risked the military alienation of her civilian inventor. Thepress 
and Congress both proved willing to twist Hampton Roads as a means ofchallenging the 
authority of the Navy, if not also the While House, in a variety of competing political 
agendas. Only the close working relationship andpersonal trust between Fox, Ericsson 
and Stimers managed to preserve the monitor system, though Ericsson was never able to 
secure the lotalfaith he expectedfrom others in his radical vision of the Union's ironclad 
program. Nor was hefree to concentrate his ownformidable talents and energies upon 
the lone Dictator. Unparalleledpersonal success brought Ericsson equally unparalleled 
responsibilities, and these would only intensify as thefortunes ofthe A merican Civil War 
changedyet again. 
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IV. British reactions to Hampton Roads and the 'Monitor Riddle' 
What an ironclad duet might actually involve for the British following the Trent Affair at 
the end of 1861 was demonstrated soon enough, when the Union Monitor confronted the 
Confederate Virginia at Hampton Roads in early 1862. More dramatic for British 
interests, perhaps, was the one-sided engagement between the heavy sloop U. S. S. 
Cumherland and the frigate U. S. S. Congress against the Virginia the previous day. in a 
letter to "The Peace Society" (which it frequently ridiculed) Punch rejoiced in "imagining 
the havoc which one Warrior would create amongst a whole fleet of timber vessels 
crowded with invaders, " though with ironclads "there really does seem some ground for 
hoping that, ships being rendered practically invulnerable, any two vessels of war 
belonging to hostile nations, will, hereafter, meeting on the high seas, each find herself 
unable to injure the other, and therefore be obliged to part in peace... "340 The London 
Times likewise commented on the obvious "efficiency of a single iron-cased frigate 
against any number of wooden vessels, " adding however "the fact that nine-tenths of the 
British Navy have been rendered comparatively useless": 
Now, suppose these two vessels had encountered a division of the 
magnificent fleet under Admiral Milne; what would have been the 
result? Would our Ariadnes or Orlandos have fared any better than 
the Cumberland and Congress against an invulnerable enemy? 
True, they might have availed themselves of their speed and 
escaped destruction; but if they had chosen, as they, no doubt, 
would have done, to fight, what would have been the end of the 
battle? 341 
The Illustrated London News meanwhile depicted "The Naval Revolution" on its cover 
page of 5 April with the "Merrimac" spectacularly ramming the Cumberland. But 
whereas the Times, in its relentless campaign of anti-U. S. sarcasm, wrote that "the 
340 5-4-1862, Punch, 134. 
341 1-4-1862, London Times. 
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Warrior and her escorts" would have expressed "our naval supremacy ... as decidedly, 
though more compendiously than ever" against "turreted Monitors", the LL. N. was "not 
sure, indeed, that the case is not worse than the Times believes": 
Is the Warrior itself a match for the Monitor? It is useless now to 
talk of speed and magnificence. We don't want our war ships to 
run away successfully, or to be looked at admiringly, but to fight. 
How would the Monitor deal with the Warrior? The guns of the 
first send shot of 1701b.; the guns of the second, shots of 
1001b ... Again, the Monitor 
is practically invulnerable to existing 
artillery: is the Warrior the same? 342 
What should England do? 'Me "Revolution" of Hampton Roads suggested that the Royal 
Navy's ironclads could indeed prove decisive against an enemy's wooden fleet-whether 
on the defence or the attack-but the same applied to British wooden ships constituting 
the bulk of Britain's naval force in early 1862 against even the hastily-built ironclads of a 
resourceful potential antagonisL An Admiralty memo on the "Royal Navy Classification 
of Ships", dated 17 March 1862, fine-tuned its definition of sloops and gun-vessels but 
conspicuously did not mention ironclad warships at all, revealing perhaps the still 
t4experimental" status they carried. 343 News of the American action at Hampton Roads, 
combined with the growing doubts of exactly how a war against the Northem States could 
be prosecuted successfully, 344 forced an end to this. Furthermore, the actual type and 
character of ironclads themselves was suddenly a public as well as professional topic of 
concern. The radically-opposed designs of the Americans, North and South-the slanted- 
casemate Virginia and the raft-like, turreted Monitor-could now be contrasted with the 
concept of a fully-rigged armoured frigate. Imperial Britain's "national" security and its 
ability to extend or project its naval power beyond its own coasts was no longer as 
3421bid, 54-1862, illustrated London News, 328. 
343 ADM 115802,17-3-1862. See also Harniltorý Anglo-French Naval kvaby, 89-92. 
344 See for example, 11-3-1862, Newcastle to Somerset, SP. 
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straightforward or traditional a question as it was against Vera Cruz. Bold new 
technological challenges required equally bold responses, but which ones? 
For the LL. N. the answer began with treating "Captain Coles as our cousins are treating 
Captain Ericsson-that is, put the right man into the right place, and give him hearty 
support when there. " Britain was now "entering a race in which success will no longer be 
achieved by wealth or material resources, under merely ordinary conditions of skilful 
development, " since "men of inventive genius", men of "skill, science and individual 
energy" were clearly able to devise and produce high-tech weapons systems which might 
abruptly change the face of naval warfare, and more. 345 Somehow, in little more than 
three months, the Yankees seemed to have reversed the entire strategic balance enjoyed 
by Great Britain during the Trent Affair-stealing a march in ironclad design as wen. 
Uncomfortable about its affects on already strained Anglo-American relations, Russell 
hoped Palmerston would "stir up the slow and steady Admiralty to some vigour about 
iron Ships": 
The French have long been before us and in six months the United 
States will be far ahead of us unless our builders in the Navy 
Department exert themselves. 
I would willingly pay the additional percentage on assessed taxes 
which [William Ej Gladstone suggested if to was to give us at 
least some acceleration of our iron ship building. 
Only think of our position if in case of the Yankees turning upon 
us they should by means of iron ships they should renew the 
triumphs they achieved in 1812-13 by means of superior size and 
weight of metal. 346 
It was therefore obvious to the LL. N. that the expensive land-based fortifications insisted 
upon by Palmerston's government should be at least temporarily suspended, while 
343 54-1862, Illustrated London News, 328. 
346 31-3-1862, Russell to Palmerstorý Pp. 
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existing wooden steam-powered warships should be cut down and re-fitted as 'cupola 
vessels'. In addition to the vulnerability of wooden ships against ironclads, and the shape 
and fimction of ironclads themselves, the sensational American ironclad duel thus 
constituted a third serious challenge to Britain's existing-and proposed-defences. A 
timely letter from Coles led the attack on Monday, 31 March in the Times. Although the 
"various experiments upon every sort of iron-clad targets, sections of ships, sections of 
forts, even old floating batteries, and, lastly, with shields or revolving towers on them" 
were very judicious and valuable, "the one on the other side of the water that has taken 
place in the natural course of events is of more value than all" since it solved the question 
of "how are we in future to protect our harbours from iron marauders and our dockyards 
from being destroyedT' Some 20 "of our screw and now useless line of battle ships could 
now be converted into most efficient iron blockships"-coast defence "shield ships" of 
Coles' design, which he vowed would be much cheaper and constructed more rapidly 
than forts or Wartior-type ironclads, and yet be deadlier against invading (broadside) 
ironclads than either. 347 
Acceptance of these more radical ironclad concepts exemplified by private inventors like 
Coles and Ericsson, British and American, tapped into the latent Victorian romantic 
imagery on both sides of the Atlantic of the "misunderstood genius" or individual-hero 
whose vision alone could save his country from immediate peril-or at least a loss of 
prestige. 34' "Let it not be said by history, as it has already been suggested in Parliament, " 
the LL. X therefore concluded, "it is harder to work a conversion in our Government than 
among our ships. "349 Any discussion, any debate, over individual classes of ironclads 
was set to be one over individuals themselves-a war of wills. Hence Ericsson's endless 
347 31-3-1862, London Times. 
349 See for example David A. Mindell, War, Technolojy, and Erperience aboard the US. S Monitor 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
349 5-4-1862, Illustrated London News, 328. 
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personal struggles against Lenthall and Isherwood of the U. S. Navy Bureaus for 
commanding influence in the Union's ironclad program; and Coles' even more publicised 
challenges against Robinson the Controller and Reed the soon-to-be new Chief 
Constructor of the Royal Navy. 
As was to be expected, the anxieties of the British press quickly extended to the Houses 
of Parliament. The same day Coles' proposed solution to the riddle of the Monito, ý's 
I 
implications for Imperial Britain was virtually broadcast in the Times, Sir Frederic Smith 
noted in the Commons that the "great question of iron-plated ships against wooden 
I vessels 
had been brought to an issue, " adding suggestively "happily, without any action 
on our part. " While he was formerly willing to accept the proposed massive island- 
towers at Spithead, guarding the approaches to Portsmouth (objecting on the other hand to 
the ring of landward-facing forts designed to hold off a besieging army), the recent 
spectacle of ironclad steamers impervious to even close-range heavy cannon fire changed 
this. Armoured batteries-which incidentally carried "both heavier guns and much more 
impenetrable armour plating than any sea-going vessel"--could both run the gauntlet of 
forts and protect commercial ports and naval dockyards more effectively than fixed 
defences. Another member added that "if the Warrior had met the Merrimac, it was a 
matter of grave doubt whether the angular-sided vessel would not have overcome her 
vertical-sided antagonist; but if the Warrior and the Monitor had met, there was little 
doubt that the smaller vessel would have plunged her shot into the unprotected parts of 
the Warrior, and would, in fact, have oyercome the pride of the British navy. , 350 
In response, Sir George Lewis referred to the 1861 Report of the Defence Commission 
f 
which concluded both fortifications and floating-batteries combined would be the best 
plan. Was the House therefore prepared to vote for "a Supplementary Estimate of some 
350 31-3-1862, Hansard, 263-72. 
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L10,000,000 or D5,000,000" for the latter? Noting even the Union Army's experimental 
Rodman guns, Lewis was confident ironclads would ultimately prove vulnerable to ever- 
heavier ordnance-itself always easier to mount and man on land. In this sense the 
greater cost associated with forts was still a safer investment to the Government than "to 
rush into a series of costly changes" associated with naval defences which technology 
was more prone to affect adversely. 351 John Bright, however, felt "the man must be 
particularly stupid who does not see the importance" of the latest events in America. The 
current question was "whether the batteries which we are about to erect at a vast cost in 
the neighbourhood of Portsmouth harbour capable of resting the entrance of iron-plated 
vessels, such as the Monito? '? For the moment no one could say yes, so the construction 
of such fortifications should be temporarily suspended and public money saved while his 
Birmingham constituents, at least coped with the expected deprivations rising from the 
blockade of Southern cotton. Punch was pleasantly surprised to agree for once with 
Bright: 
If Sir George Lewis is going to play the Old Fogy, and resist all 
improvements, the sooner he retires to some sequestered spot, and 
studies his Greek authors without interruption by public affairs the 
better. Meantime we beg to remind the learned man, that neither 
the Pyrrhic [sic] phalanx nor Greek fire was invented by parties 
who declined to advance with the military spirit of the time. Will 
that consideration move him-or must we move hiM? 352 
Nor was the reply of Lord Paget, the Admiralty spokesman, that the navy generally 
accepted Coles' principle of "shield-ship§", entirely satisfactory; for he also had to 
condemn along with the Monitor their relative lack of strategic range and 
351 Ibid, 275-8. 
352 124-1862, Punch, 143. Little did Punch know that the following daY Lewis wrote to Somerset he was 
now -*nking of requesting the Defence Committee to report on the recent action in America, and to state 
whether it induces them to modify their opinion respecting the Forts at Spithead, " 1-4-1862, Lewis to 
Somerset, SP. 
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seaworthinesS. 353 Either the entire conception of British national and imperial defence 
was going to be upset by the American example, it seemed, or it was not. 
For that matter, bow radical were Britain's leaders truly prepared to be? Politicafly, there 
was little doubt that mid-Victorian society was basking in something of a Pax-or "Age 
of Equipoise'ý-under "Old Pam's" Whiggish yet undeniably conservative stewardship. 
Closely linked with this sense of social and even political security (since Palmerston's 
coalition government had indeed managed to keep the Liberals intact, the Tories content 
and the Radicals at bay) was the commonly expressed desire for potent military and naval 
symbols of national strength and defence. Anything else would be construed by the 
popular press as foolishness. Palmerston, the "Old Guard", would "slap" naive Radicals 
such as Richard Cobden and Bright who believed peace could be maintained by anything 
other than fortress walls, or an Armstrong Gun. 354 Occasional "Panics" of rising 
continental armaments and intentions-the old suspicion of a French desire for revenge 
for Trafalgar and Waterloo-were fiieUed upon a latent xenophobia, and classically 
stoked by politicians for a multitude of private or "Public" reasons. In this sense, 
therefore, realism coincided more closely with conservatism on issues of defence. 
Yet Britain's industrial and financial resources, though recognized as the most developed 
in the world, were not by any means limitless. Few speakers in Parliament would dare to 
suggest that it was not better to be safe than sorry, but many could appeal to equally 
prevalent Victorian values of thrift, efficiency, and progress. It was thus in early 1862 
that Palmerston's nemesis, Cobden, argued for essentially strategic (naval) amis 
limitations-talks with France, to negotiate a mutual reduction in at least the now 
353 31-3-1862, Hansard, 285-6. 
354 LiteraBy, see Punch, 3-5-1862, "Peace", and 19-7-1862, "I'he Old Sentinel". 
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universally-recognised obsolescence of wooden ships-of-the-line. 355 Somerset, however, 
disagreed with Cobden's gloomy forecast of endless rival naval expenditures, even with 
the advent of iron and armoured ships which prevented "any exclusive advantage from 
the augmentation". Improved armaments would likely lead to improved economy. "In a 
few years it seems probable that, instead of a large fleet of two deckers at sea, we shall 
keep a smaller number of iron-plated ftigates ready in our ports and harbours, from which 
one or two will occasionally go out for a cruise, but that the general duties of the navy 
will be performed by a smaller class of vessels such as corvettes sloops and gun-vessels. " 
'Me current increase was due to the state of transition only, the First Lord argued. Indeed, 
it was his conviction that "our large naval force has not however incited us to war, but has 
been on the contrary instrumental in maintaining peace. Out hostile passions have not 
been inflamed, but on the contrary this country has shown a temper and forbearance 
which Mr. Cobden as well as every lover of peace must approve and admire. v1356 
Of all other nations in the world it was the United States which many Englishmen were in 
the habit of pointing to; the "other" Victorian society, the English-speaking republic, that 
always seemed to move forward as fast, if not faster, than Britain herself "The whole 
spirit of modem warfare, " one Parliamentary critic declared, was now obviously one of 
"mobility against permanence. , 357 As such, Somerset had to warn Palmerston the next 
day that "under present excitement the Government will be beat" on the issue of forts or 
floating batteries, especially since it was unclear "how far the Government is committed 
to the [fort] contractors and no statement on this point was made to the House of 
Commons. 058 Lewis wanted the First Lord to attend a meeting at the War Office on the 
4 th to discuss the issue of ironclads vs. fortifications. 359 
355 Undated, 1862, Cobden to Palmerston, PP. 
356 11-1-1862, Somerset to Palmerston, PP. 
357 44-1862, Hansard, 590. 
359 14-1862, Somerset to Palmerston, PP. 
359 34-1862, Lewis to Somerset SP. 
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But before this chance for the Government to regroup Somerset was compelled to answer 
criticism in the House of Lords on 3 April. The Earl of Hardwicke referred to "the late 
events on the American coast and in the James River, " which "had brought about a sort of 
crisis in the state of public opinioW': 
... it had evinced the world that 
in contest between iron and 
wooden vessels the latter were utterly valueless. It was, therefore, 
for the Government to consider whether they would any longer 
nibble at this matter, but whether they should not rather open their 
jaws wide and swallow the whole, let the cost be what it might, 
and persevere in the construction of an iron-plated navy. As the 
question now stood before the country, it was as much one of 
common sense as of science. The duty of a navy was to secure the 
coasts of the country inviolate, to protect the coasts and harbours 
of our colonies, to blockade the enemy in his own ports, and to 
supply an adequate number of cruising ships for service at home 
and abroad. 360 
As most of the Royal Navy was wooden, it therefore stood to reason that most of it could 
not deal with coastal defence ironclads. 'Me same, however, applied to a potential 
adversary. Two types of vessels should comprise the navy of the future: mastless stearn- 
powered turret-vessels like the Monitor, limited, however, by the fact that they "could not 
keep the sea long for want of coal"; and sail-and-steam ironclads of good speed which 
should at any rate be of smaller dimensions for greater manoeuvrabifity and lighter draft 
for general dockyard accommodation than the Warrior-class ironclads, since "in fighting 
sWps it was necessary to combine the qualities of sea-going vessels with those of a man- 
of-war, and to abandon a portion of each for the sake of the whole. 061 
360 3-4-1862, Hansard, 430-1. 
361 Ibid. See 7-8-1862, Return: Navy DocAývrds, Ordered 30-6-1862 and 15-7-1862, PPS. -Me Warrior- 
and Minotaur-class ironclads could only be accommodated in three docks at "High Water Spring Tides": 
one at portsmouth, one at Devonport, and one at Keyham. The Prince Albert-class of iron-hulled, coastal 
defence turret ship, by comparison, could be accommodated in at least twenty. 
178 
Somerset replied that the current Government, on taking power in the summer of 1859, 
was merely ftilfifling the wishes of the House then and the previous Government to 
"possess a powerful fleet of line-of-battle ships, and that we should add to the strength of 
our naval reserve" in addition to laying down two experimental iron-cased steamers. 
Though the new First Lord apparently considered altering Warri&'s sister-ship, Black 
Prince (on what basis he did not say), he "found it would be necessary to have the whole 
details calculated over again and the lines re-drawn, which would have taken three or four 
months; and as there was a feeling throughout the country that it was desirable to proceed, 
I ordered her to be completed on the same lines as the Warrior": 
But I was not quite satisfied with those vessels. I admit, with the 
noble Earl, that great length and great draught of water, although 
characteristic of powerful vessels, and enabling them to make rapid 
passages, are also attended with inconveniences. I therefore 
caused the Department to reconsider the question, and to suggest 
plans for two vessels of a smaller class, which were accordingly 
prepared at the close of the autumn. Those two were Defence and 
Resistance. 
Yet Somerset admitted he was also "not satisfied with these", since none of the first four 
ironclads, large and small, were "sufficiently protected". The Valiant-class was a third 
attempt to produce Hardwicke's well-balanced, armoured 'fighting ship'. All of the 
vessels were at the mercy of contractors, who "find more difficulties than they had 
calculated upon; so much time is required in forging enormous pieces of iron, and the 
quality of iron is so carefully examined by us that contractors complain of the heavy 
obligations under which they labour in meeting our requirements, and we have a great 
deal of trouble in some cases to get them to continue the work. " Four more fast, iron- 
hulled, sail-and-steam. ironclads were ordered, yet on the basis that the 100-pounder 
AM-, strong and 68-pounder gun were still the heaviest serviceable British ordnance, and 
"that if both the armaments and the iron plates which vessels carried were greatly 
increased in weight, the vessels would be very ill adapted for service at sea. " These were 
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therefore ever longer and deeper than Warrior but at least more fully protected, carrying a 
heavier armament overall; the Achilles and the three vessels of the Minotaur-class. 
Conversions of wooden ships-of-the-line were also underway (the Royal Oak-class). 
Finally, guns mounted in revolving shields on Captain Coles' plan were tested the 
previous year with good results; Somerset "was at once satisfied that we had got a vessel 
which would be most useful for the protection of our harbours. But as there was no 
pressure for defence, and no alarm about the safety of our harbours, I did not think it 
necessary to apply to the Treasury for authority to commence that vessel at once. " To 
ward off Parliament's alarm over fortifications as an efficient means of harbour defence, 
as well as justify the Admiralty's investment in super broadside-ironclads rather than a 
turret-ship flotflla-givcn the current pressure generated by news of the American 
ironclad action-the First Lord now had to belittle its actual "importance". Hence, the 
Monitor was "something between a raft and a diving bell", barely seaworthy, of poor 
(laminated) armour configuration, and armed with shell-firing Dahlgren guns which 
nevertheless had lower velocity than the 68-pounder. Though "these conflicts, viewed 
solely as matters of scientific experiment, " were "highly interesting" to the Admiralty, 
they were, at most, only that. 362 
Meanwhile, intelligence reports were coming in that even the French were now taking 
"Captain Cowper Coles' plan of constructing iron plated vessele' under "serious 
consideration. ..,, 
36' Although one authority suggested smaller calibre rifled guns on 
either American ironclad, firing with higher velocity (rather than low velocity, large 
calibre smoothbores) would have proven more decisive, and that ironclads would ever be 
vulnerable to improved ordnance, Dupuy de Lome told Captain Edward Hore, R. N., he 
was "equally confident that he can always obtain more power of resistance than the 
362 34-1862, Hansard, 438-9. 
363 24-1862, Hore to Earl Cowley, FO 27/1436. The French had also apparently slackened the pace of 
existing ironclad construction. 
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means of penetration brought against him can overcome, and that these cannot be pushed 
beyond a certain limit, at least on board of ships, for not only would the handling of the 
guns and shot become too difficult, but also the ships" decks would [not] stand the recoil 
,, 364 and the strain. If the French lead was to be followed in ironclads, therefore, it seemed 
likely that the broadside of lighter, though feasibly more powerful, guns was the way of 
the future-not American turrets and heavy guns. 
364 4-4-1862, Hore to Cowley, FO 27/1436. 
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Enter E. I Reed, naval architect 
These considerations from various sources finther served to complicate relations between 
the Admiralty and Coles. Encouraged by the debate in Parliament the inventor-captain 
wrote to Paget to claim, first of all, priority of the "Shot Proof Steam Raft"-concept over 
Ericsson's Monitor. His Crimean War proposals were of even lighter draft and smaller 
dimensions, though his hemispherical turret was fixed, rather than a rotating cylinder. 
Responding to Somerset's request to Grey for more details Robinson declared, however, 
that "no trace" could be found "of any reporf' in the Surveyor's department. Coles could 
also not "withhold from their Lordships the deep mortification" he felt "at the Americans' 
taking away the Palm of the invention from this country... " By giving "ftirther publicity" 
to his "inventions and views to the Defences of Great Britain" Coles suggested he was 
saving England's honour-if not his own: 
I wish to point out to their Lordships how admirably those Steam 
Rafts could be adopted for the defence of our dockyards, 
Mercantile Ports, and Rivers. If in Peace time we only constructed 
a few as a pattern, and stationed them at the principal ports, when 
in case of being threatened with war, our rivers would swarm with 
them in an incredibly short time; they could be manned by our 
Dockyard men, pensioners, Coast Volunteers, and sea board 
population, giving an incentive to Voluntary services, and a 
specific understanding as to how, and what they were to fight in, 
when I believe no Vessel dare ventures near our Coast. 
If necessary to have a little more speed a few feet more length, 
draught of water, and more power would give it, it must be 
remembered that the great superiority which these Vessels have 
over larger ones which have to cross the Channel, or Atlantic to 
attack us is from their smallness, lowness in the water, rapidity in 
turning and light draught. 365 
But added publicity was exactly what the Admiralty and the Government did not want, 
and there was more than a trace of extortion in Coles' exuberant "offer". The Admiralty 
365 ADM 1/5802,11-4-1862; enclosed letter from Coles to Paget dated 31-3-1862. 
182 
would therefore not be patriotically drawn into a private dispute between rival inventors; 
two turret-ships, Prince Alhert and the Royal Sovereign-conversion, were already 
committed for the purpose of "trying7' his plan; and "the whole question" of smaller 
ironclads for coastal defence had been "for some months under the consideration of the 
Board", which would "not fail to take advantage of Capt. Coles' services should the 
adoption of his plan of anning small vessels be found desirable. 22366 
Back in the House of Commons, the Monitor, the Virginia, and Coles' proposed turret 
vessels spearheaded a renewed attack on the Spithead fortifications on 4 April. The 
opposition pointed out that while Coles' Crimean War ironclad plans were virtually on 
hold-while the Admiralty endlessly deliberated its merits-the new forts received carte 
blanche treatment. Yet "while we have been thinking, the Americans have been acting": 
They have been satisfied by the experiment, which is doubted upon 
the Treasury bench here, in the same way as the efficiency of the 
matchlock was doubted when it speeded the crossbow; of "Brown 
Bess, " when it superseded the matchlock; and of the Enfield rifle, 
when it superseded Brown Bess. Our great men are very slow to 
be convinced; and unless the House of Commons urges them on- 
unless a lesson is taught us on our own shores by the burning of 
some of our own ships-they will be as slow as the men of former 
times were. 367 
Mr. Bentinck added, however, that the criticism of the House should not "at all be 
construed into an irritating or party feeling... " The Government "could not have dealt 
with this question before, because it had not arisen, " but it was obliged by recent events to 
make some bold decision regardless. Though the Monitor was a "comparatively small 
vessel, a shapeless monstrosity", it was also virtually invulnerable-and John Ericsson, 
according to American newspapers, was now already busy designing improved, larger 
366 ADM 1/5802,114-1862. 
367 44-1862, Hansard, 588-9. See also Michael Stephen Partridge, Afilitaryplanningfor the Defense of the 
United Kingdom, 1814-1870 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 89-92,100-119. 
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versions. Though the Monitor might not be able to cross the Atlantic, "it is perfectly easy 
to construct vessels quite as invulnerable, --and therefore quite as invincible as the 
Monitor, and yet possessing all the requisite sea-going qualities for making a passage to 
any part of the world. 068 
Palmerston's personal dislike for the Wartior and her "pasteboard sisters" would now 
have to be put on hold . 
369 If conservative policy was mid-Victorian policy, the ageing 
Prime Minister would have to publicly defend his Admiralty's decision to invest in 
broadside-ironclads, though they were not in fact as fully armour-protected as the French 
counterparts. He was "not surprised", therefore, that "the public at large should have 
their eyes opened, and their minds struck, by the conclusions naturally derived from the 
event which has- taken place. " But as the First Lord of the Admiralty had demonstrated 
the previous day, the Government had indeed undertaken experiments of its own which 
had already suggested the relative invulnerability of armoured vessels against wooden 
ones. Moreover, the recent encounter in American waters also served as a warning of 
"what kind of vessel will not do for the general service which we require of our ships, " 
since the crews of both American ironclads were stifled by their low freeboard, which 
also threatened their seaworthiness except in smooth waters. "Therefore it Will not do to 
take these vessels as your model and when the House is told that they cost comparatively 
but a small sum, and were completed in a short space of time, I must say that is no ground 
sufficient for us to go on with respect to the ships we may construct. " Tenders were 
being sent out for constructing a ship on Coles plan; "whether it can be made capable of 
going to sea is another thing, but for purposes of coast defence we are of opinion that the 
construction of that vessel will turn out most effectual. " By the year 1864, Britain should 
have "16 iron ships, of different sizes, but all of a very respectable and fon-nidable 
368 4-4-1962, Hansard, 602-4. 
361 See, for example, 27-3-1861, Palmerston to Somerset, SP. 
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character. " As for the man-made island-forts at Spithead, only contracts for the 
foundations were made-the actual design of the forts to rest upon them were not yet 
settled by experiment. 370 Terminable annuities were planned to pay for their cost, which 
seemed reasonable since forts, unlike floating batteries, were considered long-term 
investments. If however the House wanted the Government to suspend those contracts 
until a new Commission re-examined the question of batteries or forts, or batteries and 
forts combined for national defence, then it would be done. For now, it was obvious that 
"floating defences can be constructed more rapidly than forts, " and that "so long as those 
floating defences were not sent elsewhere-so long as they were available, and had their 
machinery in order, they would, in all probability, be as effectual ... as forts. " But it also 
stood to reason that future improvements in heavy guns would favour their being 
mounted on land rather than floating them at sea. 371 In fact, Palmerston was trying to 
defer any decision which might kill the fortifications scheme altogether until after the 
Easter recess of Parliament, waiting for events to cool down, and the public to diverts its 
attention once more. 
Sir John Pakington, on the opposite side of the House, was not satisfied with the Prime 
Minster's explanation. As Palmerston noted, 11,000,000 was recommended for the 
construction of floating batteries by the 1860 Defence Commission, in addition to the 19 
million for fixed fortifications. But even if long-term forts might be paid for by 
terminable annuities, and batteries could not, why was nothing for the construction of the 
latter put into the annual Estimates? Indeed, "up to this moment the Government have 
taken no measures whatever to cany out that portion of the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission. " 'Mere was therefore no need to wait for yet another Commission; 
370 44-1862, Hansard, 606-10. The War Office Return on "National Defences". for the loan authorised to 
pay for the forts, listed 1574,872 already spent by 31 March 1862, primarily in modernising existing 
defences of Portsmouth and Plymouth, with over 0 million already committed to bu)ing land for 
fortifications, leaving E316,000 of the U-million advance; L5,680,000 was estimated for completion; 26-5- 
1862, PPs, 1-3. 
37144-1862, Hansard, 612. 
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let the million-pounds be voted now for iron-plated "gunboats", before the French 
assumed too great a lead in both ffigates and coastal defence/assault ironcladS. 372 Paget 
countered by suggesting that the five line-of-battle ship conversions (the Royal Oaks) 
were "to be plated as floating defencee, a partial truth inasmuch as they were not 
intended to operate as Ericsson's Monitor or Coles proposed flotilla of cupola ships. 
Thus another three-decker (the Royal Sovereign) was to be converted on Coles' plan "for 
Channel defence" as opposed to "harbour defence". Their draft would still be around 26- 
feet-hardly suitable for the defence of most harbours-but, as Paget challenged, "it is 
said that the Americans in the course of a few months plated the marvellous Monitor, and 
we in this country are behindhand; but supposing we were at war to-morrow, do you 
suppose we could not put forward our energies and create Monitors by the dozen in a few 
monthsT' This was a sensible point, for the Americans were at war; Britain was engaged 
in an arms-race with France, and in such a contest the maintenance of long-range power- 
projection was perhaps more vital for international relations and a secure peace than even 
immediate defence closer to home, for purposes of deterrence if not practicality. How 
this strategy affected the forts was another matter. As Sir Frederic Smith observed, it was 
"all moonshine to suppose that a vessel passing [fixed forts] could be destroyed by heavy 
guns. " Monitors were also, simply, much cheaper than forts, even if they were paid for 
immediately. 373 
But inasmuch as forts were part of the United Kingdom's overall vision of strategic 
defence mixed with offensive-deterrence, or hitting power-indeed, what else Could 
explain the obvious preference being given to deep-draft, long-range ironclads? -coastal 
ironclads were not, even if light-draft turret-ships proved deadlier against broadside- 
ironclads than forts. In this sense, perhaps, the new technology represented by Ericsson 
372 Ibid., 614-17. 
373 Ibid., 618-21. 
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and Coles was destabilising. Forts were classic elements of strategic defence which 
veteran statesmen such as Palmerston understood and knew their counterparts understood 
as well. Would reliance on an "invention" prove sufficient at the negotiating table or 
merely laughable? The extraordinary lessons from the Battle of Hampton Roads could 
not yet outweigh the larger history of conflict, in Europe, where ships-of-the-line and 
forts were acknowledged playing pieces in the high-stakes game of international 
diplomacy. A Cabinet Memo from Sir George Grey acknowledged there was "a good 
deal of truth" in Coles' arguments, "but it is a truth no one denies. Every one admits that 
we ought to retain our maritime superiority and to render an invasion impossible if we 
can by our first line of defence-the Navy": 
... but Captain 
Coles appears to me to overrate the power [turret 
vessels] would give us of defeating an attempted invasion, if, as 
in the case he assumes, "Our fleet should be ordered or called 
away for the protection of our colonies and commerce. " His 20 
iron ships might be concentrated rapidly at a given point, but what 
is the French fleet doing all the time? 374 
Somerset later added in the House of Lords that forts served another psychological 
7 375 
purpose: to defend the country "against panic attacks at home. At any rate, the final 
vote of 74 to 13 successfully suspended "the construction of the proposed Forts at 
Spithead until the value of iron-roofed gunboats for the defence of our Ports and 
Roadsteads shall have been fully considered... " A new Committee would convene I 
May 1862 to consider diverting any money set aside for fortifications to construct or 
convert coast defence ironclads instead . 
376 The possibility of Royal Navy monitors was 
therefore also put on hold, despite Hampton Roads. 
374 Sir George Grey, undated memo, 1862, GP. 
375 114-1862, Hansard, 853. 
376 44-1862, Hansard, 613-14,630. 
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During this tune, Edward I Reed, described by Robinson to the Board of Admiralty as a 
naval architect by profession, "educated at the central Mathematical School at 
Portsmouth", was hired to build a small ironclad of "novel description7' for the navy. The 
Controller was looking for alternatives to the wooden conversions and the big iron-hulled 
broadside ironclads; ships with greater handiness and armour protection, with less 
demanding construction and perhaps also fighter draft. 3n Thus far "no plan that has yet 
been proposed, for partially Armour Plating small ships, has apparently presented the 
same prospect of success as this Design of Mr. Reed's, " wrote Robinson . 
373 The new 
"Armour Plated Corvette", H. M. S. Enterprise, had a fully armoured waterline belt, with 
thicker armour concentrated in a central 'box' housing a small but heavier battery, with 
traversing guns which would permit fore and aft fire. In essence, the vessel was similar to 
Confederate casemate-rams, though the casemate itself was not angled, and part of a 
larger, traditional topside which would facilitate the use of masts. 
At once the "central-battery" system posed a challenge to Coles' proposals for lighter, 
seagoing ironclads which also concentrated armament into fewer but heavier guns, though 
mounted in turrets to permit wide fields of fire rather than traversing through alternate 
ports. But whereas Coles was still finalising even the shape of his turrets, from truncated 
cones to cylinders like the Moniw's turret, and perceptibly failing to provide actual 
schematics for a vessel ready to build, Reed was a trained professional, a skilled engineer, 
creative and at least equally ambitious to mould Britain's new ironclads as Coles. 379 
Robinson was prepared to offer Coles 120,000 "to surrender absolutely to the Admiralty 
all his Patent rights so far as they relate to Guns in Cupolas or Shields to be carried on 
board ship, " with an obligation to "furnish such plans and drawings to the Admiralty 
377 Milne meanwhile desired a hauling-up slip for Bermuda, "for effecting repairs of even small class ships 
which may have touched the ground. " Docling and repairing Warrior or even Defence at Bermuda was 
currently impossible; ADM 128/21,20-4-1862. 
379 ADM 115 802,14-4-1862. 
379 See ADM 1/5791,174-1862, Coles to Robinson, and 204-1862, Coles to Romaine. 
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connected with his patent as they from time to time may require of him, receiving while 
so employed a remuneration to be fixed by them on a fair and liberal scale. " The 
Admiralty attorneys thought this "inconvenient for many reasons and objectionable as a 
precedent, " drafting instead a proposal to the Treasury for a down-payment sum of 
15,000 "and also a royalty of 1100 for every Cupola built in a ship or fort during the time 
of his patent, " which would expire in 1864. Again, the turret system was considered an 
"uncertainty" at best, though "an element which must be paid for... " Armstrong guns, 
another product of a private inventor, were by now an accepted component Her Majesty's 
fleet, but Coles' system was "hardly ... a parallel" case, and was already inspiring 
"resentment" with authorities. This was exempiffied when Coles pointed out to Romaine 
on 16 April that "Foreign Governmente' were willing to pay him handsomely for his 
Shield-Ships, that the British Government owed him money after the successful trial of 
his system in the Trusty, six months previously, and that his plan was "pronounced by the 
United Voice of the Nation through both Houses of Parliament to be eminently successful 
and of the greatest value to the Country. 080 Coles was making a nuisance of himself, and 
worse, becoming a focal point of political embarrassment to the Navy and the 
Government. 
When Reed offered to carry out the construction of the Enlerpfise, for which he would 
have to give up his regular work, Robinson suggested a fee up to 1600.381 This was a far 
cheaper (and much quieter) alternative to "giving in" to Coles and his supporters. The 
less radical central-battery concept was perhaps also less overtly "American" than 
coastal-defence turret-ships-vessels which strayed too close to the cutting edge of 
British naval strategy, policy, and economy by bringing national defence much closer to 
home shores than imperial interests required. The issue broadened when Newcastle, the 
380 See ADM 1/5802,254-1862. 
381 ADM 1/5802.144-1862. 
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Colonial Secretary, argued against Somerset's remarkable proposal "to enable such 
Colonies as may be willing to establish a naval force of their own defence to do so, " 
while William Gladstone, the Minister of Exchequer, was publicly challenging the 
expediency of increased military and naval expenditures-and infuriating Palmerston in 
the process. 382 Significantly, therefore, the London Mechanics'Magazine reported the 
laying down of the Enterprise at Deptford dockyard, comparing her not to Warrior or 
even Coles' "cupola vessels" but to "the American Monitor, of which the world has lately 
heard so much. " The new type of British ironclad could be "sent to any part of the 
world" and was "the first which has rendered the application of extremely thick and 
heavy armour to our larger ships possible. ý9383 
This last factor was demonstrated as especially important on 8 April, when a new, 
experimental 12-ton gun designed by the ever-innovative William Armstrong pierced the 
Wartior Target at Shoeburyness with a 156 lbs projectile, firing an increased charge of 
40lbs. The gun was smoothbore only, but Armstrong assured observers that if modified 
with lifling a 10-inch calibre, "300-poundee' could pierce the target at an even greater 
range. The American spectacle of ironclads firing away at one another, with apparently 
no cffect, was clearly short-lived. 394 So was the concept of merely extending armour 
protection to greater and larger broadside-batteries. 385 Partial protection was once again 
mandatory, not on a point of seaworthiness, as with the Warrior, but survivability in 
392 See 284-1862, Somerset to Palmerston, Newcastle's "Remarks upon proposal to introduce a Bill to 
enable Colonial Navies to be fonned", and 294-1862, Palmerston to Gladstone, PP. Palmerston himself 
felt "a large yearly expenditure for Army and Navy" was "an economical Insurance" against the catastrophe 
of a French invasion-provoked in turn by weak British national defences. But Gladstone was not 
convinced adequate defence of this nature equated necessarily to larger expenditures than not; coastal 
defence (turret) ironclads vs. forts was the prime example. See Philip Gucdalla (ed. ), The Palmerston 
Papers: Gladstone and Palmerston, being the Correspondence of Lord Palmerston with AV. Gladstone 
1851-1865 (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1928). 
383 Quoted from the Scientific American, 7-6-1862,358. 
384 See 114-1862, London Times. 
385 Although Robinson, after a publicised visit to Chatham with the First Lord, recommended the armament 
of the Achilles be reduced from 50 to 30 heavy guns, all within the protected portion of the battery, 
considering it "very essential to the efficiency of the Ship to carry a belt orArmour Plating of 4Y2-inches in 
jWckness right round the Ship in continuation of that which exists at present only for about 200 ft., 'p ADM 
1/5802,3-5-1862. 
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combat against heavier, more powerful ordnance. Armour must henceforward be thicker, 
just as existing guns were previously deemed "useless" in Parliament against iron sides. 
Though Somerset was complaining to Palmerston of all the crank proposals flooding into 
him every day as a result of the Hampton Roads sensation, only two classes of future 
ironclads stood a chance against the gun-makers of the testing grounds, if not also against 
potential foreign antagonists, namely France and especially the United StateS. 386 The 
Scientific American was reprinting U. S. Army Captain Rodman's letter to the War 
Department, dated a year before, explaining there was "no doubt of our ability to make 
reliable" monster smoothbores of 20-inch calibre, capable of firing solid shot of 1,000 
pounds. With their "whole crushing force being brought to bear upon a single point at the 
same time, while that of the smaller shot would be unavoidably dispersed, as regards both 
time and point of impact, " it was "not deemed probable that any naval structure, proof 
against that caliber, will soon if ever be built... " In the meantime, some fifty 15-inch 
calibre smoothbore guns, designed by Dahlgren, were already ordered by the Navy 
Department of the U. S. Government to be cast at the Fort Pitt Works in Pittsburgh. These 
would act as the new monitors' primary weapons. 387 
The infamous debate between Coles and the Admiralty, and then also Reed, intensified 
over the next few months. The victory of Armstrong's "150-poundee, over the Warrior 
Target prompted the Admiralty to test its powers against the trial Coles turret on Trusty. 
Coles objected that the turret in question was obsolete in comparison with the new gun, 
unlike the improved ones intended for the Royal Sovereign. The Board assured him, 
however, "the result of their intended experiments 'will involve no condemnation of the 
386 See for example "Mr. Rothwell's plan of destroying an Enemy by squirting Vitriol and Naphtha into the 
Ports" in ADM 1/5802,114-1862. Somerset quipped to Palmerston he had "letters now adlising me to build ; hips to imitate the scales of the crocodile, the hide of the rhinoceros, the quills of the porcupine, the 
-wings of the beetle, &c., &c. ". 27-4-1862, Somerset to Palmerston, PP; also 224-1862, Palmerston to 
Somerset; SP. 
3g" 3-5-1862, Scientific American, 282. The same page reported 'The British Parliament on the Fight in 
Hampton Roads". 
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Armstrong 8-inch, 150-potmder, nfled intizzle-loader-captured at Fort Fisher in 
January 1865, and now a prize of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, NY. 
(Author's collection) 
Contrast the above with the DaWgren 15-inch, 450-pounder smoothbore below, now at 
Filipstad, Sweden-one of a pair given by John Ericsson to his native country in 1865, 
to arm her first Passaic class monitor. These are believed to be the sole remainting 15- 
inch Dah1grens in the world. (Author's collection) 
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principle of the Shield. 
088 Indeed, Punch considered "floating iron shot-towers to 
constitute our fleet" something of a foregone conclusion; henceforth, sailors would be 
, 089 "frozen out" by "flat-irons with neither masts nor spars... Yet Coles' patent was itself 
still under negotiation, and the matter was now hopelessly entangled with his status as 
either a full or half-pay serving officer. On 3 May Coles wrote to the Admiralty claiming 
travel and subsistence expenses of 11 per day. When the Admiralty questioned why a 
full-pay officer should be granted these as well, Coles requested on the 10th that he be put 
on half-pay, "as I believe that it will enable me more fully to develop the advantages 
which I think may be derived from placing guns in revolving shieldS. 1090 This was 
important, since half-pay status also technically allowed him to publish criticism of 
Admiralty ironclad policy-and promote his own scheme-without necessarily 
jeopardising his position with the Admiralty to supervise the construction of trial cupola 
vessels. Already Coles was privately writing to the editor of Blackwood's that "official 
091 prejudice is working hard against me... It was likely he also knew of Reed's 
increasing influence. When Coles considered offering the Admiralty a license to use his 
cupolas, rather than purchase his patent, so that he could retain the right to sell them to 
other (including foreign) parties, Sir Frederick Grey and Paget confronted Coles over his 
resort to the Times, while he was still on full-pay, and even proved willing to publicly 
retaliate against him in Parliament-much to Coles' horror. On 16 May Coles and his 
attorney thus decided to accept the Admiralty offer of 15,000 with a 1100 royalty for his 
turrets extending to 14 years from the date of his original patent, "for the benefit of the 
Government and the Country, " though Coles added he would probably "suffer pecuniarily 
by doing so. " The Admiralty in turn considered Coles' request for half-pay dropped, but 
Coles may have waited too long. The following day Robinson suggested Reed "proceed 
399 ADM 1/5791,8-5-1862. 
389 10-5-1862, Punch, 19 1. 
390 See ADM 1/5791,14-5-1862. 
391 12-5-1862, Coles to John Blackwood, MS 4168, f 197-8, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgit 
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to Portsmouth, Devonport, and Pembroke, to prepare drawings" for "Plating small Ships 
of War". Master Shipwrights and draughtsmen were to be placed at his disposal as well. 
"From the great amount of work in this Office, " Robinson argued, "much delay would be 
avoided" by accepting his request, which the Board indeed approved. 392 
The Controller's attitude to Coles' patent changed. The inventor should retain his patent 
rights but not be allowed to extend his services to other parties. Assigning them to the 
Board of Admiralty would not "practically do what the Board wantS. "393 With Reed on 
board, the Admiralty could better afford to do without Coles if need be; could Coles do 
better than the Admiralty? What would the public think if he sold his cupolas abroad but 
refused to "benefit"his own country for "pecuniary" reasons? Keeping Coles' turrets tied 
to the British Isles would prevent their spread to potential rivals, and by keeping free of 
commitments to Coles himself keep the Admiralty free from private or public 
manipulation of the development of the British ironclad program. 
392 ADM 1/5902,17-5-1962. 
39' See the various reports included %ith ADM 1/5791,14-5-1862; Robinson's letter is dated 19-5-1862. 
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VI. Palmerston's policy 
The threat was real enough. On 19 May the entire history of the program and its 
expenses up to that point was subjected to a blistering attack in Parliament by Lord 
Robert Montagu. Once more the Admiraltywas accused of probably allowing dust to 
collect on "plans of a better form" of ironclad "which would also not be regarded until 
they had already done execution in the hands of the Americans. " Worse still, Montagu 
motioned the Government to "appoint a Committee of scientific men, who would 
investigate the subject of ship-building with a desire to obtain a real knowledge of facts, 
instead of relying upon ernpty opinions. " This would clearly take decision-making out of 
the hands of the professionals, the Navy, and especially the Surveyor (Controller). Earlier 
evidence before an Admiralty Committee stated: 
Generally speaking, if it is a matter connected with ship building 
or fitting, it is submitted to the Surveyor of the Navy, and, in 
common language, he pooh-poohs it... I very much question 
whether you will find one single instance in which an inventor 
has gone to the surveyor's office and received an 
acknowledgement of his invention having been good... 
The House now called for a Return of "the number of proposals or plans, for the purposes 
of shot-proof ships, which have been received at the Admiralty during the last three 
years ... and 
if any such proposals or plans have been referred to a Committee... " Paget 
demurred, since "inventions in reference to iron-cased ships come to us at the rate of 
about 100 a month. --" It was also advisable not to move "too fasV% though "we have no 
less than seven different classes of ships in progress of the iron-cased family, by various 
inventors, some of which are plated right round, and others plated only amidshipS.,, 394 
394 19-5-1862, Hansard, 193345. 
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At any rate, the Motion was prefatory to a much wider offensive in Parliament against the 
Government's "National Expenditure". The public, much less the politicians, was still 
not satisfied by the answers given by the professionals. Foreign powers still seemed 
"ahead" of Britain, while Coles was seemingly still left behind by the Admiralty. 
instead, the Government was spending more money than was needed on outdated forms 
of defence, the fortifications, and even its choice of ironclads was increasingly suspect. 
"Old Pam", the consummate political master, braced himself for yet another struggle. On 
23 May Somerset replied to Palmerston's request for details on French naval armaments 
that "the Revue Contemporaire of 30 April 1862 gives 6 iron-plated afloat, 10 iron-plated 
building, also 10 new floating batteries building in addition to the former batteries. The 
French iron-plated ships building are not progressing fast at present. If we go on steadily, 
we shall be equal if not above them by next spring. It is difficult to speak on the subject, 
,, 395 as some are anxious to stop our progress, others wish to excite unnecessary alarm. 
Exaggerating the French threat might lead to criticism of the Government; but ignoring it 
would do the same. 
The same was true concerning the United States. A letter from an American informant 
providing first-hand details of the Monitor and the Virginia warned "the Americans are a 
most impulsive people, and just now everybody wants iron clad ships and I doubt not that 
in a year from this time, America will have at least 30 afloat, I have no idea that they will 
be all good ones, but in all probability they will all of them be More than a match for any 
ship not so protected, and should they get the largest number or have in any way the 
advantage, a War with England is as certain as the rising of tomorrows sun. 2096 
395 23-5-1862, Somerset to Palmerston, Pp. The First Lord also argued "a retrospect of the comparative 
navies of England and France will prove that from the year 1835 to the year 1859, the naval expenditure of 
England has increased from 4 V4 to II millions or 138 per cent; but the naval expenditure of France has 
increased from 2 V4 to 8 Y4 millions sterling or 274 per cent. So that our rate of increase is only half that of 
France in naval expenditure, " 30-5-1862, Somerset to Palmerston, PP. 
396 25-3-1862, William Baynton to Robinson, forwarded to the Board of Admiralty, ADM 1/5802,21-5- 
1962. 
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Four days later Palmerston thus wrote to Gladstone there was no foreseeable "Change of 
Circumstances likely to take Place between this Time and next February which would 
justify any considerable Reduction either of Army or Navy... " It was fundamentally a 
matter of national "security" vs. "economy", and Palmerston was willing to gamble the 
nation would support his own conception of a Government's primary duty, defence. 
Fear, or at least caution, was always more suggestive in people's minds than the Free- 
Trade, penny-counting, Liberal optimism of his opponents. An appeal to the lowest 
common denominator was one not necessarily one to enlightened reason but to the public 
mind-which Palmerston was highlpskifled at manipulating. "But these anticipatory 
Resolutions are nothing but a Trap for a government, " Palmerston explained to his less 
experienced colleague-and dubious political ally. "They tend either to expose a 
Government to the imputation of breaking Faith with Parliament" (too much was being 
spent by the Government, and spent unwisely regardless of Parliament's concerns) "or to 
compel them to provide inadequately for the proper Demands of the public service" 
(economy at the expense of security, for which the Government could also be accused 
later). "I am unwilling to place myself in either of those Conditions. "" How much, 
subsequently, could the Naval Estimates be reduced, Pahnerston inquired of Somerset, 
"supposing always that our Friends in France and our Cousins in America should be well 
behaved and peaceable"? The First Lord replied "for the last two years I have kept 
steadily in view the measures which may assist the Government towards a reduction of 
expenditure without any great decrease of naval efficiency": 
For example in May 1861 we had in commission 306 vessels of 
all rates. In May 1862 we have 282 in commission. Again in 
May 1861 we had line of battle 0 rates, 2nd rates, and P rates 30 
ships. We have now of these expensive ships 21 in commission. 
397 27-5-1862, Palmerston to Gladstone, PP. 
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We have constantly replaced on distant stations ships-of-the-line 
by ftigates and larger by smaller vessels. 
But the French had II serviceable ships-of-the-line in the Mediterranean as well as 2 
ironclad-frigates ready at Toulon; Britain had 7 ships-of-the-hne and might be able to 
send an ironclad of her own there "before the Autumn". This was "the great difficulty" in 
regards to reductions, "our position in regard to iron-plated ships. " Foreign powers could 
not be allowed to gain any decisive lead, "yet the iron-plates add enormously to the cost 
of a ship": 
If France had not a large wooden navy in addition to their iron- 
plated ships we could easily cut down some of our two deckers 
and plate them; by which means they would soon be ready, and 
the cost of engines would be avoided. But it would not in my 
opinion be prudent to adopt this course except with a few ships, 
and those chiefly for mere coast defence. 
The degree of speed with which we should advance in preparing 
iron-plated ships is a question of such importance politically as 
well as financially, that I should be glad if some members of the 
Cabinet would agree to meet here when the matter could be 
brought before them with the information requisite to enable them 
to decide on the course to be pursued. 398 
The following day, however, Somerset wrote he could bring the current naval Estimate of 
111,794,305 "below 11 millions" since the cost of current ironclads under construction by 
private contract would be reduced for 1863-4 year to 11 million, a savings of 1450,000 
from the current year's payments. The vote for timber might now be reduced but this 
would be counter-balanced by an increased vote for iron plates, those "for one of the 
wooden frigates now to be plated will cost about; E40,000. This is a direct addition to the 
cost of a frigate as there is no saving on other materials to compensate for thiS.,, 
399 
398 1-6-1862, Palmerston to Somerset SP; 1-6-1862 Somerset to Palmerston, pp. 
399 2-6-1862, Somerset to Palmerston, PP. 
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The tumultuous debate in the crowded House of Commons on 3 June 1862 represented 
one of the most serious challenges to Palmerston's leadership ever-a debate revolving 
around the fortifications, the threat from France-instigated by the news of the Battle of 
Hampton Roads, the issue of turret ironclads, the state of the Royal Navy, and Coles. 
Palmerston objected to even the point of the various proposed Resolutions and openly 
reduced them as politically motivated, "whether the Gentlemen who sit on these benches 
or the Gentlemen who sit on the opposite benches are best entitled to the confidence of 
the House and of the country. " If all parties agreed the nation's defences needed 
improving, there was no real need for debate. If, however, economy was considered a 
more pressing issue than defence, Palmerston declared it "better for the House to go at 
once to the question fraught with serious important consequences, instead of wasting time 
in discussing the comparative value of the Amendments which have been proposed. "' 
This aggressive move immediately put the Opposition, rather than the Government, on 
the defensive. Here too was an implied logic that "die proper Demands of the Public 
service, " or "naval efficiency" was by definition incompatible with any significant 
reductions in naval or military expenditure. Though Lord Montagu held "a sincere and 
honest desire to promote economy in the financial arrangements of the country, "' he was 
shocked the Prime Minister had converted the question "into the stalking-horse of 
ambition, and the prostitute of our claims to power. " Nevertheless, as Spencer Horatio 
Walpole admitted, no one really wanted the Liberal-Coalition Government to resign. 
Indeed, political stability in the wake of the Crimean War, and in the face of rising social, 
economic, and strategic pressures, was a positive necessity. 401 Palmerston's indignation 
was therefore more of an ultimatum to the House, reduced to expressing opinions on 
defence, but not to the point of denying his Administration, or "the Nation", of its 
40 3-6-1862, Hansard, 292. 
401 kid., 294-8. 
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demands. John Bright, speaking through the uproar, was not surprisingly unafraid to call 
Palmerston's bluff. Assuming there was in fact no object politically "dangerous or 
subversive" by questioning the matter in the House; "if we are all in favour of economy, 
and so much in favour of it that we do not object to any definite statement with regard to 
it-I should like to know why we should have any party contest at all? " 
If the House is disposed for a debate, let us have a debate. But I 
ask the House-especially those sixty or seventy gentlemen who, 
a year ago, requested the noble Lord, in very civil and humble 
terms, to condescend in a little degree to diminish the expenditure 
of the country-Whether they now intend to set up the noble Lord 
as dictator absolute upon this subjeCt? 402 
"The truth is, that the amount of the Military and Naval Estimates, " Siansfeld declared, 
"is decided by general views of policy, which cannot be discussed in Committee of 
Supply. " Taken for granted, such policy always allowed the Estimates to "pass almost as 
a matter of course. " Humiliated by "the early disasters of the Crimean war, the temporary 
collapse of our military system, on its first trial after a long peace, before the eyes of 
Europe, and by the side of France, " the popular cry for "the efficiency and sufficiency of 
our armaments" was to be met by the House "as a representative and deliberative 
assembly-not parrot-like, to repeat the public cry and leave all to the Government of the 
day, but to consider something of greater importance than any individual Votes in 
Committee of Supply-the great questions of the cost, the policy, and method of those 
armaments that may be deemed necessary for the purposes of the country. " Were such 
armaments necessary in a time of peace, and therefore the taxes on the British population 
to pay for them? There was a contradiction at work even in terms of "defence", between 
England's determination "to be safe and to feel safe, and at the same time to hold her own 
before the world... " The former was "above suspicion", but the latter was scmuch more 
within the range of discretion, and within the limits of which ... 
large economies are 
402 Ibid., 300-2. 
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possible-it is the possession of the means of aggressive warfare, and the preparation for 
the possibility of external warfare. A03 This struck at the heart of the mid-Victorian 
British Empire, between strategic concepts of national defence, imperial inviolability, and 
world-wide power-projection, or "deterrence". Coastal or harbour defence ironclads, on 
Coles' model-monitors-might deter attacks defensively but not provide for the 
deterrent threat of counter-attack. If such ironclads were designed first with a mind for 
coastal assault (in the British case, at least trans-Channel operations), and then longer- 
range strikes or blockades, early 1860s technology, at least, required ironclads of an 
altogether different fashion-Warriors rather than Monitors. It was a question of policy 
after all; and Stansfeld was a Member for Halifax. 
That such a policy was "justly called for by the country, wisely sanctioned by Parliament, 
and legitimately proposed and carried into effect by successive Administratiot&', as 
opposed to the product of his own will, Palmerston declared he had not doubt: 
... 
it is part of the duty of Parliament to enable the Government of 
this country to hold a proper position with regard to the affairs of 
the world, and, without interfering by force of arms, at all events 
to exert a moral and, I will not say, preponderating, but at all 
events a powerful influence in favour of the principles which this 
great nation so heartily and cordially approves. But to do this, it 
is essential that we should be in a position of perfect self-defence; 
and by self-defence I mean not merely self-defence upon the 
shores of these islands; we have interests all over the world; we 
have possessions in every part; and the perfect defence of the 
country means that we should ... 
have the means not merely of 
defending our shores, but also of protecting those vast interests, 
commercial and political, which we have in every part of the 
world. 404 
"" Ibid., 305-13. 
404 Ibid., 327-8. See Daniel I, lleadrický "The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the Expansion of 
European Colonial Empires in the Nineteenth Century", 7he Journal OfMilitary History, 5 1, Issue 2 (June, 
1979), 231-263, on how expanding British "commercial and political interests" and naval technology were 
often mutually supportive; also Robert Kubicek, "British Expansion, Empire, and Technological Change! ', 
in porter, oxford History, 247-69. 
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Palmerston therefore proposed an Amendment of his own, since "any Government that 
came down to this House to make a reduction simply as a claptrap attempt to gain 
momentary favour with the public, would soon find that they lost a great deal more than 
they gained. " 'Mat House might state instead that economy would be studied and 
practiced by the Government, but would "not lose sight of its duty to provide adequately 
for the defence of the country, and"--this was an important caveat---"for the maintenance 
of our interests abroad. "405 
implied here was that a string of coastal fortifications, leaving the Army in charge of 
directly defending against naval assault let alone invasion, would allow the Navy to 
"defend" interests abroad; protecting commerce and colonies, but also conducting 
blockades and coastal assaults of its own. Economy may not have been incompatible 
with defence, but it was a difficult proposition to reconcile with offence, or perhaps 
"strategic defence". 406 The amount of money invested in Britain's ironclad program 
reflected this dilemma, but certainly the offensive-character of the ironclads themselves 
suggested Coles" scheme for a coastal defence flotilla was fundamentally at odds with 
Palmerston's strategic thinking. Any challenge to this would therefore be regarded by the 
popular Prime Minister as a political one as well, and so, amid desperate shouts of protest 
Walpole's Resolution was accused of omitting "altogether the protection of the interests 
of the country abroad. His Resolution would confine the attention of the House to the 
, AO7 defence of our shores. 
Again, Palmerston was not speaking to the House so much as he was consciously, bluntly 
addressing the press reporting the debate and the educated, interested classes of the 
405 3-6-1862, Hansard, 328-333. 
406 Less than 3 weeks later, however, Sir George Lewis declared in the Parliamentary Committee on 
Forfificaflons and Works 'It is the characteristic of our naval and military system, unlike that of many other 
countries, that it exists exclusively for defensive purposes... ". 23-6-1862, Hansard, 870. 
407 3-6-1862, Hansard, 329. 
202 
public; would even the "man in the street"be willing to sacrifice the wealth and honour of 
the Empire, just to save a few pennies? How important was "position" to mid-Victorians 
after all? Palmerston knew better than most of his well-meaning though frustrated 
contemporaries. If they wanted "by the force of reason and the expression of opinion, 
backed by the moral weight of the country, to endeavour to influence in a liberal spirit the 
course of events" in foreign countries, for example, Italy-or perhaps also the United 
States-then the House should attempt to restrain the Government from spending 
whatever it felt was necessary to achieve this. Any proposed "humiliation" of the 
Govermnent (Palmerston) by Parliament would be an humiliation of "public opinion". "I 
do say, " Palmerston taunted, "that we [the Government] possess the confidence of the 
country. 'A08 
The Tory Leader, Benjamin Disraeli, had been "trying to give some meaning to a phrase 
so vague" as "the protection of our interests abroad". Strong garrisons, fortifications and 
naval squadrons "in every clime" defending commerce were no doubt "sources of respect 
for us with foreign Courts and countries. " But England's real strength and influence had 
always been her moral resolve and "financial reserve" which simply sustained war efforts 
longer than most of her enemies. Economy in this sense was strength, not weakness. 
Where there was "financial embarrassment the results are certain, and comparatively 
speaking immediate, and a Minister may be a most popular Minister-he may have a 
majority of 200 in this House; but if his policy is that two and two make five, the time 
will come when all his majorities will not be able to maintain him in his pride of 
place. "409 It was thus also difficult to convince the man in the street "of the necessity of 
extravagant armaments" when Britain was, in fact, at peace, and Europe exhausted from 
wars and revolutions. Richard Cobden, a legendary though unpopular "Radical" since the 
"$Ibid., 333. 
409 Ibid., 333-55. 
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Crimean War, could likewise dismiss visions of French "Command of the Channel" or 
even invasion in favour of "a great gulf yawning which none of us has the courage to look 
into or fathom, " the state of the economy. The real strength of a nation rested not "Upon 
armaments so much as upon its resources, " and Cobden pointed to the difficulties Britain 
experienced with overbearing, expansionist America before the Civil War. There was a 
country which "was never armed", but which was now "manifesting a power such as I 
have no hesitation in saying no nation of the same population ever manifested in the same 
time. " This was because debilitating pre-war taxation was kept to a bare minimum. The 
French were neither such a threat to warrant expenditure in the name of "defence". "The 
noble Lord [Palmerston], indeed, scarcely ever speaks but it is to produce some 
apprehension, some disquietude, with reference to French preparations. " Of the "thirty- 
six iron-cased [French] ships-he always speaks of 'ships'-buflt or building" only 16 of 
them were sea-going frigates; the rest were batteries, "and of these five are actually lying 
in the warehouse at Toulon, having been built to be carried by railway to Lake Guarda to 
be used in the siege of Peschiera. " What, indeed, was the point of a French entente 
cordiale, the trade agreement he himself had recently negotiated, when the object of the 
Prime Minister "was first to frighten people into the apprehension of danger of attack, and 
then find an excuse for a large expenditure of money, and at the same time to get for 
himself the credit of being a spirited Minister, enable to protect the people by all his 
forethought and preparation"? 410 
But Palmerston, "with that adroitness of which he is so great a master", Sir William 
Heathcote bitterly admitted, had successfully confused and diffused the House enough for 
now. Members were aware "how far the noble Lord's Government has gained in 
character by the course pursued to-night" and yet that the "financial subject" remained 
410 Ibid., 373-82. 
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open, unresolved, delayed. 411 Stansfeld withdrew his Resolution, unwilling to accept the 
sudden and unexpected responsibility of a. vote of confidence which would might topple 
the Government-or irreparably disgrace himself and his supporters any more than 
Palmerston had already. Palmerston, writing in his diary later that night, declared a great 
"triumph" for his Cabinet which earlier that day at his house had "determined to oppose 
all the Resolutions but our own. 2,412 
The newfound political confidence of Britain's Prime Minister did not have to wait long 
for an opportunity to "exert a moral ... and powerftil 
influence" on foreign governments. 
When U. S. General Benjamin Butler issued his infamous Order of is May, which 
threatened to treat the women of recently captured and occupied New Orleans as "women 
of the town, plying their vocation" if they continued to harass Federal officers and 
soldiers, Palmerston angrily wrote the U. S. Minister to Britain, Charles Francis Adams on 
II June that "no example can be found in the History of Civilized Nations till the 
publication of this order of a General guilty in cold Blood of so infamous an act, as 
deliberately to hand over the female inhabitants of a Conquered City to the unbridled 
License of an unrestrained soldiery. " Old Pam's opinion of Union "mob"-Conscripts, or 
American soldiers in general, was not high. But "if the Federal Government chooses to 
be served by men capable of such revolting outrages, " he concluded with a thinly- 
disguised threat, "they must submit to abide by the deserved opinion which Mankind will 
form of their condUCt., A'3 "Adams", Russell wrote to Palmerston two days later, was "in 
a dreadful state" about the letter over Butler. The Order was misinterpreted, and probably 
did not reflect the full wishes of President Lincoln. "If you would withdraw the letter 
altogether it would be best, " Russell cautioned, "but this you may not like to do. A14 
411 Ibid, 393. 
412 Entry dated 3-6-1862, Diary (13/22), PP. 
413 11-6-1862, Palmerston to Adams, PP. 
414 13-6-1862, Russell to Palmerston, PP. See also Ephraim Douglas Adams, Great Britain and the 
American Civil War, 2 vols. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1925), ]: 302-5. 
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Even the debate over forlifications was far from over. On 23 June, Sir George Lewis told 
the House Committee on Fortifications and Works that construction on the Spithead forts 
was suspended until the following year, thanks to misleading public reaction to the Battle 
of Hampton Roads, rather than the results of British ordnance tests which suggested 
instead the vulnerability of ironclads-but urging a Resolution "to serve for a foundation 
to a Bill for continuing the Act" from 1860-adding that military "efficiency" was "only 
another term for increased expense". 415 This remark drew a sharp response from Bernal 
Osborne. The House was definitely "not pledged" to the scheme of fortifications for 
defence. Though the 20 May 1862 report of the Commissioners on National Defences 
was willing to largely dismiss the significance of the Battle of Hampton Roads, wooden 
Union steamships had since run the gauntlet of 200 guns from two Confederate forts at 
short range to capture New Orleans itself The Armstrong 150-pounder, moreover, was 
tried under only ideal circumstances to establish its superiority over the Warrior's armour 
protection (a target previously fired upon) and was, at any rate, an experimental 
prototype. Now the Government had ordered 20 more 300-pounders and authorised 
Armstrong to come up with a 600-pounder rifled (muzzle-loading) gun which would still 
have difficulty hitting a moving target 1,000 yards away-all at exorbitant price. "With a 
man like Sir William Armstrong going on regardless of expense, backed by the 
Government as his sleeping partner, I am afraid we may take further steps until we run up 
a bill large enough to require the addition of another penny to the income tax. " There was 
more: 
If we are always assuming a pugnacious attitude, and initiating 
what is called a spirited foreign policy, the result of which has 
been to increase our taxation to something like 170,000,000-if 
we are one day drawing Reform Bills for Sardinia, another day 
lecturing America, and always pointing the finger of suspicion at 
4 15 23-6-1862, Hansard, 882,87 1. 
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France, the natural consequence must be that we shall have the 416 
income tax saddled upon us forever... 
Osborne noted the current Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gladstone's, own disapproval of 
Palmerston ... spirit of interference"' and Franco-phobia. These were "neither the 
traditions of the Liberal party, nor are they the traditions of that Whig party once great 
and flourishing. " All this said nothing for the other Liberal platform (other than Peace 
and Retrenchment): Reform, which was "courted and caressed and adopted by both sides 
of the House in the palmy days of its Parliamentary prosperity; but now it is treated like 
an indigent and disagreeable connection, and not suffered to come into the House. Such, 
Sir, is the state of the Liberal party. ,; 417 
Again, Palmerston's response deserves study, as a definition of British foreign if not 
naval policy in this period under examination. The Government would not use part of the 
loan for fortifications for the construction of floating batteries, even though these were the 
other vital ingredient for defence prescribed by the Report of the Commissioners, since 
forts were long term and therefore "it was fair to throw the burden upon some years to 
come by providing terminable annuities of thirty years ... a burden we thought was too 
great to ask the House and country to submit to in the current year, " whereas "floating 
defences were in their nature temporary, and could last only for a limited time. " They 
ought to be paid for by a Vote in the annual Estimates. If Parliament was willing to pay 
extra for these types of ironclads, in addition to armoured frigates and fortifications, then 
so be it. But that of course would spoil any Liberal argument for economic retrenchment 
or "restraint". It was incontestable whether or not forts were needed, even assuming the 
Navy was to be regarded as the nation's ultimate guardian. "Go to Pembroke, go to 
Plymouth, go to Portland, go to Portsmouth, go to Sheerness, go to Medway-all these 
411 Nd, 905. 
417 Ibid., 905-7. 
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fortifications are expressly intended for the protection of our arsenals and dockyards, 
without which you cannot have a navy at all. You might as well expect to have a good 
dinner without a kitchen, as a good navy without dockyards; and you cannot have good 
dockyards unless they are securely defended. " This policy conveniently sidetracked the 
issue whether or not the Royal Navy could defend its own dockyards, in the form of 
ironclad-batteries (or what were traditionally known as "block ships"), rather than vastly 
more expensive fortifications (which also took years rather than months to construct. ) 
The public's reaction to the apparent invulnerability of the Monitor and the Merrimack at 
the Battle of Hampton Roads Palmerston derided in Cobden's direction as perhaps "the 
fourth panic". Though his Government had agreed to suspend construction of the forts, 
"we did not think the contest decisive". Gunnery experts had since promised to deliver 
ordnance which would restore the "general principle that forts as opposed to ships must 
have the advantage, because they may have a gun of any size you can manage, whereas a 
floating battery cannot sustain more than a certain weight. " How this applied to 
armoured ships running a gauntlet of forts rather than fighting a fixed artillery duel with 
them was likewise another matter not mentioned by Palmerston. 
More fundamentally, the tiresome debates in Parliament only served to question, confuse 
and weaken the resolve of the nation's leaders and therefore the real strength of the nation 
itself. "If all these opinions were acted upon, " Palmerston complained, "the result would 
be that the country would have neither fleet, nor army, nor a dockyard, and that we should 
have to rely entirely on the goodwill, kindness, and forbearance of our neighbours to 
protect us in all possible contingencies against any difficulties in which we might be 
involved. -I do not think that this is the feeling of the British nation. " As to the charge 
that Britain's increased "defences" were in fact provocative and jeopardised peaceful 
relations with other (and especially comparatively defenceless) nations, Palmerston 
argued that a strong self-defence gained respect from potential enemies. "So long as 
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nations are equal, they are likely to be friends. " The Trent Affair demonstrated how even 
long-term "Friends", or at least close trading partners, could quickly become enemies- 
and the value "of those means of defence which every nation is bound to provide for 
itself" That "peace" in this instance was preserved not by the military and naval equality 
of the Northern States with Great Britain, but Palmerston's ultimatum was, again, another 
matter. Unilateral domination seemed to serve Peace as wen. Yet "these works, when 
complete, " he assured the House, "will not be a menace to any country whatever, nor will 
they in any way increase the liability to war; but they will be a security for the 
continuance of peace. "418 Missing here too was a comparison with France's recent 
modernising of the defences of Cherbourg, opposite Portsmouth, an event which 
famously alarmed Prince Albert and the Queen after their visit there in August 1858, and 
which originally served as one of the strongest reasons Palmerston employed to counter- 
. 
419 en e' uality fortify the south-coast of England It was not in fact the 'def siv 'q of the forts 
which maintained peace, but the continued ability of the Royal Navy to counter-attack 
France if need be. If the forts were to securely protect the dockyards, and good dockyards 
were essential for a strong navy, the purpose of a navy was to act offensively, not 
necessarily in the direct defence of its own dockyards. The Royal Navy would better 
defend its own bases by attacking those of France or any other enemy. Fortifications, 
even more necessary if other naval powers fortified themselves for similar reasons, 




419 -Never before had France had a great arsenal and excellent harbour directly facing the Channel and the 
South Coast of England. Capable of outfitting, sheltering, and despatching a great invasion fleetý 
Cherbourg seemed like a knife pointing directly at Britain's jugular, " Ilarnilton, Anglo-French Naval 
Rivalry, op. cit, 83-4. 
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Summary: 
The Battle of Hampton Roads had a profound impact on both the British and Union 
ironclad programs, though in remarkably different ways. For the US. Navy. attention 
was drawn seaward, improved monitors with improved guns might successfully contest 
British naval supremacy on the open ocean as well as along the American coastline. By 
August 1862, Harper's Weekly went so far as to "take for granted that, if it became 
necessary, the large iron-clads which 
Captain Ericsson and Mr. Rowland are 
constructing could sail up the Thames to London Bridge with perfect impunity, sinking 
every war-vessel theyfound in their way, and could dictate terms to the British over the 
ruins of the House of Lords. "420 Though probably notfor a purpose this extravagant, 
Assistant Secretary Fox was still more willing to rely upon civilian contractor Ericsson 
than his own Bureau of Ship Construction & Repair. Indeed, Ericsson's Monitor was 
regarded as a much-needed boost in Northern morale and conji'dence in Lincoln's 
administration of the war. Scientific American observed that "Had the Pay Department y 
undertaken last August to construct a vessel like the Warrior, the hugeframe would be 
now standing on the stocks, with a prospect of beingfinished in the latter part of 1863, 
and the destructive course ofthe Merrimac would have gone on unchecked. "421 
For Palmerston's Government, however, the example of the American ironclads, and 
especially Ericsson's taunting Monitor, was politically destabilizing-ultimatelyforcing 
the popular Prime Minister to call the bluff of Parliament in a way Lincoln could have 
never dreamed of-even though, as Blackwood's remarked, "The debates of the present 
session ... have 
been absolutely unparalleled for the absence of party spirit and party 
contests. -to impute to seUlsh ambition the telling ewposures ofMinisterial incapacity 
420 30-8-1862, Harper's Weekly, 546. 421 5-4-1862, Scientific American, 217. 
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which have of late proceededfrom the front benches of the Left. , 
422 This was because 
news of Hampton Roads focused British attention inward, to critically re-examine the 
character of England's own national shore-defences. Ironclad batteries, whether of 
Coles'pattem or Ericsson's Monitor, were clearly cheaper andfaster to produce than 
fortifications-and arguably more efficient in checking the attacks of ironclad-frigates. 
This sense of economy strongly appealed to the mid-Victorian Liberal ideal, as well as 
the romanticised image of the highly pragmatic, highly inventive "Man of the F ulure " 
struggling against government red-tape and conservative "Old Fogies". Ericsson 
managed to escape this dangerous association, cultivating even closer ties with the most 
powerful elements within the Navy Department in order to secure future contracts. 
Coles, on the other hand, was quickly alienating himselffrom the Controller ofthe Royal 
Navy, and allowing his ideas to be publicly used as weapons against the Government. 
Part of the problemfor Coles was his simple lack ofprofessional shipbuilding experience 
or engineering skill, in direct comparison to Ericsson. Injact both Robinson and Fox 
increasingly relied upon Reed and Ericsson respectively, neither of whom were naval 
offi cers, but who were bo th neve r1heless capable of supplying the types of ironclads their 
superiors demanded and willing to do so without fundamentally questioning their 
authority. Facts spoke louder than words, in convincing each navy which model of 
ironclad was best for each nation; and both Ericsson and Reed were able to supply 
ironcladjacts which Coles, in turn, could only allude to with editorials, lectures and 
colourful sketches. 
423 
422 june 1862, Blackwood's Edinburgh Alagazine, 777. 
41 ironically enough, within a week of Coles confidently expressing to Cobden his Opinion that the Dictator 
was a "bad specimen" and "Ericsson a humbug's Robinson informed the Board of Admiralty "that at a 
recent interview Captain Coles informed Sir F. Grey that he wished to avoid the responsibility of designing 
a turret ship as a whole, he not being a naval architect... " 14-11-1864, Coles to Cobden, CP; and ADM 
1/5892,10-11-1864. 
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Anotherfactor weighing in against Coles was his insistence upon ocean-going "shield 
ships", combined with his lack of technical expertise. If turret-batteries threw the 
Government on the defensive in Parliament, it was the allusion to dubious seagoing 
versions which allowed Admiralty spokes7nen and Palmerston to charge that Coles and 
his supporters jeopardised the safety of the Empirefor mere Liberal economy. As the 
ultra-Conservative Blackwood'sJurther remarked: 
There may be a difference of opinion as to the aspect offoreign 
affairs. Some may think that we could reduce our armaments ifwe 
were to cultivate a still closer alliance with France, and abnegate 
our own views and interests wherever a difference ofpolicy arose 
with our Imperial ally. Others, like Messrs. Cobden and Bright, 
may go further, and believe it possible to dispense with all 
armaments, and establish a millennium of peace. The latter 
opinion is absurd, the former is untenable. England, in our 
opinion, is not one whit overarmed-we would almost say that we 
cannot be too well anned, considering the state of affairs 
abroad 424 
In truth, A rmstrong's new 150-pdr gun had suddenly done as much as the Monitor to 
demonstrate to the Brftish, as Henry Adams wrote from the American Legation in 
London, that "their wooden navy, their iron navy, and their costly guns, [are] all utterly 
antiquated and useless. 425 It remained to be seen how each ironclad navy would adapt 
to ever-changing technological, strategic. andpolitical circumstances. 
424 jUne 1862, Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazzine, 784. 
425 114-1862, Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., quoted from Worthington Chauln3c4ey ford (ed 
.4 Cycle ofAdams 
Leiters 1861-1865,2 vols. (Boston: I loughton MiMin Company, 1920) 1: 
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PART THREE 
Deterring Britain: The Trent Affair Reversed 
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1. Coles loses ground 
Disraeli was quick to note that "the noble Lord's plan of defending our arsenals seaward 
by forte' had in fact "really been demolished by the general opinion of the country"; 
defence in itself was not being questioned. 426 This was where Coles rested his hopes, 
since the public was fascinated by the American high-tech Monitor as a potential-and 
perhaps also cheaper, if not more effective-means of national defence than Palmerston's 
forts. But the Government was not obviously going to abandon the forts, just as the 
public was unwilling to lose Palmerston, to the Monitor. Coles therefore largely gave up 
his attack against fixed land defences with light-draft, cupola-armed coastal defence 
ironclads and switched to a campaign against broadside-armed ironclads in favour of 
turret-ships. "Ibe more he ran into official opposition the more he relied upon political 
connections and the media. The events of the Civil War, however, which originally 
tended to support his system, later turned against him. Coles now had to distance himself 
from Ericsson's achievements and apparent failures with the monitor-class of ironclads. 
But Coles' turret-ship ventures were stuttering forward only. Impressed with the new 
Armstrong 150-pdr guns, and insisting the Royal Sovereign's turret carry the heaviest 
guns practicable as part of the system's principle, Coles now had to redesign the turrets 
larger than 22'8" diameter to accommodate at least a single gun-rather than 110- 
pounder rifled Arinstrongs or 68-pounders. To do that required computations from the 
Controller's Department for "the total weight allowed for the 5 shields, their fittings and 
7427 iron rings as proposed on the deck around them'. Robinson was impatient with the 
changes, and irritated by Coles' insinuations to the Board that the Controller's Office was 
in any way responsible for the delay. An Admiralty Return ordered by Parliament on 30 
426 23-6-1862, Hansard, 956. 
427ADM 1/5791,19-6-1862. 
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June 1862, "of all Iron-Cased Ships and Floating Batteries Building or Afloat", noted (as 
of 17 July 1862): 
Iron-hulled (built): Warrior, Black Prince, Defence, Resistance 
Wooden-hulled (built): Prince Consort 
Iron-hulled Floating Batteries: Erebus, Terror, Thunderbolt 
Wooden-hulled Floating Batteries: Trusty, Thunder, Glatton, Aetna 
Iron-hulled (building): Hector, Valiant, Achilles, Minotaur, Agincourt, 
Northumberland, Prince Albert 
Wooden-hulled (building): Royal Oak, Caledonia, Ocean, Royal Ayred, 
Enterprise, Favorite 
Plus, under "Wood Built, Converting7, the Royal Sovereign. 428 Added to this, Robinson 
now wanted to convert the 91 -gun Zealous, "in frame at Pembroke", into a central-battery 
ironclad of 41/24nch iron armour protecting 16 guns up to 120cwt weight each, "with 
doors of sufficient size to admit of a Gun being taken fi-om the battery on each side to a 
port forward or aft which will enable the Guns to fire in a line with the ships keel. "4'9 
This conversion was distinctly not to be another turret vessel. 
Already on 22 May, Robinson had proposed an armour test-target for another Reed 
design, the Favourite-the same day he was advising against any further test of Coles' 
turret on the Trusty, which was so battered enough in the recent firing that five of the 
truncated cone's eleven 41/2-inch plates, in Coles' words, "do not fit at the joints with that 
accuracy which they formerly did, and which the strength of the cone so much depended 
upon. "430 Five days later, a report from the Controller on whether or not to accept a Coles 
offer for two privately-built, iron-hulled ironclads, each "to carry two Shields on Capt. 
Coles' plan" did even more damage. There was no provision in the Estimates for these. 
"The great question therefore is, " Robinson noted, "can any saving be made in the 
423 17-7-1862, Return, "Navy (Iron-Cased Ships, &c. ) ", PPs. 
429 ADM 1/5802,2-7-1862 
430 ADM 1/5802,22-5-1862, and 22-5-1862. Coles' enclosed letter dated 20-5-18,62. 
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building of other ships in the Dockyards which shall counterbalance the expense of 
building such a ship by Contract"? Only if no other wooden conversions were made (the 
five Royal Oaks, the Royal Sovereign, and now the Enterprise) and thus no need for 
paying for more engines could 113 0,000 be saved, as well as the necessary shipwrigbts be 
freed from employment by the Admiralty, possibly in the Autumn. The savings in 
wooden materials would be counterbalanced by the added cost of armour plates. Though 
it was therefore "possible to build these two Ships by contract if it is so desired, "' 
Robinson did not "recommend that course" and indeed, from his own growing, bitter 
experience it would be "dangerous, to effect such large reductions in our dockyards and 
thus throw ourselves completely into the hands of Contractors and private builders... " 
Furthermore, this "class of vessel for which this sacrifice would have to be made, though 
admirable for the defence of the Channel and its Ports, would not be one adapted for 
general service at Sea, and this consideration would of itself influence their Lordships in 
not abandoning in the manner referred to the Construction of Ships of War in the 
Dockyards. " If the wants of the country were pressing enough, the ships might be 
constructed at Pembroke and Sheerness, although those dockyards were not properly 
equipped or experienced for the building of ironclads: 
But considering how far behind our neighbours; we are in the 
number of iron plated Ships of all classes, I would submit 
whether it is not necessary not only to build these two Ships for 
Channel Service by Contract but also to convert such of our Ships 
now on the Slips and in France, to partially Iron plated Ships with 
few but heavy Guns, their batteries and water line being wholly 
protected by 4V2-inch Armour Plates. In all our Dockyards, there 
are Ships in a state to admit of this proceeding. 
This referred to Reed's central-battery concept, which might be applied to corvettes, 
which would "require considerable strengthening"; frigates, which could be "altered with 
greater ease, but with rather more waste of material"; and even the Line-of-Battle ships 
















already done. " Were turret ironclads even that necessary? "The objections to altering 
Ships designed for one purpose and adapting them to another are obvious; but the 
objections to throwing away all that has been already done for the purpose of beginning 
an entirely new system, seem to be still more conclusive, against the latter course. " Only 
if the Navy were willing to apply for a greater Vote should the cupola ships be built by 
contract, while the dockyards continued to convert the frames of existing wooden 
steamships, first on the Royal Oak pattern, then on Reed's. As far as Robinson was 
concerned, with various foreign powers now investing in armour-plated ships, it was 
"impossible to put ourselves on an equality with our rivals without incurring an excess of 
naval expenditure. A31 
Despite the Admiralty's previous assurances, Coles anticipated their hesitation over his 
turret-ship principle, and suggested improvements to the Royal Sovereign (and Prince 
Alberi) designed not only to make the ship itself much more formidable against an 
enemy, but impressive to the Board. Instead of four hand-revolved turrets with one 68- 
pounder and a fifth turret with two, the ironclad-conversion should carry either four or 
three larger (26'-diameter), steam-powered turrets, each with a pair of the forthcoming 
Armstrong 150-pounders. This echoed the U. S. Navy's proposal to convert the stearn- 
frigate Roanoke following the Battle of Hampton RoadS. 432 Whether or not Coles was 
aware of the details of the Roanoke, possibly through New York newspapers, he insisted 
masts "of the very greatest importance ... circumstances might occur when the want of 
them would paralyse all beneficial advantages of the Shields": 
Consider this Vessel sent outside the Isle of Wight to grapple with 
an enemy in a sea way, something, although for a short time, goes 
wrong with the Engines, and she has no head sails, or means of 
431 ADM 1/5802,27-5-1862. 
432 ADM 1/5802,4-7-1862; Coles' enclosed letter dated 1-7-1862. See 19-3-1862, Lenthall and Isherwood 
to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. 
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getting her head the right way, lying in the trough of the Sea, she 
would be at the mercy of her antagonist. Again, when she has but 
a narrow space to turn in, and a good breeze blowing, her head 
Sails would be invaluable. If she is caught in a gale going across 
the Channel, or from Portsmouth to Plymouth, thick weather 
comes on, and she cannot run into Port, I believe she would roll 
herself, shields, and all to pieces, for it must be remembered that 
this Vessel having her weights low, and great beam, will be very 
quick in her rolling motion. 
Therefore Coles wished "to record that if these Ships are tried without Masts, it may 
vitiate the whole principle of Shield Ships. " Robinson, however, informed the Board he 
saw not much advantage of a single 150-pounder over two 68-pounders, and that 
"considering the possibility of totally disabling a shield, which an unforeseen accident 
might bring to pass, it would not be wise" to reduce the nurnber of shields in order to 
carry heavier ordnance "even if it were practicable". The larger number of smaller 
shields, with their lighter guns, should remain. Converting their rotating power to steam 
was already to late, and time was a factor. Rather than wait for a possibly improved 
prototype turret conversion on Coles' plan, Robinson argued it was instead "extremely 
desirable to show with what rapidity this work can be executed and to turn out of hand 
promptly what must prove a most formidable engine of war, deferring some possible 
improvements until further experience has been acquired, and until the construction or 
alteration of another vessel may afford the means of adopting them with facility and 
economy. 2A33 But this was becoming extremely unRely, and a lightly armed turret ship 
unable to sink the Warrior, as Coles had promised for years, would hardly be regarded as 
the new role model ironclad for the Royal Navy. In the meantime, Robinson was 
complaining to the Board that "the greatest possible inconvenience is felt both as regards 
the Royal Sovereign and the Prince Albert, from the want of the Drawings of the Shields 
, A34 which Captain Coles was requested to furnish in April and May last. 
433ADM 1/58o2,4-7-1862. 
434 "M 1/5791,8-7-1862; Robinson's notation remarks dated 10-7-1862. 
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In England matters were compficated by Coles' application for half-pay status, finally 
granted by the Board, but not after the issue was paraded through the Commons-in 
connection with the fortifications debate-on 16 jul Y. 435 Now Coles was technically free 
to further publicly express his opinions "not as a Naval Officer serving in the Fleet, but as 
a Patentee protecting a valuable invention". This implied Coles could 'do more good for 
the Navy' outside of his strict professional obligations (and the chain of command), as a 
civilian-inventor, than otherwise, promising in turn "I shall not relax in my exertions to 
carry out the details and adjuncts connected with the application of my inventions in any 
way [the Admiralty] may be pleased to order. "436 But whatever Coles gained politically 
from his ability to join the debate on national defences, by promoting his cupola-ship 
system as an officer on half-pay, he also lost professionally. What he needed were 
powerful friends within Somerset House who might counter the increasing influence of 
Admiral Spencer Robinson and Edward Reed on the issue of turrets vs. broadsides-or 
central-battery ironclads. It therefore became a question of what would determine the 
Admiralty's ironclad-building policy more, external political and public pressure or the 
Controller's Department? 
Nor were battle lines so clearly drawn, at least yet. On 26 July Robinson reversed his 
opposition to Coles' proposal for a single cylindrical tuffet Of 25' diameter (rather than 
two of 22'6") in order to house the new 12-ton gun on the Royal Sovereign, even adding 
"on the whole I think Captain Coles' plan preferable to the design made in this Office, 
and would recommend its adoption. iA37 It was also stiH undetermined what form sail- 
and-steam broadside-ironclads themselves should take. On 7 August Russell privately 
communicated to the Duke of Somerset his own ideas "aboathe distribution of the 
Navy, so far as foreign stations were concerned. " Only in the Mediterranean and 
435 See 19-7-1862, Hansard, 505-5 10. 
436 ADM 1/5791,22-7-1862. 
431 ADM 1/5802,26-7-1862. 
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"Home" (or Channel) stations were line-of-battle ships still required, but in numbers 
equalling those of France, Italy and Russia respectively; "large frigates and smaller 
ships" for the protection of trade in North America; and light-draft swift steamers for the 
suppression of the slave trade off the coasts of Cuba and Africa. Somerset in turn 
forwarded the Foreign Secretary's views to Palmerston, noting that with the Defence then 
in the Baltic, the Warrior, Black Prince and Resistance would hopefully be ready for 
Channel service "by the end of August". Since these ironclads, the only ones in 
commission in the Royal Navy, were "at least equivalent to ships-of-the-line' there was 
little need to commission more wooden liners as replacements. Instead, wooden-hulled 
conversion ironclads of the Royal Oak class should be ready by the spring of 1863, "and 
we shall wish to try these as a guide to future construction. " Indeed, many naval officers 
already preferred these to the Warrior clasS. 438 When the Board issued orders to Rear 
Admiral Dacres, in command of the Channel Squadron, to proceed to Malta in mid- 
September be was also informed he was "at liberty to order the Black Prince and Warrior 
to return to England previous to his arrival at Gibraltar should he deem it advisable"- 
caution and uncertainty about the huge armourclads' sailing qualities were still clearly 
prevailing. 439 
At the same time the First Lord was amazed with the recent test results of vvutworth, s 
rifled 70-pounder, which put a shell through 4-inch plate with 8-inches of oak backing at 
200 yards. "I wish Sir W. Armstrong had been there to see it, " he wrote to Lewis. By 
contrast, the experimental "Horsfall Gun", a monster 13-inch smoothbore weighing 24 
438 7-8-1862, Russell to Somerset, SP; 8-8-1862, Somerset to Palmerston, PP. Russell specified at least 8 
line-of-battle ships for the Mediterranean Station rather than frigates, since "they tell in effect and naval 
impression far better" * 
Any reduction in manpower would also drop Britain's naval power ranking to third, 
behind France and then the United States; 25-8-1862, RusseU to Somerset, SP. 
439 ADM 31270,17-9-1862. At the end of October 1863, the Rowl Oak class ironclad-frigate II. M. S. 
1, rince Consort was nearly swamped on her maiden voyage from Plymouth to Dublin because of her heavy 
rolLing, shipping seas in a gale-and then her only stearn pump faded. LAke the Monitor's stormy maiden 
voyage from New York to Hampton Roads, she too barely survived the night; see BaHard, Black Battlefleet, 
115-23; also 14-11-1863, illustrated London News. 
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tons, also blasted a jagged 4-foot square hole through a full Warrior Target. This marked 
an important divergence of practice in naval ordnance: high-velocity rifled guns 
"punching7' clean holes through armour vs. lower-velocity, heavy smoothbores, crushing 
large sections of plate, or "racking" the entire structure. Either way, "iron-ships are 
rather down again, " Somerset concluded, "and fighting at sea will not be the harmless 
amusement imagined lately. "' The Secretary for War agreed: "the history of scientific 
warfare has hitherto been a history of the power of attack on the power of defence. The 
iron plated ships seemed a move in the other direction but this superiority has been much 
reduced by the late experiment. "440 Inasmuch as guns had defeated annour on the fields 
of Shoeburyness, ironclads had also lost ground in the politically-charged attack against 
fortifications, with invulnerable steamships acting decisively on the "offensive". In that 
sense, guns were to defence what armour was to offence. In a matter of months the 
precarious equilibrium of warfare had changed again. 
440 17-9-1862, Somerset to Lewis, and 19-9-1862, Lewis to Somerset, Sp. See the report of the Iron Plate 
Committee, dated 24-9-1862, found in ADM 1/5809. 
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11. The practical concerns against British intervention 
By the end of September 1862 Britain's international relations also proved to be as 
unstable as her weapons-technology and associative defence policy. Although the 
Government fought hard over the spring and summer to protect the fortifications bill and 
the navy's ironclad program, on the basis that it was certainly not the time for liberal 
efficiency and retrenchment, Lewis could also confide to Somerset that a reduction in at 
least the number of men and stores voted seemed feasible. 441 News from the American 
Civil War (again) upset this forecast, in unpredictable ways. The repulse of Confederate 
General Robert E. Lee's invasion of the North, at Antietam Creek (or Sharpsburg) on 17 
September, finally encouraged President Lincoln to issue a preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation. This, he hoped, would help convince London and Paris of Washington's 
moral high ground over Richmond; the physical liberation of the slave, not the political 
triumph of his master. Yet bowing to the strategic threat of alienating the Border States, 
Lincoln only proposed to free those slaves in the Confederacy. Already the British public 
was appalled with the relentless character of the war; McClellan and the Union Army of 
the Potomac could not take the rebel capital that summer after all, and even under a 
different commander Northern arms were disgraced at the Second Battle of Bull Run. 
The Southern Rebellion was alive and well. Furthermore, it was on the counterattack. 
Ile policy of the Union had, in the words of the London Times, "produced enormous 
bloodshed, enormous waste of treasure, created an unparalleled amount of private 
suffering and public debt, and widened an originally small-and perhaps bridgeable- 
gulf into a yawning chasm, on each side of which stands a separate nation ... never again 
to be reunited. " Punch represented Lincoln and Jefferson Davis as two exhausted boxers, 
held up by laughing slaves, with the French and British looking on. "Interference would 
441 25-9-1862, Lewis to Somerset, SP. 
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be very Welcome". 442 Now the North seemed deliberately willing to incite a massive 
slave uprising in the South, a grisly servile war all too reminiscent of the recent, ferocious 
Indian Sepoy Mutiny of 1858-9. Punch considered this, in a deadly game of "Rouge-et- 
Noie' between the two American presidents, to be "Abe Lincoln's Last Card". 443 Even 
though Seward advised Lincoln to forestall an announcement of the Proclamation until 
Union arms could produce a victory-so that it would not be regarded as an act of 
"desperation'ý--the bloodiness of Antietam and the lack of any foreseeable end to the war 
nevertheless failed to convince the bulk of European opinion otherwise. 444 Napoleon III 
thus proposed to Lord Cowley, the British ambassador in Paris, on 27 October a joint 
mediation before the American conflict became conceivably even worse. The proposed 
six month armistice would include, above all, a suspension of the Northern blockade of 
the South. 445 But mediation might lead to formal recognition of the Confederacy; and 
this would most Rely lead to war with an already irritated Union. 
Palmerston was unusually cautious in the affair. Only "great success of the South against 
the North, " he wrote to Russell weeks earlier, might convince the Yankees to consider 
foreign mediation. Antietam deprived of them of this opportunity, "but we do not yet 
know the real course of recent events, and still less can we foresee what is about to 
follow. " More importantly for British interests, "as regards possible resentment on the 
part of the Northems following upon our acknowledgement of the Independence of the 
South, it is quite true that we should have less to care about that resentment in the Spring 
442 5-8-1862, London Times; 13-9-1862, Punch. 
443 18-10-1862, Punch. 
444 unless Lord Russell meant War, I think his letters [of 17 January 1863, to Lord Lyons] most 
unhappy, " U. S. Senator Charles Sumner later wrote to Cobden. -I am tempted to tell you how our 
imperturbable President felt on receiving the Letter about his Proclamation. As he knew nothing of Lord 
Russell personally and very little opinion as a public man, he was not able to make the apologies for him 
which I could. And yet it was hard. The case was very bad. I doubt if all history shews an instance of a 
question of such magnitude being treated with such mingled levity & ignorance... - 26-4-1863, Sumner to 
Cobden, Cobden Papers. See also Beverly Wilson Palmer (ed. ), The Selected Letters of Charles Sumner, 2 
vols. (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), 2: 160-2. 
445 Jones, Union in Peril, 199, -Ibe emperor noted [to Confederate emissary John Slidell] that Union 
rejection of the offer would provide 'good reason for recognition' and, in a veiled but unmistakable 
Teference to the use of force, 'perhaps for more active participation, ' " 201. 
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when communication with Canada was open and when our Naval force could more easily 
operate upon the American Coast, than in winter when we are cut off from Canada and 
the American coast is not so safe. " As long as England, France and some of the other 
Great Powers could act together, "the Yankees would probably not seek a quarrel with us 
alone and would not like one against a European Confederation. " Russell believed-or 
rather hoped-Napoleon's commitments in Mexico made him vulnerable to British 
demands in Europe, namely over the French protectorate in Rome, as a condition for co- 
mediation, but Russia would not back any diplomatic alliance at odds with 
Washington. 446 Indeed, Russia was one of the few fiiends the United States had during 
the Civil War, a natural strategic partner in a world still dominated by the nations of 
Western Europe. 
At any rate, a special British cabinet met previously on 16 October to deliberate 
intervention in wake of the news of Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation. 
Russell, for his part, felt "unless some miracle takes place this will be the very time for 
offering mediation, " and drafted a memo for the cabinet on the 13th which ridiculed in 
altruistic rather than practical terms Lincoln's reasons in freeing some, but not yet all, of 
the slaves. 447 Gladstone, already in some political trouble for a speech in Newcastle on 7 
October (where he announced there was "no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders 
of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made 
what is more than either-they have made a nation"), also favoured intervention. 44' The 
American Civil War was "the most gigantic" and likely "the most purposeless of all great 
civil wars that have ever been waged" since it seemed incapable of any (domestic) 
military or political resolution. "Secondly, " he wrote in his own printed cabinet memo, 
"it is certainly the one which has inflicted, beyond all comparison, the severest suffering 
446 2-10-1862, Palmerston to Russell, and 2-10-1862, Russell to Palmerston, Pp. 
447 4-10-1862, Russell to Palmerston, PP; copy of memo found in PP. 
44" Jones, Union in Peril, 182-6. 
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on the other countries of the civilized world, and has given them the best title to be heard, 
if they shall think fit to speak, on the question of its continuance. A49 
But the military and naval leaders of the cabinet, perhaps crucially, felt otherwise. "ne 
[Foreign Office] wishes to do something before Parliament meets, and there is great risk 
of doing mischief, " Somerset wrote to Lewis, who knew that intertwined with the idea of 
recognising the Confederacy was the political, if not moral issue of slavery and its 
probable expansion into new territories. It was highly unlikely the North was ready for 
foreign mediation. If they refused, what then? "The French having sent an iron-plated 
ship [the Normandie] to Vera Cruz, " Somerset observed, "could hardly have done this 
against Mexico, which has no fleet and no fort to be taken. If they mean to recognise the 
South, it is well to have such a vessel in those waters, otherwise the ship is ill-suited to 
that climate and station. " Lewis stated he could "understand effective assistance, in 
money and men, to the South, " and could "understand sending our fleet to break the 
blockade. " Had not France done this against Britain during the Revolutionary War? 
"But a request to them to be good boys and not to give one another black eyes and bloody 
noses, does seem to me the weakest and most hopeless course which could be 
conceived. "4'0 
Was Britain in fact ready to go to war with the United States? Writing to his Foreign 
Secretary, Palmerston again uncharacteristically preferred to wait a little longer for events 
to decide themselves. "The Love of quarrelling and fighting is inherent in Man and to 
prevent its Indulgence is to impose Restraint on Natural Liberty; a State may so shackle 
its own subjects but it is an Infringement on national Independence to restrain other 
"9 25-10-1862, memo in PP, 7. 
450 16-10-1862, Somerset to Lewis, 19-10-1862, Lewis to Somersetý SP. See also Charles S. Williams and 
Frank I Merli (eds. ), "The Normandie shows the way: report of a voyage from Cherbourg to Vera Cruz, 4 
September 1862"9 7he Mariner's Mirror, Vol. 54 (1968), 153-162. 
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Nations. " But underlying this philosophy were practical military and strategic concerns. 
,, A Rupture with the United States would at all Times be an evil but it would be more 
inconvenient to us in Winter than in Summer, " he explained, "because our 
Communications with Canada would be cut off, and we have not there a Garrison 
sufficient for War Time. The French are more at ease in this Respect-they have no 
Point of Contact with the Americans, and their Naval Force is stronger than that of the 
Americans while they have less commercial navy to protect or to lose. A51 By 24 October 
Russell, not convinced the North would be willing to fight Britain if it could not maintain 
the Union, was nevertheless willing to concede that "if Russia agreed Prussia would, and 
if France and England agreed Austria would, " and that "less than the whole five would 
not do. " Such a coalition he must have known was unlikely, and the following day he 
wrote "it should not take place till May or June next year, when circumstances may shew 
pretty clearly whether Gladstone was right. iA52 
In response to the recent French proposal, Lewis also modified his views. 
"Assuming ... the right to 
intervene, " he asked in another printed memo, dated 7 
November 1862, "would such an intervention be expedient? " 
Greece and Belgium were small circumscribed districts, lying at 
the feet of the Great Powers of Europe, which the latter could 
manipulate at their will, so long as they were willing to act 
together. But the Northern States, even weakened by the 
Secession, are a great Power, and the intervention of European 
fleets and armies on the Potomac is very different from their 
intervention at Navarino or Antwerp. It is difficult and expensive 
to send large armies across the Atlantic, and the wooden ships of 
Europe would encounter the small iron-cased steamers of 
America, which, though not sea-going ships, would prove 
destructive in the ports and rivers. 453 
451 18-10-1862, Palmerston to Russell, PP. 
452 24-10-1862, and 25-10-1862, Russell to Palmerston, PP. 
453 7-11-1862, Secretary for War Sir George C. Le%%is, Recognition of the Independence of the Southern 
















Here was a decisive admission. Whatever the moral, political, or even economic 
justification for accepting the French proposal for co-mediation, Britain was as 
unprepared to act against the Northern states now as it was ready to do so over the 
comparatively trivial affair of the Trent less than a year earlier. The Atlantic Monthly 
later speculated that "two circumstances ... were a restraint upon [Palmerston], and 
appealed with controlling force to his caution. He was not only an aristocrat and a hater 
of republics, he was also the Prime Minister of all England. " Most of the British working 
classes supported the Union, and their political power was inexorably rising. Palmerston 
owed his own position to his remarkably skilful appreciation-or manipulation-of "the 
public" if not also the press (much to the consternation of his most Liberal opponents. ) 
"His love of place is too strong to succumb either to personal prejudice or national 
jealousy; and the long habit has made the self-denial more easy. " Furthermore, "while 
Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell are very apt to stalk about and threaten and talk very 
loudly at nations whose weakness causes them not to be feared, and by bullying whom 
some power or money may slide into British hands, they are slow to provoke nations 
, A54 whose resentment either is or may become formidable. 
Though this assessment was partisan enough, "the small iron-cased steamers of 
America", Ericsson's monitors, had clearly made an historic difference in Britain's 
foreign policy. Indeed, this was at least half their intention. "if tile condition of our 
relations with other nations is less gratifying than it has usually been at former periods, " 
Lincoln deftly understated to Congress, in his Annual Message of I December 1862, "it 
is certainly more satisfying than a nation so unhappily distracted as we are, might 
reasonably have apprehended. " The accompanying Report of the U. S. Secretary of the 
Navy was more explicit. From a pre-war (March 1861) force of 76 men-of-war, Union 
naval power had jumped to 264 vessels by December 1861-136 of them converted 
454 August 1864, The. 4 dantic Monthly, 245-8. 
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merchant vessels-and to 437 by the end of the year. Of these 123 were purpose-built 
warships, "completed and under construction", and 44 of them-more than a third-were 
415 
armoured. According to Gideon Welles, before the events of Hampton Roads (in fact, 
at the height of the Trent crisis), he had determined that Ericsson's model of ironclad 
"was particularly adapted to our harbor and coast defense, and service on the shallow 
waters of our sea-board... " Their purpose was clear. "Whatever success may attend the 
large and costly armored ships of the Warrior class, which are being constructed by some 
of the maritime Powers of Europe, cruising in deep waters, " his Report continued, "they 
can scarcely cause alarm here, for we have within the United States few harbors that are 
accessible to them, and of those few the Government can always be prepared whenever a 
foreign war is imminent. ýA56 
After the diplomatic wrangling over intervention in the fall of 1862 Palmerston himself 
was noticeably frustrated. Though he was unquestionably popular at home, he could not 
bargain the French out of Rome, cynically complaining to the King of the Belgians on 18 
November of the Emperor's professed reason of alienating the priesthood. "With his 
immense army devoted to him and a nation the great mass of which look up to him, and 
to nobody else, he might well do what is right and just without caring for fanatical 
Priests, sentimental Ladies, or intriguing Politicians. A Fait accompli would silence them 
all. " This was an apparent freedom of action the British Prime Minister did not enjoy. 
Four days later Punch, in a similar vein, retreated from its earlier stance on tile 
intervention issue with a cartoon entitled "One Head Better Than Two". Pointing to a 
scene of American battlefield commotion, a fully-uniformed Napoleon III asks "hadn't 
we better tell our friend there to leave off making a fool of himself? " "Il'in, well, " 
455 This did not include the 10 "armored wooden vessels, (transferred from the War Department)", for 
service on -Western rivers", but of the total tally of 54 ironclads, 28 were intended for the "Sea-board", and 
most of these were turreted monitors, CG, Appendix, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1-12-1862,17. 
456 Ibid., 17-18. 
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replies a civilian-dressed Palmerston with a knowing smile, "suppose you talk to him 
yourself He's a great admirer of yours, you know. , 
457 
At the same time, local intelligence from British naval officers on the North American 
Station was arriving in London to confirm the boastings of the Northern press made that 
summer. 458 "1 have lived long enough in this atmosphere of puffing not to be blinded by 
its smoke, " wrote the Times correspondent from San Francisco on 29 July. But reports of 
an improved Ericsson monitor to be constructed there, possibly more, "must not be 
overlooked by our Government. They are suggestive at best; perhaps ominous. " Mr. 
Ericsson had promised that " 'applications of mechanical science will put an end to the 
power of England over the seas, and render the United States impregnable against (to) the 
navies of the world. ' "A59 From 4 September to 8 October Captain John Bythesea, R. N., 
an important figure in the history of British assessments of the Union's ironclad program 
during the American Civil War, toured U. S. naval dockyards and commercial 
establishments along the Great Lakes and the eastern seaboard, after participating in the 
Royal Defence Commission of Canada. Between Chicago, Detroit, Newport, Cleveland, 
and Buffalo he found some 6,000 shipwrights were employed; "foundries and machine 
work shops of every description" could be found in "all the important places, many of 
which, now employed in the manufacture of Agricultural implements and Railway rolling 
stock, could, in the event of hostilities, be employed in the construction of Marine 
Engines and iron cased Vessels. " The Federal navy yards, however, were "inadequate to 
either the construction or maintenance of a large fleet. Private yards partially supply the 
defect. " This must have sounded familiar to the Admiralty, especially the fact that "the 
457 22-11-1862, Punch. 
459 -... oNving to difficulties of maintaining communications and other causes, - Milne wrote a very intrigued 
Board of Admiralty, "it is not easy to collect trustworthy information beyond what the Newspapers furnish 
on this interesting subject as I am not aware that there were any British Officers, or other authorities at or 
near the James River, or on the Mississippi, where the only serious actions between Batteries and Iron clad 
Vessels have as yet taken place, " ADM 1/5788,26-8-1862. 
459 9-9-1862, London Times. 
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work done by contract is reported to be unsatisfactory and the expense to Government 
much greater than it would be if the public yards were on a more extended scale. " 
Still, Bythesea listed 14 ironclads (mostly armoured gunboats of the Western river 
flotilla) afloat as of I September 1862, "mounting 153 guns and representing 14,375 
Tons", with another 38 under construction in both government and private yardS. 460 
Aside from the seagoing broadside-battefy U. S. S. New Ironsides "nearly the whole of the 
Iron clad Vessels building are to be armed with heavy guns in turrets and to be protected 
with layers of inch iron plates on Mr. Ericsson's pian: 
A61 The Bdtish naval officer got a 
close look at one of these, the Passaic-class monitor U. S. S. Nahant, while at Boston, and 
provided details of her mode of construction. It was unlikely the monitors would be sent 
to sea, yet they were "fairly adopted for river and harbour defenses [sic]". Persons inside 
the turret could withstand the concussion of shot, he was informed by an experienced, 
though unidentified Union naval officer, as long as they were not in contact with the 
turret walls at the time, and "no inconvenience was felt by the firing of their own guns. " 
What truly made the Union turret-ships ominous was their armament, which would be 
either 15-inch Dahlgren-designed smoothbores, or 300-pounder Parrott rifles. Dahlgren 
himself, Bythesea wrote, "stated to me at Washington in April last that he did not think 
favourably of rifled guns larger than 40 pdrs. or of the range of any guns beyond 2,000 
yards. " At the time the Chief of U. S. Navy's Bureau of Ordnance was busily designing a 
gun "to carry a projectile of 20 inches diameter and spoke of adopting a plan which has 
460 ADM 1/5791,8-11-1862; see also ADM 1/5788,13-11-1862. 
461 ADM 1/5791,8-11-1862. Captain Ross, R-N., of H. M. S. Cadmus had the opportunity of touring the 
completed New Ironsides at Hampton Roads on the 24"' of October, 1862. Tbough he found the vessel in 
"good fighting order", he believed a single shot would disable the rudder, which was "just awash". and she 
was "very difficult to steer when going more than six knots. " The armoured bulkheads fore and aft, which 
protected the main battery, Ross considered inadequate; "a vessel getting athwart her stem, and being 
exposed to the fire of only one 50 pounder [a pivot on the upper deck], would soon drive in her after 
bulkhead and rake her gun deck, " 25-10-1862, Ross to Milne, enclosed in Milne's 8-11-1862 collection of 
forwarded reports to the Admiralty, ADM 1/5788. 
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been submitted to him of a gun with 36 inch bore. " Perhaps Dahlgren was indulging in 
his own boasts calculated to impress foreign minds. More importantly, "he was of 
opinion that for the protection of rivers and harbours the gun would soon be the principal 
part and the vessel only its carriage. A62 
Summaiy: 
On 15 December 1858, EdwardJ Reed delivered apaper to the Society ofArts on "The 
Ships of the Royal Navy ". With the onset ofthe recent Crimean War, he noted "thefleets 
of England, though well adaptedfor battles by sea, and sufficient to drive the enemyfrom 
the open waters, were almost totally deficient of the class of vessels which were essential 
to the puttingforth of ourfull power against hisfleets and coasts. Nor was the want 
supplied with anything like that promptitude which the occasion demanded " By 
December 1862, it was questionable still whether or not the Royal Navy could cope with 
the American Union's newfound capacityfor self-defence. The Civil War had undeniably 
become a unique source of strength as well as weaknessfor the United States. Federal 
defeats were more spectacular as the war evolved and the North mobilized its vasty I 
superior resources, while Confederate victoriesfor the same reason carried with them an 
increasingly noticeable edge ofdesperation. But on the sea the Union Navy remained an 
undefeated force, developing at an even more impressive rate-and with an iron 
backbone. Times had changed quickly indeed, and no one knew what to expect next. 
Even Reed in his 1858 paper asserted, with all the confidence of an Editor of the 
Mechanics' Magazine, that the "attempt to build ships which shall be proof to solid 
, 112 ADM 1/5791,8-11-1862. 
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shot-at least, to wrought-iron solid shot-is an altogether illusory one; and such ships 
are not urgently required. o463 
Captain Cowper Phipps Coles also found himself grappling with events apparently 
beyond his control. The attempt to introduce his cupola vessels at the cost of 
fortifications on a wave ofpopular support only confirmed instead that national pride 
was in fact imperial pride. Though doubts lingered about the seaworthiness of the 
experimental broadside-ironclads, these would hardly be dispelled by assaulting, in the 
press, as a hat(-pay naval officer, the broadside principle itself infavour of masted turrets 
ships-especially when the Controller of the Navy found what he was looking for in 
Reed's central-battery concept. "It is no merit whatever in such ships to have a large 
proportion of weight to steam power, obtained by means of excessive length and size ", 
Reed, as ChiefConstructor, recounted to a newfirst Lord of1he Admiralty in 1868. "The 
merit of an armoured fighting ship consists in having a large weight of guns and of 
armour, carried by a short, cheap, and handy hull, and, judged in this way, the 
Bellerophon is much superior to the Achilles. '464 Because Coles critically delayed the 
completion of his trial turret ship, the Royal Sovereign, in order to incorporate the 
almost daily changes occurring in heavy ordnance (and thereby decisively defeat the 
broadside), any initiative he may have enjoyed by the spring of 1862 was lost by the 
summer. Instead of representing an even greater economy offorce, seagoing "shield- 
ships " were therefore relegated by the Admiralty as expensive, untried luxuries thepublic 
would have to pay extra for. This outcome was further assured by his own refusal to 
build a mere "battery" first. 46,5 Even Ericsson in a war-time navy had to address and 
463 Printed as Edward J. Reed, On the Modifications which the Ships of the Royal Navy Have Undergone 
During the Present Century (London: Robertson, Brooman, & Co., 1859), 13,21-2. 
464 3-9-1868, Reed to H. L. Corry, in MP. Ericsson made sure to take Reed's Our Ironclad Ships to task in 
1870, comparing the Bellerophon with the Dictator in similar fashion; 12-2-1870,, 4rmy and Navy journal, 
397-8. 
465 in one of many angry outbursts, Robinson complained to the Board "bow utterly untrustworthy and 
uncalled for are all [Coles'] remarks on what he chooses to call the determined opposition and 
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overcome many of the original Monitor's deficiencies-in habitability, ventilation, 
seaworthiness, speed, armour protection and armament-before his own version of a 
free-ranging capital shipfound some acceptance with the powers-that-be. 
condemnation of his principle, openly disclosed by Mr. Reed. " Rather, the controller admitted there had 
been , an opposition to crude and impracticable ideas, %hich it was right and proper should be offered by 
those who have the responsibility of spending the Public Money and whose business it is to see that, Ships 
which can only carry certain weights are not burdened with double the amount their flotation %vill support, " 
ADM 1/5840,20-4-1863. 
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Ill. Summer of 1862: the tide turns against the Union 
While the evolution of ironclads as weapons platforms intrigued British naval observer 
Captain Bythesea, the Union capture of New Orleans drew confusing lessons. Farragut's 
squadron did not include a single ironclad and faced potentially three, including the huge 
casemate-rains Louisiana and Mississippi. Though both of these leviathans were blown 
up by the Confederates to prevent their capture, Louisiana was complete enough to act as 
a moored floating battery near Fort Jackson. Porter already drew up close-range, 
desperate plans of how to deal with her armoured broadside. 466 The diminutive C. S. S. 
Manassas, a poorly annoured, semi-submerged ram armed with a single 32-pounder, 
made valiant efforts to check the progress of passing Union warships, but a few 
broadsides from the U. S. S. Mississippi were enough to overwhelm her thin plating and 
drive her ashore. The forts themselves were bypassed, but only after the barrier blocking 
the river was removed days before, nevermind the prefatory bombardment from Porter's 
mortar flotilla. 467 In an official report to Secretary of War Stanton, printed for Congress, 
Brevet Brigadier General and Colonel of Engineers Joseph G. Totten also declared 
"while it is true that floating batteries will be useful auxiliaries in many cases, and in 
some cases our only safe resort, it is equally true that their expensiveness, to build and 
maintain, and their certainty of decay, exact that we rely in general upon works ashore, 
where, for the same outlay, ten times the amount of artillery may be arranged, with 
imperishable cover, impenetrable to guns afloat. " Ships would always be at the mercy of 
f ortS. 468 I Welles, however, was already informing Du Pont, commanding the South 
Atlantic Blockading Squadron, of the Department's intention 6'to capture Charleston so 
466 27-4-1862, General Order, PFP. 
467 IboUp 
,h predicting 
the forts could not stop a well-executed dash by Union warships, Major General and 
Army Chief Engineer John G. Barnard proudly noted to Fox afterwards that "my forts were harder to take 
than supposed... " 11-5-1862, Barnard to Fox, FP. 
46" 19-5-1862,37 Ih Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Executive Document No. I 13, Change 
OfMaterials and Construction ofForts, 6. Although the Congressional Resolution of inquiry was made on 
15 April, Totten's letter to Stanton is dated 10-5-1862, well after the fall of New Orleans. 
236 
soon as Richmond falls, which will relieve the iron boats Galena and Monitor. " These 
could be then be used in the same manner as Farragut on the lower Mississippi. "The 
glorious achievements of our Navy inaugurated by yourself give every reason to hope for 
a successful issue at this point, where rebellion first lighted the flames of civil war. "469 
Yet within 48 hours the prospects for a fairly straightforward, if not easy victory were 
mitigated by the Navy's repulse at Drewry's Bluff on the James River. Most of the 
damage to the Galena was inflicted by 8-inch solid shot, which stripped her decks of 
fittings and numerous gun crews. 470 "1 have seen the elephant in the fighting line", 
Rodgers wrote to his wife. "I ran up within eight miles of Richmond and there found 
three separate barriers formed of piles and sunken vessels[j the channel only as wide as 
the vessels length[, ] the banks lined with rifle pits and sharp shooters and a battery of 
heavy guns on a hill some 200 feet high to protect the barrier. " It was a formula for 
combined defence that would also prove effective at Charleston a year later. Unable to 
move forward like Farragut before New Orleans, the formidable Union ironclads were 
suddenly rendered sitting ducks. Significantly, no one was hurt aboard the Monitor, 
aboard which Anne Rodgers assumed her husband would be, "and therefore perfectly 
, A71 free from personal danger... 
The Monitor's new commander, Lt. William N. Jeffers, however, was not so optimistic. 
The Monitor's guns could not be elevated to reply against heavy gun emplacements on 
bluffs 200 feet high. Obliged to anchor further downriver, the Monitor's two I 1-inch 
Dahlgrens were then handicapped by greater distance and therefore reduced accuracy, 
469 13-5-1862, Welles to Du Pont, RG 45, Entry 15. 
470 See Rodgers' official report, dated 16-5-1862, to Goldsborough, ORIV, Series 1, Vol. 7,357-8. See also 
Executive Officer L. H. Neivnian's 16-5-1862 report of damages and Corporal of Marines John Mackie, s 
account, 16-5-1862, RFP Rodgers 
himself later observed the iron fragments from the Galena's shattered 
armour plating "became very 
formidable grape shot; our principal loss I am convinced was from them, " 19- 
5-1862, John to Anne Rodgers, RFP. 
471 16-5-1862, John to Anne Rodgers; 18-5-1862, Anne to John Rodgers, RFP. 
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"with the usual effect against earthworks. "472 Based on his previous experience against 
Roanoke Island, Jeffers told Rodgers it was "impossible to reduce such works except by 
the aid of a land force. 9A73 Perhaps anticipating the enormous disappointment from his 
superiors, if not the nation, the Monitoi's commanding officer soon compiled an official 
list of "defects" of his vessel. This would be the first in a long line of similar complaints, 
made for similar reasons, against these ironclads. The message would also be essentially 
the same: the machines were at fault, not the men who were obliged to fight with them. 
Give its naval officers and crews better tools and the nation could reasonably expect 
better results. 
There was more. "The opportune arrival of this vessel at Hampton Roads, and her 
success in staying the career of the Merrimack, principally by the moral effect of her 
commander's gallant interposition between that vessel and the Minnesota, caused an 
exaggerated confidence to be entertained by the public in the powers of the Monitor, 
which it was not good policy to check. " It was his duty, Jeffers wrote, "to put on record 
my deliberate opinion of her powers. " His conclusions were striking: "Notwithstanding 
the recent battle in Hampton Roads and the exploits of the plated gunboats in the Western 
rivers, I am of the opinion that protecting the guns and gunners does not, except in special 
cases, compensate for the greatly diminished quantity of artillery, slow speed, and 
inferior accuracy of fire; and that for general Purposes wooden ships, shell guns, and 
forts, whether for offense or defense, have not yet been superseded. "474 
This level of defiance, coming from a naval veteran in command of the nation's most 
celebrated engine of war, was sure to provoke an equally virulent response, touching, as 
"72 Ericsson calculated Us distance, based on the degree of the guns' elevation, to be 650 yards, but pointed 
out that such an angle (6*) worked two ways: Plunging Confederate fire could not penetrate the A4onjjOr, s deck, 28-6-1862, Ericsson to Fox, EPLOC. 
473 16-5-1862, Jeffers to Rodgers, ORN, Series 1, Vol. 7,362. 
474 ibid. 
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it did upon so many nerves. The White House still had every reason to believe that the 
"operations against Richmond may close favorably at any moment". Therefore the 
Department of the Navy ordered Goldsborough to prepare for "a sudden naval 
demonstration against Fort Caswell ... without a moment's delay so soon as Richmond 
falls. ', 475 The Monitor was to be edged as close as possible to rebel works up the James, 
to spearhead reconnaissance. But on 2 June the Monitor's engines broke down. 
Combined with the previous combat damage to the Galena, Goldsborough could only 
write his superiors he was "less confident of success" and that the "principal work is now, 
perhaps, more formidable than the Department is aware. 2-A76 The commanding officer of 
the Monitor was meanwhile pointedly "much chagrined at the "necessity of forwarding 
Y 'An the accompanying report of the senior engineer relative to an accident to the engine. 
Jeffers was apparently as irritated by his reliance upon the Monitor's mechanic as he was 
on the Monitor 
herself. 478 
Equally irritated was the Monitor's designer. In quick response to Jeffers' report of 22 
May, Ericsson wrote to Welles that it did not "convey a single new idea, nor does it 
develop a single new fact ... relative to the construction of the Monitor not previously 
known to the constructor. " Presently foregoing a point-by-point "analysis of the 
subject, 7--for he had precious little time for this-Ericsson could only assure tile 
Secretary that the new monitors, "being pushed towards completion by all means that 
ftmds and mechanical energy have at command", were free from any previous oversights 
475 2-6-1862, Welles to Goldsborough, ORIV, Series 1, Vol. 7,445. 
476 3-6-1862, Goldsborough to Welles, ORN, Series 1, Vol. 7,448. 
477 3-6-1862, Jeffers to Goldsborough, ORN, Series 1, Vol. 7,449-50. 
478 See Monitor engineer Isaac Newton's letter to Ericsson of 10-7-1862, EPPA, in which he complains that 
"Jeffers' peculiar characteristic is that he has not an consideration for anyone but himself, so you may well 
imagine what I have to go through when he in his spacious and comparatively well ventilated cabin 
growls.,, in his opinion, it was not the Monitor to blame, "the hot weather alone brought out her defects", 
but "the stupid head powers of the Navy". Commodore Goldsborough in particular was "so thoroughly 
impregnated xvith fear of this bugbear [the Virginia], that half the Navy was paralysed. " Welles later 
agreed, writing in his journal Goldsborough "had done nothing effective since the frigates were sunk by the 
Merrimac, nor of himself much before, " 10-8-1862, Beale, Diary, 1: 73. 
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in the original prototype. "Lieut. Jeffers' assumption that the Monitor's reputation is 
based on fictitious grounds", however, demanded "immediate refutation": 
The advocates of the new system so far from admitting that too 
much is claimed for it deplored the circumstances that Monitor 
was not supplied with powerful guns. How different the result, 
they say, if the impregnable turret had contained guns of proper 
calibre [sic] and strength ... 
479 
Having given Jeffers' report more thought, day Ericsson returned to his counterattack the 
following day. He had "no hesitation in saying that is a pernicious document, coming as 
it does at the very moment when you are called upon to decide the question of Iron Clad 
vessels. " Nothing the Monitor's own commanding officer wrote overturned "the success, 
of every essential feature, claimed for the new system, and yet Lieut. Jeffers clings to 
&wooden vessel and shell guns for general purposes. "' As usual when defending his 
monitors, Ericsson took to the high ground. "The commander of the Monitor evidently is 
not aware of the extraordinary-unprecedented-activity of the European dock yards in 
fitting out whole fleets of Iron Clad vessels at this moment, or he would not advise his 
government to rely on 'wooden vessels and shell gun', rather than impregnable iron 
vessels carrying solid-shot-guns protected by impregnable iron turrets ., 
180 What was the 
point of such reports, therefore, given their negative, unconstructive, almost 
insubordinate tone? 
Perhaps the underlying issue of correct 'attitude' was behind the Department's 7 May 
decision to appoint Rear Admiral Francis H. Gregory, U. S. N., as General Superintendent 
of the new ironclads' troublesome construction-rather than Comniodore Smith. 481 
479 28-5-1862, Ericsson to Welles, EPLOC. 
480 29-5-1862, Ericsson to Welles, EPLOC. 
48 1 For Gregory's zeal see 9-6-1862, and 11-7-1862, Gregory to Welles, RG 45, Entry 38. For a sense of 
Smith's alienation see also 19-6-1862, Smith to Ericsson, RG 45, Entry 464, Box 51. When Gregory 
submitted Stimers and Ericsson's request to install iron stringers in the Passaic monitors, Smith replied the 
Bureau was "of the opinion that any vessel of war requiring extra ballast to trim her is defective in 
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Indeed, there was no time for interminable debates on ironclad policy. Fundamentally- 
defect ironclads like the Galena Fox was not interested in even repairing; while Gregory 
wrote to Smith (in transmitting the latest instalment payment-bills for the monitors) that 
"Mr. Ericsson has over eight hundred men now employed at Green Point, working extra 
time and progressing energetically. vA82 As W. L. Bames, Ericsson's agent in 
Washington, wrote to Erastus Coming ("a member of Congress and a partner of Winslow 
in the Albany Iron WorkS, A83), "the question of a Superior Iron Clad Navy has taken hold 
fmnly of Capt. Ericsson's mind": 
No man in this Country is more intensely interested in it. He does 
not like English supremacy and be assured that if his advice is 
followed we shall energetically push the matter to an 
acknowledged Conclusion in our favor. 484 
Barnes also discovered from his recent interview in New York that Ericsson secretly 
authored the article on "Our Iron-Clad Navy" for the New York Herald of 26 June, which 
asserted the "position of the country at the present moment is so intimately connected 
with the power of our navy" (echoing his historic letter of 23 April to Seward). 485 MUCII 
of the credit for the powerful new ironclads under way Ericsson publicly attributed to the 
Secretary of the Navy and his Assistant. 486 "it has been objected that the Engineer-in- 
Chief [Isherwood] is not employed in the construction of the new vessels; but Secretary 
Welles, to the surprise and annoyance of many, has lately been found to entertain very 
peculiar notions on all matters connected directly with the efficiency of the navy, among 
which may be attributed that of putting 'the right man in the right place'. " Ericsson the 
architecture"; 9-7-1862, Gregory to Smith, RG 19, Entry 1235; 12-7-1862, Smith to Gregory, RG 45, Entry 
464, AD, Box 5 1. 
482 21-6-1862, John to Anne Rodgers, RFP; 24-6-1862, Gregory to Smith, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
493 Baxter, Introduction, 278. 
484 28-6-1862,13ames to Coming WP. 
485 26-6-1862, New York Herald. 
486 Barnes revealed to Fox the same day that Ericsson had also "written in the strongest terms privately to 
the editor of the New York Herald. "IFWs will probably end the latter's tirade of abuse, " 28-6-1862,13ames 
to Fox, FP. 
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civilian was simply a better-qualified engineer than the Navy Bureau Chief As a result 
of this arrangement, Europe would soon "view with astonishment" a "prodigious display 
of energy and mechanical resources. " The national agenda was clear- "The rebels are 
growing weaker every day; the Union feeling is spreading, and we will be ready to defy 
all the maritime Powers of Europe combined in less than two months. Napoleon in 
Mexico may then look OUt., A87 
Yet the President's own assessment of national, much less naval, policy was less than 
'ironclad'. Indeed, the almost heady ambition to invest in continental-scale railroads and 
canals, in widespread coastal fortifications, and in monitors capable of defending 
American interests anywhere-all of which would challenge British naval supremacy on 
the high seas as well as along American's own maritime boundaries-only reflected the 
optimism still existent in the early summer of 1862; that the Civil War might soon be 
over. Lincoln may have liked to indulge in similar expectations, if not fantasies. The 
Homestead Act, passed on 19 May 1862, he heartily endorsed. 488 The promise of 
greatness afforded by "that portion of the earth's surface which is owned an inhabited by 
the people of the United States" was to him logically "well adapted to be the home of one 
national family; and it is not well adapted for two, or more. 18' But lie of all people had 
learned that war was full of bitter surprises. Victory could not be assumed. Moreover, 
there was a fine line between actively destroying the enemy and merely avoiding defeat. 
Lincoln's visit in early May with General McClellan, to discuss the progress of the 
Peninsula campaign, did little too reassure him in this regard. By 28 June his "view of 
the present condition of the War", as he wrote to his closest cabinet advisor, Secretary of 
487 26-6-1862, New York Herald. 
488 Although this would surely aggravate future relations with Native American tribes such as the Cherokees 
and Sioux, who were already embroiled in the Civil War west of the Mississippi. 
489 1-12-1862, Annual Address to Congress, CG, Appendix. Lincoln was fascinated with the prospect that, 
given "an average decennial increase of 34.69 per cent". the population of the United States could reach 
over 251 million by 1930-in direct relation to Europe's-but only if "we do not ourselves relinquish the 
chance by the folly and evils of disunion, or by long and exhausting war springing from the only great 
element of national discord among us": through emancipation. 
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State Seward, was that events had "enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in 
Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. " A similar concentration of Union 
forces would only leave Washington vulnerable to a quicker thrust from Richmond. "Or, 
if a large part of the Western Army be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have 
Richmond and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, &c. " Instead, they should "hold 
what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chatanooga [sic] & East 
Tennessee" while "a reasonable force should, in every event, be kept about Washington 
for its protection. " The North could then continue the mobilization of its vastly superior 
resources, fielding yet another army "in the shortest possible time", and eventually crush 
the bulk of Confederate forces in Richmond, carefully held in place by McClellan. If 
need be, Lincoln pledged he would "publicly appeal to the country for the new force, 
were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow-so hard it is to have a 
thing understood as it really iS: 
A90 
Sure enough, even as Lincoln, Congress, the Navy, the press and John Ericsson were all 
determining the best course of Union grand-strategy, the new Confederate general in 
charge of Richmond's defence, Robert E. Lee, launched a brilliant series of attacks on the 
besieging Army of the Potomac; the Seven Days' Battles (25 June-l July). McClellan's 
loose grip on the war's strategic initiative was suddenly lost. Though Confederate forces 
suffered more dearly, the siege was lifted, and the Union Army was unquestionably back 
on the defensive. This in turn only placed more pressure on the Navy, and upon the 
precarious foreign relations of the United States. "If [McClellan] is not the man, " Anne 
Rodgers anxiously wrote to her husband on I July, "where are we to look? If we are 
490 28-6-1862, Lincoln to Seward, LP. Lincoln called for 300,000 more volunteers, to enlist for three years, 
on 3 July. A month later this unpopular appeal would be amended to nine months. 
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defeated here England & France will be only too glad of the excuse to be counted in & 
we shall then be between the upper & the lower millstone. A91 
The next day, John Murray Forbes wrote to Fox, enclosing a letter from J. M. Beckwith 
in Paris, "a shrewd old Democrat long resident in France & well posted up there-a Hater 
of England & rather a lover of France-which makes his warnings the more valuable. " 
From his perspective, Beckwith found it undeniable "that [the] aristocracy in Europe is 
arrayed against Democracy in America, and resolved irrevocably to break up the great 
Republic if possible. " The growing strength of the Union army and navy had "quickened 
the instinct of self preservation & revived the alarm of the whole aristocratic class; they 
now see nothing but danger from the success of the North... " The proverbial iron fist of 
the European elite, however, would come wrapped in a velvet glove of diplomacy. 
"They know that ... offers of 
friendly mediation will be refused & resisted, but they intend 
to embrace us with the affectionate hug of a Bear. " Beckwith's only consolation was that 
a foreign war might unite the North and stiffen its determination even more. Napoleon 
III, in the meantime, was closely watching events in the Civil War, waiting for an 
opportunity. "The way the Cat jumps depends on the mouse-but the English feel very 
sure of the Emperor this time. " Forbes himself was fairly disgusted with the performance 
of the Union army, and the need for even more reinforcements. "You cannot get soldiers 
now", he wrote Fox, "but there are plenty of mechanics & before you can recruit & drill 
into value an army of 100,000 men (representing 100 millions per ano) you can get under 
full headway-& indeed near completion-50 millions worth of Iron cased ship more 
than now ordered... " As far he was concerned, "these will be worth far more that the 
491 1-7-1862, Anne to John Rodgers, RFP See also Dahlgren, Memoirs, 373,376-7, who was sympathetic 
to McClellarL 
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100,000 men-whether for subduing Domestic or preventing Foreign War. TheMonifor 
, A92 
stands us today in as good stead toward Europe as one whole arm . 
All this served to only intensify Union ironclad shipbuilding efforts still further. Smith 
was threatening contractor Charles Whitney that "the time for completing [the twin- 
casernated ironclad Keokuk] is rapidly approaching, and if you are dehquent in this 
respect, heavy damages will be claimed under the contract. ', 493 Yet in transmitting 
progress reports of the ironclad contractors under his supervision to Smith, Francis 
Gregory found it "very gratifying to know that all are sensible to the importance of their 
labors in the present crisis, and appear to be governed more by patriotism than selfish 
considerations. "494 Work on the Passaic-class monitors was progressing rapidly. Smith 
was pleased. The contractors' bills were approved and the next payment instalments sent 
OUt. 495 
The ever-energetic John Ericsson took another view to Gregory's, however, especially 
after the 4'b of July. "Our men observed the great festive day of the nation With so much 
spirit last Friday", he complained to Fox, "that they were unfit for work yesterday 
[Saturday]. " As a result "we lose three valuable days in succession. " Already cracks 
were beginning to appear in the ironclad construction business. The explosion of 
Government work available placed a high premium on labour. As far as Ericsson the 
contractor was concerned, "we have not got our men 'in hand' as we had a year ago. " 
Furthermore, the Department's (political) need to balance the contracts for the six 
original, improved monitors under Ericsson's responsibility around the country was 
492 2-7-1862,1 M. Forbes to Fox, FP. Beckwith's enclosed letter to Forbes is dated Paris, 13-6-1862. 
493 20-6-1862, Smith to Whitney, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 5 1. 
494 30-6-1862, Gregory to Smith, RG 19, Entry 1235. See also 30-6-1862, Gregory to Welles, RG 45, Entry 
38. Welles informed Commodore Paulding of the New York Navy Yard he could not grant "the workmen 
full time for the day on which they were permitted to attend the Union meeting in New York. " nere was 
no precedent, and it was "not desirable to inaugurate such a system, " 23-7-1962, Welles to Paulding, RO 
45, Entry 328. 
495 1-7-1862, Smith to Gregory, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 5 1. 
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leading to irregularities in production. Relatively inexperienced and poorly equipped 
Pennsylvania and Delaware firms were failing to meet their deadlines, which only 
involved delays in other areas of the vessels. Not taking any chances, Ericsson would 
build both his seagoing monitors in New York. 496 This was bound to irritate other 
interested parties. 
On 19 July Robert Forbes wrote to Fox from Boston. He had met "several of our 
principal mechanists & iron workers, " and had "very little doubt from what they say, that 
by a combination of two shops, now doing little, a three tower ship could be got up 
here... " When Forbes suggested this to Ericsson all he received was a "laconic response 
of yesterdays date, " in which "he makes no allusion to doing any thing here beyond 
machinery & he cautions me specially against promising more for this City than we can 
carry out. " Forbes acknowledged the lack of investment capital "of our machinists" but 
insisted they were "as good workmen as exist any where in the Country & will do all they 
can to carry out any thing they undertake... " It would be imprudent for them, moreover, 
to promise "to do any large work very quick [or] very cheap-unless they can get their 
pay in the equivalent of gold or silver-it would be suicidal to do So., A97 But for 
Ericsson at least it was far too late to turn back. Already there were, as Gregory reported 
to Smith on 9 July, "over 1000 men at work at Greenpoint ., 
A98 "We are pushing ahead 
the ironclad as fast as possible, " Ericsson assured Fox. Besides, "A fleet of these vessels 
afloat at this moment would inspire the nation with fresh life and confidence. 'A99 
496 6-7-1862, Ericsson to Fox, EPLOC. 
497 19-7-1862, R B. Forbes to Fox, Part 1, Letterbook, Forbes Papers, L. O. C. Fox replied with some 
annoyance. "if our Boston people are going to make tenns for gold, they will see the work go to New York 
and Phil& The last bid for engines from Boston was 40% higher than the two latter places. We have 
ordered a board to go on and examine the cause of the delay in Carey' s engines on board the Housatonic. 
Somebody is trifling, and whether it is our fault of Carey's I am most anxious to find out, " 26-7-1862, Fox 
to R- B. Forbes, FP. 
498 9-7-186Z Gregory to Smith, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
499 24-7-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
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Perhaps Ericsson was referring to recent events in the West, if not the East. Here Welles 
had been pressing Secretary of War Stanton of the "importance of capturing Vicksburg 
and keeping open and unobstructed the Mississippi river"ý-an operation which would 
require a diversion of "a sufficient land force to cooperate with the Navy in taking and 
holding the place... " This, the Secretary of the Navy assured his colleague, was "a 
source of regret" for both of them since Vicksburg "keeps our Squadrons unemployed" 
from other duties-500 Army-Navy cooperation, it was implied, was critical, especially in 
the West-where the most dramatic Union advances of the war bad been made (as 
Lincoln recognised). Corinth, Mississippi was captured on 30 May. Memphis, 
Tennessee surrendered 6 June, following a climactic, though one-sided naval battle that 
morning between Confederate gunboats and Union Flag-Officer Charles Henry Davis' 
force of ironclads and rams, operating out of Cairo, Illinois. As Welles noted in his diary, 
"the army has fallen in love with the gunboats and wants them in every creek. "501 Flag- 
Officer Farragut had meanwhile run his salt-water blockaders past Vicksburg's upper 
bluff batteries to join combined Union forces there. 
Reports had been circulating, however, that the Confederate States Navy was rapidly 
completing another ironclad-ram up the Yazoo River, just north of Vicksburg. "We must 
seek this great danger before it hunts us", Commander H. H. Bell nervously wrote in his 
diary in early June-502 A reconnaissance in force, consisting of the ironclad-gunboat 
Carondelet, the ram Queen of the West and the paddle-wheel gunboat Tyler, finally went 
in search of the C. S. S. Arkansas. But unlike at New Orleans, tile Confederates had 
managed to finish their ironclad just in time. Early on the morning of 15 July, the 
Arkansas ran into this probe. Caught off-guard, the Union vessels turned about to warn 
the rest of the combined Union fleet. A running gun battle ensued in which theArkansas 
500 29-7-1862, Welles to Stanton, WP. 
501 Entry dated 10-10-1862, Beale, Diary, 1: 167. 
502 Entry dated 6-6-1862, ORN, Series 1, Volume 18,708. 
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quickly disabled the Carondelet, driving her aground, and then chased the remaining 
Union gunboats into the Mississippi. There her captain, Isaac Brown, "approached the 
Federal fleet-a forest of masts and smoke-stacks-ships, rams, iron-clads, and other 
gun-boats on the left side, and ordinary river steamers and bomb-vessels on the right.,, 503 
Due to extensive damage to her smokestack (which reduced her draught and speed), the 
Arkansas could not ram. Instead she blasted her way through the combined Union 
squadrons which, did not have their steam up, inflicting damage in every direction, and 
receiving purnmelling hits in turn. At last the Confederate ironclad reached shelter 
beneath the guns at Vicksburg, a battered but powerfid boost to moral there and across 
the South. Immediately there was talk of sending her, upon repairs, to retake New 
Orleans single-handed if need be. '04 
Farragut was outraged. At sunset a sortie was made to sink the Arkansas below 
Vicksburg, but driven off under heavy fire in the approaching darkness. An II -inch shot 
penetrated the ram's casemate at short-range, however, disabling the engine, killing two 
and wounding three more. "This single shot caused also a very serious leak, " Brown 
wrote, "destroyed all the contents of the dispensary ... and, passing through the opposite 
bulwarks, lodged between the wood-work and the annor. "505 Nevertheless, the mere 
presence of a single Confederate ironclad had again completely upset Union strategy. 
Farragut reported to Welles his "deep mortification ... that, notwithstanding my prediction 
to the contrary, the iron-clad ram Arkansas has at length made her appearance, and taken 
... Isaac Brown, "rbe Confederate Gun-Boat Arkansas", in Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence 
Clough Buel (eds. ), Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols. (Edison: Castle Books, 1956, reprint of 
1884-88 original series), 3: 575. Hs official report lists "4 or more ironclad vessels, 2 heavy sloops of war, 4 nýoats, and 7 or 8 rains, " 15-7-1862, Brown to Mallory, ORIV, Series 1, Vol. 19,64. 
51 Ibid. Brown reported 10 killed and 15 wounded on the Arkansas; hair his remaining crew were 
exhausted from the overpowering heat of the engine room. For Southern moral, see Confederate Major. 
General Earl Van Dom's enthusiastic telegrams to President Jefferson Davis, 15- and 16-7-1862, ORN, 
Series 1, Vol. 19,65. 
505 Brown, 'The Confederate Gun-Boat Arkansas" , Battles andLeaders, 3: 577. This must have been fired 
by the steam sloop U. S. S. Oneida, which mounted two 11-inch Dahlgren pivots; see M-7-1862, 
Commander S. Phillips Lee to Farragut, ORIV, Series 1, Vol. 19,27. As Brown described his ironclad later 
that night -We are much cut up, out pilot house mashed, and some ugly places through our armor, " 15-7. 
1862, Brown to Flag-Officer Wharn F. Lynch, ORN, Series 1, Volume 19,70. 
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us all by the SUrpriSe. 2,506 Davis preferred waiting to attack the Arkansas until after she 
was prepared and moved away from the protection of Vicksburg's guns; Farragut wished 
to attack before her repairs could be completed. Rising sickness, failing river levels, 
shrinking coal supplies, uncertainty of army reinforcements against Vicksburg, and the 
damage to morale by prolonging tensions over the ram were other considerations. At any 
rate, an ill-coordinated attempt to sink her on 22 July with the new ironclad gunboat 
U. S. S. Essex also proved ineffective. 507 Welles could only assert by telegrarn three days 
later that the rebel ironclad "must be destroyed at all hazards", and on 2 August wrote to 
Farragut "that the escape of this vessel and the attending circumstances have been the 
cause of serious mortification to the Department and the country. It is an absolute 
necessity that the neglect or apparent neglect of the squadron on that occasion should be 
wiped out by the capture or destruction of the Arkansas, which I trust will have been 
effected before this reaches YOU.,, 
508 By that time, however, Farragut had already 
withdrawn his fleet back to New Orleans in disgust. The army was too sick to stay and 
moved off to Baton Rouge; and as long as the Confederate ironclad remained before 
Vicksburg, the city could not be taken. Welles and Stanton might have blamed one 
another with equal success. 
509 
What finally destroyed the Arkansas was her own mechanical breakdown. Forced to 
assist in a Confederate attack on Union forces at Baton Rouge without full repairs, her 
starboard engine failed-after a 300 mile journey, within sight of Baton Rouge-and the 
Arkansas ran hard aground. As Federal warsWps approached, the ram was scuttled. But 
the lesson of her example was undeniable. The North could not win the war as long as 
Confederate ironclads could be built in shallow waters and launched to threaten Union 
506 17-7-1862, Farragut to Welles, ORN, Series 1, Vol. 19,4. 
507 See 17-7-1862, Davis to Farragut, ORN, Series 1, Vol. 19,9-10; 18-7-1862, Farragut to Davis, ORN, 
Series 1, Vol. 19,13. 
508 25-7-1862, Welles to Farragut and Davis, telegram, ORN, Series 1, Vol. 19,36; 2-8-1862, Welles to 
Farragut (and Davis), ORN, Series 1, Vol. 19,5-7. 
509 Beale, Diary, 1: 71-2; also 30-7-1862, Welles to his wife, Mary, WP. 
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gunboats penetrating into the South. Just as the Monitor and the Passaic-class follow-ons 
were needed to protect the Atlantic blockade, from European threats on the outside and 
Confederate ones within, so would even lighter-draft ironclads of superior armour- 
crushing armament and impregnability be needed to bolster Union combined-operations 
in the West-510 Until then the North was as much on the strategic defensive there as it 
was again in the EaSt. 511 
There were political side-effects as well. "Ram Fever was growing in the North as 
newspapers spread reports and rumours of new Confederate ironclads under construction 
all over the South. "Merrimac No. 2" was ready at Richmond, while the English 
blockade-runner Fingal was being converted into a powerful armoured ram at Savannah, 
after delivering a precious supply of arms and munitions. But the Secretary of the Navy 
correctly surmised it was unlikely these were suitable for offensive operations. "In the 
mean time the sensationalists will get up exciting alarms and terrify the public into 
distrust and denunciation of the Navy Department. "512 This was important, since public 
trust in the government was a necessary precondition for public support of the Civil 
War-one whose nature would soon radically transform, as Welles learned two days 
510 In Bamard's opinion, however, quantity-and speed of construction-was perhaps more important than 
N% as they quality. "To build a regular iron clad gun boat is a long job" he Tote to Fo_ -Might we not, did 
on the Mississippi, and as the Confederates have done [on 
iheý James], improvise for this service by simply 
taking river steamers or our present gun boats and giving the iron shieldsp] If the vessel is to be confined 
to river operations it is not of much consequence that she has not seagoing qualities, " 19-7-1862, Barnard to 
Fox, FP. 
511 19-8-1862, Welles to Farragut WP Even if Union warships were freed from supporting the Anny of the 
Potomac on the James River to bolster Farragut instead, Welles; could only advise Stanton if "NeN%port 
News is to be held by the Army ... that 
half a dozen 200 lb. Rifled Parrott guns be mounted there, as means 
to assist in keeping blockaded the Iron Clad vessels now building at Richmond, " 29-8-1862, Welles to 
Stanton, WP. 
512 10-8-1862, Beale, Dim, 1: 72. "Not but that the Rebels may get up a formidable afTair-may injure 
some of our vessels, and do harm, " Welles; %vrote to his wife. "Me child might be born-rnight craAl into 
the oven, &c., &c., When the Iron monster crawls into New York harbor, destroys all the shipping, bums 
the city, the scare will have been consummated. There are a great many people in this world who like to 
despair with them ... 
it is good for such to read the sensational articles in the N. York papers, " 13-8-1862, 
Welles to his wife, WP. 
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before the Arkansas burst out onto the Mississippi; Lincoln was ready to issue a 
513 
preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. 
It was therefore under these circumstances of the summer of 1862 that John Ericsson 
again addressed a letter to the nation's Chief Executive. The famed engineer-inventor 
positively endorsed "Mr. Rafael's repeating rifle", which he could authoritatively 
pronounce was "free from those imperfections which invariably defeat the usefulness of 
such contrivances. " Technology drove tactics, and therefore strategy. Warfare, in fact, 
was becoming more efficient. Perhaps attrition could be avoided, if not 'radical 
mobilisation': 
The time has come, Mr. President, when our cause will have to be 
sustained not by numbers, but by superior weapons. By a proper 
application of mechanical devises alone will you be able with 
absolute certainty to destroy the enemies of the Union. Such is the 
inferiority of the Southern States in a mechanical point of view, 
that it is susceptible of demonstration that, if you apply our 
mechanical resources to the fullest extent, you can destroy the 
enemy without enlisting another man. 514 
Ericsson, however, was about to be taken at his word again. As with the Virginia at 
Hampton Roads, the Arkansas on the Mississippi only increased public pressure upon the 
Navy, and therefore upon its veritable "Chief of Operations", Fox. 515 As in March, the 
Assistant Secretary in August turned to Ericsson for help in preventing similar debacles 
from recurring. But history could not repeat itself exactly; the circumstances had 
changed. In March, Ericsson's only pre-occupation was with the six Passaic-monitors, 
mounting 15-inch guns. Now, in the hot new climate of crisis, he was already committed 
to providing plans for another four Passaics, and two of the huge ocean-going monitors 
513See Beale, Diary, 1: 70-1. 
514 2-8-1862, Ericsson to Lincoln, LP. The "repeating rifle" %vas in fact a machine-gun. See also Robert V. 
Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 208-11. 
5'5 See 16-8-1862, and 20-8-1862, Fox to Welles, WP; also John D. Hayes, -'Captain Fox-He is the Navy 
Department'-p US. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 9 1, No. 9 (1965). 
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he had dreamed of even before the Monifors ironclad duel with the Virginia. Fox began 
with the usual flattery. "I feel that we should have more of your vessels, nothing that has 
been presented approaches them in value", he wrote Ericsson "The Galena and Ironsides 
are the work of a blacksmith; the Monitor a piece of delicate, perfect mechanism. " This 
tumed to a straightforward appeal: 
Your associates have nearly five millions worth of work, and the 
public whom we all serve, expect other work to be scattered. For 
yourself with your patriotic impulses the establishment of your 
system must be your greatest reward. People incapable of making 
one of your ships are begging, beseeching and demanding one. 
We propose to advertise say for a class of vessels like the big 
Monitor, Quintard's vessels, and the new Monitors to be built on 
the Atlantic or Western Waters; will you help us by furnishing 
drawings &c with the present royalty for the small ones, and say 
$10,000 each for the big ships? I am most anxious to see 
Monitors on the Mississippi ... Shall we advertise and rely upon 
you? This seems the only way since we cannot have the entire use 
of your brains exclusively. I have thought about the matter deeply 
and have come to the conclusion that your boats only can give us 
the Mississippi ... 
If you say yes, we will go ahead at once and the 
credit belongs entirely to you. 516 
Suggested here was not just one but two more distinct classes of monitor-ironclad, of ten 
and six feet drafts. Ericsson would supply the plans but other contractors would 
construct them beyond his direct or even indirect supervision. This was ambitious and 
risky. The specifications for such complicated vessels would potentially have to be 
furnished in even greater detail in Ericsson's absence. They would also preferably be 
supplied at once, if possible, and in greater numbers to separate private firms-and sub- 
contractors-across the country. Nor were the new monitors the only response by tile 
Union Navy to the events of the summer. On the same day, 5 August, that Fox wrote to 
Ericsson above, Welles announced to Dahlgren "the Department is about contracting for 
more double-ended Gunboats, say fifteen, " in addition to the four Navy-built double- 
516 5-8-1862, Fox to Ericsson, EPPA. 
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turreted ironclads, and a new class of "screw Gunboats". 517 This meant all these 
shipbuilding efforts would be likely competing against one another for mobilizing, but 
limited national resources-especially manpower. 
This last was turning into a serious consideration. Even though Ericsson the next day 
indeed wrote Fox to "advertise as soon as you deem proper for more vessels and count on 
my assistance, pay or no pay" labour gangs on the Passaic monitors could no longer be 
worked night and day "during this warm season", and double gangs of men were no 
longer possible. "Such is the pressure produced by the Government work that we cannot 
fill up our day gangs much less work the double system. " How then would this affect 
Ericsson's other pressing concern: the supply of 15-inch guns? "Can you not by 
employing all the makers at Pittsburgh, West Point and Boston obtain a supply? " lie 
asked. "It will be nothing short of national disgrace if we are forced into protracted 
contest with the rebel craft when we ought to sink them as soon as engaged. 9? 518 
National conscription only made matters worse, and threatened, as Ericsson wrote to 
Wclles, to "put a stop to the work on the Iron Clad Navy. " Half the workmen involved 
would be lost to the draft, while also "depriving us of the leaders of gangs and hands 
trained to particular work... " Ericsson had already taken the initiative of preserving this 
vital, specialised workforce by contacting "the owners of the rolling mills now employed 
in the manufacture of our Armor and other plating, as also the builders of vessels and 
machinery, to make out accurate lists of the names of the men employed on tile 
Government work, with a view of obtaining exemption from drafting for these men. " But 
this, be informed the Secretary, was respectfully not intended to commit or 
embarrassment the Department: 
517 5-8-1862, Wefles to Dahlgren, RG 74, Entry 16. 
518 6-8-1862, Ericsson to Fox, EPLOC. 
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It is not for me to urge the imperative necessity of your prompt 
action in this matter, nor would it become me to set up an 
argument to prove, that a man drafted to pursue rebels or digging 
trenches, does not contribute more effectually to the defence of the 
nation than the toiling laborer who heats and clenches the rivets of 
the Armor intended to resist hostile shot. 
Though this was in fact precisely what Ericsson was arguing, nevertheless he concluded 
by pointing out to Welles "that the instant you obtain exemption from military foe men 
employed on the national vessels, new life and vigor will be infused into our building 
yards. Skilful and good men in great numbers will at once seek work on the Iron 
Clads. "519 Gregory too, after reporting to Welles on 9 August "that the Contractors are 
making every possible exertion to fulfil their obligations in good faith", felt it "proper to 
call your attention to the consequences a draft of the Militia. " Skilled labourers simply 
could not be replaced. "So great has been the demand, particularly for Iron Workers, " 
Gregory observed, "that the Contractors have not been able at any time to procure as 
many as they required. 19520 
Nevertheless, that August Fox continued with his scheme for building two new classes of 
monitors. The Navy Department was under stress. 
52 1 Ericsson's answer of the 6 th lie 
wrote was "a loyal one and such as I counted upon". Fox wasted no time in making out 
his order: "10 feet gives us the main part of the Mississippi most of the year, to be sure 6 
would be better, and I trust you will turn over in your brain a six foot invulnerable II 
knot boat, and we will bring it out so soon as you brain gets a little rest. In the meantime 
,, 522 we must have some 10 foot Monitors out west . Even more extraordinary, Ericsson 
replied he would send "a general plan of a swift and powerful Monitor Ram for the 
519 7-8-1862, Ericsson to Welles, EPLOC. See also 20-10-1862, Ericsson to Brigadier-General C. P. 
Buckinghani, EPLOC, enclosing a list of draftees he wished exempt from the Pennsylvania State militia. 
ITbese men are of the greatest importance and without them the rolling mill has had to stop. - 
519-8-1862, Gregory to Welles, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
521 See 13-8-1862, Welles to hiswife, and 20-8-1862, Fox to Welles, WP. 
522 8-8-186Z Fox to Ericsson, EPLOC. 
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Mississippi, of 10 feet draught" within two days. But his efforts could not be single- 
handed. The Assistant Secretary must procure exemption from the draft of everyone 
employed building such ironclads. "If you cannot, " he warned "the country must then 
look to its soldiers alone for protection, for a long time to come. , 523 Fox, however, was 
still dazzled at the level of protection Ericsson was offering. True to his word, the plans 
for the improved, swift monitor drawing 10 feet arrived within days. To Stimers, Fox 
wrote: 
The advertisement (required by law) will be sent to day, and every 
shop capable of doing the work, shall have one, both here and on 
the western waters. I was surprised to find the royalty upon 
Ericsson's brain was divided amongst associates. We threw work 
so far as we could, into his hands to reward him for his success, 
but I should have preferred that the pre-eminent skill which has 
characterized him should have been devoted directly to our cause. 
However his answer to my letter and his generous offer without 
price is noble, and if Congress do not do him justice, the country 
will. 
Fox was also "delighted" Ericsson was proceeding with the ultra light-draft monitors 
next. "It is all we require to complete our series. " Yet Stimers' concerns that the 
contracts might be let to unqualified firms promising more than they could deliver Fox 
answered could not be avoided. "We must advertise by law: there is no help for it, but 
we can confine the work to bona fide workers. " He was able to promise, on the other 
hand, "that the men who are working on boilers &c. for us will be immediately 
discharged whenever they are drafted. 97524 
After meeting with Ericsson again in New York on 15 August Fox reported to Welles 
that the first improved monitor, the Passaic, would be launched on the 30 th , followed by 
another two weeks later. He expected three to be ready by the end of October, "a 
5'3 9-8-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
524 13-8-1862, Fox to Stimers, FP. 
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favorable time to go South. " In the meantime Ericsson's work was being "driven all 
night. Even one inch plates cannot be furnished fast enough . "525 But there was 
comparatively less zeal for Ericsson to expect in return concerning the new monitors' 
armament. There were plenty of reasons to move cautiously than otherwise, Dah1gren 
argued, even suggesting Ericsson resort to mounting the longer 15-inch Rodman (Army) 
guns in the new turrets to save time. This of course Ericsson found "impracticable" and 
too late in any case. Dah1gren then noted the "great difficulty however in procuring the 
fabrication of such guns at all, and whether they shall prove reliable or not when made, 
remains to be seen. " There was, after all, only one prototype of this calibre in existence. 
Even his II -inch gun was in 1854 "considered too heavy to be allowed as a gun of the 
Navyý--and was not admitted until I went to sea in the Plymouth (1857-185 8) and proved 
practically that the gun was manageable. " Could Ericsson 'practically prove' a class of 
ordnance two and half times' heavier without a trial? Could manufacturers be persuaded 
"to encounter the risk" of casting theM? 526 The immediate concerns of the Civil War 
seemed to weigh against their adoption. 
What ultimately tipped the scales in favour of procuring 15-inch smoothbores for the 
monitors, however-despite the difficulties; despite the risks-was the recurring 
influence of European concerns. "The Nation cannot afford to sacrifice the prestige 
which will attend a perfectly successful first trial of our system", Ericsson explained to 
Dahlgren. If the guns for the second monitor were delayed, Ericsson felt it better to "Put 
only one XV inch gun into each", rather than none at all, "well convinced that with only 
one of the large guns in each vessel we shall be able to destroy all rebel craft[j inspire a 
wholesome dread in Rebeldom[, ] and prove to foreign powers that we can punish 
525 16-8-1862, and 20-8-1862, Fox to Welles, WP. 
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intermeddling. , 527 That same day, the Second Battle of Bull Run (or "Second 
Manassasý') had begun, ending with the defeat of the Union Army of Virginia under 
General John Pope by General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson and Lee's combined forces 
on 30 August. On 5 September Lee took advantage of the Federal retreat into 
Washington's defences to invade Maryland, which he hoped would then be 'free' to 
secede also. A campaign on Northern soil would spare the rich Shenandoah Valley of 
further pillaging, feed the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia on enemy harvests, 
and force McClellan's Army of the Potomac, back up from the Peninsula, to fight its own 
desperate battle. A victory on Northern soil would then demoralize the Union still further 
and encourage European powers to offer mediation on the basis of a permanent 
528 
separation of the United States. 
Doubt and stress in the Department of the Navy turned to pessimism and panic. As Lee 
struck out from the Virginia, Fox wrote to Stimers that Dah1gren's recent test against an 
inclined target representing the Passaic class monitor's deck had proven its weakness. It 
also supported Dahlgren's claims since the battle of Hampton Roads that "30 lbs. of 
powder makes the II in. a terrible weapon. " Perhaps Ericsson should accept that the 15- 
inch guns were unrealistic and unnecessary after all? "Give us two monitors and the 
Ironsides, and we will make Jeff Davis unhappy, " Fox dolefully concluded, "though now 
he seems to have every thing his own way, and darker days are coming. 9'529 The Union 
needed a victory, and apparently only the Navy could supply one, but where? Richmond 
and Vicksburg defied combined Federal arms; there was only one major target-city left in 
the South, of little practical military value but conceivably as important morally if not 
527 29-8-1862, Ericsson to Dahlgren, EPLOC. 
328 See McPhersoný Battle Oy of Freedom, 534-5.3-9-1862,4-9-1862, and 8-9-1862, Lee to Jefferson 
Davis, ORA, Series 1, Vol. 29,590-2, and 600. 
529 5-9-1862, Fox to Stimers, FP. See also 1-9-1862, telegram, Dahlgren to Fox, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. 
Dahlgren himself regarded the New Ironsides as "a clumsy attempt at an iron clad... " The original 
monitor's turret, however, he was convinced "would not long stand battering with XI in. shot, - memoirs, 
377,381. 
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strategically to the Union cause; where the Navy might strike a blow with minimal 
support from the hapless U. S. Army: Charleston. This was where the great rebellion 
began, and where British interests most visibly touched the South in the form of 
blockade-running. 530 Seward therefore implored the Navy to attack Charleston, "his 
remedy for all evils, " Fox complained to his wife, Virginia. 531 
Yet it was to avoid ftirther internal Navy disputes that Stimers responded to Fox's 
forecast of "darker days" with his own preference for Dahlgren's 11-inch gun-with 
30lbs. of powder-----ý'for present purposes". "New and untried guns in our new system of 
vessels which in reality have yet to make their name to the satisfaction of our Naval 
officers have all along made me anxious", he confessed. 532 Realising his own 
convictions had become perilously isolated, John Ericsson, however, characteristically 
struck back. I cannot yet give up the idea of having one big gun in the Passaic's turret", 
he wrote to Fox on 8 September, enclosing a copy of his reply to Dahlgrcn, whose "trial 
just made fully corroborates my views. " This reaction may have seemed strange, but in 
fact Ericsson set out to counter-discredit Dahlgren before the Assistant Secretary. Hence, 
the passaic-deck target-test Ericsson found "very interesting as it exposes the fallacy of 
inclined armor, " he wrote to Dahlgren: 
I hope you will lose no time in making trials that have a direct 
bearing on the question of the resisting power of the decks of our 
impregnable fleet. 150 is an angle at which no competent 
Commander will ever permit his deck to be struck, excepting by 
spent balls. I need not point out the fact that to be struck at an 
530 See 9-9-1862, Fox to Farragut, ORN, Series 1, Vo. 19,184-5. Fox expected the "first new monitor %vill 
be ready October 1; others wfll come out during the month. Their first strike must be Charleston, %here all 
the munitions go for the use of the rebels. " Mobile would have to wait; Farragut's forces were too weak-. 
-it is a dark time for us just now, and the country asks for another naval victory, but my opinion is that 
wood has taken risk enough, and that iron NviH be the next affhir. 11 
53 16-9-1862, Gustavus to Virginia L. Woodbury Fox, FP. 
532 6-9-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP. 
259 
angle of 15' from a battery of the great altitude of 120 feet, a 
vessel must be within a distance of 160 yards. 533 
Yet Ericsson was also under enormous stress. "I am not surprised to learn that you are 
experiencing effects of over effort... " Griswold wrote to him. "No other person could 
have ach. ieved what you have and lived through it. "534 When Ericsson was reprimanded 
for not hurrying up work on the Passaic, he lashed out at his old colleague, Thomas 
Rowland of the Continental Iron Works, for not accepting his assistant's request for an 
explanation for the delay. 535 In the meantime, Fox and Stimers pushed ahead on altering 
Ericsson's specifications for the new Harbor and River (Canonicus)-class monitors, 
despite his arguments. Deck annour would be increased to two-inches, Stimers reported, 
who was also hard at work to provide fresh copies of the updated plans to every 
contractor. A model had been prepared by the Chief Engineer, now General Inspector of 
the ironclads under construction, while Ericsson busied himself with the Passaic- 
monitors he was building, the Dictator and Puritan, and a design for an ultra light-draft 
monitor drawing six-feet. "Capt Ericsson and the Admiral [Gregory] are very much 
disappointed at the prospect of being compelled to send her out without at least one XV 
inch gun, " Stimers added. 536 
533 8-9-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. Ericsson's enclosed letter to Dahlgren is dated 3-9-1862. DaNgren's 
diary entry of October 3,1862 took some satisfaction in noting the obvious weakness of the original 
Monitor's pflot-house. "How a man of such cleverness as Ericsson should commit the error of exposing a 
flat surface to direct blow is curious... This square box should have been a turret, too. Every Achilles, 
however, has his heel, " Memoirs, 381. Nevertheless, Dahlgren eagerly accepted an opportunity to procure 
sample armour plates of British manufacture; certainly to test their resisting powers to his II -inch gun, and 
perhaps also prove that the foreign threat-Ericsson' s trump card-could be met without resorting to 
monitor-platforms for 15-inch ordnance; see 18-9-1862, Welles to Dahlgren, RG 74, Entry 16, Box 4, and 
25-9-1862, Dahlgren to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. 
534 8-9-1862, Griswold to Ericsson, EPLOC. 
535 15-9-1862, Ericsson to Rowland, EPLOC. This came hard on the heels of Rowland capturing front-page 
headlines (with a portrait-Blustration) of the 6-9-1862 Harper's Weekly, as builder of the original Alonitor, 
with contracts for the Onondaga, Puritan, three of the Passaics, and three more or their turrets for others. 
See also 8-11-1862, Scientific American, 297. 
536 12-9-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP. 
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By this time, the fate of the Union seemed to be "drifting on a troubled sea and God only 
Knows where", as one Navy Department insider wrote to John Rodgers. 537 Matters again 
depended on McClellan's Army of the Potomac, which was at last facing against Lee and 
Jackson's combined forces at Sharpsburg, Maryland, near Antietam Creek. The great 
battle of the 17 th subsequently managed to compel Lee to withdraw back across the 
Potomac, thereby ending the invasion. But while the Union had not suffered another 
defeat, neither was it altogether certain it had achieved a clear victory. The Army of 
Northern Virginia was left intact-and even allowed to escape without Federal pursuit. 
The war would continue. A dismayed President Lincoln nevertheless saw an opportunity 
to come forth with his Emancipation Proclamation, which he did on 22 September 1862. 
The war would become more total. 
Fox knew the nation could not afford to wait much longer for the new monitors. How 
many would definitely be ready by I November, he asked Stimers? "Look at this by 
comparing them with all past experience, so that our movements may not be defeated by 
overestimating; as is almost always the case. " Furthermore, a more total war would 
undoubtedly require a wider, more comprehensive spread of Federal monitors. "Capt. E. 
must not give up the light draft boats" he persisted. "Our series is not complete without 
them. " The Assistant Secretary had already told the Department and "the iron folks here 
and out West" that advertisements for their construction, based on new plans from tile 
redoubtable John Ericsson, would soon be placed. His message for Ericsson (which fie 
understood Stimers would read to his new neighbour that day) was that Fox had "every 
confidence" in him to "fitirnish such plans'ý--and in fact, could rely on no one else to do 
SO. 538 
537 16-9-1862, F. A. Murray to Rodgers, RFP. 
538 20-9-1862, Fox to Stimers, FP. 
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But Gregory's report to Lenthall of 22 September revealed a much more restrained 
optimism from those of the summer. According to the various government inspectors, 
"in general, the progress of the work under construction is satisfactory.,, 539 Four days 
later the bubble burst. Welles, reports in hand, wrote directly to Gregory of the 
"necessity for having half a dozen of these vessels completed by the middle of 
November, so as to use them during the fair weather which may then be expected, and the 
great results to be hoped for from their character... " The Admiral in charge must 
therefore make "extraordinary exertions for their early completion. " Rowland should be 
pressed-hard----ý'throwing his whole energies into the works, giving daily the influence 
of his presence among the workmen, especially in the case of the Catskill, so far behind 
hand. " The state of the experimental, lightly-armoured Keokuk was even more shocking. 
No extra hours were put into her construction, despite the "assurances of zeal and 
perseverance" originally made to the Department by her contractor. Henceforth, the 
Secretary demanded that weekly reports list the number of workmen employed upon each 
ironclad, and the amount of overtime work given. By mid-November lie specified the 
Passaic, Patapsco, Montauk, Nahant, Catskill, Weehawken, and Keokuk should be sent to 
sea. 540 
Even as Welles called upon Gregory to lead the ironclad contractors' in a renewed sense 
of patriotic energy, other elements within the Union Navy were anything but optimistic. 
Captain Percival Drayton was a prime example. I am quite willing to take the 11assaic 
and do what I can to reduce Charleston or any other place that it may be thought propcr to 
attack", he wrote a comrade on the 25th. "I doubt the fact of any of these vessels being 
very seaworthy, but some one must decide the point, " he added, "and I might as well do it 
as any one else. " Beneath this exterior indifference, however, Drayton was a sharp 
539 22-9-1862, Gregory to Lenthall, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
540 26-9-1862, Welles to Gregory, WP. 
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activist in his own right. The monitors were obviously flawed. "As it seems that a good 
deal of ballast will be required to bring these vessels down to a proper draft, I think it a 
great folly that it should not be effected by means of water, which could be removed to 
lighten the draft in case of getting ashore. " He also opined that "the decks will be found 
to be very easily penetrated, this however can be left for the first action to decide... "54 1 
Pessimism, like its opposite, had a decisive way of reinforcing itself in the Civil War. 
Fox on the same day questioned Stimers with exasperation why Ericsson would need 100 
tons of extra shot in the Passaic. "If it is to bring her down, it might as well have gone 
on the decks, where the system is weak. " In the same breath he reminded Stimers that 
the Passaic and her sisters were daily expected. "When Congress adjourned last session, 
we promised them Charleston on assembling. I am afraid the Monitors will be behind 
hand. 51542 
Two days later, Fox again wrote to Ericsson. Though he was intrigued with the engineer- 
inventor's most recent suggestion of "Flying Artillery", or "Monitors on shore"-tanks, for 
the troubled Union Army, Ericsson "must recollect one thing-your brain is more 
engaged to us to a certain extent. " Virtually in exchange, the Assistant Secretary 
promised that 15-inch guns were only days away. Could not Ericsson in the meantime 
"give them a stir-up, there at Greenpoint, so as to enable us to settle the question of iron 
clads against stone forts, before Congress meetS"? 
543 Fox also confessed his doubts over 
the Passaic-monitors' forward ballast, which he presumed was "unavoidable, or your 
extraordinary skill and ingenuity would not have been forced to adopt it. 9""44 This read 
more unmistakably like a suggestion of mistake on Ericsson's part, however. Perhaps 
Fox (if not also Ericsson) was becoming careless as well as nervous. At any rate, Stfiners 
5"' Enclosed in 25-9-1862, Drayton to Fox, FP. Captain C. 11. Copeland was Possibly shipbuilder Charles 
W. Copland. 
542 25-9-1862, Fox to Stimers, FP. 
543 27-9-1862, Fox to Ericsson, EPPA, 
544 ibid. 
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assured him that Ericsson was indeed "hard at the 6 foot vessels, but you know he will 
never show me a plan until he has worked it out. "545 At this, Fox became only more 
perturbed-and outspoken-to Stimers. 546 
Ericsson, no longer able to ignore the latest crisis of faith from naval professionals, 
responded to Fox on 29 September. The Union Navy did not have to worry about his 
ideas for technologically rescuing the Army, since the "great moving cause no longer 
exists, besides which I am now fairly up to my ears in the construction of the big ships 
and completion of the small ones, to say nothing of the Shallow water boat. " As for 
proper ballast, this was a matter of careful calculation and choice. Ericsson could quickly 
change his calculations; but dispensing with ballast at all "would utterly destroy the 
needed accommodation within the forward part of the vessels", or require "additional 
time and money". Giving the vessel finer lines would also give it great speed as well as 
reduce the ballast, but then the Navy would have to "put up with uncomfortable 
quarters". The choice, of course, was up to Fox, Ericsson challenged-if ballast was 
such a critical issue. "The best sailing vessels require ballast, why should not also the 
most comfortable Monitor vessels be allowed to carry it? " '547 Ericsson then summoned 
Stimers, reading to him his reply to Fox and explaining it with "great force ... So much so 
that I am not certain that we can improve matters at present in these vessels", Stimers 
wrote to Fox. Evidently, Ericsson also mmmed home another vital issue to the young 
Chief Engineer (as well as redirecting pressure back to the Bureau of Ordnance): tile 
number of weapons that would be available, as much as the number of weapons. 
platforms, would determine when operations could commence against Charleston. 15. 
inch guns would unquestionably wreak greater damage against the brickwork of Fort 
Sumter than Dablgren's preferred I I-inchers. Likewise, the "fewer the number of vessels 
545 25-9-1862, Stimers to Fox, RG 19, Entry 1250. 
546 27-9-1862, Fox to Stimers, FP. 
547 29-9-1862, Ericsson to Fox, also 12-12-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
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which carry these guns the less will be the target for the enemy to fire at. Four vessels 
will carry gight of them. Will you have more than that? "548 
Nor was Ericsson finished. "I infer from expressions used by Chief Engineer Stimers at 
our interview last evening that you attribute the ballasting the Monitor fleet to mistake or 
miscalculations on my part" he wrote to Fox. "Should this inference be correct I can no 
longer afford to deal with the subject in the playful manner I did in my letter of 
yesterday": 
I must state then emphatically that not one pound of ballast above 
what I calculated upon will have to be put into these vessels nor 
would I dispense with this ballast for the price of the whole fleet. 
The question of stability of vessels built on the new system is one 
of serious importance and has engaged more of my attention than 
any other part of the subject. 
Because of the monitors' low freeboard at sea, plunging into waves that washed over the 
deck, it would "not answer to increase the thickness of the deck and armor 
indiscriminately without putting weight below to balance the heavy top. " Ericsson, 
unlike Drayton, Fox, or even Stimers, had pre-calculated the unusual metacentric height 
of the Passaic monitors in direct relation to their seakeeping abilities, not just their 
protection against possible enemy fire. -549 He then repeated his argument "that the 
number of 15 inch guns rather than the number of vessels will decide your success 
against the Stone forts. , 
550 
548 29-9-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP. 
549 30-9-1862, Dicsson to Fox, EPLOC. 
550 Ibid. 
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IV. The Passaic crisis 
Ile belated presence of the U. S. S. New Ironsides meanwhile did little to reassure Union 
naval leaders-at least at first. Although commissioned on 21 August her trial run from 
Philadelphia to Hampton Roads proved so unsatisfactory that she spent another month 
back in Philadelphia for an emergency refitting. On 4 October 1862 Commodore Smith 
wrote to her builders, Merrick & Sons, that "$100,000 of the reservations" was being paid 
by the Navy; "the balance will be held for further trial of the ship, especially in regard to 
speed. " This was guaranteed to be 9Y2knots, drawing 15 feet, and carrying eight days' of 
coal for steaming at that speed. 551 Those attributes, however, would never be met. 
Perhaps this was the result of numerous changes made to her while under construction (as 
with many of the monitors). For the Union's only armoured broadside-ffigate to see 
service in the Civil War these included, significantly, the addition of armoured 
bulkbeads-sealing off the battery forward and aft to prevent raking fire-an artnoured 
pilot-house (foolishly mounted behind the smokestack), 4-inch thick gunport shutters, and 
an increase of armament (and therefore carriages, ammunition, and handling crew) from a 
battery of 9- to I 1-inch Dahlgrens. 552 At any rate, Smith was low on mercy. As long as 
the additions in weight did not affect her draft, the builders of the New Ironsides would be 
, 553 deducted $500 per day "from contract over time'. 
By 6 October, however, Chief Engineer Stimers reported to Fox that Ericsson's plans for 
an ultra light-draft monitor were ready. "Of Course", he wrote, "it is quite original 
5514-10-1862, Smith to Merrick& Sons, RG45, Entry 464, AD, Box 51. 
... See Roberts, New Ironsides, 21-2; 25-6; 29-30; also Canney, 7he Ironclads, 18. Roberts' attempted 
excuse of "traditiorf' for the placement of the pilot-house does not make it any less practical in a steam. 
powered warship. The designer ofNew Ironsides, Barnabas H. Bartol, had made several critical effors. 
553 4-10-1862, Smith to Merrick & Sons, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 51. The ship was under trial for 
nýinety days after being turned over to the Navy. See Roberts, New Ironsides, 37-8. See also 15-10-1862, 
Smith to Captain Thomas Turner, RG 45, Entry 464, AD, Box 5 1. New fronsides steered so badly as to 
prevent any greater speed than 6Y2 knots because her poorly-designed hull gave little power to the ruddcr- 
critically exposed above the waterline unless the slip was weighted down with extra coal. Seealso3l-10- 
1862, Turner to Dah1gren, DP. 
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differing from all other plans yet proposed and surpassing them all just as much as it 
differs from them. , 554 Two days later Ericsson transmitted the general specifications to 
Welles-who had finally seen the original Monitor, refitting at the Washington Navy 
Yard, just three days before. 555 Among other features, the new monitors would have a 
long wooden-hull overhang over an inner, submerged iron one, staggered twin-screws, 
and two layers of V2-inch plating for deck armour. "The turret, pilot house, turret 
machinery, blowers, blower engines, Worthington pumps, and impregnable smoke pipe" 
Ericsson noted would "precisely as the Passaic and the other U. S. Gunboats of her class. " 
This would make those portions of the new monitor-class at least as well-protected as the 
Canonicus-class as well. A uniform design would furthermore allow greater ease of 
construction for new and experienced constructors, who could be supplied with veritable 
duplicates of existing plans-and thereby save mass-production drafting time. As 
Ericsson pointed out, "the plans and general specifications thus furnished will no doubt 
furnish the bidders to make their estimates of cost more particularly since the whole of the 
turret work is now accurately defined by precise working drawingS.,, 536 Stimers, 
however, could only write Fox that Ericsson expected him to provide the drawings for the 
various monitors. Managing ironclad production on a mass scale, involving multiple 
firms across the country, was a ftirtlier, unprecedented responsibility. Simple oversights, 
assumptions, and lack of coordination between Bureaus could quickly lead to disaster. 
Chief Engineer King, Stimers noted to Fox, was in Pittsburg superintending the 
construction of two Canonicus monitors; "lie has now orders to superintend the 
Manayunk building at Pittsburg with its machinery building at Brownsville-50 miles 
awayýand the two vessels Tippecanoe and Catawba building at Cincinnati, 0.11 
Personal rivalries could also come into play. To ease the burden on King, Stimers 
recommended an associate, Chief Engineer Elbridge Lawton, serving on the frigate 
554 6-10-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP. 
555 5-10-1862, Gideon to Virginia Welles, WP. 
556 8-10-1862, Ericsson to Welles, EPLOC. 
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U. S. S. Mississippi; "but I have an idea that the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering would 
do nothing which he would consider as favoring in any way Mr. Lawton. " Extra 
superintendents and inspectors would also need extra assistants and draftsmen. 557 In fact 
what was needed was a separate infrastructure, if not a distinct Bureau. 
But Stimers was already presuming too much, and Fox let him know it. The Assistant 
Secretary had noticed he was openly assuring contractors who were already behind 
additional compensation. "All my letters to you are unofficial and you must not use them 
in your official dispatches", he reproached. For any monitor that could be ready at 
Hampton Roads by 15 November the Secretary would probably "remit all forfeitures", 
and this was a better strategy for urging the builders if nothing else. 558 He meanwhile 
continued to face doubts over the new monitors and their rapid completion. Drayton, 
commander of the first Passaic, reported his ship "does not seem to be much further 
completed than ten days back and I doubt if even now any time can be appointed for her 
delivery to the yard. " Only by making a short trip in the Passaic herself, wrote Drayton, 
would the Assistant Secretary "get a clear idea of the capabilities for sea service of this 
class, which I doubt your being able to obtain in any other way. " Although Drayton 
himself had never been to sea in a monitor, how could Ericsson possibly assure the Navy 
of its investment? Worse than being pessimistic, perhaps, Drayton was fatalistic. "Tile 
Monitors have undoubtedly many faults but it seems difficult to correct them without 
failing into others equally bad... "559 Fox could not ignore his officers' opinions; if 
possible, he would go to New York and try out the Passaic for himself, lie informed 
Stimers. He was not confident about the monitors' ventilation, "which is of the greatest 
importance", and there were "some other points that I desire to examine carefully. " 
Against the misgivings of his naval professionals, however, Fox had to respectfully weigh 
557 6-10-1862, Sfimers to Fox, FP. 
558 8.10-1862, Fox to Stimers, FP. 
559 7-10-1862, Drayton to Fox, FP. 
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Ericsson's assertions to the contrary. The engineer-inventor's bristling though convincing 
explanation of ballast vs. top-weights in the Passaic was but a recent example. "If such is 
the case", he admitted to Stimers, "of course there is no answer to it. "560 
Still, the matter of ironclads appearing at all, nevermind their actual effectiveness, was 
paramount. "We must have six vessels on the 20 th November and we will astonish the 
world, " he pressed Stimers. "Time slips away. " Though hesitant fmns, were at last taking 
on more of the Canonicus contracts, some preferred to bid for the light-drafts instead, 
others demanded more time and money, and how could the Government actually refuse 
any offer in a period of national emergency? Ericsson's matter of fact observations on 
light-draft construction Fox likewise regarded as "most admirable but the conclusion is 
dreadful, viz: that if Delarnater was not employed he would produce 3 in 90 days. "561 
Gregory could at least report to Lenthall and Isherwood on 6 October that the contractors 
had noticeably increased their efforts, though these were combined with Stimers' talk of 
,, 562 r6extra compensation to the Contractors under certain circumstanccs... Two days later, 
the Admiral could also assure Welles' that his urgent appeal of 26 September had taken 
effect; the monitor Nahant was launched with the Montauk to follow the next day; 
Keokuk was swarming with an "arnple force of men" to complete her. 563 The results 
themselves seemed encouraging. Having "minutely examined the exterior" of the Nahant 
just before her launch, Stimers let Gregory know he was "proud of her as a specimen of 
our proficiency in this country in the art of iron ship building. , 564 
Flush with this sentiment, Stimers candidly addressed Fox's worries on the 9 Ih . The Chief 
Engineer was "quite grieved" to find he had overstepped his bounds in his last official 
560 7-10-1862, Fox to Stimers, FP. 
5" Ibid. See also 5-10-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
562 6-10-1862, Gregory to Isherwood; 6-10-1862, Gregory to LendW , RG 19, Ent 235. 563 8-10-1862, Gregory to Welles, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
ry 1 
564 8-10-1862, Stimers to Gregory, RG 19, Entry 1250. 
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report. "Hereafter you may consider everything you write me as private and unofficial 
unless it has your rank attached to the signature and I will make no official reference to 
any but such letters. " As for why contractors could obviously work harder at some 
moments than others, Stimers reminded Fox that for private industry the work was "a 
matter of business". To "hurry work faster than is ordinarily done by energetic men adds 
to its cost. " The Government-contracted firms would of course secure as many labourers 
as they needed, provided the Government was willing to pay 50 per cent more for them 
than any other builder. Furthermore, "if you pay this to new hands you must also increase 
the wage of the old to an equal amount. " The same principles applied to materials, 
especially iron. To get as much as required, as quickly as possible, would simply cost 
more. "Therefore, if a Military exigency has arisen which makes it important that you 
have these ships before you can get them by driving them up to the limit, of what may be 
termed, commercial energy, you must pay an additional sum. " How could the 
Government hold contractors responsible for labour problems which the war-and hence 
the Government-exacerbated with extraordinary demands? Contracts were made under 
ideal conditions; and New York was a world away from the front-line environment of 
Washington. Hence, Stimers advised Fox that "[$5,0001 per vessel would make a 
difference of a month in the time of a ship in the present condition of the Sangamon or the 
Weehawken": 
Ericsson has given orders to expend that amount in increased 
wages upon the power vessel, he cares not whether it will be 
refunded or not, he will expend it, but at Jersey City they must be 
satisfied that it will be returned before they will expend it even 
though they pretend to me that they will do it, and really, you 
cannot blame them for they could easily ruin themselves if they 
worked without care of the cost and they do not know as well as 
Ericsson how much they will be in or out of pocket when all bills 
are settled. 
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This was behind Stimers' earlier suggestion to the contractors. If Gregory were instructed 
to guarantee up to $5,000, then night and Sunday work would also (and only) be 
considered 'cast-iron'. "Then we could drive mattere. The war was thus forcing 
Lincoln's administration to choose between time and money; and recent events made the 
fear of its political collapse seem more immediately a matter of the former-as a military 
defeat-rather than the latter-in the form of national bankruptcy. These were tough 
decisions for a junior officer to make, caught between the opposing needs of two crushing 
realities-as reflected by the alternative interests of these two groups, the Government 
and private industry. "I am almost ffightened at times when I reflect upon the enormous 
amounts which are now being expended by the Government under my general 
inspection, " Stimers confided. "I fell like the man who walks the tight rope across a 
rapid, the slightest deviation from a direct line is immediate ruin, not only in acts of 
common honesty but also in the advice I give and the suggestions I make to the 
Government. , 565 
Naval professionals were likewise proving quick to detect any imperfections which, 
however quickly resolved, could still leave a seriously complicated mechanism 
inoperable. "Today I was made unhappy by learning from Capt. Drayton that the parts of 
his Iron Clad the Passaic are but 17 inches in diameter whilst the 200 pounder for the 
Turret is 27 inches", Commodore Paulding wrote to Welles on 15 October. This was "a 
discrepancy that Ericsson should have provided for & which to remedy will occasion 
delay. " It seemed unlikely that the ironclads would go south until December, lie 
predicted. "It grieves me that it is so but we are helpless in the hands of the Iron men 
565 9-10-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP. The most detailed study of Stimers' role in the Union ironclad program 
remains that of Dana Wegner, "Alban C. Stimers and the Office of the General Inspector or Ironclads, 
1862-1864". State University of New York at Oneonta M. A. thesis, 1979; see also William 11. Roberts' 
recent CiWl War Ironclads: Yhe U. S. Navy and industrial 
Mobilization (Baltimore: The John I lopkins 
University Press, 2002). 
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[though] I believe they are doing all they can. "566 Smith too wrote to Ericsson only to 
"caution ... against a 
failure" regarding his new monitors, whose seakeeping properties he 
still did not trust, but by mid-October he had learned to keep a respectable distance from 
the harried engineer-inventor. 567 A bigger problem was administrative, he informed 
Welles. Contractors' bills and payments were made to and from various Bureaus 
including his own (Yards & Docks) and should be consolidated into the Bureau of Ship 
Construction & Repair. 568 
The Department reacted to these concerns optimistically, however, continually driving 
efforts forward-even as the British Cabinet debated mediation. They were other 
practical details to attend to, Welles reminded Gregory. Could the Nahant be brought to 
New York to receive her 15-inch gun? How were the ordnance arrangements for each of 
the ironclads coming along? Were pilots familiar with the Southern coast and ports being 
obtained for the monitors? Was the Admiral even making sure that "enough tallow or 
slush [was] put on board each of them to slush decks and turrets in action"? Two more 
Canonicus monitors were contracted in the meantime, to be put under his 
superintendence, the Saugus and Oneola. 
569 Gregory replied to Welles that the 
"Ordnance Arrangements for the Vessels are in advance of other matters. "570 The 
passaic's gunports, originally designed in the uncertain days of spring to accommodate 
an experimental 13-inch smoothbore, were too small for the barrel of the new 15-inch gun 
to protrude. Rather than increase the openings, however, Ericsson saw this development 
as a further tactical improvement. As long as the 15-inch shot itself could pass through 
the 17-inch diameter opening the gun was essentially effective-and protected even more 
since its muzzle could not be shot off. But could such a massive cannon be fired inside a 
566 15-10-1862, Paulding to Welles, WP. 
567 17-10-1862, Sn-dth to Ericsson, EPLOC. 
568 Wenes concurred. 21-10-1862, Smith to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd.; 22-10-1802, Welles to Smith, 
RG 7 1, Entry 5. Box 423. 
569 17-10-1862, Welles to Gregory, WP. 
570 20-10-1862, Gregory to Welles, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
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turret? Again, Ericsson's calculated 'guess' said so, and only awaited a proper test. 16 
October arrived, yet where was the 15-inch Dahlgren? "It is indispensable to ascertain at 
once if my plan is practicable of firing through a small hole without passing the muzzle of 
the gun through the turret", he complained to Fox. 571 When it finally did arrive, was 
mounted, and duly tested on board the Passaic on the 28h, the results were controversial, 
indicative once more of the wider-yet personal-tensions that existed within the Union 
Navy's ironclad program. 
Captain Drayton's report to Rear-Admiral Gregory was, perhaps not surprisingly, 
anything but flattering to Ericsson and stressed his system's defects. With only a fifteen 
pound blank charge the 15-inch Dahlgren had filled the turret "With smoke to a degree 
almost suffocating and which was so for a very disagreeably long period, although the 
two hatches were off which could not have been the case in action. " Under a greater 
charge and solid shot the smoke was less, "but the concussion such that I should not think 
that a heavier charge could have been used with safety to the guns crew, it seems that the 
compressor was not on this occasion properly screwed up, which permitted a recoil that a 
time prevented finiher trial, which was also the case with the eleven inch gun which was 
fired with a solid shot and fifteen pounds of powder. " Though Drayton admitted the "trial 
is not considered as finally settling the question, " it had nevertheless satisfied him "that it 
will not be practicable to use the guns inside of the turTet. " Rather than write off tile idea, 
Gregory's notational remark on the copy of Drayton's report forwarded to the Bureau of 
ordnance stated Drayton's remarks "are premature-arrangements are in progress for the 
purposes stated. "572 
571 16-10-1862, Ericsson to Fox, EPLOC. 
572 29-10-1862, Drayton to Gregory, RG 74, Entry 22, Box 1. 
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Ericsson, on the other hand, stressed in his telegram to Fox that the "trial of the fifteen 
inch Gun yesterday by no means proves that it may not be fired inside of the Port Hole. " 
He was fitting an iron "muzzle piece" around the end of the barrel inside the turret to 
control the discharge-smoke better. More significantly to him, it only took two men to 
"run the large Gun in and ouf ý-an amazing technical advance in the annals of heavy 
armaments for warships. 573 The next day, 30 October, Ericsson's defensive optimism 
turned to a virulent counterattack on Drayton and the other scoffers present at the trial, 
including Commander John Worden of the original Monitor. "The trial of Tuesday was 
made at my request for the sole purpose of firing the large gun without the muzzle piece", 
he explained to Fox. "It was the first time such an enormous gun had been fired on board 
of a vessel. " As for the noise produced, he pointed out, many experienced witnesses 
considered it less than an open air I I-inch Dahlgren firing. "The smoke which entered 
the turret was heavy but passed down by suction of the blowers in about 10 seconds. " 
The muzzle box would reduce it further. Widening the port, Ericsson vigorously objected 
to "until engineering expedients have been exhausted". Even larger port-holes would 
only require larger shutters, or, if the turret was rotated while reloading, increase the 
chances of shot entering the turret, killing the crew, and destroying the guns-which were 
themselves in precious short supply. 574 
Worse still, Gregory and Stimers had prematurely allowed the press to cover the 
experimental trial. As a result, wrote Ericsson, "a very damaging account appeared in the 
[New York] Herald of yesterday": 
A few more such statements will relieve Jef [sic] Davis of his 
present anxiety about the Iron Clads that threaten his strongholds. 
Our rivals across the water will also be greatly relieved. Should 
573 29-10-1862, telegram, Ericsson to Fox, RG 74, Entry 22, Box 1. 
574 30-10-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. Welles still had his doubts, sending Fox, Dahlgren and Smith to New 
York to witness further tests; see Beale, Diary, 1: 179, entry dated 1-11-1862. 
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our guns not be capable of sustaining more than one third of the 
proper charge demanded by the magnitude of the gun and weight 
of Shot, it is a misfortune we ought to keep to ourselves. 575 
Ericsson was even more "greatly annoyed" by his critics, if not embarrassed for the 
country, than he let on. The day hefore the Passaic's initial 15-inch gun test, an unsigned 
essay that he submitted appeared in the New York Herald, on "American and English 
Iron-Clads". Here, Ericsson attempted to place the Union's ironclad program into 
sharper, yet broader, patriotic focus. The historic events at Hampton Roads had 
succeeded in ffightening Great Britain away from all thoughts of troubling the United 
States. In response Armstrong had created a gun that could penetrate the armour of the 
strongest ironclad. "This reassuring fact was forthwith made known through tile press, 
and John Bull took a long breath, quite sure that the Yankees, after all, had no hit upon 
anything better than the Warrior. " But the isolated British targets were misleading, not 
representative of an American monitor's amour-shelf, supported by the full flat deck 
resting in water. "In return for the attention which our proceedings receive from tile 
English, " Ericsson informed Herald readers, "we are carefully looking into what they are 
doing with their iron-clads. " Warriors armour protection scheme was well know, and 
weak-the 15-inch guns of the new Passaic monitors would put the Warrior and her 
sisters on the run, which the Dictator would then hunt down on the open ocean. Much 
more heavily armoured on her sides and turret than anything the British were planning, 
Ericsson concluded there were "substantial reasons for believing the Dictator will prove a 
dictator. , 576 
Ericsson's simplistic emphasis on foreign affairs drew some attention away from the 
period of comparative quiet which followed Antietam. "But little is being done just at 
575 30-10-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. Welles subsequently reprimanded Gregory about reporters -giving 
accounts of the trial trips of our new iron clad steamers and making public much information %%hich they 
should not, " citing a General Order of the Department dated Aprd 22,1862; 1-11-1862, Welles to Gregory, 
Wp. See also 12-12-1862, U. S. Navy General Order on secrecy, copy found in RG 45, Entry 328. 
576 27-10-1862, New York Herald. 
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this time by either the Army or Navy, I regret to say" Welles wrote to his son on 2 
November 1862. "All the contractors are greatly behind their time in completing & 
delivering their vessels thereby deranging all plans, and while I perhaps am the person 
most wronged and disappointed, the country will be very likely to blame me most for 
delay or neglect. , 577 Indeed, it seemed a long time since the Union had achieved any 
notable successes in the Civil War-and the Congressional elections were at hand in 
November. Meanwhile, at sea the C. S. S. Alabama was wreaking havoc on Northern 
commerce. For this too Welles expected personal blame, rather than his colleague 
William Seward, whose policy towards Britain since the Trent Affair he felt was one of 
"meeting aggression with concession... to avoid hostilities, but to throw the labor of the 
conflict on the Navy if there was to be a war. 97578 
The mounting national and international tensions of late 1862 had thus turned the 
cramped confines of the gun turret of the U. S. S. Passaic into a pressure-cookcr. Ericsson 
and his engineers were under close and urgent scrutiny from the Navy to make their 
vaunted machines work as quickly and perfectly as possible. As a result, the 
unprecedented challenge of mounting a single 15-inch gun of 22 tons on a single ship, 
and making it fire in an enclosed space without deafening, concussing or smoking out the 
gun crew quickly had become indicative of the many deeper-and personal-issues at 
stake. Ericsson, for his part, considered the success of his ideas inevitable., " This 
included employment of an iron smoke-box around the 15-inch gun. "The experiment is 
simply a question of strength', he wrote to Fox. I have employed Ylinch thick plate, not 
having been able to obtain heavier plate without losing too much tilne. ""o Time proved 
decisive, however. On the 15th the efficiency of the box in reducing smoke and 
577 2-11-1862, Welles to son, WP. 
578 14-10-1862, Beale, Diary, 1: 172; also 10-10-1862,165-6,13- and 14-10-1862,170-1. See also 
1862, Seward to Welles, and 15-10-1862, Welles to Seward, WP. 
579 Success was also necessmy; as Stimers pointed out to Fox, the 15-inch gun would have to utilize charges 
of more than 40 pounds to be effective against strongly-armoured targets, 10-11-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP. 
580 9-11-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
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concussion was proven enough after three test-fires; Stimers then advised removing the 
muzzle ring to test it still fiirther. The fourth shot ruptured the box. 
At any rate, General Superintendent Rear-Admiral Gregory was satisfied with Ericsson's 
recent test-fire, reporting to Welles on 15 November that the "certainty of being able to 
use guns of that large calibre in my opinion [is] ftilly established. "581 The Secretary, 
having written to Gregory the same day that it was "yM important that the Passaic 
should be at Hampton Roads on Saturday next", congratulated him in response to the 
news that it was "a continuation of the triumph of mechanical skill. ', 582 To Dahigren, 
however, Gregory reported on 16 November that "the arrangements made by Capt. 
Ericsson ... were not entirely successful as there was some 
damage done the box fitted 
round the port by the concussion... " But he agreed the test was nonetheless indicative 
that Ericsson would "perfect the [arrangements] in such manner as to answer the purpose 
,, 583 effectually... 
Drayton's assessment of the same day took Gregory's wavering to the other extreme. 
Although he admitted it was "practicable to fire the gun in the way proposed, " lie 
admitted to Dahigren, it was "at the sacrifice of some convenience in loading and 
sighting. " On the other hand, it would always be easier to drill out a port4iole larger than 
seventeen inches later if it was found necessary, than to fill it up. Nevertheless, tile 
newspaper reports of the trial were "pretty much false, the fact being that the gun is not 
fired inside of the turret, but into a chamber attached to it, and in point of fact I havc bccn 
right and not Mr. Ericsson from the start, as I always told him he could not fire tile gun as 
it was when you were on board... " It was thus Drayton's suggestion to construct a 
smoke-box, not Ericsson's, and Drayton who urged that it be made strong enough, "which 
5" 15-11-1862, Gregory to Welles, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
582 15-11-1862, Wefles to Gregory, RG 45, Entry 15; 17-11-1862, Welles to Gregory, Wp. 
5111 16-11-1862, Gregory to DaWgren, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
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it is difficult to make him do, " he added sarcastically, "as his experience as a Swedish 
Artillery officer has taught him that there is no lateral escape from the muzzle, but that the 
gas goes straight ahead. 7584 
Rodgers noted this discrepancy of attitudes to his wife: "Ericsson says make the box 
stronger and it will answer completely. Drayton doubts whether it can be made strong 
enough. , 585 Unfortunately, so did one of Ericsson's reporters, who, according to Stimers, 
"expressed himself quite feely about the Naval Officers and did not show his complete 
report to the Capt., so that although nothing is published which can be objectionable to 
the Government there is an apparent discourtesy to a large number of officers which has 
caused a good deal of feeling and which makes the Admiral, Capt Drayton and Myself 
regret that we took the responsibility of permitting the reporters to accompany US. "586 
Ericsson later attempted to trivialize the affair, yet with an unmistakable air of official 
denial. 587 The press, the Navy, and Ericsson; no one was willing to openly state there 
might be a civil-military relations issue over the monitors in the balance. 
584 16-11-1862, Drayton to Dahlgren, DP. 
585 19-11-1862, John to Anne Rodgers, RFP. 
5136 20-11-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP. 
597 26-11-1862, Ericsson to Fox, EPLOC. 
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V. Shifting ironclad confidence 
Again, the wider circumstances of the Civil War put these diverse and often conflicting 
personal, working relationships into sharp relief Exactly how would the Union ironclads 
be used when they were ready? Where would they strike? Or would they be used for 
strictly coastal and harbour defence after all? Ilie subsequent discussions of their 
deployment were a matter of national policy: would the Navy assume the strategic 
defence with its ironclads or try to regain its initiative with them? When Rodgers 
bemoaned his initial refusal to be reassigned to one of the new monitor-ironclads-and 
off the stricken Galena-his inside contact at the Navy Department assured him on 
November 6 that "at this moment greater anxiety is felt about the 2 nd Merrimac [the 
diminutive casemate ironclad-ram C. S. S. Richmond] than upon any other subject 
connected with the naval operations of the war, not excepting the '290' [the C. S. S. 
Alabama], when she is destroyed or blows herself up. "588 Hampton Roads, Fortress 
Monroe, and the recaptured base at Norfolk-and perhaps even Washington-were still 
considered far from secure; the memories of the Virginia and the Arkansas lingered, even 
as Rodgers in the Galena languored. 
That same day, Captain Thomas Turner of the New Ironsides was even more fretful. No 
one seemed to understand the iron gun carriages provided for her powerful battery of 
sixteen 11 -inch Dahlgren smoothbores, neither Dahlgren nor her builders, lie complained 
to Rear Admiral Samuel P. Lee of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. I'lleir recoil 
was so violent as to prevent a sustained fire, while the gundeck of the broadsidc-ironclad 
was not large enough to house the crews needed to work such heavy guns with traditional 
truck and tackle. Until that technical problem was fixed, or lighter ordnance substituted 
(which Turner preferred), the New Ironsides guarding Hampton Roads virtually had no 
588 6-11-1862, Murray to Rodgers, RFP. 
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armament. Her captain, in the meantime, wished his concerns formally reported to the 
Department "if any disaster should occur in the partially crippled condition of my ship- 
by which the enemy might inflict serious damage, or escape to the waters of the 
,, 589 Chesapeake... 
Even if the Union had an additional ironclad frigate in service, Welles apparently 
indicated be would like to see it stationed in New York harbour, "ready for sea". 590 The 
threat of the Alabama, and other fast, British-built Confederate cruisers always on the 
horizon, had caused considerable alarm in the big eastern port-cities. Deputations from 
the powerfid New York Chamber of Commerce and the Governor pressured Welles to 
allocate at least one of the new ironclads for the permanent defence of their harbours from 
quick raids or humiliating demands for "tribute". 591 The Boston Board of Trade wrote: 
"In view of the recent reckless depredations of the piratical steamer Alabama, and her 
reported near proximity to our bay, and also the apparently well authenticated fact 
recently made public, that powerful stearn rams are now partially constructed in England, 
to be used by the rebels in an attack on our principal cities on the Northern coast, added to 
an apprehension (by no means unfounded) that our country may suddenly be involved in 
a foreign war, it can not be regarded strange that this community should be pervaded by 
deep solicitude as to the absence of immediate means to make any adequate defense 
against an attack fforn either of the sources referred to. " Though there were three forts, 
Warren, Independence, and Winthrop ready to accommodate 475 guns, only 153 were in 
place, "and none of these can be said to be of sufficiently large caliber to make a 
successful defense against an armor-plated steamship, especially if she should attempt to 
enter the harbor through Broad Sound. " Although this form of defence was the 
589 6-11-1862, Turner to Lee, and 11-11-1862, Dahlgren to Welles, RG45, Letters Rec'd. See also 2-11- 
1862, Dahlgren to Welles, RG 45, Letters Rec'd. At any rate, the U. S. S. Afonifor had rctumed to I lampton 
Roads by the 15th. 
590 10-11-1862, David Radly Field to Welles, WP. 
591 See 16-9-1862, telegram, Morgan to Welles, ORN, 1: 1,475-6, and 8-11-1862, r- D. Morgan to Wcllcs, 
ORIV 1: 1,539. 
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responsibility of the U. S. Army, its resources were obviously stretched, and the necessary 
ordnance would take more time. It was logical to the Board that, in the meantime, the 
Navy should fill the gap with a "floating battery". "We are not unaware of the 
embarrassment which the Government has suffered from the limited means of supplying 
ordnance in its great emergency, nor would we make the claims of Boston Harbor for 
protection unduly prominent, but you will pardon us if we suggest that, after a war of 
twenty months, the harbor of the third commercial city in the Union ought no longer to be 
allowed by its very weakness to invite the aggression of a desperate enemy. " Boston 
therefore wanted the Nahant, which was finishing under Loring. 592 'Me next day, Welles 
was even informed by fellow Cabinet member, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. 
Chase, that the Governor and Port Collector of New York had called upon him in 
"reference to the defenses of that city. " Chase could not resist the opportunity of blithely 
informing Welles that the "duty of providing such defenses on the water belongs 
appropriately to your Dept. ", and that his own could provide two revenue steamers, if 
need be. 593 
Welles relented to Governor Morgan. Instead of the old sailing sloop Savannah (being 
used as a training sh. ip), the converted multi-turret ironclad Roanoke would be placed 
under the command of Rear-Admiral Paulding for the defence of New York until another 
armoured man-of-war was ready. 594 But when Paulding inadvertently informed Ifirarn 
Barney, the New York Collector of Customs, that the Passaic was already ordered south, 
592 12-11-1862, Boston Board of Trade to Welles, ORN, 1: 1,542-4. See also the deputation of the Boston 
Marine Society, 18-11-1862, to Welles, ORIV, 1: 1,547-8; and 14-11-1862, C. If. Marshall, Chairman of the 
New York City Chamber of Commerce, to Welles, requesting commissions to fit out private vessels to 
capture the Alabama "under promise of reward by citizens". ORIV, 1: 1,545. 
593 13-11-1862, Chase to Welles, WP. See also 19-11-1862, Ifirarn Barney, New York Collector of 
Customs, to Welles, ORIV, 1: 1,548, who complained that since the Passaic was ordered south, and the 
Roanoke (according to Paulding) would not be ready for at least 60 days, he would utilise the armed 
revenue steamers to at least act as warning pickets, and reassure the local populace "that the naval 
authorifies are ready to perform the duty which they have undertaken of destro)ing any hostile vessels 
which may possibly reach the harbor. " 
5"' See 17-11-1862, Morgan to Welles, WP; also ORN, 1: 1,546-7; and 18-11-1862, Welles to Paulding, 
RG 45, Entry 328. 
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and that the Roanoke would not be ready for at least another sixty days, Welles was 
quickly told New York City would indeed utilise the armed revenue steamers, to at least 
act as warning pickets, and reassure its citizens "that the naval authorities are ready to 
perform the duty which they have undertaken of destroying any hostile vessels which may 
possibly reach the harbor. " 'nie next day, 20 November, Barney-with Morgan- 
telegraphed Welles they desired "the Passaic remain for the defense of this harbor until 
the Montauk is ready for that service. , 595 
The control of Federal ironclads thus threatened to be pried out of the hands of the Navy 
Department in Washington. Moreover, an ironclad granted for the direct defence of one 
city would similarly oblige the Navy for every other. Were the nation's interests best 
served locally or not? Welles wasted no time in replying. it was, he acknowledged, 
"proper at all times to guard against danger, though it may not be imminent. " Yet there 
was "seldom a day when there are not several Naval vessels at New York undergoing 
repairs, " some of which would probably be "ready for instant service". Ilie defences of 
New York were, at any rate, "much better provided for ... so far as the Navy is concerned, 
than most of the places on our sea-board. " Most crucially, the Secretary of the Navy 
specified: 
This is in no respect a maritime war, and the War Department has 
doubtless attended to the harbor defences. It can hardly be 
expected that the Navy Department should suspend active 
operations and divert vessels from their destination from merely 
apprehended dangers, or apprehended omission on the part of the 
Government or others, in regard to defences. 5% 
595 19-11-1862, Barney to Welles; 20-11-1862, telegram, Morgan and Barney to Welles; OR)V, 1: 1,548. 
Gregory meanwhile reported "a very large force employed" on the Roanoke, 22-11-1862, Gregory to 
Lenthall, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
596 22-11-1862, Welles to Morgan, WP. 
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When John Forbes wrote from Boston on 19 November that people on the coast were 
"subject to spasmodic attacks of the Shakes-& just now our public [are] much 
concerned about the Alabama", Fox replied the same day as Welles he had no doubt such 
cruisers "can be kept out by our present forts. " Besides, the Alabama was "doing a much 
business with less risk than attacking Boston. , 597 What Fox had in mind for the monitors 
was a series of offensive strikes all along the southern coast, starting at Wilmington, then 
Charleston, possibly Savannah, and finally sweeping the Union tide of victory back into 
the Gulf of Mexico, where Farragut was waiting. To Rear Admiral Lee he almost 
cavalierly suggested on 7 November that it would be "a grand stroke to take a couple of 
steamers, tow these vessels down in good weather, and clean out Wilmington and its 
railroad connections. " Indeed, he added: "Perhaps the forts would surrender if you got to 
,, 598 the town. Fox was even willing to offer $5,000 to any pilot familiar with the harbour, 
"of undaunted courage and great coolness", "if they take an ironclad to the town of 
Wilmington and back. "599 But these plans, he already knew, were reliant upon the Navy's 
ability to force enemy obstructions, as much the Union might rely upon them as well. 
Though Stimers reported to him on 10 November he had "Torpedoes men placed in 
hand", Gregory had his doubts that the monitors would have the necessary power to batter 
through obstructions with armoured rafts the way Ericsson and Stimers envisaged. " 
Even if the various obstructions could be overcome, and ropes avoided, would tile forts 
surrender? Would the town? 
In any event, troubles continued to plague the Passaic in the meantime. On her two-day 
maiden voyage to Hampton Roads her boilers suffered from poor construction and evcn 
worse management by her chief engineer. Shuttled back up to the Washington Navy 
117 19-11-1862, John Forbes to Fox; 22-11-1862, Fox to John Forbes; FP. 
598 7-11-1862, Fox to Lee, ORN 1: 8,2034. 
599 28-11-1862, Fox to George W. Blunt, ORIV, 1: 8,237. See also 26-11-1862, Welles to Lieutenant. 
Colonel Martin Burke, ORN 1: 8,235. 
600 10-11-1862, Stimers to Fox, FP; 13-11-1862, Gregory to Welles, RG 19, Entry 1235. 
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Yard, Isherwood himself was ordered by Fox to examine the cause. The Martin Boilers 
had been the Bureau Chief s suggestion. Drayton did not waste time complaining to 
Rear-Admiral Lee about Ericsson's injured ironclad, "owing to bad work and 
negligence"; while the Assistant Secretary, always the positive conciliator, assured Lee 
that although the "arrival of the Passaic was very discouraging, " she would quickly be 
back in service. "We have learned something by the accident. Accident is a good 
teacher. 7601 
Ericsson's mood, however, was anything but satisfied. Even though the Montauk was 
also ready, he was annoyed of her not being ordered out, "as the several officers found all 
sorts of things to do. " Holes were being drilled into her decks for various fittings, making 
him uneasy. "One would think from the manner the Monitor fleet is viewed by your 
officers", he wrote to Fox, "that it must be intended for cruising and not for attacking and 
destroying the eneMy.,, 602 It was little wonder that Rodgers was nervous of meeting the 
fiery and reclusive inventor, a sort of great and brooding volcano. "He is said to keep 
himself aloof from vulgar eyes, much in the manner of the great Mogul; and to offend 
generally those who gain admittance", be noted to his wife. "I think I can get on without 
receiving offense as I am neither captious nor touchy. , 
603 Men Loring inquired on IS 
December whether Ericsson was sure he had not omitted any extra details for tile 
monitors which the Navy might require, the volcano burst. Additional fittings were not 
his responsibility, but Stimers'. "It is here that in order to please the several on-1ccrs of 
the Gunboats I have invented and applied various contrivances such as bits, timber 
houses, chocks, flag staffs, auxiliary steering gear, holding down gear of hatches, Shot 
lifters and a variety of other similar contrivances but in no instance have I succeeded in 
601 See 29-11-1862, Drayton to Turner; 3-12-1863, Drayton to Lee; 9-12-1863, Fox to Lee, ORN, 1: 8,243; 
269. 
602 10-12-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
603 7-12-1862, John to Anne Rodgers, RFP. 
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calling forth expressions of approbation. " While the Government and general public 
seemed to appreciate his efforts, nothing had "so far given satisfaction to the commanding 
officers. " Yet Ericsson had responded to their concerns-and the builders-within days, 
if not hours in most cases. I politely offered the other day to send you a turret sight 
ready made, " he pointed out to Loring, offended, "you have not even noticed my 
attention. " What right did Loring or anyone have, therefore, to suggest any "neglect" on 
his part? The Passaic's boilers were only the latest example. Ericsson expected more 
gratitude, respect-perhaps faith-by then. "I could show you that such herculean [sic] 
labor as I have performed in relation to the Monitor fleet is not on record in the history of 
engineering": 
Not one plan have you waited for essential to the prosecution of 
the work. Matters of detail unconnected with the vessel and 
machinery yourself and the Government Inspector should have 
looked after. 
I have repeatedly urged your sending some competent person to 
copy what was doing here if you desired to follow me in every 
thing. I now again urge this course. 
I will at once report the whole case to the Secretary of the Navy as 
I cannot permit blame to be fastened on me as my reward for 
almost superhuman exertions during the last seven months. 604 
But when Ericsson did complain to Fox, not Welles, the Assistant Secretary finally boiled 
over himself Indeed, he could afford to be more forthright, in many ways, with Ericsson 
than with his fellow Union officers. It was for Ericsson to rernember that Fox too was 
under stress because of the monitor-ironclads; from the officers, the contractors, and the 
bickering found at all levels over matters of technical detail which nonetheless threatened 
to derail the Union ironclad program unless someone proved willing to actuallyfiX Such 
problems as they occurred, and everyone was kept on track-wliich was not always a 
rewarding task either: 
604 16-12-1862, Ericsson to Loring EPLOC. 
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Being myself responsible that some twenty are now underway, 
and knowing that the exigencies of the public service did not 
permit experiments with the details, I have personally 
considerable at stake in the matter. It is a stake of reputation 
which is the greatest one that can be imposed. It is briefly whether 
I shall be considered an Ass or a very sensible man. I take this 
risk on these boats most cheerfully, having every confidence that 
your skill will work out successfully the perfection of all minor 
detailS. 605 
Ericsson was again mollified, to some extent, but seems to have missed Fox's Wider 
point. Two weeks later, Ericsson finally acknowledged he was "more and more 
surprised at the course of this officer [Drayton] who seems bent on prejudicing everybody 
against the vessel under his command. " Not only was Drayton's proclivity for criticism 
and despair unsuitable for the Passaic, it was severely infectious. In a state of civil war, 
perhaps it was even treasonous... Was this the type of officer the Union needed? In fact, 
Ericsson was prepared to show "by legal testimony" that it was Drayton who had "called 
on the Editor of The [New York] World and told him that the muzzle box had been torn to 
pieces and that the idea would prove an utter failure. " This was a much weightier 
indictment than those against Rowland, the "overbearing" builder with his poor choice of 
foremen, or the various "incompetent" engineers of the monitors-assigned by 
Isherwood, the "malign" Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering; the man behind the 
monitors threatened (perhaps justly) to demand the replacement of the captains in 
command of the nation's most important, high-profile warships-, Pricsson's ironclads: 
I trust the man may prove to be what you expect, certain it is 
however that he is discouraged by the slightest difficulty. I have 
found him on every occasion to give in on the first appearance of 
trouble. I will try to believe that it is mechanical difficulties alone 
that appall [sic] him. 606 
605 16-12-1862, Fox to Ericsson, FP. 
606 30-12-1862, Ericsson to Fox, FP. 
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distinction to be made between those who operated the ironclads and those who 
commanded (if not directed) them. Senior engineers in charge of the ships' engines 
could, should, and would be rather easily replaced when need be. "It is only necessary for 
you to give us an intimation in time, to have a change instantly made, as in the case of the 
Passaic, " Fox confirmed. But the charge against Isherwood was more complicated, and 
the Assistant Secretary disapproved of "Mr. Stimers putting on to Isherwood's shoulders 
any 'malign influence' against the Monitor fleet. " Isherwood was not the mastermind of 
an anti-monitor conspiracy; one of his Bureau's clerks assigned the engineers for the 
monitors, and these were then under Stimers' supervision, not the Engineer in Chief's. 
Once more, Fox reminded-and reassured-Ericsson: "I have shouldered this fleet, and I 
doubt if any one can stand in the way provided we are successful, of which I entertain no 
doubt. " Complaints from officers he absolutely liked to hear of "because it teaches a 
lesson-Pride never does. " Bickering, on the other hand, was inexcusable, even 
dangerous, in the Navy. "Mr. Stimers and Mr. Isherwood belong to a military family, and 
it is impossible for the former to talk openly about the latter, and tile Officers tell me 
Stimers does, without laying himself liable to be called upon to prove all fie says. " If 
Ericsson, or Stimers, were to ever put Fox's professional loyalties to the test, on the basis 
ofpairiotism, he could assure them both there was no inherent conflict of his duty. 111 
have no fiiend in A this business except those who most earnestly and zealously work to 
defeat the public enemy, " he wrote, "and all those who are banded together to work to the 
same end, should endeavor to do it with harmony. , 
607 
Perhaps more significantly, the monitors were at least being commissioncd, at last 
becoming a reality, and already fulfilling their primary, original role. As Rodgers 
indicated to his wife on December 16'h, the Montauk's trial trip, , which I and Rowan 
George Rodgers were ordered to witness and take note upon", including the test-firing of 
607 30-12-1862, Fox to Ericsson, FP. 
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the 15-inch gun inside the turret, was "very satisfactory. " Furthermore, "Capt. 
Lessoffsky[J Russian Navy[J with 2 other Russian officers were on board and very much 
impressed with the power of the gun. "608 Despite the setbacks and uncertainties of 1862, 
Rodgers contemplated the New Year with a sense of hope, and this was all that Ericsson, 
the Department, and Lincoln, asked. His new command, the monitor U. S. S. Weehawken, 
already needed a repair just before her departure south. "An accident happened to the 
machinery, whereby two of the cog wheels for moving the turret were damaged by having 
some of the teeth broken out", yet this could be easily mended, he wrote. Eager to be off, 
Rodgers was more than ready "to have a finger in humbling Sumpter [sic]. " Indeed, the 
"garrison should be made to surrender without conditions... " Fanaticism and confidence 
went hand in hand. The Navy still expected victory, and its ironclads were the key. As 
for the threat posed by the "Men-finac No. 2" against Hampton Roads, Rodgers thought it 
possible that "when the iron clads are taken off to some pressing exigency ... she will pitch 
in, and strike for Washington. " But he would be "pleased" if she attacked before then. "I 
stood Fort Darling 3V2 hours, " he assured his wife, "and in less than that time the 
Merrimac will be chips. , 609 
608 16-12-1862, John to Anne Rodgers, RFP. 
609 31-12-1862, John to Anne Rodgers, RFP. 
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V1. Regaining the strategic initiative? 
Regaining the strategic initiative during the Civil War had by this time become an 
international issue for the Union as well. On 7 December, even as the Army of the 
Potomac, under the new command of General Ambrose Burnside, finally began to march 
against the Army of Northern Virginia-towards Fredericksburg-Seward stressed to the 
U. S. Chargi dAffaires at St. Petersburg, Bayard Taylor: "Our great expedition assigned 
to Major General Banks has moved towards its destination, and it will soon be heard 
from. Our forces are clearing the valley of the Mississippi. Another army is pressing the 
insurgents in Virginia. Our iron-clad fleet is growing with rapidity, and it will soon 
reduce the last remaining insurgent port. The principal part of Tennessee is restored. " It 
was the task of all U. S. consuls to constantly assure-and warn---ý`that any foreign power 
which think this people is ready to divide and destroy itself is mistaken, and that if any 
such state thinks the Union can be destroyed by interference from any foreign quarter, this 
belief is even still more erroneous. " Taylor likewise replied on tile 17'h (before news 
arrived of the repulse of Burnside at Fredericksburg) that "nothing can do us so much 
damage abroad as inaction, either real or apparent. " The intervention crisis following tile 
news of Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation had temporarily passed, and Taylor 
hoped "that the restoration of confidence ... will not again suffer a relapse . 9961 
, The Union 
had to demonstrate strength as well as resolve-against the Confederacy, and against 
Europe if need be. But against the latter it had to do this tactfully, even politely. 
A case in point was the increased effort of Gideon Welles to find and destroy the C. S. S 
Alabama-which was busily wrecking Yankee prestige as much as its maritime 
commerce-and to disrupt "Anglo-Rebel" blockade-running operations. "" YCt the 
6 10 7-12-1862, Seward to Taylor, and 17-12-1862, Taylor to Seward, F-A, 771-3. 
611 See for example, 1-12-1862, Welles to Paulding, RG 45, Entry 328. 
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Secretary was also cautioned by the State Department to tread carefully on British 
neutrality in the process. His instructions to the ever-assertive Rear-Admiral Wilkes, 
hovering with his cruisers outside Bermuda, were thus a curious mixture of approval and 
admonition. 612 How difficult this must have been for Welles, who within a week had to 
complain himself to Seward about ironclad frigates reported to be building at Glasgow 
and Liverpool for the Confederate States Navy ! 613 Perhaps the United States should 
simply out-bid Southern agents in Britain and buy up all such belligerent vessels? Fox 
wrote this was "frequently... under discussion, and as a matter of precaution is expensive, 
as it would involve us in unlimited purchases without entirely curing the evil, since every 
steamer could not be obtained. " The blockade seemed effective enough to stop most 
runners. In his estimate "not one in twenty have landed a cargo and returned safely to 
England. " The ironclads were another matter. These, he informed John Forbes, should 
be purchased "if they can be obtained for money. Mr. Welles favors the idea and Mr. 
Seward simply urges it. " How they would keep such a transaction secret from Congress 
was a finiher problem, but a future one. For the Department of the Navy, British-built 
ironclads for the Confederacy were a long-dreaded nightmare, "deserving instant action at 
any price, since we have not a port north that can resist an iron Clad of very moderate 
power. , 614 Forbes added that it was doubtful "as to John Bull allowing any decent people 
to take them away, but even so far it may be well worth trying, then perhaps some 
fiiendly getting such ironclads Government, Spain or Portugal, may licreallcr buy them or 
us if we fail to get them out while we are Belligerent! "615 This was also important: tile 
U. S. might purchase a seagoing ironclad more expensive than tile Dictator or 
Dunderberg-and never be able to wield that added power against Britain herself 
someday. What would prevent the Royal Navy from grabbing it up as their own-a 
612 2-12-1862, and 15-12-1862, Welles to Wilkes, WP. 
613 8-12-1862, Welles to Seward, WP. 
614 9-12-1862, Fox to John M. Forbes, FP. 












donation from the belligerent Yankees, if not the South? Indeed, less than a year later 
Lord Palmerston shrewdly urged the First Lord of the Admiralty to purchase the twin 
"Laird Rams" built at Liverpool for similar reasons: 
Now what I wish you to consider is whether it would not be a 
good thing to buy these Iron Clad Rams for our Navy; we are 
short of Iron Clads, and it takes Time to build them, we want a 
good many more to put us on our proper level with France; here 
are Two nearly finished, no doubt well built, fast sailors, and fitted 
as Rains; if you want Two such either in our Dockyards or in a 
private yard you would not get them till the end of next year, and 
these will be available before the End of this year. If the Federals 
get them they wiH strengthen the Yankees against us if they 
should be disposed and able next year to execute their threatened 
vengeance for all the Forbearance we have shewn them; if we get 
these Ships they will tend to give us Moral as well as maritime 
strengtll. 6 6 
At any rate, Welles had taken the lesson to heart and promptly notified Congress that "tile 
line of policy which the events and the necessities of the period have instituted, " made it 
"obvious that other and vigorous should be adopted in order that we may, when 
circumstances require it, be able to act with effect on the offensive. " In order for tile U. S 
Navy to be "formidable abroad as well as at home, " Welles continued, it "should have 
armored vessels of great power and speed and of different construction from any that we 
now possess as cruisers. " The energetic attempts of the South to obtain such ironclads in 
Great Britain, combined with rising tensions with at least that European Power, meant the 
Union could not afford to be taken at any such disadvantage, anywhere, if possible. Tilus, 
Welles continued: "We shall require for service in case of a foreign war a class of vessel 
of this description that will be capable of encountering any enemy and asserting and 
maintaining our rights in the ocean as well as to assist in guarding our coasts. " Ilie 
Department had "for some months past had in view the construction of two or three 
powerful Steamers of Iron and to be Iron Clad, " and these would help enable the Union to 
616 13-9-1863, Palmerston to Somerset SP. 
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take the initiative-in a war which did not exist but nevertheless seemed probable. The 
nation's "turret boats of the Monitor class" were distinctly for coast and harbour defence. 
Combined, such an ironclad navy would "go far to render us invulnerable as a naval 
power, capable of resisting the assaults of any nation and always able to assist and 
maintain our rights at home and abroad. ý, 617 
Yet there were hitches with this ambitious new naval strategy. As Welles, noted, the 
"cost of the proposed vessels would necessarily be great, so much so that I deem it proper 
before commencing them that the subject should receive the attention of the Naval 
Committees and, should they deem it advisable, be submitted to Congress for its sanction 
and approval. " Their ostensible purpose, however, while "taking the offensive" if the 
United States was "at any time engaged in hostilities with a naval power". was still one of 
strategic defence, for they "could disperse any blockade that might be attempted"ý-rather 
than initiating one of their own. Could not the existing ironclads, especially the monitors, 
already fulfil that role? Was this not the primary reason for their construction during the 
previous December, at the height of the Trent Crisis? Furthermore, Welles was 
specifying massive, iron-hulled, seagoing ironclads of the European pattern which would 
require at least $12 million in addition to the annual estimate, take several years to build, 
and which the Northern press was actively campaigning against in comparison with 
American monitors. Was now the time to build such a navy? Could Northern resources 
even handle such an order, in addition to all those already building for coastal assault and 
defence, let alone those for riverine warfare? So far there had only been contract delays, 
labour shortages, and cost overruns; and would these problems become better or worse as 
the war progressed? These were questions that undoubtedly occurred to knowing 
members of Congress, though Welles pointedly neglected to address thern. Instead, lie 
617 12-12-1862, Welles to Sedg%-. ick and Hale, RG 45, Entry 5. 
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resorted to the classic, often unanswerable argument for military expenditure which he 
must have known had failed to convince politicians long before the Civil War: 
To be prepared for war is one means of preventing its occurrence. 
It is true wisdom to be ready at all times for any emergency, and 
hence the proposition for a few powerful Steamers, Iron Clad, and 
each having the properties of Ram of immense power, with a 
speed of at least sixteen knotS. 618 
In fact, Welles had already outlined the Department's vision for the future in his Annual 
Report to Congress, dated I December 1862. Stymied as he was by the quieter protocol 
of diplomacy to carry out his duties without openly offending Britain, Welles infon-ned 
Congress it had been "deemed advisable ... that we should have a few large-sized armed 
cruisers, of great speed, for ocean service, as well as of the class of smaller vessels for 
coastwise service and defensive operations. "69 In this altered perception of Union 
ironclad strategy, the monitors would "penetrate the inner waters, rivers, harbors, and 
bayous of our extended double coast", - while vessels similar to the Warrior would deal 
with "foreign powers" on their own terms after all. This was the silent, but strong-armed 
political leverage of naval power at work. The British Empire would respect nothing less. 
With a rival fleet of American "Warriors" to contend with, it might respect such power 
even more. Just as Ericsson promised the previous December that his monitors would 
serve a vital deterrent function against foreign intervention, the Department's call for 
high-seas ironclads the following year might force the British Government to more 
strictly observe its own stated neutrality-and stop further blockade runners, raiders, and 
even ironclads, from building in private British establishments, being manned by British 
subjects, and finding quarter in British colonial ports. As Welles wrote: "The tiinc has 
arrived when, in order to maintain ourselves and our true position as a nation, we must 
have a formidable Navy, not only of light draught vessel to guard our extensive and 
618 Ibid. 
619 1-12-1862, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy. 
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shallow coast, but one that with vessel always ready for the service, and of sufficient size 
,, 620 to give them speed, can seek and meet an enemy on the ocean. 
Yet "great speed" required "enormous steam power". and for this the United States "must 
have vessels of the greatest magnitude. " Iron construction would thus also be needed; 
and to facilitate this a new, Government-owned naval and industrial base would be 
necessary. "No private establishment can undertake such heavy work as the Government 
requires for its armor and steam purposes", Welles pointed out. "Possessing advantages 
that no nation enjoys, we should avail ourselves of them. Our iron and coal are found in 
the same region, and we have fresh-water rivers in which iron vessels can be docked and 
kept clean, and from which all enemies can be excluded. " The greatest justification for 
this sweeping program for an entirely new, Government-controlled naval-industrial 
infrastructure, was in fact, Welles contended-as did Controller of the Royal Navy 
Spencer Robinson to the Admiralty-the failings of the private sector in meeting the 
equally radical demands of modem warfare. 
Thus, for the nation-state to wield even more military and naval power, it would need to 
consolidate even more the means of that power. I'lie national draft, the income tax, the 
constitutionally-dubious liberties which the Executive branch of the Government had 
assumed to successfully prosecute the war against the Rebellion, perhaps even tile 
Emancipation Proclamation; all these were symptoms of the same process; and all were 
contingent upon the shifting circumstances of the Civil War itself, domestically and 
internationally. Welles' admonition of Congress in neglecting greater investment in 
Federal power prior to the outbreak of secession also carried a double meaning. Not only 
was the republic ill-prepared for suddenly waging-if not deter7ing-a great, modern 
civil war, but perhaps this state of weakness--or a weak State-was intentional: 
620 ibid. 
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Successive Administrations, with a view to the appearance of 
economy and a show of small expenditure, restricted the estimates 
for supplies to amounts barely sufficient to keep its few ships 
afloat. 
The war found us literally destitute of materials in our navy-yards, 
as well as with but few ships to sustain the national integrity. 
From mistaken economy, or from design, the Government was, in 
its need, deficient in ships and destitute of material for their 
construction. 621 
By this reasoning, the Navy Secretary and his Department could hardly be criticized, 
much less investigated, by Congress in its dealings with private shipbuilders-its 
procurement policies-or possibly even its operations, or not, either successful or failed, 
against the Confederate States. Moreover, the victories the U. S. Navy had achieved in tile 
past year, including above all the vigorous establishment of a grand blockade of the 
South, despite the limited means at its disposal, merited praise from the nation. For his 
part, Welles' opinion of the efficiency of the national legislature was anything but 
flattering. "The demagogues in Congress disgrace the body and the country", he confided 
in his diary on Christmas Eve. "Noisy and loud professions, with no useful policy or end, 
exhibit themselves daily. "622 
But the Secretary's Report undercut itself For thepurposes ofthe Civil War, an ironclad 
fleet was already being launched thanks to private industry-and the threat of 1, forei n 
intervention seemed contained by the small ironclad-monitors with their 15-inch ordnance 
on the one hand, and the faltering, yet persistent advances of the Union Army on the 
other. Despite the chronic lack of preparation for a major-and increasingly total- 
modem war, the nation and its Executive was, by the end of 1862, more powerflul than 
ever before in its history. Did the Navy really need to build ocean-going ironclads 
621 Ibid. 
622 Entry dated 24-12-1862, Beale, Diary, 1: 206. 
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matching European enterprises to "insure peace' when, admittedly, smaller coastal 
versions were already within the capacity of Northern industry to produce? 
It was not clear what may or may not trigger a foreign war. Even greater Federal power 
might actually disrupt peaceful relations with Britain and France by tempting the United 
States to "bully" them (a common cry even before the Civil War) into compliance with its 
views on the nature of the terrible war in America, and thejustice of the Union cause over 
that of the Confederacy. Welles' personal irritation with the British was only one 
indication of tile complexities of maintaining peace, and avoiding war. "it is annoying 
when we want all our force on blockade duty to be compelled to detach so many of our 
best craft on the fruitless errand of searching for this wolf from Liverpool", he wrote in 
his diary concerning the 41abama. "We shall, however, have a day of reckoning with 
Great Britain for these wrongs, and I sometimes think I care not how soon nor in what 
manner that reckoning comes. , 623 Contrast Us sentiment with Lincoln's own, in his 
Annual Address to Congress which began with, above all else, the state of the nation's 
foreign relations. By June 1862 there were, he wrote, "some grounds to expect that the 
maritime Powers which, at the beginning of our domestic difficulties, so unwisely and 
unnecessarily, as we think, recognized the insurgents as a belligerent, would soon recede 
from that position, which has proved only less injurious to themselves than to our own 
country. " But the fortunes of war had once again changed against the Union. Tliough tile 
American Civil War "excited political ambitions and apprehensions which have produced 
a profound agitation throughout the civilized world", the U. S. had carefully -attempted no 
propagandism, and acknowledged no revolution; but we have left to every nation the 
exclusive conduct and management of its own affairs": 
623 Ibid, entry dated 29-12-1862,1: 207. Contrast this sentiment uith Lincoln's o%%n Address to Congress. 
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Our struggle has been, of course, contemplated by foreign nations 
with reference less to its own merits than to its supposed and often 
exaggerated effects and consequences resulting to those nations 
themselves. Nevertheless, complaint on the part of this 
Government, even if it werejust, would certainly be unwise. 624 
A strong defence was therefore one thing; the threat of attack was another. Nothing 
served Union diplomacy abroad better than a strong Federal military which could 
demonstrate its power by successfiffly crushing the South; and for that purpose blue-water 
ironclads of the "greatest magnitude" Welles had already assured Congress could not 
"nearly approach our shores... "625 
624 1-12-1862, Message of the President of the United States. 




Both Britain and the United States suffered simultaneous-and interrelated crises-of 
civil-n-fflitary relations during this period under examination, though with remarkably 
different outcomes. If historians today perceive that the Victorian ideal of the Hero- 
Inventor fighting against the "System" was overplayed by the public, neither can 
professional organisations themselves, especially government ones like the British 
Admiralty or the U. S. Department of the Navy, be considered victims wholly "exploited" 
by ( crank inventors and greedy entrepreneurs. 626 The truth is that it was not about the 
"Individual vs. the Institution", but Individuals vs. other Individuals. Cowper Coles made 
the mistake of attacking Edward Reed as part of an institution, rather than as a rival 
engineer or shipbuilder. John Ericsson's fame on both sides of the Atlantic only added a 
personal anxiety to this public campaign, when actions would have spoken much louder 
than words. Likewise, John Lenthall and Benjamin Isherwood's complaints of private 
contractors' influencing Fox and Welles did not conceal the fact that Ericsson, the 
individual really in question, offered to meet the policy needs of the Navy, established by 
its civilian leaders, better than they could-or would-do, with their preference for turret- 
ships loosely based on Coles' ideas; the customary deference to British practices only 
serving to irritate the Navy Department during the Civil War. 
The great controversies between Ericsson and various naval officers over the Passaic 
class monitors were also very much personal struggles, which could not, however, be 
taken personally. It did Ericsson little good to blame "sailors". In addressing their 
complaints Ericsson appreciated that only detailed problem-solving would settle matters 
626 See Andrew Lambert "The Ship Propeller Company and the Promotion of Screw Propulsion, 1836. 
1852" in Robert Gardiner (ed. ), 7he Advent of Steam: 7he Merchant Steamship hefore 1900 (London: 
Conw; y Maritime Press, 1993), 136-7; also Gideon Welles, "Tbe First Iron-Clad Monitor" in 7he Annals of 
War (Daýlon, OH: Momingside House, Inc., 1988), 17-31, where the former Secretary bitterly denied his 
Department had not paid Ericsson and his backers for the Monitor by the Battle of Hampton Roads, 
attacked Stanton and the Army, and was willing to place any "money-making motives" alongside 
Ericsson's "patriotism". See also Church, Life of Ericsson, 1: 192. For designing the entire Passaic class 
of Civil War monitors, Ericsson "profited" from their contractors' use of his patented lever-engine "one per 
cent on the contract price, " and "3/8 per cent of the contract price" for the Canonicus-class; 16-4-1864, 
Ericsson to Gregory, EPLOC; also 244-1862, Ericsson to Welles, EPPA. 
304 
with Fox and Welles. This would also serve to incriminate his opponents for him. 
"Without intending any disrespect to the commander of the Passaic [Drayton], " Ericsson 
thus wrote to Welles on 8 February 1863, "1 cannot abstain from calling your attention to 
his singular custom of drawing on the imagination in order to show what might have 
happened under certain contingencies, and what dire consequences would have resulted 
from occurrences which happily did not take place. , 627 Ironically enough, Reed and 
Robinson might have made a similar observation about Coles. 
At the beginning of the Civil War it was not clear to either Great Britain or the United 
States which was more important, defending one's own ports or attacking those of the 
enemy? Certainly the Trent Affair succeeded in confinning the Union Navy's 
predisposition to concentrate its resources on coastal vessels, and in giving a double 
meaning to John Ericsson's original "Monitor"-type ironclad. The emphasis of Union 
ironclads especially after Hampton Roads was upon their ship-killing abilities, whether to 
defend New York Harbor, for example, from British ironclads, the blockade from more 
Confederate rams (or European interference), or indeed to help crush the naval defences 
of Southern ports. Because of this concentration upon coastal operations, the Union Navy 
can be said to have succeeded in its choice of strategy-at least as far as the foreign threat 
was concerned. With various Union ironclad descriptions before him by the beginning of 
1863, from American newspapers and Royal Navy officers under Milne's command, 
Robinson reported to the Board of Admiralty that "there appears to be no novel or 
important principle elucidated by these constructions. " Those that "seem to possess sea 
going qualities", particularly the experimental broadside-ironclad U. S. S. New Ironsides, 
44are in no way superior to the French Gloire or Invincible or the Ships of the Royal Oak 
class. " The obvious bulk of the annoured Federal warships were 44mere RaftS Canying 
very few heavy guns propelled at moderate speed, and though perfectly well adapted for 
627 8-2-1863, Ericsson to Welles, Report ofthe secretary of the Navy in Relation to Armored Vessels, ()o I. 
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the inland waters of that great Continent, and most formidable as Harbour Defences, are 
not in any sense sea going Ships of War": 
This is not said with any view of disparaging the Skill and industry 
which has been displayed in their construction, still less with any 
intention of undervaluing the enormous defensive power which has 
thus been developed: a power which I believe renders the 
Americans practically unassailable in their own waters... 
if again, Admiral Nfilne means that we have not yet an Iron plated 
Flotilla capable of going into the inland waters, rivers and 
Harbours of the United States, and when there, able to fight an 
Action on equal terms with the description of Vessels which will 
be found awaiting us, he is perfectly right and it will be only 
necessary to observe that such a proceeding on our part is simply 
628 impossible. 
Against combined Confederate defences, however, the Union's preference for coastal 
ironclads-and especially monitors-held important disadvantages. Monitors could not 
be expected to out-gun forts, unless they were given adequate time and army-support, or 
were massed in such numbers as to be instantly irresistible. Even so, no ironclad design 
was better suited for running gauntlets than the light-draft, low-freeboard, heavily- 
armoured monitor. The question then revolved around whether or not simply running a 
gauntlet successfully would guarantee victory-would compel a determined enemy to 
surrender? Added to this vexing complication was the simple yet effective 
countermeasure of obstructions and especially minefields. But if coastal assault ironclads 
would find these defences difficult to overcome, seagoing ironclads would most likely 
have found them all but impossible to negotiate. 
The Royal Navy, by contrast, never openly held shallow-drafted ironclads to be 
worthless, whether for defending British ports or attacking those of an enemy. But 
neither could such vessels be relied upon to openly "command the sea". Maritime or 
629 ADM 1/5840,30-1-1863. 
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naval war was traditionally acknowledged as best fought on the strategic offensive, with 
blue-water cruisers taking the initiative, driving a rival back upon his own coastline, 
bottled up in his own harbours, and thereby leaving the sea-lanes open for imperial trade 
and communications, as well as strategic, waterborne mobility-and depriving the enemy 
of the same. Superior British imperial resources-financial, industrial, maritime-thus 
protected, victory was only a matter of time. The relatively "suddeif' threat posed by 
French ironclad-fiigates necessitated a British reaction obsessed with the sea, not the 
shoreline. Fortifications, the Defence Committees of 1860 and 1861 insisted, would more 
properly take care of national defence by "[setting] our fleet free, to operate offensively 
against the enemy or defensively for the protection of our shores... "629 Between the 
taxing demands of building large iron-hulled seagoing ironclads and fortifications, 
expressly coastal defence ironclads, turret-ships on Coles' pattern, though continually 
endorsed by the Admiralty, were routinely left at the bottom of annual defence estimates. 
A problem emerged with this strategy, however, when Great Britain also found herself 
forced by the American Civil War and particularly the Trent Affair to consider how tile 
defence of the Empire and an assault upon Union national defences was to be actually 
carried out. In his authoritative, multi-volume study of The British Navy., Its Strengths, 
Resources, and Administration (1882), Sir Thomas Brassey observed that in 1870: "'the 
failure of the French fleet, owing to the deficiencies of vessels of light draught adapted to 
coast service, was fresh in the recollection of the maritime world": 
our own experience in the Baltic campaign, when a powerful 
fleet of line-of-battle ships and ffigates was condemned to 
inaction for want of gunboats, and the success of the operations 
against the Confederates conducted by the naval forces of the 
United States, with a large flotilla of vessels of light drauglit, 
seemed to afford conclusive evidence of the necessity for 
629 LetterAddressed by the Royal Commissioners on National Defences, 11; see WO 33-10. 
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completing our naval matiriel with a due proportion of vessels 
adapted for service on the coast. 
Nevertheless, Brassey, continued, the "view adopted... has been that coast service vessels 
can be promptly improvised, and that our efforts should therefore be concentrated in time 
of peace on those classes of ships the construction of which must necessarily occupy a 
long period of time. " This indeed explained much of the course of the early British 
ironclad program. But international crises often erupted before even coastal defence 
vessels could be "improvised". This was the state of both the British and Union navies 
during the Trent Affair-though only the latter force may be said to have adapted itself 
accordingly. "It is a point to be always bome in mind, that the best ships for coast 
defence are also the best for coast attack, " Brassey concluded, and the "monitor is, par 
excellence, the best type of vessel for the operations of naval warfare on the coaSt.,, 630 
One wonders how radically different history may have been had Napoleon III originally 
chosen to concentrate on annoured batteries rather than frigates, and Britain again 
countered the French initiative appropriately-a question even J. P. Baxter failed to 
address. Instead, Hampton Roads was seen as by Baxter as having "exerted on the 
building policy of the administration an influence which in one respect may be thought 
pernicious. " Why? Because (in an all-too often repeated display of historical 
determinism) "the opportunity for building a high seas ironclad fleet was largely 
ý, 631 overlooked . 
What this thesis has avoided is a "nuts-and-bolts" comparison between Union and British 
ironclads of the Civil War era which might be expected. Yet this would have been, as 
Stanley Sandler suggested, an exceedingly tedious exercise and probably misleading in 
any case. Enough of these comparisons abound, from this period in question and ever 
630 Sir Thomas Brassey, The British Navy Its Strength, Resources, and A&ninistration, 3 l'ols. (London: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1882-3), 2: 380-7; also 3: 72. 
63 1 Baxter, Introduction, 302. 
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since, and are more noteworthy for what they tend to overlook. It is pointless to assess a 
warship's tactical strengths without reference to the wider strategic imperatives which 
intertwined-and often clashed-with them. As Donald Canney noted: 
In the United States, the reflection of these world technological 
developments was distorted: capital ships such as the 
revolutionary British Warrior of 1860 did not play a significant 
part, and the emphasis was on light-draft river and coastal 
vessels-a consequence of the Civil War, a conflict where 
inland and shoal water warfare was virtually the rule (excepting 
only the operations of the cruisers on the high seas). An 
American Warrior would have been simply useless in this 
context, except in the remote possibility of intervention by a 
European power. 632 
This thesis has shown, however, that even the Union's coastal ironclads, and especially 
the monitors, have been previously assessed by a sort of Civil War strategic near. 
sightedness; a predilection for American self-absorption. It is not the case, as Canney 
added, that "any attempt to compare American and European ironclad fleets of the era is 
infelicitous: neither fleet could meet the other on common termS. "633 On the contrary, it 
was precisely because of this historically unique and decisive relationship that tile 
comparison has been made-and not so much on the nuts-and-bolts level, comparing 
smoothbore gun with rifled, and turret with broadside, but looking beyond the strict 
confines of the American shoreline; looking outwards from a Union perspective, and 
inwards from a British one. After all, if "an American Warrior would have been simply 
useless in this context, " how might a British Warrior have faired? 71iis was a question 
which drove much of the Union's ironclad program in the deciding years of 1861-1862, 
when European intervention was considered far from "remote". 
632 Camey, Ironclads, 1. 
633 jbid, 9. 
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Another notable aspect which has emerged when "assessing the comparative strategic and 
tactical strengths of British and Union ironclad programs of the Civil War era" is how 
Britain and the Union actually assessed each other's ironclads-the perception of power. 
Ericsson was quick to realise that the monitors, if not also his own public image, served 
an important propaganda role in sustaining Northern morale, depressing the South's, and 
warning off Europe. Nor was he alone in this conviction. Imperial Russia, still smarting 
from the Crimean War, and facing renewed Anglo-French opposition to its suppression of 
the Polish Revolt, was the only major European Power during the Civil War which 
expressed unconditional morale support for the Northern States. Both nations recognised 
a further similarity between Tsar Alexander 11's freeing of the serfs in 1861 and President 
Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. When the Tsar narrowly escaped 
assassination on 16 April 1866, Congress passed a joint resolution on 16 May which 
expressed a deep personal sympathy, especially given the terrible memory of Lincoln's 
assassination the year before. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Vasa Fox was 
chosen to personally convey the message to Russia, "in a national vessel". For this 
purpose Fox without hesitation chose one of the U. S. Navy's newest monitors, the 
double-turreted, twin-screwed (and Navy designed) U. S. S. Miantonomoh. In fact lie 
leaped at the opportunity. 
Triumphant as the Union eventually was during the Civil War, professional scepticism on 
both sides of the Atlantic continued to ebb and flow for and against monitors as 
successful warships. Though these vessels rode out many storms throughout the Civil 
War, it was the gale that sank the original prototype on New Year's Eve, 1862 that stuck 
in everyone's mind. When Ericsson's single-turret flassaic class monitors were 
outgunned by the network of fortifications ringing Charleston Harbor on 7 April 1863, 
their naval officers (led by DuPont, who was in turn undoubtedly influenced by Dmyton) 
initiated a stinging publicised controversy against the Administration's decision to invest 
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in "machines". 634 At the same time, however, the monitors' 15-inch guns had proven 
their worth against enemy ironclads. Less than two weeks before his fateful charge 
against Fort Wagner (18 June 1863) Union Colonel Robert Gould Shaw, of the famous 
54'h Massachusetts Infantry regiment, visited the U. S. S. Montauk off Port Royal. "Tlie 
officers of the navy have by no means as much confidence in the Monitors as the public 
at large, " he wrote to his wife, "and say they can be of service only against other iron- 
clads, or wooden vessels, and brick-and-mortar walls. Forts of other descriptions, such as 
field-works and sand-batteries [like Wagner], they think would get the better of them. " 
Though Shaw was exposed to the worst anti-Ericsson gossip possible-at the worst time 
possible-he also visited the captured ironclad-ram C. S. S. Atlanta, quickly pummelled 
into submission at Wassaw Sound by the Weehawken (under Captain John Rodgers) less 
than three weeks before. This he described as a "very powerful" though "roughly 
finished" annourclad which "would have made great havoc in our blockading fleet, if she 
had got out... " Despite their defects, Shaw concluded the monitors were "terrible 
en&es, and wonderful in their Strength. "635 
Between the periodic boastings-and threats-of the Yankee press against British naval 
pre-eminence, and a Congressional inquiry in 1864 which could find no evidence to 
censure the Navy Department, the British Admiralty dispatched Captain James G. 
Goodenough, R-N., as an official naval attachd to Washington. His lengthy report 
concluded that "altho' not one of them could be sent to sea to cruize against an enemy or 
for any but a special object involving not more than 48 hours' absence from port, it 
appears to me that... ["as a defensive force"] ... they would 
be very valuable.,, 636 Within a 
634 See Richard S. West, Jr., Gideon Welles, Lincoln's Navy Department (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
1943), 311-14. 
635 6-7-1863, Robert to Annie Shaw, quoted from Letters of Robert Gould Shaw (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1864), 319-20; also 317. 
636 Capt. J. G. GoodenougN "Report on Ships of United States Navy 1864", ADM 115879,33-4. See also 
Richard M. Basoco, William E. Geoghegan, and Frank J. Merli, eds., -A British View of the Union Navy, 
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year even the London Times was willing to assert that a "perfect Ironclad is an imperfect 
seaboat": 
That is the maxim which up to this time might be reasonably 
propounded as the deduction from all our experience. 'flie best 
illustration of the doctrine was given by the American Monitors. 
Probably no fabric ever combined a greater capacity for fighting 
with a smaller capacity for swimming than Mr. Ericsson's 
original model. 637 
Joining Fox on the Miantonomoh, however, was Goodenough's successor from 1865, 
638 Captain John Bythesea. His 1871 testimony, before yet another Parliamentary Ship 
Design Committee, noted the passage was "quite dry". The monitor's ventilation "was 
exceedingly good", but when the engines were stopped "the lower deck then began to get 
stuffy and nasty". Still "there were three pairs of engines to supply air, " and "one pair, or 
even one cylinder, was sufficient to do the duty". Through an armoured ventilating shafl 
on deck, "they sucked the air down, and the foul air went up the turrets. " There was also 
"an arrangement for distributing the air, so that any officer, when in his cabin, could turn 
a little rose, and have as much air as he liked, or, by closing the rose, the air was turned 
off. " Sickness averaged 3 per cent. Even so, Bythesea concluded, I think if a vessel is 
to go to sea, or go from port to port, in all weathers and at short notice, a higher freeboard 
would be better. The precautions that have to be taken on each occasion that the 
'Miantonomoh' goes to sea are very great, and entail a great deal of work, much of which 
would be obviated by having a higher freeboard. " Otherwise, he "saw no necessity for 
any increased height. "639 
1864: A Report Addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Washington". Amerkan Ncptune 27 (January 
1967), 3045. 
637 1-11-1865, London Times. 
638 See 15-5-1866, Bruce to Earl Clarendon, FO 5/1065; also 1-3-1865, Russell to Somerset, Sp. 
Bythesea's own "Remarks on the U. S. Navy" I dated 19-8-1865, can be found in ADM 1/5954. 639 1871 Ship Design Committee, PPS, 34-41. See also the copy of B)-thesea's report to Clarendon, dated 
16-6-1866, including a log account of the Miantonomoh's first crossing, in ADM 1/5992. 
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As soon as the U. S. S. Miantonomoh entered Queenstown, on 15 June 1866, anchoring 
between the towering broadside-ironclads H. M. S. Black Prince and Achilles, a fresh 
storm of public controversy broke over England. The day before her arrival, the 
Admiralty had carried out an unusual and severe target practice by the Reed-designed 
central-battery ironclad Bellerophon-against the turrets of Coles' converted Royal 
Sovereign. The tests embarrassed everyone involved, and it was with no small amount of 
irony that the same issue of the Illustrated London News which covered the event also 
depicted the presence, beyond all expectation, of a Federal monitor in Ireland. Here was 
American naval and technological prowess-what the Royal Navy considered lunacy-in 
the face of apparently endless British experiments and uncertainty. Crowds were flocking 
to Queenstown to take a look, "greatly to the profit of the railway and steamer 
companies, " added the LL. N. 640 
When the Miantonomoh proceeded next to Portsmouth the attention of the nation 
followed her. "A strange vessel, with a strange figure and still stranger name, now lies at 
Spithead, " wrote the London Times. "She is a real genuine Monitor, a true specimen of 
that singular fleet on which the Americans rely for their position on tile seas. " "As these 
vessels resemble no other floating things, " the Times reasoned, "it follows almost 
inevitably that if the American shipbuilders are right ours must be wrong, and it is our 
imperative duty to investigate the subject without prejudice or delay. v641 
Nor was it solely a question of seaworthiness. A thorough inspection of the 
Miantonomoh left a Times Correspondent observing that "as a war machine for close 
heavy fighting she appears to be perfect. " Ilie 15-inch Dalilgren smoothbore was itself a 
serious contender against the "best present ship gun [in the Royal Navy], the 12-ton 9- 
60 30-6-1866, The IllustratedLondon News, 63941; 651-3. 
64127-6-1866, London Times. 
313 
inch rifle, or 250-pounder, " while the iron gun-carriages and slides "Were superior to 
anything of the kind previously seen in this country ... Two men can run the gun in or out 
with ease, and one man can regulate the compressors. -A42 The Scientific American, which 
had battled for years with the opinions of the British Engineering journal and Mechanics' 
Magazine on monitors, now quoted them eating their own words. 643 , Everywhere it is 
our resources, strength, inventions, " Fox wrote to Welles from London, "[the Monitor] is 
a wave of triumph for us allover this country... "644 The Army and Navy Journal was 
more blunt, headlining the "Victory of Monitors". "[Tbe London Times] needed only a 
sight of the Monitor to complete its gradual conversion to a belief in the system which the 
English press so long ridiculed. And now, like all new converts, it shames the old 
believers with its zeal. " "The Monitors have won, " it concluded. "It is plain they do not 
longer need advocacy. "645 
But what had the monitors "won"? Where exactly was the "victory"? More than proving 
mere technical points in one warship design over another, Fox and Ericsson succeeded in 
winning the confidence of not just the American public but the respect of British policy. 
makers as well-a victory in a long cold war of deterrence at the very heart of the Civil 
War, not at its borders. It was clear that Lord Palmerston recognised ironclads as 
powerful new playing pieces on the realpolitik-chessboard of international diplomacy. As 
early in the Civil War as June 1861 the British Prime Minister was keen to utilise them in 
a show of force against the Union, for "their going could produce no bad Impression 
here, " he wrote to Somerset, "and depend upon it as to Impression in the United States the 
Yankees will be violent and threatening in Proportion to our local weakness and civil and 
pacific in Proportion to our increasing local strength. '" Perhaps Abraham Lincoln 
642 28-9-1866, London Times. 
643 14-7-1866, The Scientific American, 34. See also 13-7-1866, Ericsson to Wise, EPPA. 
644 29-6-1866, Fox to Welles, WP. 
643 4-8-1866, Army and Navy Journal, 797. 
646 23-6-1861, Palmerston to Somerset, SP. 
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referred to the Union's own ironclads as much as its veteran annies when he declared 
towards the end of the war that "England will live to regret her inimical attitude toward 
us. " The resolution of the Trent Affair, he recalled, was "a pretty bitter pill to swallow, 
but I contented myself with believing that England's triurnph in the matter would be 
short-lived, and that after ending our war successfully we would be so powerful that we 
could call her to account for all the embarrassments she had inflicted upon US., 7647 Until 
Britain could overcome the Union's new coastal defences she could not apply the same 
political leverage with her naval power from early 1862 as she had during late 1861. By 
September 1864, Palmerston complained to Lewis' successor as Secretary for War, Earl 
de GreY648, that the Royal Navy still had no heavy guns which would smash and sink the 
Monitors. "649 
British naval supremacy by the mid 19kcentury was traditionally expected to act as a 
diplomatic counterweight to the threat posed by the mass-an-nies of continental powers 
such as France, Russia and the United States. The rise of a strong navy in any or all of 
these powers would upset this often less than obvious "balance". It was all too easy, 
perhaps, for a naval power such as Britain to wield her influence in foreign affairs (let 
alone "defend her interests" worldwide) and to tip the scales in her favour during 
international crises. The Royal Navy both neutralised the threat posed by invading 
annies-given the geography of the British Isles-and therefore offered a means for 
striking soft targets with impunity. Palmerston's informal 'chat' with the Austrian 
ambassador, Count Apponyi, during the Schleswig-Holstein crisis and Prusso-Danish 
War stood as a perfect example. England favoured Denmark; her independence as a State 
was vital to keeping British access to the Baltic. Writing to Russell, the Prime Minister 
647 Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant (New York: Da Capo Press, 1986, reprint of Century, 1897), 
407-8. 
648 George Frederick Samuel Robinson, 3rd Earl de Grey and 2 "d Earl Ripon. 
649 11-9-1864, Palmerston to de Grey, PP, (Private Letterbook). LeNvis had died on 134.1863. 
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recounted I begged [Apponyi] that nothing I might say should be looked upon as a 
Threat but only as a frank explanation between Friends on matters which might lead to 
Disagreements, and with regard to which unless timely explanation were given as to 
possible consequences of certain Things a Reproach might afterwards be made that timely 
explanation might have averted disagreeable ResultS.,, 650 Palmerston was more frank 
with Queen Victoria, who vehemently opposed his stance on Denmark, and who had also 
opposed his penchant for foreign interference more than once. That "England, the first 
and greatest Naval Power, " he wrote, "should allow the Austrian fleet to sail by our 
shores, and go and conquer and occupy the island capital of a friendly power, towards 
which we are bound by national interests and Treaty engagements, would be a national 
disgrace to which Viscount Palmerston, at least, never would stoop to be a party. it 
makes one's blood boil even to think of it; and such an affront England, whether acting 
alone or with Allies, ought never to permit. "651 As a result, continental powers ofIcn 
resented the "Mistress of the Seas", and especially Palmerston's rather imperious forcign 
policies. For the United States during the Civil War the Trent ultimatum (which Britain 
herself considered a response to American "arrogance") was the final proof of Britain's 
far-reaching pretentiousnesS. 652 
No other single military tool of U. S. diplomacy was considered more cfflcient- 
specifically intended to answer British interference in American affairs-than tile 
ironclad; specifically the U. S. S. Monitor. John Ericsson went even further, trying to 
atone for his own steep personal sacrifice. Years after the Civil War he confided to his 
brother: "My future, and my success in the world, required that I should not be troubled 
with children or with a wife who had a full right to live with me. " Fate had taken him 
650 1-5-1-1864, Palmerston to Russell, GP. See also Chamberlain, Pax, 116-18. 
65 1 22-2-1864, Palmerston to Victoria, quoted from George Earle Buckle (ed. ), 7he Letters of Qucen 
Victoria, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1926) 1: 161-3. See also Brian Connell, Regina v. I'almerston: 
Me Correspondence Between Queen Victoria and Her I oreign and 11rime Minister, 1837-1865 (London: 
Evans Brothers, Ltd., 1962), 349. 
652 See for example 14-1-1862, CG, 333. 
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instead to America, where it was "the cannon in the rotary turret at Hampton Roads that 
tore the fetters from millions of slaves, and afterward made the French abandon 
Napoleon's project in Mexico. , 653 In this mid-Victorian recourse to arms-both between 
the Northem and Southern states, and intemationafly-despite "Progress". despite 
"Civilisation", despite even "Christianity"ý--nothing offered a more reliable assurance of 
victory, it seemed, than a war machine itself coolly calculated upon measurable, 
immutable principles of opposing force and resistance. This was the new equation in 
modem conflict. Like Newton's Third Law of Motion, whereby every action causes an 
equal and opposite re-action, aggression had provoked reaction. Deteffcnce had led to the 
development of counter-deterrence. As Henry Adams in London marvelled at the brute 
ascendancy of iron over wood at Hampton Roads, and the contest of iron against iron on 
the testing grounds at Shoeburyness, he could not help darkly reflecting how "Man has 
mounted science, and is now run away with if': 
I firmly believe that before many centuries more, science will be 
the master of man. The engines he will have invented will be 
beyond his strength to control. Some day science may have the 
existence of mankind in its power, and the human race commit 
suicide by blowing up the world. 654 
The fact that such a mechanised ironclad did not directly threaten Britain's national 
security as the French armoured frigates-though it did represent serious challenges to 
her imperial commitnients-was, however, beneficial in more ways than one. "I'lie one 
great dread of the prime minister, as it regards American affairs, " Charles Francis Adams 
wrote to Seward in late March 1865, "is that of appearing to be bullied. " As Monitors 
constituted more of a defensive deterrence (rather than British ironclads, which rcflccted 
a naval strategy and foreign policy of offensive-deterrence), "this feeling, shared in some 
653 27-12-1867, John to Nils Ericsson, quoted from Church, Life ofE. ricsson, 2: 219. 
654 114-1862, Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Ford, CKle OfAdaftn letters, 1: 134. 
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degree by both branches of the English race, " and which Adams observed "interposes 
55 
most of the obstructions in the way of their harmony"6 , was left to evaporate harmlessly 
away. 
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